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note on transliterations
Transliteration of Arabic words has followed the system used by the 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, except for colloquial Pal-
estinian names, texts, and phrases for which I have adapted the system 
used in the Hinds and Badawi dictionary to Palestinian dialect. At times 
throughout the research and writing of this book it was extremely dif-
ficult to distinguish between colloquial and formal texts. Throughout I 
have attempted to provide transliterations of popular song texts, poetry, 
dialogue, and commentary that remain legible to the reader while pre-
serving essential aspects of dialect, accent, and inflection. However, there 
are several instances where song texts, slang, and other commentary re-
quired a bit of creativity in transliteration. Palestinian poets, singers, and 
musicians are notorious for manipulating the pronunciation of their texts 
to fit syllabic patterns and rhyme schemes, to shield meaning from cen-
sors and the secret police, and to play with words and their relations. In-
sofar as is practicable, I have tried to maintain a middle ground between 
what was said or sung and what was meant or intended. Consistency has 
been difficult to maintain as artists often shift their pronunciation from 
performance to performance. Song titles, poetry titles, and other titles of 
published works have been capitalized and transliterated without diacriti-
cal marks (except for ʾ and ʿ). Common names have also been capitalized 
throughout, transliterated, and italicized without diacritical marks (except 
for ʾ and ʿ). Words that appear in Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary or that 
have an accepted English spelling and/or pronunciation, such as Cairo, 
Beirut, and Yasser Arafat, remain in their familiar forms without diacrit-
ics. In instances where individuals, ensembles, or other organizations have 
readily adopted an English transliteration (for example, El- Funoun instead 
of al- Fanūn), I have maintained their transliteration throughout. I adopted 
the same approach for the one Hebrew transliteration in this text as well.

note on accessing perforMance ViDeos
I have deposited a portion of my ethnographic field recordings with the 
evia Digital Archive Project housed at Indiana University (www.eviada 
.org). The evia project is a collaborative venture to establish an online 
digital archive of ethnographic field videotapes for use by scholars and 
instructors. Funded from 2001 to 2009 by the Andrew W. Mellon Foun-
dation, Indiana University, and the University of Michigan, the project 
developed from the joint efforts of ethnographers, scholars, archivists, 
librarians, and information technologists to make available ethnographic 
field tapes for use online in teaching and research environments. How-
ever, the evia project is much more than simply a digital archive. The 
process of depositing these recordings requires rigorous annotation and 
peer review whereby each performance, each song, is painstakingly docu-
mented, analyzed, and fully searchable across the entire collection by 
various keywords and controlled vocabularies.
As a companion to this text, my evia project, entitled Music, Folklore, 
and Nationalism among Palestinian Refugees in Amman, Jordan (2003–
2005), allows the reader to view video field recordings of many of the per-
formances discussed in this monograph; easily search within the collec-
tion for titles, lyrics, or artists; and quickly toggle between performances 
of the same songs and dances by various performers. While making their 
way through this monograph, readers are invited to explore this ethno-
graphic video collection for further explanations, performances, and dem-
onstrations of core aspects of Palestinian music and dance.
Below is a list of pertinent audio/video examples available for viewing 
on the evia website. Each example below has been assigned a persistent 
uniform resource locator, or purl, which functions as a unique marker 
or web address for locating the audio/video example in the evia project 
collections. Throughout the text I have also labeled each example with a 
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parenthetical code (e.g., evia 14- a3387). Those who wish to access the 
evia project collections must first create a free account by clicking “enter 
the archive” and then clicking the login button, which opens the “create 
an account” page where they may register with the evia project. Once an 
account has been created, the listed examples below may be easily located. 
Readers of the print edition of this book may access the videos by logging 
into the evia project and typing into their web browser the full purl ad-
dress associated with a specific media example. These purl addresses are 
listed below as well as in the endnotes of the chapter wherein an example 
is discussed. A purl address includes a root that never changes and a 
six- digit, one-character, purl identifier at the end of the address (e.g., 14- 
S9030) that is unique to each specific media example. Once the full purl 
address has been entered, readers may view other media examples simply 
by replacing the unique purl identifier at the end of the address with 
the purl identifier of the media example they wish to view. Readers of 
the electronic version of this book may simply click on the purl address 
for each example wherever it arises; once they have logged into the evia 
website, this active link will take them directly to the requested media ex-
ample. Once registered with evia, readers may create a playlist of events 
and scenes for future reference. This playlist will eliminate the need to 
search for each example when returning to the site. The list below, orga-
nized by chapter, includes the segment title, parenthetical code, and the 
full purl address for each audio/video example discussed in this book.
Audio and Video Examples
chapter 2
evia 14- s9039 | “Yama Mawil al- Hawa” (Oh song of longing)
[http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/eviada/14- S9039]
evia 14- s2070 | “Min Sijn Aʿkka” (From Aʿkka Prison)
[http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/eviada/14- S2070]
evia 14- a0876 | Carrying the martyr in a mock funeral march
[http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/eviada/14- A0876]
evia 14- a3387 | “ Aʿtābā”
[http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/eviada/14- A3387]
evia 14- a1093 | “ Aʿlā Dalʿ ūnā”
[http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/eviada/14- A1093]
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evia 14- a6184 | Demonstration of dabke pattern, “wāḥid wa nūs”
[http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/eviada/14- A6184]
evia 14- a5646 | “Yā Ẓarīf al- Ṭūl”
[http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/eviada/14- A5646]
chapter 3
evia 14- s6760 | “Hubbat al- Nar” (The fire swelled)
[http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/eviada/14- S6760]
evia 14- s0768 | “Ishhad Ya ῾Alam” (Witness oh world)
[http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/eviada/14- S0768]
chapter 5
evia 14- s7686 | “Sadayna al- Shawariʿ” (We blocked the streets)
[http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/eviada/14- S7686]
chapter 6
evia 14- s6800 | “Aghniyat Hubb li- Shahid al- Karak” or “Ahmad Majali” 
(A love song for the martyr from Karak, Ahmad Majali)
[http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/eviada/14- S6800]
evia 14- s0790 | “Laya wa Laya”
[http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/eviada/14- S0790]
chapter 7
evia 14- s4997 | “Dawla” (State/country)
[http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/eviada/14- S4997]
evia 14- a4295 | Kamal Khalil is greeted by Umm Imran, an elderly 
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introduction
Entering the Field: Means and Methods
Immediately prior to my arrival in Amman, Jordan, in May 2002, the 
ongoing al- Aqsa intifada (uprising) (2000–2006) had recently intensi-
fied. Sparked by Ariel Sharon’s heavily militarized encroachment on two 
of Islam’s holiest sites, the Haram al- Sharif and the al- Aqsa Mosque, in 
September 2000, this new “intifada” had finally put to end the illusion 
of a peace process begun with the signing of the Declaration of Prin-
ciples (dop) provisioned in the Oslo Accords in 1993. I hesitate to even 
call this an intifada, as many of my interlocutors would often shudder 
in embarrassment at applying this term, for while this new uprising was 
superficially interpreted as an extension of the first Palestinian intifada 
(1987–93), in reality this new uprising lacked the core principles of popu-
lar resistance seen in 1987: nonviolent civil disobedience, protests, dem-
onstrations, and boycotts aimed at ending the Israeli military occupation 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In this second al- Aqsa intifada new 
techniques of violent warfare were developed and used against civilians 
and soldiers alike in the name of “popular resistance.”
That spring of 2002 the first of several Israeli invasions and Palestinian 
suicide attacks occurred, each in counterpoint with one another. Repre-
sentatives of the Israeli Defense Force (idF), speaking on American news 
programs, strategically labeled these operations a “journey of colors” and 
a “defensive shield,” yet each involved widespread and wanton devasta-
tion inflicted against civilians and the reoccupation of the Palestinian ter-
ritories, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. In counterpoint Palestinian 
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militants responded with strategic bombings and adopted new forms of 
social media and performance to frame acts of violence against occupa-
tion forces and civilians alike as legitimate forms of martyrdom and re-
sistance to a foreign Israeli military occupation.
Cities were laid under siege. Strict curfews, checkpoints, and other re-
strictions of movement sequestered approximately four million Palestini-
ans under house arrest for weeks at a time while soldiers moved from 
house to house in search of “militants.” Likewise Israelis retreated from 
public spaces, vulnerable to attack by indiscriminate acts of violence 
by various Palestinian politico- religious factions. On March 27, 2002, a 
bombing in Netanya killed thirty Israelis celebrating Passover in the sea-
side resort city, and war was declared. The following day Operation De-
fensive Shield (ods) began, resulting in the outright invasion of every 
major Palestinian city, refugee camp, and village, causing catastrophic 
damage to civilian infrastructure. The Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics, housing population, demographic, and land ownership data 
were strategically targeted, as were the Ministries of Education, Health, 
and Culture. With precision, Israeli forces systematically destroyed the 
institutional vestiges of Palestinian identity (archival recordings, histori-
cal and administrative documents, books, histories, and so on), disman-
tling the Palestinian Authority (pa) and effectively cloistering its presi-
dent (Yasser Arafat) among the last remnants of his executive compound 
of piled concrete and rebar. Within a matter of weeks little remained of 
the Palestinian protostate imagined in the 1993 Declaration of Principles 
and ensuing Oslo Accords.
In scope and breadth the occupation affects millions. Since the cata-
strophic loss of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Israeli forces in the June 
War of 1967, millions of Palestinians have lived under foreign occupa-
tion, without citizenship, without civil liberties, without rights to self- 
determination. Over time the occupation (al- iḥtilāl) became the de-
fining feature of Palestinian life, shaping structures of identity and habits 
of thought and practice. In moments of intensified and collective vio-
lence, such as what occurred under the banners of ods in 2002, the 
effects of occupation extended outward from those enduring the siege 
to those witnessing in exile. Walking the streets of Amman, Jordan, for 
example, where more than 60 percent of the population identifies as Pal-
estinian refugees or their descendants, it was clear that intifada culture 
had gripped the city. Inside coffee shops and other street- side businesses, 
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shopkeepers, customers, and passersby attentively watched televisions. 
Angry commentators and other political analysts monopolized the air-
waves with debate and vitriolic calls for justice. Consumer boycotts were 
formed against Israeli and American goods and businesses, including any 
companies with ties to the occupation. Protests and demonstrations pro-
cessed through the city streets denouncing Israeli brutality and the failure 
of the Western powers to protect Palestinian human rights.
During my residence in suburban West Amman, the intifada engen-
dered a new rise in student activism. University of Jordan students wore 
kūfīyas (black- and- white checkered scarves), flags, and bandanas to show 
their support for the intifada. Necklaces depicting historic pre- 1948 Pales-
tine (the combined area of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip) or 
other nationalistic images were sold on street corners along with various 
other intifada paraphernalia. Cars all over the city sported pictures of 
Handhala (the cartoon characterization of political satirist Naji al- ʿAli) on 
their bumpers, while many other people chose to show their support by 
painting over English- language street signs and license plates. Protesting 
students periodically gathered outside the university’s main gates, shout-
ing anti- American and anti- Israeli slogans. Activism in its myriad forms, 
political, social, economic, and cultural, permeated both native Jordanian 
and Palestinian Jordanian communities.
I arrived at a moment of profound instability, hoping to write an 
ethnography of Palestinian music and musicians living in this reality. Ini-
tially Jordan was my primary field site due to its having the largest Pales-
tinian refugee population in the world. As a result of three distinct waves 
of exile in 1948, 1967, and 1992, Palestinian refugees have flooded into 
the Hashemite Kingdom to the extent that Palestinians now dominate 
its population, economy, and private sector. In search of the performa-
tive meanings of contemporary exile, I approached this space wanting to 
understand experiences of dispossession and the various ways Palestine 
as a national construct is articulated in diaspora. Contemporary Jordan 
has over time come to constitute the heart of the Palestinian diaspora, de-
lineating its physical and imaginative properties. Here notions of Pales-
tine structure, past, present, and future, are imagined as an idyllic well-
spring of cultural identity, a force of contemporary politics, and a site of 
future desire and actualization.
Ethnography seeks to understand how each of these overlapping frames 
structure commonsense perceptions of self and other. It amounts to a 
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beautiful interaction, a collaboration of sorts, demanding the ability to 
converse intimately at the level of personal experience and meaning. In 
ethnomusicology this task involves conversations of a different sort, seek-
ing out the iconicities of social structure and music performance. Initially 
I was naïvely inspired by notions of “resistance” as a performed social 
reality, believing expressive culture to be a profound modality for articu-
lating notions of self within the Palestinian nationalist movement. In per-
formance, specifically in musical performance, I believed I would find an 
essence of Palestinian identity that might fully capture widespread ex-
periences of Israeli occupation, dispossession, and exile endemic to Pal-
estinian life. To this end, I pursued the established, yet fluid, genre of Pal-
estinian protest or resistance song wherever I could find it, from dusty 
wedding tents and mournful funeral processions to organized political 
rallies and demonstrations, cosmopolitan cultural festivals, and cramped 
twisting back- alley dance parties.
At a time of occupation and intense national sentiment, the study of 
Palestinian protest song seemed entirely appropriate. I actively sought out 
performative spaces where feelings of “Palestinian- ness” were cultivated, 
harnessed, and wielded in the project of self- determination. Friends often 
told me that they felt “most Palestinian” at weddings. Celebrating through 
music and dance, participants affirmed and embodied the very survival 
of Palestinian subjectivity in exile. To this end, I began performing bag-
pipes and percussion with Firqat al- Riif (The Village Ensemble), a local 
group of Palestinian wedding musicians. I did this hoping to uncover the 
poetics of Palestinian identification in Jordan. However, what I found was 
far more complex than anticipated. Weddings were sites of intense nation 
building, to be sure, but so- called resistance or nationalist music flowed 
freely between social spaces. Protest songs were sung at weddings as often 
as wedding songs were sung at protests, if such a distinction could even be 
made. Moreover, through analysis of the meanings inherent to this reper-
tory of indigenous song, it was clear that weddings, and their associated 
roles, practices, and rituals, were closely identified within a broad- based 
and diffuse notion of “resistance,” defined and articulated in myriad 
ways, refracted through the prism of class, religion, gender, and politics. 
In essence the foundational repertory of Palestinian song from which I 
hoped to build a coherent narrative and analysis remained elusive, kalei-
doscopically shifting under the duress of overlapping frames of difference.
At each turn my quest to learn the canon of influential artists, poets, 
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singers, and songs became increasingly complicated. I attended political 
demonstrations and concerts held to raise money and awareness for Pal-
estinian causes and sought out vast caches of intifada cassettes and other 
expressive media. My return to Jordan in the fall of 2003, for what would 
amount to sixteen months of research, only compounded my difficul-
ties. Though the overt culture of resistance and activism had waned in 
the time between these two research trips slightly, the development of a 
new (and revival of an old) repertory of Palestinian protest song created 
an environment of profound fracture. Since my interests were in tracing 
the musical manifestations and interpretations of Palestinian resistance, 
I sought out many of the musicians active during the first intifada (1987–
93). Combining the histories and life stories of these activists with those 
involved in the second intifada, I began to assemble a historical narrative 
of Palestinian nationalist activity through music and dance. But the pieces 
didn’t seem to fit. Songs from the first intifada seemed tired, old, clichéd 
to the contemporary generation of young activists. New songs had yet to 
catch on, largely falling into two categories: propagandist calls for martyr-
dom and transnational pop songs with little relevance to contemporary 
Palestinian experiences of violence and exile. My search for the unified 
“voices of the masses,” struggling to resist Israeli occupation and forced 
exile, resulted in nothing more than an odd collection of propagandized 
tropes and imagery shouted across myriad political, economic, and reli-
gious divides.
Moreover, the many terms often used to describe resistance (ma-
qawma, thawra, ṣumud, intifada) became increasingly problematic as 
artists freely wielded them without a clear understanding of what they 
meant. What came to be labeled “resistance music” or “protest song” 
was defined not by active musico- political processes, but rather by static 
notions of thematic content, folkloric signification, and other elements of 
musical “style.” Delineating between a stylistic notion of “resistance” and 
a process- oriented one aimed at social change became increasingly diffi-
cult. What became apparent was the need to develop a means of dealing 
with “resistance” apart from essentialized stylistic categories, to reinscribe 
“resistance” as an active functional process for social change. To this end 
I employ the term “resistance music” or “protest song” as a genre cate-
gory based not in stylistic attributes, but in terms of musico- political pro-
cesses: its articulation within larger projects of social change. Palestinian 
resistance music may best be defined as the conscious use of any music 
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in the service of the larger project of Palestinian self- determination. This 
functional- processual definition decouples style and sentiment and pre-
cludes the likelihood of essentializing “resistance” based on musical style 
alone. From this definition rural folk song, militarized marches, classi-
cal art music, and urban hip- hop may all be equally defined as resistance 
music.
Although the production of new forms of Palestinian resistance music 
was widespread, gaining access to the social spaces of production and 
consumption proved to be a great challenge. Artists, producers, record-
ing companies, and political intermediaries were often hesitant to share 
their opinions and life stories with outsiders. Many had spent significant 
time in prison or had been subjected to myriad forms of state terror and 
harassment. Convincing these musicians of my intentions proved to be 
an ongoing and difficult process, unfortunately so, for some of the social, 
cultural, and political barriers proved too difficult to overcome. Yet by and 
large the majority of activists with whom I spoke were surprisingly sup-
portive and welcoming of my research, inviting me into their homes to 
be a part of their daily lives.
After several months of working and performing in Jordan, it became 
apparent that I would need new data sets from musicians active in the 
West Bank. This 5,640- square- kilometer area of land, along with the Gaza 
Strip, was all that remained of historic Palestine following the war of 1948 
and the establishment of the state of Israel. Claimed by Jordan follow-
ing the 1948 war, the “West Bank” was so named as a strategic means of 
indoctrination, imagining this piece of land as an extension of the Jor-
danian “East Bank.” However, the project of incorporating the West Bank 
into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan proved unsuccessful, as much of 
the land from the western banks of the Jordan River valley to the 1948 
armistice lines of Israel, including East Jerusalem, emerged as the heart 
of Palestinian culture and society and the imagined site of a future Pales-
tinian state. After the defeat of the Jordanian army in the June War of 1967 
(or the Six- Day War), the West Bank and Gaza Strip (collectively called 
“Palestine” by its inhabitants) fell under a foreign military occupation by 
Israeli forces. Today these Occupied Palestinian Territories (opt) are sub-
jected to harsh military administration and control via larger projects of 
Israeli national security and colonialist expansion in the form of illegal 
(under international law) Jewish settlements.
My reasons for working in the West Bank were many. Unfortunately 
Introduction ✹ 7
Jordan is notorious for state censorship and hence offers scant research 
facilities. Reliable libraries, sound archives, and politically sensitive docu-
ments were difficult to find in Amman, even in the “back rooms” of pri-
vate libraries and research institutions. In order to gain access to invalu-
able literature and recordings of Palestinian music it was necessary to 
work in the more expansive archives and libraries in the West Bank. Ironi-
cally, even under occupation (or perhaps because of it), political debate, 
critical research, and important source materials are far more available 
in the West Bank than in Jordan. Palestinians have devoted considerable 
time and resources to understanding the social, political, and cultural dy-
namics of the occupation, generating extensive collections of research in 
the social sciences and humanities. This research was largely unavailable 
in Jordan, where such discussions often are deemed threatening or sub-
versive to the sovereignty of the Hashemite monarchy. Likewise, in Am-
man musicians seemed far too willing to gloss over the many social and 
political fractures inherent within the nationalist movement. I was pre-
sented with a superficial rendering of Palestinian solidarity, when on the 
streets raged a protracted “war of position” where many politico- religious 
groups sought to garner the consent of the people to lead the uprising. 
And finally, exilic imaginings of Palestine in song and dance were power-
ful markers of national identity for refugees in Jordan. In traveling to the 
West Bank I became increasingly concerned to find out if the imaginings 
of “Palestine” in exile bore any resemblance to contemporary Palestinian 
life in the West Bank.
Fieldwork in the West Bank presented a completely new set of meth-
odological challenges for which I was little prepared. Especially during a 
period of intense occupation, work in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Ramal-
lah was complicated by shifting curfews, closures, checkpoints, searches, 
interrogations, and at times emotional and physical harassment by Israeli 
forces. Traversing between these two separate Palestinian communities, 
one in exile, the other under occupation, I found many of my previous 
relationships obsolete. Often I was forced to walk into highly confronta-
tional and at times violent social spaces without the necessary cover that 
had been provided by my cadre of contacts, friends, and associates in Jor-
dan. Over time, however, I settled into my Ramallah- based community 
and found a group of politically active musicians willing to participate in 
this project. Traveling back and forth between Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and 
Ramallah (a distance of about twenty kilometers) was at best arduous and 
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at worst impossible. Checkpoints, closures, and isolated incidents of vio-
lence between local Palestinians and occupation forces meant that even 
the most innocent trip required hours of waiting, three to four different 
taxis, and a gauntlet of body searches, questioning, and intimidation.
Returning to Amman with cases of photocopied source materials and 
recordings, I began to uncover two disparate cultural narratives: one of 
occupation and the other of exile. Exploring these two narratives offered 
fascinating data on the various ways identity, nationalism, and resistance 
are performed and enacted in everyday life. Every few weeks, or there-
abouts, I would return to the West Bank via the Allenby Bridge. I would 
then attend concerts, interview musicians, take lessons, or search for lost 
books or articles. Moving back and forth between Amman and Ramallah 
proved to be one of the most interesting, and challenging, aspects of this 
research. I transported old and new intifada cassettes across the banks of 
Jordan River, putting groups of musicians working for the same cause in 
touch with one another for the first time. Travel into the West Bank has 
been strictly controlled since 1967, effectively preventing Palestinian refu-
gees and their descendants in Jordan from visiting their natal villages. 
Shielded by my American passport and Irish complexion, I visited the 
ancestral villages of several of my close friends, bringing back pictures, 
mementos, or bags of soil (keepsakes of Palestine) for their homes. My 
American citizenship and non- Arab name provided an important means 
of reaching out to their homeland, if only through photographs and other 
souvenirs.
In the fall of 2003 I began rehearsing with one of the most famous re-
sistance ensembles of the 1970s and 1980s, Firqat Aghani al- ʿAshiqin (The 
Songs of the Lovers Ensemble). The group had recently begun a come-
back tour in November 2003, enlisting the talents of a new generation 
of young musicians to revive the group’s canon of past resistance songs 
made famous in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Under the direction of one 
of the group’s founding members, Hussein Munther (Abu Ali), I was en-
listed to help consult with the group and acted as the group’s nai player 
(an Arab end- blown reed flute) in rehearsals and recording sessions. 
While playing with al- ʿAshiqin, I learned the standard repertory of inti-
fada songs (melodies, rhythms, and texts) from the vantage point of an in-
side performer. Modal relationships, timbre, ornamentation, and rhyth-
mic and melodic nuance were all explained onstage and in the course of 
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performance. This training was invaluable to my research and proved my 
savior on many occasions.
My ethnographic experience working and performing with these fa-
mous intifada singers gives this study a unique coloring typically absent 
from previous work on Palestinian music. As a performer, I was able to 
not only record and collect these songs, but at times perform them at 
rallies, weddings, and festivals. My participation in rehearsals, concerts, 
jam sessions, and other musical events allowed me entrance into the com-
positional and performative processes that gave the music its meaning. In 
my analysis I explored the musicological relationships between the can-
onized repertory of resistance cassettes made popular in the early 1970s 
and their indigenous “folk” antecedents by getting directly into their in-
stinctive and associative musical meanings. Learning the songs directly 
from the poets and singers opened up possibilities for exploring mean-
ing, intent, composition, improvisation, and other creative processes not 
available from recordings alone.
My approach to researching the fields of music and nationalism con-
sisted of a careful reading of the extant literature, while at the same time 
seeking out the opinions, histories, and practices of those currently work-
ing in the movement for Palestinian self- determination. This research 
was, therefore, largely ethnographic in orientation, based on extended 
participant- observation. In some cases I documented performances from 
afar, mingling among the crowds. At other times I was a full member of 
the ensemble, participating in rehearsals and performances onstage. Here 
in the living rooms and performance halls I learned the nuance of certain 
melodies and rhythms, why ṣaba and huzām, for example, were particu-
larly powerful modes for indexing experiences of mourning and lament. 
Throughout this fieldwork it was my hope that such an approach would 
provide a more meaningful middle ground between journalistic obser-
vation and source material analysis, infusing each with an ethnographic 
“sense of being”: a representation of the repertory as it was performed and 
consumed among its practitioners.
Circulating among groups of activists in Amman and Ramallah, I at-
tended countless concerts, protests, and demonstrations; made extensive 
visits to Palestinian social and political institutions; and sought out folk-
lorists and other experts in the political sphere. Participant- observation 
combined with formal interviews and the collection of oral histories 
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formed the main methods of my research. Many of these interviews were 
informally held in late- night music sessions over a plate of hummus and 
coffee or tea. Others were quite formal, taking place in government offices 
and ministries. In either case interviews were done in a mixture of Arabic 
and English depending on the situation. Research in one of Jordan’s many 
refugee camps was often entirely in Arabic, while interviews with gov-
ernment officials and more cosmopolitan artists in the cities would often 
be entirely in English. Unconsciously and unintentionally, many of these 
conversations freely shifted between the two languages, making for a con-
siderably difficult time transcribing the interviews the next day. In a cul-
tural intersection of class and social formation, language was a primary 
means of self- identification and self- construal, distinguishing a mathāqqaf 
(cultured) Palestinian from someone min al- shuwāriʿ  (from the streets).
After several months of working in Amman in the winter of 2003, I 
met Kamal Khalil, leader of the Jordanian- based ensemble Baladna (Our 
Homeland). Working with Kamal provided a fascinating counterpoint 
to previous narratives I had been exposed to. In our interviews Kamal 
was eager to share many of his life experiences. He provided a compel-
ling history of activism in Jordan, and through our close relationship he 
emerged as one of the primary voices in this book. Despite our mutual 
enthusiasm, there were often unavoidable difficulties in our collaboration. 
Working fifteen- hour days as a construction laborer, Kamal was often too 
tired to be interviewed, too busy with family obligations, or simply not 
up to entertaining a non–family member in his busy house. So, too, for 
me, the trip to his home in Ruseifa took three buses and, depending on 
traffic, over an hour each way. Given that our meetings rarely began be-
fore 8:00 pm, I was often left wondering how I would make it back to 
my apartment in suburban Amman. After midnight, buses and shared 
taxis became very difficult to find, and rarely was I able to get back home 
without incident. At times the trek back to Amman in the middle of the 
night required imagination, a sense of humor, and resourcefulness. One 
particular night I was overjoyed upon finding a bus going directly to my 
Amman neighborhood, Talaʿ Aʿli. Unfortunately the driver was so tired 
from his twenty- hour shift that the only way I could persuade him to fin-
ish his route was to drive the bus myself. So while he slept in a passenger 
seat, I drove the bus back to Amman, picking up passengers, collecting 
fares, laughing uncontrollably at the strange looks and surprised faces 
from the local passengers.
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Over the course of twenty months of fieldwork during the second al- 
Aqsa intifada, the political landscape of the resistance movement changed 
considerably. The American invasion of Iraq, the accelerated construc-
tion of the Israeli “security/apartheid” wall, the assassinations of Sheikh 
Ahmad Yassin and his successor (Abdel Aziz Rantisi), the Abu Ghraib 
prison abuse scandal, the signing of the “Road Map,” and the death of 
Yasser Arafat all had significant effects on Palestinian society and were 
manifest in music and cultural production. Within days of each of these 
events, cds, videos, and other popular media (both new and old) became 
available on the streets, commemorating the dead, debating political ide-
ology, or expressing outrage. Music, it seems, was a powerful means of 
reaching out to the Palestinian community, of nationalizing and defining 
resistance, and of forging political allegiances. This musical soundscape 
formed a significant space in which commonsense understandings of Pal-
estinian identity, nation, and resistance were publicly debated on stereos 
and street corners, in taxicabs and coffee shops.
In the summer of 2005 I returned to Palestine to embark on a new 
path of research. Over the previous year I had been in contact, via e- mail, 
with a group of Palestinian Israeli hip- hop artists currently perform-
ing throughout Israel and the West Bank. Their experiences living in the 
Israeli ghettos of Lyd offered an intriguing aspect of Palestinian music 
and resistance heretofore absent from my research. They were Palestinian 
citizens of Israel, or “ ’48s,” as they called themselves, an allusion to their 
residence in and identification with pre- 1948 Palestine. These young art-
ists used a transnational form of American hip- hop to express feelings of 
ethnic and national sentiment across both Palestinian and Israeli sound-
scapes. Performing in a mixture of English, Hebrew, and Arabic, these 
rappers offered a truly remarkable opportunity to document a new di-
rection in Palestinian resistance song, one that was perhaps more aligned 
with new transnational social realities. For three months in the summer 
of 2005 I researched the development of Palestinian hip- hop, interview-
ing artists and audiences, and attending performances in Israel and the 
West Bank. The fluidity with which these young rappers were able to tra-
verse and at times transcend the rigid binaries of Palestinian and Israeli, 
Arab and Jew, offered a truly intriguing foil to the hardcore nationalists 
performing in exile and under occupation. By documenting the cultural, 
aesthetic, and ideational tactics exhibited by these rappers as they per-
formed before audiences of Israeli Jews and West Bank Palestinians, I 
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began to realize the poetics, politics, and potentialities for a new imagin-
ing of Palestinian protest song.
Synopsis
This book is conceptualized in two distinct yet interrelated sections: the 
first ethnohistorical (chapters 2–5); the second, ethnographic (chapters 
6–9). Ethnomusicologists have long employed historical and ethno-
graphic methodologies in their work, and this book is certainly no ex-
ception. My goal has been to blend historical and ethnographic modali-
ties, shifting from broad historical narrative to particular ethnographic 
experience. However, the movement between these two methodologies 
presents certain challenges, and they tend to overlap throughout the text. 
To this end historical events may reappear in subsequent chapters as they 
are opened up to further interrogation and more in- depth ethnographic 
analysis based in personal experience.
The distinctions between historical and ethnographic modalities are 
further complicated in terms of fieldwork techniques. For while the his-
torical narrative presented in chapters 2–5 was written as a chronology, 
it was derived entirely from ethnographic methods: long- term sustained 
participant- observation, oral histories, interviews, and textual analysis. 
Many of the singers and songs depicted in this historical narrative were 
revealed to me in the course of contemporary performance (conversa-
tions, interviews, collective listening, and musical performance). Artists 
build on and dialogue with the established repertories of the past. In this 
way the history of Palestinian protest song is one of constant conversa-
tion, never detached or distant from the lives and experiences of contem-
porary actors. My attempt to present an ethnographic history of Pales-
tinian protest song situates historical understanding of political events 
within the legacies and frameworks of contemporary meaning.
On a more practical level the division of this text into two sections 
serves a specific purpose. Given the lack of an English- language mono-
graph on the history and development of Palestinian music, the chro-
nology presented in chapters 2–5 is intended to lay the groundwork for 
later discussions of individuated experience and local meaning, to estab-
lish a working vocabulary of Palestinian musical identity that may then 
be employed in understanding the lives and experiences of contemporary 
performers. To fully understand the ideational processes through which 
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the performance of the Palestinian line dance, al- dabke, becomes a mean-
ingful gesture of resistance, for example, one must first understand the 
legacies of history, the interpretive frameworks through which the dabke 
becomes meaningful to its participants. For this to occur it is essential to 
have a working knowledge of Palestinian cultural history, to know names 
and dates, people and places.
With this in mind, in chapters 2–5 I provide a basic historical over-
view of the canon of Palestinian resistance song, focusing specifically on 
its relationship with the changing social and political landscape. Through 
careful musical and textual analysis I explore many of the dominant signs, 
myths, and meanings inherent to this repertory, deconstructing the in-
dexical associations that constitute the poetics of Palestinian national-
ism and resistance. In chapter 2 I investigate the pre- 1948 origins of Pal-
estinian resistance song, beginning with the repertory of the traditional 
shaʿr al- murtajal (poet- singer). The life and career of the famous poet 
Nuh Ibrahim and his influence on the 1936 Great Revolt is explored with 
particular detail, emphasizing his overall impact in fostering support for 
the rebellion and nationalizing a rural population of indigenous fallāḥīn 
(peasantry) to rise up against the British colonial administration.
Following this, I trace the cultural repercussions of the 1948 war, 
al- nakba (the catastrophe), on indigenous forms of Palestinian music 
making. I then explore the effects of Arabism on music and cultural pro-
duction in Egyptian cosmopolitan centers as well as among communities 
of dispersed Palestinian refugees across the region. I discuss the idea-
tional impact of Arabism and Nasserism on the formation of Palestinian 
national identities in exile and document the role of music and music 
performance in maintaining communal relations and subjectivities in the 
refugee camps. With the fall of Nasserism and the defeat of Arab forces 
in the June War of 1967, a new repertory of political song emerged, made 
known by the famous satirist Sheikh Imam ʿ Issa. I begin chapter 3 with an 
investigation into the rise of the sheikh and further trace his lasting im-
pact on the formation of modern Arabic political song to the present day.
In chapter 3 I continue the historical narrative, beginning with the 
establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (plo) and the 
rise of the fidāʿiyīn (paramilitant freedom fighters). The various styles of 
music emanating from the liberation movement are analyzed with re-
gard to the formation and dissemination of prominent Palestinian iden-
tity constructs. Significant poets, singers, and songs are discussed with 
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regard to the overall project of nationalism, liberation, and militarization. 
The Palestinian- Jordanian civil war (Black September) and the massacres 
at Sabra and Shatila are then discussed with regards to their influence on 
Palestinian poetics and cultural production.
In chapter 4 I explore the role of music in the first Palestinian intifada 
of 1987–93. Here I present an analysis of the ensuing revival of indige-
nous forms of political activism. The identity construct of the militarized 
fidā īʾ was supplanted by imagery of stone- throwing youth, the atfāl al- 
ḥijāra (children of the stones), rebelling in the streets of Gaza. This shift 
had tremendous importance for defining the nation and the culturally 
constructed notions of resistance prescribed in its defense. I examine, in 
turn, the conflicting aesthetics of nationalist, Islamist, and Arabist musi-
cal formations and follow the trajectories of each through the post- Oslo 
period and into the beginnings of the second al- Aqsa intifada. I begin 
chapter 5 with a discussion of revivals and new arrivals, resistance singers 
and songs brought back into the public sphere nearly twenty years after 
their prime as well as a new crop of cultural activists composing and per-
forming for the next generation ( jīl al- thānī).
In chapters 6–7 I depart from a broad historical narrative to provide 
an ethnographic look into the life and career of one of the most famous 
intifada singers of the 1980s and 1990s, Kamal Khalil. In studying Khalil’s 
life and career I illustrate how large- scale social and political forces were 
felt and experienced by musicians willing to sacrifice their careers, fami-
lies, and bodies for a nationalist ideal. Situated within the Palestinian Jor-
danian nationscape, these two chapters provide a historical and ethno-
graphic analysis of the compositional and performative processes by 
which one musician attempted to negotiate pervasive structures of vio-
lence and state terror. Drawing out personal narratives of arrest and tor-
ture, I attempt to reveal the personal manifestations of Palestinian dis-
possession and further illustrate what effects state actions, interests, 
and discourses have had on musical processes emerging from within its 
frames. For a population of exiles living peacefully in a host nation- state, 
what does resistance really mean? And how might music fashion perfor-
mative moves for experiencing and participating in the intifada from afar?
In chapters 8 and 9 I shift to an examination of the origins of Pales-
tinian hip- hop as it was spearheaded by a group of young Palestinian 
Israelis from the city of Lyd, a small ethnically mixed neighborhood out-
side of Tel Aviv, Israel. At the time of my initial research, Palestinian hip- 
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hop constituted a new direction in resistance song that quickly took hold 
among cosmopolitan youth in Israel and the West Bank. This movement 
was especially significant in that it began among a small community of 
Palestinian Israelis initially rapping in a mixture of English, Arabic, and 
Hebrew. Their work revealed a new discursive field wherein the estab-
lished modes of Palestinian nationalism were resignified, inclusive of new 
forms of music and media. Particularly important to this analysis are the 
changing ways these artists have attempted to transcend their ethnic and 
national ambiguity through the performance of shared cosmopolitan aes-
thetics and practices. In analyzing the politics and poetics of this new 
wave of hip- hop I interrogate contemporary discourses of terrorism, na-
tion, and transnationalism, pursuing an approach that situates popular 
culture as a fundamental means of examining power and agency.

1
nationalism, Belonging, and the performativity of resistance
The Activist: Performing the Nation in Exile
“Just watch. If I sing loud enough and strong enough, we can create Pales-
tine in the music” (idhā ṣawtī qawī, raḥ manaʿmal filasṭīn bi- 1 - mūsīqā), 
Kamal Khalil tells me before a performance commemorating Palestinian 
Land Day in the summer of 2004. Within minutes hundreds of shabāb 
(youth) have abandoned their chairs to join one of six different dabke 
lines (Palestinian indigenous line dance) circling the stage. Some of the 
more adventurous young women form their own dabke line, stage left, 
distanced from the gaze of the young men. Older refined businessmen, 
lawyers, and other notables, seated conspicuously in the front row’s vip 
section, relinquish their formal public station and openly sing along, wav-
ing their arms wildly over their heads. Young families parade their small 
children through the crowd atop their shoulders waving signs of victory, 
wearing the Palestinian flag or kūfīya (white- and- black checkered head-
scarf) around their necks. Noticing the crowd’s reaction to his first set of 
resistance songs, Kamal looks over at me standing backstage, dutifully 
videotaping the performance, and smiles. His dark eyes suddenly soften. 
Wrinkles stretch across his tanned cheeks. With pride his glance reads, 
“See? I told you so . . .”
I acknowledge his gesture, shaking my head back and forth in dis-
belief at the incredible transformation taking place before my very eyes. 
The once subdued, even lethargic, audience had awoken within a matter 
of moments into a participatory expression of Palestinian nationalism. 
Where once strangers sat, politely listening to speeches given by various 
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community leaders, in song and dance, a community of national inti-
mates has emerged. Before long I am pulled from my ethnographer’s 
perch to join one of several dabke lines weaving through the crowd. While 
dancing, several businessmen wrap their kūfīyāt around my neck in a 
sign of friendship and indoctrination into the performance environment. 
Later, I politely and diplomatically excuse myself from the dabke to ner-
vously check my recording equipment backstage. Making sure that the 
sound levels, microphones, and batteries are all working properly, I notice 
a group of boisterous shabāb approaching. I brace myself for the usual 
barrage of questions and accusations customarily levied at foreigners cir-
culating within politically charged venues such as this, but before I am 
able to speak, one of the teens grabs me by the shoulders and quickly 
bends forward to kiss the pin of a Palestinian flag on my lapel. Sharrafnā, 
yā ḥabībī (honored to meet you), he screams in my ear over the raucous 
music and merriment.
The Archivist: “Palestine will  
always remain under our stamping feet”
Sitting in the office of the eighty- three- year- old librarian, scholar, and folk-
lorist Aʿbd al- Aziz Abu Hadba (Abu Hani) at the In aʿsh al- Usra Society in 
the West Bank village of al- Bireh, I am initially asked to fill out a question-
naire describing myself and the nature of my research. As I leaf through 
Abu Hani’s large binder of similar questionnaires filled out by streams of 
foreign researchers who have passed through his office over the last thirty 
years, I come to realize the long legacy of ethnographic research that has 
been carried out in the West Bank. Abu Hani sits behind his desk, care-
fully, silently watching my expression as I read through the various entries. 
The silence is unsettling. Some of the names are easily recognizable, schol-
ars whose work has formed the foundation of my understanding of Pales-
tinian culture and practice. Most, however, are not. Page after page flashes 
before me, fascinating research projects, each seeking the same answers 
as myself. Looking over the stacks of entries, it pains me to realize that my 
research is not as groundbreaking or as innovative as I once imagined. I 
am but one of a long list of (perhaps idealistic and naïve) researchers who 
has sought out Abu Hani’s advice, believing their work might in some 
way contribute to the end of the occupation. After what seemed an eter-
nity, Abu Hani realizes his exercise in humility has achieved its intended 
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goal, and his distant exterior suddenly thaws. The uncomfortable silence 
that has gripped the room is then broken. His gleaming blue eyes sparkle 
against the backdrop of his thinning white hair and wrinkled cheeks. A 
youthful enthusiasm quickly emerges from his voice as he smiles and be-
gins telling me the story of his birth village (depopulated and destroyed in 
1948) and of his ensuing quest to preserve its memory.
Among researchers of Palestinian culture, folklore, and history, Abu 
Hani is a national treasure. Over the years his many books, articles, and 
service to the Inʿash al- Usra Society have provided the foundation for Pal-
estinian cultural and folkloric studies. Waiting weeks to sit and talk with 
him about my research, I anxiously anticipated his thoughts and ideas. 
Despite his eighty- three years, Abu Hani’s face lights up when I explain 
my interest in studying Palestinian history, nationalism, and resistance 
from the perspective of music. With the dexterity of a man half his age he 
quickly rises from his chair and begins pulling books from the surround-
ing shelves. After a modest stack has accumulated on the front corner of 
his desk, he returns to his chair and begins talking about the cultural sig-
nificance of Palestinian music and dance. The discussion soon turns to 
stories of our favorite poets, singers, and songs. We sing bits and pieces of 
Palestinian folklore. It is obvious Abu Hani takes great pleasure in test-
ing my abilities to decipher lyric, mode, and rhythm in the great canon 
of Palestinian indigenous music ( aʿlā dalʿ ūna, al- ʿatābā, al- jafrā, yā ẓarīf 
al- ṭūl, and so on).
About an hour into our discussion Abu Hani becomes quite serious. 
“You know, Daʾud [David], I have been asking every researcher who 
comes through this office the same question for years. And I am curi-
ous if you can tell me what the answer is.” Abu Hani then stands up be-
hind his desk and begins to stomp his feet on the ground repeatedly. “Do 
you know what this means when we [Palestinians] stamp our feet in the 
dabke?” he asks, cautiously balancing on one foot. “Do you know what the 
dabke means? Why we do it? Why we love it so much?”
Initially I am caught off guard by such a question, and even more wor-
ried that I will have to catch Abu Hani if he should fall. So I quickly 
answer, “No, I am not sure what the dabke means.” In my research I had 
read widely on the dabke and had spoken with and learned from many 
dancers about the history, steps, and contexts of dabke performances. But 
I was a bit taken aback by Abu Hani’s direct query, unsure of what exactly 
he was looking for, and unwilling to risk offering a wrong answer.
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We stomp our feet in the dabke to show the world that this is our 
land [Baladna] [stomping loudly on the floor], that people and vil-
lages can be killed and erased [stomping again] . . . , but our heri-
tage [turāthnā] is something that they can’t reach because it is here 
[motioning to his heart]. They have stolen our land [stomp], forced 
us out of our homes [stomp], but our culture is something they 
cannot steal. When we stamp our feet we are saying that no mat-
ter how far we have been scattered, Palestine will always remain 
under our stamping feet [ filasṭīn rāḥ biẓāl taḥt aqdāmnā]. (empha-
sis  added)
The Artist: “Tupac is a martyr for Palestine”
“You see . . . people don’t understand that Tupac should be considered 
[a] shahīd [a martyr for Palestinian liberation],” Tamer Nafar explains to 
me backstage before a rap concert in Ramallah in the summer of 2005. 
“His experiences are our experiences. His struggles with the police are our 
struggles with the police. His ghetto is my ghetto. If you listen all he talks 
about is the ghetto, revolution, politics. And he died because he was will-
ing to speak out for his beliefs. . . . That makes him [a] shahīd, and that 
makes him Palestinian.”
As Tamer carefully explains his point, crowds of exuberant teens crowd 
into Ramallah’s Kassaba Theatre. With a low rumble the sound of the sold-
out crowd reverberates through the green room walls, giving the cramped 
space an energy of anticipation. Backstage local media beg the group to 
pose for their cameras. The young rappers are only too happy to oblige, 
posturing with one another, pointing into the cameras with rehearsed 
hand gestures and facial expressions. Their oversized athletic shorts, 
T- shirts, and designer high- top sneakers add to the novelty. One reporter 
asks, aʿlā fikrā, shū hadhā al- rāb? (by the way, what is this rap music?). 
Although many in the crowd were unfamiliar with hip- hop—its sounds, 
rhythms, dances, and practices—dam’s much-awaited performance in 
Ramallah spoke volumes about the potential impact of rap on Palestinian 
youth culture and politics. In a city overwrought with violence, besieged 
by occupation, and entrenched in a pervasive culture of steadfastness, 
hip- hop opens the door to new sounds and new ways of conceptualizing 
contemporary struggles. Tupac’s subaltern posture of empowered resis-
tance against racism and dispossession resonates with these young Pales-
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tinian rappers to the extent that Tupac might assume the politicized iden-
tity of a Palestinian shahīd: a martyr for the cause of self- determination. 
Tupac, according to such criteria, is Palestinian. His angry yet poignant 
counterhegemonic rhetoric indexes a common struggle of ethnic engage-
ment and minority rights. This young cadre of Palestinian Israeli rappers, 
making a name for themselves as Palestine’s first rap group, freely draws 
from the identity construct of the empowered subaltern (as manifested 
in the legacy of Tupac Shakur) in fashioning their own repertory of hip- 
hop against the occupation and the ethnic marginalization of Palestinian 
citizens of Israel.
✹ ✹ ✹
each oF the above vignettes narrates strikingly different conceptions 
of time, space, nation, and resistance articulated through performative 
processes of music and dance. Moreover each presents the aesthetic and 
ideational dispositions of three very different Palestinian communities. 
The intifada singer and political activist Kamal Khalil has spent a life-
time struggling for the right to return to his ancestral village in the West 
Bank. Growing up on the socially dispossessed periphery of the Jordanian 
nationscape, Kamal developed a profound sense of exilic nationalism real-
ized in his performances of Palestinian protest songs. Such songs brought 
forth in the minds of his audience alternative aesthetic realities in which 
the Palestinian nation could be celebrated, mourned, or otherwise per-
formed from within foreign state regimes. Through such performances 
participants were able to performatively sing and dance the nation into 
existence, to assert agency over their collective experiences, and to main-
tain the ideational links which constitute the nation in exile. More im-
portantly for Kamal such songs offered opportunities to experience and 
articulate the Palestinian resistance from afar: to feel Palestinian. His per-
formances opened spaces for feeling as if he were experiencing, perhaps 
even participating in, the struggle for self- determination, creating a vital 
connection, a belonging, to the nation in exile.
The elder Abu Hani, by contrast, took a slightly different approach. For 
him Palestine was defined and circumscribed by a shared cultural his-
tory of indigenous practices and dispositions. Manifest in the line dance, 
al- dabke, Palestinian lifeways constituted the ideational and performa-
tive links between the self and the nation. Throughout Abu Hani’s pro-
lific career he has sought to study and preserve the authentic Palestinian 
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folklore against forced exile and cultural erasure. In collecting the stories, 
poems, proverbs, folk songs, and dances of his pre- 1948 generation, Abu 
Hani has attempted to safeguard and revive al- waṭan al- aṣīl (the pure 
nation), an image of Palestine uncontaminated by time, colonialism, and 
foreign influence. The idyllic Palestine articulated here is encapsulated in 
the expressive practices (steps, gestures, poetry, food, dress, and melo-
dies) of a lost generation of ancestors. To preserve the dabke is to preserve 
the nation. Indeed, to dance the dabke is to dance the nation in its purest 
form. In the face of Israeli encroachment and the erasure of Palestinian 
space, time, and presence, the preservation of indigenous practices such 
as the dabke forcefully resists dispossession. Folklore is resistance. De-
tached from its “precious soil,” Palestinian identity, history, and nation 
must be kept alive, carried, preserved, and performed. It must endure, 
made manifest in the cultural practices and dispositions of its people, “in 
our hearts” and in “the ground beneath our stamping feet.”
For rapper Tamer Nafar and his dam cohorts, Palestinian identity piv-
ots on an axis of shared experiences of racism and political dispossession. 
To be Palestinian, in this sense, means to be engaged in the struggle for 
racial and ethnic equality. The perceived iconicity between Tupac Shakur’s 
repertory of politically charged rap and the Palestinian struggle for self- 
determination positions the American rapper within the national imagi-
nary. For this reason Tupac may be considered a shahīd, memorialized 
as a fallen hero for Palestinian liberation. In contrast to Kamal Khalil 
and Abu Hani, Tamer Nafar does not conceptualize Palestine based solely 
on shared indigenous practices or exilic nationalism. Rather he defines 
Palestine by the terrain of subaltern resistance to racialized oppression 
and state injustice. A Palestinian is one who resists such oppression, re-
gardless of geography, history, or culture.
To be sure, each of these three artist- activist- archivists recognized the 
importance of performance in the articulation of Palestinian identity. 
They understood that performance inscribes within the minds of par-
ticipants powerful indices of national identity through shared experience 
and history. And while each believed music and musical performance to 
be powerful modes of communicating nationalist sentiment, they each, in 
effect, defined the nation in radically different terms. In activism Kamal 
Khalil defined the nation in shared experiences of forced exile and the 
struggle for return. In folklore Abu Hani defined the nation through the 
preservation of seemingly authentic Palestinian lifeways and practices. 
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And in hip- hop Tamer Nafar explored the Palestinian condition via trans-
national discourses of youth culture and racial injustice.
Each of the examples further points toward three very different Pales-
tinian communities: in exile (Jordan), under occupation (West Bank), and 
in ’48 (Israel). Moving fluidly between these three sociocultural and geo-
graphic frames, this book examines the dynamics of history, nationalism, 
and resistance as realized through music performance. Central to this 
endeavor is the assertion that each of the above processes is best under-
stood through the prism of context and social action, as performances of 
aesthetics and ideation. In this book I explore how Palestinians, through 
music performance, have fashioned and disseminated markers of a dis-
tinct Palestinian identity and then trace how this identity has been his-
torically articulated through various local, national, and transnational 
contexts. In so doing, my analysis engages discourses of power, hege-
mony, and resistance and argues for the utility of music performance in 
resolving central questions of individual subjectivity, agency, and collec-
tive identity formation.
belonging
At the very heart of these vignettes, these performances, is a profound 
desire for belonging. Indeed belonging remains a foundational concern 
to ethnomusicology given its centrality to issues of social differentiation 
and reproduction. In this project I am principally concerned with the vari-
ous ways discourses, technologies, and other power/knowledge networks 
serve to produce the relationships within which people and objects inter-
act. Further I am interested in exploring the ways power discourses pro-
duce bodies, subjectivities, and identities. But beyond Foucauldian con-
cerns with what makes us who we are amidst conflicting and competing 
power relations, there remains an essential discussion to be had at the 
level of affect. It is a primary concern of this book to investigate both the 
lines of allegiance and fracture that determine the order of things as well 
as the affective moves individuals make to satisfy the longing for social 
solidarity and synchrony. The perpetual drive to be, and to belong, is a pri-
mary concern of identity politics, exilic nationalism, political resistance, 
and humanist advocacy. Put another way, all these performances have at 
their core the insatiable drive to belong, to be at peace with oneself among 
others, to transcend the well- documented Palestinian condition of limi-
nality and dispossession, and to escape perpetual movement, fear, and loss.
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The issue is not one of identity, merely, but one of identification. In 
all of the above vignettes the artists are grappling with fundamental 
issues of what it means to be Palestinian, and what it means to resist. 
They each carefully locate a sense of Palestinian identity, or belonging, 
within ephemeral moments of performative identification. Here the con-
ceptual move from identity to identification seems appropriate in that it 
allows for the transience of belonging to emerge in more nuanced ways. 
One does not simply “belong” to the nation. Rather, belonging is a per-
formative achievement accomplished through the ritualized citation of 
the “national” in performance. Contemporary ethnomusicological under-
standings of identity have long since destabilized any reified notions of 
the term. Yet in moving toward an understanding of belonging based in 
specific identification processes and performances, I seek to call atten-
tion to the very active means by which individuals participate in their 
own subjectivation and the contexts within which this is achieved. It is 
in the coordinated act of identification, illuminated most clearly in ritu-
alized moments of social performance, that belonging as performative 
affect may be more critically located in time and space. By repositioning 
our focal awareness toward these ephemeral moments of social perfor-
mance, moments of active identification, we begin to understand the per-
formativity of belonging.
Performativity, a term arising from within linguistics yet applied so 
beautifully in the gender theory of Judith Butler, is of central concern to 
this discussion, for it problematizes conventional understandings of be-
longing and identity, by focusing on the very production of selves as ma-
terial effects of these identification processes. Propelling a theoretical dis-
cussion first introduced by Austin, Searle, Derrida, and Foucault, Judith 
Butler employs performativity as a means to understand the myriad ways 
identities, bodies in fact, are passionately produced and performed amidst 
fields of social and political consequence. It is with the performativity of 
belonging that the above artists are most concerned. For them Palestine 
exists, comes to exist, and continues to exist as performative: a reitera-
tive citation of power that produces the very phenomena it is intended 
to regulate.1 Through these performances my interlocutors are marked 
as nationals, fashioned as Palestinians, yet in the act of marking, the per-
formance regulates, constrains and otherwise mediates fundamental as-
pects of what it means to be Palestinian and what it means to “resist.”2 All 
these performances, of political activism, of racial equality, and of cul-
Nationalism, Belonging, Resistance ✹ 25
tural preservation, are themselves citational practices that in their repe-
tition give materiality to the belongings they purport to describe. In a 
manner of speaking, they constitute “Palestine” and “Palestinians” amidst 
ever- shifting fields of consequence, power, and agency.
Music, Power, and Resistance
Drawing from recent work in feminist scholarship examining diffuse 
operations of human agency amidst fields of subordination, researchers 
in the humanities have long sought to better understand the ways hege-
monic discourses may be subverted and redeployed for myriad interests 
and agendas. Ethnomusicologists and folklorists have questioned the dia-
lectics of consolidating and subverting power structures, exploring the 
many possibilities for musicians to fluidly redirect and resignify domi-
nant signs and meanings in accord with their own interests. This literature 
reveals the ways power articulates through virtually “every process of cul-
tural creation and interpretation” but is divided along the nature of music 
and political movements more generally.3 On the one hand, music has 
often been romanticized as reflecting an authentic, counterhegemonic 
voice of the masses struggling against foreign domination, an effectual 
means of empowerment and transcending structures of domination. On 
the other hand, the very idioms of performance artists use to enter into 
these fields are often based in propagandized discourses, class structures, 
and state regimes that serve only to secure their subordination to norma-
tive political ideology. It seems that the aesthetic tools of empowerment 
are created, made meaningful, by the very power structures struggled 
against. Simply put, submitting to cliché nationalist tropes and essen-
tialized claims of national identity appear to be routine machinations of 
nationalist music and the emancipatory politics of self- determination. 
However, a central component of this book involves understanding the 
power dynamics within which such clichéd nationalist tropes are articu-
lated and imagined as a means of locating and interrogating diffuse sites 
of agency. What are the questions or anxieties for which an assertion of 
essentialized, primordial notions of national identity are an appropriate 
answer? Who benefits from the circulation of these tropes? And how does 
this enable or inhibit larger discussions of power and agency?
Contemporary ethnomusicological accounts of power have largely 
stalled in their attempts to provide a theoretical framework for under-
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standing both the social structures that create and sustain formations 
of domination and the potentialities for subverting those formations. 
The problem, as I see it, is a reluctance to step outside the faulty premise 
that all social action may be mapped onto an axis of domination (by the 
powerful) and empowerment (for the powerless). Lila Abu- Lughod, for 
example, has effectively criticized many of the assumptions underlying 
empowerment and domination- centered literatures. Reflecting on her 
own work among the Bedouin tribe Awlād Aʿli, Abu- Lughod challenges 
the literature for being too enamored with “explaining resistance and 
finding resisters,” rather than attending to the larger workings of power.4 
In this assertion, Abu- Lughod draws attention to the inability of feminist 
scholarship to fully theorize power outside of the binary of domination 
and empowerment. “There is perhaps a tendency to romanticize resis-
tance, to read all forms of resistance as signs of the ineffectiveness of sys-
tems of power and of the resilience and creativity of the human spirit in 
its refusal to be dominated. By reading resistance in this way, we collapse 
distinctions between forms of resistance and foreclose certain questions 
about the workings of power.”5
Instead Abu- Lughod recommends that resistance be employed as “a 
diagnostic of power,” as a means to map social relations and better under-
stand the “complex interworkings of historically changing structures of 
power.”6 Rather than interpreting acts of resistance purely in terms of 
opposition to, or liberation from, dominant forms of power, they should 
be understood as reinscribing practices embedded within systems of 
meaning, values, and aesthetics from which the idea of resistance is even 
a possible form of action. In this sense, “attention to the forms of resis-
tance in particular societies can help us become critical of partial and re-
ductionist theories of power.”7
To conceptualize resistance as a diagnostic of historically changing 
structures of power moves the discussion beyond the simple binary of 
powerful and powerless and serves to interrogate acts of resistance within 
the shifting relations from which they emerge. As the artists introduced 
above navigate deep- seated experiences of exile and occupation, they do 
so by employing a poetics made meaningful from within the power re-
lations from which they operate. If we are to fully move beyond the ten-
dency to romanticize these expressive practices as resistance, it is essential 
to understand each performative act, each song, poem, dance, gesture, as 
a tool for understanding the dynamics of power from which it arose. In 
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their myriad and diverse articulations of “Palestine,” each of the above 
artists attempts to satisfy specific needs and values born of multiple and 
diffuse experiences of dispossession. A central focus of this book involves 
operationalizing music as a means to better understand these fields of 
power and agency, these experiences, within which the discourse of Pal-
estinian nationalism comes to take on meaning.
While Abu- Lughod moves the discussion of power and agency in new 
directions, she nevertheless stops short of problematizing the very idea 
of resistance as a useful category of analysis. She does not challenge the 
utility of the term “resistance” itself as a means to describe and under-
stand the entire range of activity which might prove wholly indifferent 
and/or unresponsive to challenging hegemonic norms. For Abu- Lughod, 
resistance seems to be a relatively easy form of political activity to locate 
and identify. Rather it would seem appropriate, as Saba Mahmood sug-
gests, to further investigate the consequences of employing a universal 
category of acts, deemed resistance, without further interrogating the 
conditions within which these acts acquired their particular meanings.8 
Perhaps the very notion of resistance itself forecloses potentially impor-
tant discoveries on the dynamics of power given that it often imposes a 
discursive legacy of progressive and emancipatory politics difficult to see 
around. Couched within the emancipatory politics of the powerless, con-
ventional understandings of resistance are perhaps ill- equipped to ac-
count for the myriad ways that acts of subversion may in fact serve to 
consolidate, rather than destabilize, entrenched power discourses.
In both the emancipatory and progressive politics of academia as well 
as the streets of Palestinian refugee camps the concept of “resistance” 
(maqawma) is often carelessly wielded as a blunt instrument, imposing 
itself on various modes of contestation regardless of context and local 
meaning. It is assumed rather than determined, asserted rather than dem-
onstrated. What is more, the term brings with it a discursive legacy of 
Orientalist inquiry, applied by academics as a means of accommodating 
and naturalizing difference, and adopted by Palestinian musicians and 
activists in an effort to build superficial notions of solidarity. In effect, the 
overdetermination of resistance in both of these contexts serves to sta-
bilize meaning in ways that problematize representation. My approach 
throughout this text has been to consider how locally situated poetics 
influence the meanings of resistance as practice and mode of being, and 
to further explore the political consequences brought to bear when musi-
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cians freely assert this term. Much like “identity,” “race,” or “nation,” I 
have approached resistance as a performative construct. As such, resis-
tance must be carefully scrutinized as an object of analysis, rather than as 
a lens through which to interpret political action.
Thinking critically about this issue, it seems important to interrogate 
the discursive tactics that imbue acts of resistance with their particular 
meanings. Despite a near ubiquitous use of the term, among the many 
artists discussed in this book there is a large spectrum of what exactly re-
sistance is, how it might be defined, and in what ways it articulates with 
dominant power structures. To resist the occupation takes on drastically 
different connotations as one moves through time and space between 
various Palestinian communities. What becomes apparent in thinking 
through these questions is the importance of expressive culture (music, 
dance, poetry, graphic design, and so on) in fashioning diverse concep-
tualizations of what exactly resistance means, and under what circum-
stances it might be pursued.
Ethnomusicology and Palestinian Nationalism
In the field of ethnomusicology performative domains such as music, art, 
poetry, and dance have been shown to be constitutive modalities for the 
construction of national identity formations.9 Nationalist movements 
throughout the world have revived, invented, or preserved various cul-
tural arts in the assertion of a strategically engineered national identity. 
Music, given its shared indexical associations of time and space, participa-
tory dynamics, and group formative capacities, is a particularly powerful 
means of fostering national sentiment in the service of a political agenda. 
My goal in this book is to examine musical performance in relation to its 
contributions to the interpretive processes by which the Palestinian na-
tion comes into focus across various sociocultural and historical terrains.
Nevertheless, any discussion of Palestinian nationalism and identity 
runs the risk of perpetuating a vast literature of essentialist and primor-
dial approaches, studies governed by the premise of legitimating and vali-
dating Palestinian claims of history and presence against threats of cul-
tural erasure and appropriation. Such studies use historical and cultural 
evidence to authenticate a distinct national identity in an effort to advance 
Palestinian claims for self- determination. Here essentialist renderings of 
Palestinian identity, rooted in timeless history, are reinforced without 
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properly interrogating the various ways the nation is actively imagined, 
represented, constructed, and governed under myriad circumstances. 
Zachary Lockman has written persuasively on this issue in his research 
on the historical connections between the Yishuv (Jewish communities of 
Palestine prior to 1948) and the indigenous Palestinian population in the 
period leading up to 1948. Working through archival collections and his-
torical documents, he identifies a “dual society” model in which scholars 
working within either Israeli Zionist or Arab nationalist narratives have 
failed to critically question many of the categories of historical and cul-
tural analysis they deploy. In such studies both Palestinian and Jewish 
communities are presented as primordial, self- contained, and homoge-
neous entities, developing and maturing along separate historical trajec-
tories within fields of meaning unique to each group. In each case Israeli 
and Palestinian national identity formations are theorized as natural, if 
not pre- given modes of consciousness, rather than seen as constructs de-
rived from historical, social, and political fields of relations and reactions.
Given that each nationalist narrative is employed primarily within a 
discursive frame of survival against potential destruction and exile (to be 
driven into the sea, or to be transferred across the river), to challenge the 
dominant nationalist paradigm is to potentially endanger the community 
and provide ideological ammunition for competing claims to territory, 
presence, and history. However, the implications for submitting to the 
pressures of this type of research are perhaps even more damaging, for as 
Lockman writes, “The result has been a historiography which has hardly 
questioned the representation of the communities [Israeli and Pales-
tinian] as self- evidently coherent entities largely or entirely uninfluenced 
by one another. This approach has rendered their mutually constitutive 
impact virtually invisible, tended to downplay both intracommunal divi-
sions and intercommunal linkages, and focused attention on episodes of 
violent conflict, implicitly assumed to be the only normal, significant, or 
even possible form of interaction.”10
To confront the deficiencies of Israeli/Palestinian historiography, Lock-
man seeks to develop a “relational history” and historiography cognizant 
of moments of interdependence and interaction that call into question 
the Arab/Jew binary. Drawing on Perry Anderson’s plea for a “‘relational’ 
history that studies the incidence—reciprocal or asymmetrical—of dif-
ferent national or territorial units and cultures on each other,” Lockman 
seeks to develop a “relational paradigm” that challenges the narratives 
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and categories of the “dual society model.”11 In this relational paradigm 
the histories of Arabs and Jews are understood as being shaped within 
a larger field of social, political, economic, and cultural interactions. In 
pursuing research from within the discourse of the nation- state, national 
formations are rarely questioned. Rather they become reified entities 
operating in relation only to other nations. Violent conflict and politi-
cal dialogue overshadow mutually constitutive histories and intercom-
munal linkages between and within national communities. What is more, 
the dual society paradigm diverts attention away from the very processes 
through which these national identities are constructed and performed 
across various social spaces. In what ways are the boundaries between 
communities drawn and maintained, and how are the practices of exclu-
sion and conflict negotiated?
This notion of relationality is an important step toward releasing the 
hold of the persistent primordial nation- state, as well as highlighting 
forms of cultural interaction that are largely ignored as aberrations in 
both Palestinian and Israeli scholarship. However, this construct of rela-
tionality must also be applied within each national narrative. Although 
only a portion of this text explicitly examines Israeli and Palestinian inter-
action (chapters 8 and 9), throughout this text I have attempted to employ 
a relational history to the variously imagined and often contradictory and 
competing claims to Palestinian identity. While it is extremely impor-
tant to bring out the mutually constitutive interactions between Pales-
tinians and Israelis, it is equally important to reveal fractures and discon-
tinuities from within each national formation, or to be more specific, to 
reveal myriad ways competing and conflicting segments of society (re-
fracted through class, gender, religion, and so on) struggle for influence 
in defining and actualizing the nation. Among Palestinians this approach 
presents several challenges. To imply that there are differences between 
Palestinians in Israel, under occupation, and the near diaspora (Jordan, 
Syria, Lebanon) is to tread on the unspoken nationalist myth that Pales-
tinians are united in their struggles against Zionism and share equally 
in the traumas of occupation and exile. Moreover to bring out the pro-
cesses by which gender, religion, and class crosscut and destabilize the 
rigidity of the nation is to open up a discursive space for talking about 
shared communities of practice and interaction beyond and across the 
Palestinian- Israeli divide. In revealing the many different ways dispos-
session has been experienced by Palestinians in exile, under occupation, 
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and in ’48 (Israel), it is my explicit goal to interrogate the many ways Pal-
estinian identity, nation, and resistance are constructed and reproduced, 
performed amidst differentially situated fields of meaning and conse-
quence. Nations are necessarily founded on a matrix of myth and mean-
ing filtered predominantly through the discourses of collective history 
and experience. For scholars to transcend the mythologized pasts and to 
criticize the filters through which the nation is reified as natural and time-
less, they must confront many of the components of their own identities 
as citizens and nationals.
In seeking to explore the relational histories and identities of Palestini-
ans in exile, under occupation, and in ’48 (Israel), a critical understanding 
of the processes of popular culture is especially important.12 Although in 
the literature of Palestinian studies cultural practices are largely included 
only insomuch as they reflect “greater” political and economic forces, it 
is the intention of this book to reveal how popular culture (specifically 
musical texts, sounds, images, and practices) is in fact a constitutive mo-
dality of collective identity formation within which broader social forces 
emerge. Heretofore, the literature on Palestinian folklore and nationalism 
has by and large constructed music, poetry, and dance as epiphenomenal 
tools for the mobilization of oppositional politics and ideology. Schol-
ars have shown how expressive media often reflects larger, more perti-
nent issues of politics.13 So, for example, graffiti, poetry, and music are all 
symptoms, manifestations, or expressions of forced exile and the brutality 
of foreign occupation. They are texts—things to be read and interpreted 
within various frames of class, ethnicity, religion, and so forth. As such 
the appearance of expressive art forms and media are illustrative of the 
“voice of the masses” and are the results of various political discourses. 
In contrast, such expressive media should be seen as constitutive fields 
where the political and ideational effects of the occupation are not only 
expressed, but given materiality. The so- called texts of popular culture 
(songs, poems, paintings, dances) are not merely things in and of them-
selves, but rather they demarcate the boundaries of a discursive field in 
which ideas of self and the world may be engaged and naturalized within 
or against the dominant order.14
Specifically in the Palestinian diaspora music, dance, poetry, and litera-
ture have been instrumental in generating and maintaining national sen-
timent. Forms of performative action such as these have been shown not 
only to alleviate patterns of political dispossession and provide a counter 
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ideology to social inequality, but also to guide participants through a net-
work of shared meanings that foster a distinct Palestinian national con-
sciousness in exile. In this book I explore the aesthetic and ideational 
components of this particular national consciousness and trace how re-
sultant feelings of solidarity, engendered by such performances, are then 
put into service by various politico- nationalist groups and organizations. 
In the process, performative spaces, and the various arts and practices 
that fill them, are examined in detail as sites of subversion, resignification, 
and nation building amidst fields of violence, occupation, and state terror. 
My analysis reveals the various ways Palestinians have been able to assert 
counterhegemonic and/or subversive nationalist identities against often- 
violent countermeasures of state control, that within performative spaces 
Palestinians may, in essence, declare what they dare not say and do on the 
streets. They may dance the dabke wearing the kūfīya and raise the flag of 
their ancestral homeland amidst fields of potentially violent consequence.
The idea that music, nationalism, and resistance function as perfor-
mative, as mutually constitutive modalities for individual subjectivity and 
collective identity formation, is a recurrent theme of this book. Drawing 
from folklore studies, sociolinguistics, and cognitive psychology, ethno-
musicologists have shown that music, as social process, is best under-
stood within its various frames of articulation. In so doing, these re-
searchers have pursued a new direction of ethnographic inquiry, placing 
emphasis on the processual, the ephemeral, and the performative. In this 
book I propose that a similar analytic may be applied to the study of na-
tions and nationalism. As music is made manifest in the articulation and 
interaction of participants within a socially constituted performance en-
vironment, so, too, are nations themselves products, or effects, of a perfor-
mativity of ideation framed within discourses of power and agency. The 
analytic of studying nations and nationalism, as one might study music 
and musical performance, opens up the discursive, interactive, and per-
formative aspects of Palestinian sociality and further reorients nations 
as organic sets of ephemeral relations, performative effects, rather than 
reified social constructs.
In the absence of political, economic, and other material means with 
which to articulate national sentiment, Palestinians in exile and under 
occupation are often left only expressive media through which to assert 
national belonging. Protests, demonstrations, concerts, lectures, wed-
dings, and funerals are important sites within which such performances 
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take place. Each involves a transaction of cultural norms, national signs, 
engineered to elicit powerful feelings of belonging and community.15 
In performances of the nation, participants enact prescribed roles, fol-
low detailed scripts of engagement, and act out within defined spaces 
national feelings and identities. Through their citationality to dominant 
cultural norms, participants define and redefine the established lexicon, 
or poetics, of the Palestinian nation. Throughout this study I attempt to 
transcribe and analyze the ideational transcripts of these performances, 
exploring the historical, cultural, and material connections between Pal-
estinian music, the nation, and its myriad understandings of resistance. 
Whether it be a call to arms in the refugee camps of Amman, the stomp-
ing feet of a folkloric dance troupe in Jerusalem, or the acrobatic twists 
and turns of break-dancing teenagers in Ramallah, music performance 
constitutes a primary process for understanding what it means to be Pal-
estinian and what it means to fight for its self- determination.
2
poets, singers, and songs
Voices in the Resistance Movement (1917–1967)
 “Yama Mawil al- Hawa” (Oh song of longing)
Eighty kilometers northwest of Amman, along Jordan’s northern border 
with Syria and Israel, lies the small village of Umm Qais. Nestled atop 
a small mountain at the very edge of the East Bank plateau, Umm Qais 
overlooks the intersection of the Jordan and Yarmouk River valleys, each 
framed by the biblical Sea of Galilee (also known as Lake Tiberias). From 
the village’s surrounding olive and fig orchards, one can easily look out 
over the hills of the Galilee, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. De-
scending down to the mountain’s base one finds the intersection of three 
international borders (Israel, Jordan, and Syria), each reinforced by a net-
work of barbed- wire fences, patrol roads, and watchtowers. The signposts 
of these borders line the summits of each hill and the edges of the two 
valleys. With a basic set of binoculars one can watch Jordanian, Syrian, 
and Israeli border guards making their rounds on patrol, sequestered be-
hind chain- link and barbed- wire fences.
For tourists the trek to Umm Qais is rewarded by some of the choicest 
olives in the region and one of the kingdom’s most elaborate archeologi-
cal sites. The Roman Decapolis city of Gadara remains one of the most 
beautifully preserved ruins in the Middle East. A well- managed tourist 
center and excellent fine- dining restaurant have earned Umm Qais the 
reputation of a must- see destination for any tourist visiting the kingdom. 
However, upon my first visit to the area in the summer of 2002, I quickly 
understood the cultural importance of this village to the local population. 
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Far more than archeology, Umm Qais offers some of the most beautiful 
panoramic views of historic Palestine: Galilee, Tiberias, and the Beisan 
valley (see figure 2.1).
When I arrived at the main gate of the ruins I found the tourist center’s 
parking lot overrun with picnickers, people playing soccer, and children 
running wildly, dragging kites through the summer winds. Friday after-
noons are typically when families spend time relaxing outdoors, barbe-
quing, or otherwise enjoying their time together. On this particular Friday 
perhaps fifty families had decided to enjoy the summer’s day by having 
their afternoon meal atop the mountain. Small makeshift grills roasted 
kabobs in the summer sun as groups of men and women sat in relaxed 
conversation. Walking among the crowds I realized that the weather was 
perhaps not the only reason so many decided to stretch out and enjoy the 
view. In talking with my friend and companion Daoud Aʿbbasi, a twenty- 
something Palestinian from the al- Husseini refugee camp in Amman, I 
learned that the majority of Palestinian Jordanians who now live in Umm 
Qais and the surrounding areas were originally from the Palestinian vil-
Figure 2.1. ✹ Lake Tiberias, the Galilee, and the Israeli city Teveria as seen  
from Umm Qais. Photograph by the author (2003).
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lages of Tiberias, Farwana, Masil al- Jizl, Beisan, and others. Today, over 
sixty years later, the original refugees from these villages and their de-
scendants gather periodically on this spot to look out over their ancestral 
lands, lands they are prohibited from ever visiting. On clear days, these 
panoramic views are all that remain for these picnickers as they try to re-
connect with their ancestral villages.
Making my way through the crowds to the main gate of the ruins with 
my friend, I noticed a small group of young girls sitting together on a 
blanket singing with an older relative, perhaps a great- aunt or grand-
mother. I lingered momentarily to better hear their song and quickly 
pulled Daoud, a budding folklorist, over to help me with the lyrics. He 
immediately identified the well- known Palestinian folk song as “Yama 
Mawil al- Hawa.” The melody was incredibly beautiful and immediately 
caught my attention (evia 14- s9039).1
Oh my song of longing
It is better to be killed by daggers than ruled by the unjust.
I walked under winter’s sky and it quenched my thirst,
And summer became hotter from the fires which burn inside of me.
My life will continue through sacrifice for freedom
Oh song of longing
The night cries out in dew to witness my wounds.
The army of the enemy came from every direction.
The night witnessed the destruction and learned from the martyr2
Oh song of longing
Weapons on the hills are higher than the highest.
They open the path of hope and the hope in my men.
Oh heroic youth, I sacrifice myself for your sake.
Oh song of longing
The elegantly slow- paced melody of “Yama Mawil al- Hawa” remained 
with me for several weeks. After some basic inquiries among friends I 
managed to find a slightly modified recording of this song, on an old cas-
sette tape by the famous ensemble Firqat Aghani al- ʿAshiqin (The Songs 
of the Lovers Ensemble). More than a year later, on a return trip to Jordan, 
I began working with al- ʿAshiqin as they began performing once again in 
support of the second intifada. An ʿudist and the conductor of the group, 
Adnan Odeh was not at all surprised when I told him the story of my first 
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experience with this song (see example 2.1). He cites “Yama Mawil al- 
Hawa” as one of the most widely known Palestinian folk songs, and per-
haps one of al- ʿAshiqin’s most important.3 In one of our first interviews 
together he sang “Yama Mawil al- Hawa” beautifully for me, and explained 
the meaning of the lyrics (see figure 2.2).
“Yama Mawil al- Hawa” is one of the best songs in the national 
movement [al- ḥarakat al- qawmīya] simply because it is purely 
100 percent Palestinian [ filisṭīnī mīya bi- 1 - mīya]. Although we 
 [al- ʿAshiqin] changed the lyrics, and I think Hussein [Nazak] 
modified the original melody [from bayyati to aʿjām] and meter, it 
is a folk song [aghnīya min al- shaʿb] that every Palestinian knows 
from the time they were children. It sings about the people and 
their struggles, no matter where they were scattered. When we 
perform it, it is one of the only times in the concert when people 
would stop dancing and just listen, [simply because] it had the 
most beautiful melody and powerful text . . . everyone knew the 
lyrics . . . and it was the same [whether we were playing] in Bei-
rut, Damascus, anywhere. Everyone knew it because everyone 
could identify with it . . . the winter’s walk of 1948 [mashaīt taḥt 
al- shatāʾ], the summer heat moving [from Palestine] to the [Jor-
example 2.1. ✹ “Yama Mawil al- Hawa.” Transcription from author’s field notes.
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danian or Syrian] desert, the loss of our land, the sacrifice of the 
martyrs, these were all things that Palestinians knew and experi-
enced everywhere [wayn makān].
For Adnan Odeh songs like “Yama Mawil al- Hawa” narrate a personal 
history of the Palestinian al- nakba (catastrophe) and provide powerful 
markers of a distinct national identity in exile. As I observed in Umm 
Qais, families shared this song with their children while evoking collec-
tive memories and experiences of dispossession. As they overlooked the 
now- empty fields where their ancestral villages once stood, “Yama Mawil 
al- Hawa” was sung to best communicate the feelings of the moment and 
to further inculcate in the lives of these young girls foundational aspects 
of their Palestinian identity. In a similar fashion, Firqat Aghani al- ʿAshiqin 
has been performing this song for over thirty years because of its capacity 
to index uniquely Palestinian experiences of dislocation, struggle, and 
Figure 2.2. ✹ 
Adnan Odeh, ʿudist 
and composer 
for Firqat Aghani 
al- ʿAshiqin. 
Photograph by the 
author (2003).
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sacrifice. On picnic blankets, in political rallies, and on the national stage, 
“Yama Mawil al- Hawa” has played an important role in narrating a col-
lective national history and identity in exile.
To this end, Palestinian artists throughout the diaspora have developed 
vast repertories of music, poetry, drama, film, and dance in support of the 
Palestinian national movement and the struggle for self- determination. 
Such artistic projects have given voice to a subaltern nationalist ideology 
and have promoted powerful sentiments of national identity both within 
and between communities in ’48 (Israel), in the occupied West Bank and 
Gaza Strip (al- bilād), and in exile (al- ghūrba) (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon). 
Within the near Palestinian diaspora (in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon), musi-
cal performance has been especially important in the formation of cul-
tural meanings in two distinct ways: first, by providing a forum for the 
expression of subaltern/nationalist ideologies from within dominant 
host nations, and second, by facilitating performative interaction and be-
longing between diaspora communities. It is this lateral awareness, the 
hallmark of diasporic signification and identification, that has enabled 
and encouraged Palestinians throughout Bilad al- Sham (Jordan, Syria, 
Lebanon, Israel/Palestine) to collectively experience the pains of occupa-
tion: as national pride, hope, and shame.
In this and the following chapters I seek to trace the broad history 
of Palestinian resistance song to better understand how and why certain 
singers, songs, poets, and ideas have come to define the Palestinian nation 
and its struggle for self- determination. What are the foundational songs 
that narrate the nationalist movement, and how have these songs influ-
enced, reflected, or otherwise generated the ways Palestinians conceptu-
alize themselves and their struggle for self- determination? In particular I 
am interested in revealing how this repertory has been both constituted 
by and constitutive of the myriad poetics and politics of dispossession 
and resistance. What role have music and performance played in the de-
velopment of the Palestinian liberation movement? And how might a 
topography of the major performers and performances illuminate wider 
sociopolitical boundaries, cracks, and fissures within its ranks? Is there 
a relationship between the poetics of song and the politics of resistance? 
And if so, how and why might this be so? What potential does music 
have for expressing meaning within wider sociopolitical frames over-
determined by violence and trauma?
At their core, however, the following chapters provide a basic intro-
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duction to the field of Palestinian protest song. Throughout I trace the 
historical development of this repertory from its earliest known and re-
corded antecedents to its present- day transnational manifestations, high-
lighting foundational figures, groups, songs, and ideas. Through careful 
musical, textual, and performative analysis I explore many of the domi-
nant signs, myths, and meanings inherent in this repertory, deconstruct-
ing the indexical associations that constitute the poetics of Palestinian 
resistance. In the course of drawing out this history, however, it becomes 
apparent that the performativity of nationalist song and of nationalist 
politics are coterminous. In effect they inhabit the same social spaces, 
play on the same lexicon of associations and ideas, and are mutually con-
stitutive in the articulation of large- scale group identity formations. The 
performance of Palestinian resistance music across space and time has in 
essence narrated the history of the Palestinian nation, its triumphs and 
failures, its pride and shame. Within its melodies, rhythms, and poetics is 
a uniquely textured cultural performance of Palestinian history. Situated 
within larger fields of meaning, these songs provide a truly fascinating 
historical record of the Palestinian condition as it has been conceptual-
ized and embodied over the last eighty years. To perform this music, in 
many ways, is to perform the nation.4
The story that unfolds, however, is not necessarily one of unilinear soli-
darity. Far from it, the story of Palestinian resistance music that emerges 
in the following chapters is beset with contradiction, complication, and 
points of contention between and among performers and audiences. This 
is an extraordinarily complicated story, where imaginings of the body and 
body politic move in counterpoint with myriad social forces, constantly 
affirmed and contested in performance. The presence of such contradic-
tions, however, need not call into question the very existence of Pales-
tinian identity, nor should they detract from the legitimacy of the Pal-
estinian cause of self- determination. Rather the twisting and turning of 
Palestinian protest song, weaving its way through history, replete with 
points of blockage and disagreement, reveals the performativity of re-
sistance itself and the processes through which imaginings of the nation 
are constructed and articulated. Focusing on the fractures and fissures in 
Palestinian nationalism allows for cultural meanings and experiences to 
be opened up, examined, and interrogated in interesting ways, revealing 
a more nuanced topography of resistance itself.
At issue are the various ways resistance is interpreted and performed 
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at different points in Palestinian history. How is resistance interpreted 
over time and across the landscape of Palestinian experience? Who are 
the targets of such resistance? As the popularity and influence of resis-
tance songs ebb and flow, coming into and out of fashion, what does this 
say about the nature of resistance music at times of state building when 
very little active and organized fighting is taking place? Following Lila 
Abu- Lughod, the concept of resistance must be employed specifically as 
a “diagnostic of power,” as a means to map social relations and to better 
understand the “complex inter- workings of historically changing struc-
tures of power.”5 Here I seek to use protest song as a tool for understand-
ing the dynamics of power within the Palestinian nationalist movement. 
In telling the story of Palestinian protest song it is essential to under-
stand each performative act, song, poem, dance, or gesture as a means for 
understanding the field of consequence from which it arose.
Pre- 1948 Indigenous Palestinian Protest Song
Archival sources on the performance of protest song prior to 1948 are 
found in various Palestinian, British, and Israeli sound archives and per-
sonal collections or within the literature of Palestinian folklore, poetry, 
and oral history. A careful reading of these sources reveals a vibrant tra-
dition of protest song throughout the British mandate period reaching a 
climax during the Great Arab Revolt of 1936−39. Under stiff British mili-
tary occupation, songs performed at local events provided an important 
forum for political discussion outside the reach of colonial censorship. 
Among the rural fallāḥīn (peasantry), folk songs were a powerful tool 
for mobilizing the masses in support of the labor boycotts and the armed 
conflict against British forces. Traveling musicians and poets, hired to 
perform at weddings and other life- cycle events, brought news of the re-
volt to the villages, debated pressing political issues, and glorified the re-
sistance and its leadership as heroic soldiers for the nation.6 Most impor-
tantly, these performers sowed the seeds of nationalist discourse itself, 
carrying the idea of Palestinian nationalism from the cosmopolitan urban 
centers to the rural towns and villages.
This tradition of Palestinian resistance song was operationalized 
through the performance repertory of the indigenous shaʿr al- murtajal 
(poet- singer). Colloquially called al- shāʿr, al- zajjālī, or al- ḥādī, these 
poets were hired to perform at celebratory gatherings, life- cycle events, 
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calendar festivals, or diwānīn (village guesthouses) throughout the re-
gion. At these events traveling poet- singers would entertain participants 
by freely extemporizing stanzas of poetry based within prescribed indige-
nous folk- tune archetypes. Texts were improvised based on myriad con-
textual criteria, local politics, proverbs, folklore, and history, following 
precise rhythmo- poetic rhyme schemes. Once performed, variations of 
a particular song would spread very quickly among neighboring villages. 
Prominent performers became famous for their unique social and politi-
cal commentary, raising many to the status of folk heroes in the nation-
alist movement.
Given the improvisational character of this repertory, coupled with a 
dearth of reliable recording technology in pre- 1948 Palestine, this tradi-
tion of political performance has been difficult to document. However, 
Palestinian fallāḥī singers were periodically broadcast on local radio, and 
many of their performances routinely dealt with quasi- political issues 
and themes. The literature reveals that such broadcasts were an extremely 
effective means of reaching out to the people, but rarely do such sources 
provide more than topical discussion of well- remembered texts. In rare 
cases collections of well- known folk poetry were published, largely with-
out musical analysis or commentary.7 However, careful examination of 
these texts often suggests its musical rendering. Based on poetic struc-
ture and rhyme scheme it is possible to approximate the manner of its 
original musical rendering based on contemporary performance practice. 
Many of the more famous songs of this period, however, have survived 
through continued performance and widespread popularity (see below). 
These songs, first composed between 1920 and 1939, now serve as the 
foundation for new repertories of resistance songs over eighty years later. 
In most cases, the composer of the song is unknown, or it is attributed 
only to “folklore” ( fulklūr) or “popular heritage” (turāth al- shaʿbī). How-
ever, in rare circumstances, the identity of the poet becomes embedded 
within the song itself. One such poet, Nuh Ibrahim, is routinely cited as 
having had the largest grassroots impact on the development of Pales-
tinian resistance music and literature. His many compositions remain a 
vital part of this repertory, having survived through the generations in 
various publications and continued performance since the time of the 
Great Arab Revolt (1936–39).
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nuh ibrahim
Born in Haifa in 1913, Nuh Ibrahim developed a passion for poetry as a 
young boy working at a local printing press. Performing publicly at social 
clubs, labor syndicates, and other professional unions, Ibrahim became 
quite famous as a captivating young poet. His local fame later led to fre-
quent performances for cosmopolitan elites in Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, 
and other Arab cultural capitals. In his many poems Ibrahim would de-
liver impassioned rhetoric against the British mandate, escalating Jewish 
colonization under the aegis of Zionism, and the unwillingness of the 
Arab world to come to the defense of the Arabs in Bilad al- Sham after the 
First World War. Returning to Palestine in the early 1930s, he joined an 
anticolonial resistance movement, led by the infamous imam ‘Izz al- Din 
al- Qassam.8 Known by the alias talmīdh al- Qassām (Pupil of al- Qassam), 
Ibrahim spread the imam’s message of popular resistance to British colo-
nial administration and Zionist expansion via repertories of indigenous 
poetry. Though al- Qassam was killed in an ambush before the revolt for-
mally began in 1936, a series of murabaʿ poems (see below) composed 
and sung by Ibrahim in his honor were instrumental in memorializing 
the famed leader and drawing popular support for the cause that bore 
his name.9
While there are many interpretations of sung murabaʿ based on sty-
listic and regional variation, in this example the introductory quatrain of 
poetry follows a prescribed rhyme scheme where the first, second, and 
fourth lines must rhyme, while the third is free. Then, in the subsequent 
quatrain the poet uses the rhyme from the third line of the first quatrain 
as the basis for the subsequent three lines, and then cadences the fourth 
line with the dominant rhyme from the first quatrain (that is, aaba, 
bbba). All subsequent quatrains then maintain the dominant rhyme of 
the first quatrain in its cadential line (ccca, ddda, and so on). Between 
each quatrain participants sing one of several responsorial lines (lāzama), 
usually introduced by the poet. The retention of the initial rhyme struc-
ture throughout the murabaʿ creates a sense of continuity between qua-
trains and adds to the virtuosity of the compositional technique. In this 
tradition, poets must freely improvise contextually appropriate quatrains 
while remaining within the prescribed poetic structures of each song- 
type. The following murabaʿ composed and performed by Nuh Ibrahim 
reveals this poetic structure (see transliteration in appendix 1) and dem-
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onstrates how folk poetry was employed as a means of commemorating 
the memory of the Palestinian leader.
Izz al- Din oh what a loss, you became a martyr for your people
Who can deny your generosity, oh martyr for Palestine.
Izz al- Din rest in peace, your death is a lesson to all
Ah . . . if only you’d remained, oh leader of the freedom fighters.
You forsake your soul and your wealth, for the freedom of your land!
When you faced an enemy, you fought with great determination.
By 1937 Nuh Ibrahim had been arrested by British authorities for his 
involvement with the al- Qassam brigades; subsequently he spent five 
months in the famous Aʿkka Prison.10 While there Ibrahim was exposed 
to a general population of prisoners, made up of predominantly rural, 
nonliterate Palestinian fallāḥīn. Among the fallāḥīn Nuh Ibrahim found 
a new audience for his poetry and its underlying political message. Frus-
trated in his many attempts to convince cosmopolitan elites to confront 
the British, Ibrahim turned his sights toward the rural masses living in the 
Palestinian countryside.
Composing and performing in Aʿkka Prison, Nuh Ibrahim found a 
far more receptive audience for his collections of protest poetry. Accord-
ingly Ibrahim adapted his poetry to include Palestinian colloquial lan-
guage, a thick rural accent, and indigenous poetic song- types and per-
formance practices.11 In contrast to the many classically trained writers 
crafting beautifully sophisticated Palestinian- inspired poetry from their 
urban offices in Haifa, Jerusalem, and Beirut, Ibrahim’s detention in ʿAkka 
Prison, his use of local dialect, and his experiences on the front lines of the 
struggle gave his poetry a sense of credibility and authenticity among the 
rural masses. Moreover—given that Ibrahim’s poetry was transmitted via 
live performance, delivered within widely known folk- songs and indige-
nous poetic structures—his work was very easily learned and dissemi-
nated among the villages. Rural fallāḥīn, predominantly illiterate farmers 
and laborers, constituted approximately 70 percent of the total Palestinian 
population during this time.12 These rural villagers suffered mightily from 
overtaxation, underdevelopment, and civil neglect. Nuh Ibrahim’s emerg-
ing poetry, based in indigenous Palestinian song- types and poetic device, 
mobilized these disenfranchised rural masses against British authorities 
and Zionist expansion through collective performance.
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In both poetic and musical device Ibrahim’s compositions had a sig-
nificant impact on the local population based on their use of indigenous 
poetics and performative practices. Though published collections of his 
work were widespread, and eventually banned by the colonial authorities, 
the performative nature of his words in indigenous song allowed for his 
message to spread quickly beyond the reach of colonial censors. Nested 
within the prescriptive structures of Palestinian folk song common to 
public celebrations, life- cycle events, and other calendar festivals, Nuh 
Ibrahim’s poetry could be quickly learned and reiterated, told and retold, 
by networks of traveling poet- singers at various public occasions. Encod-
ing his message in popular song had the effect of encouraging public en-
gagement and future repetition among communities in the countryside 
as well as in urban centers.
Nuh Ibrahim’s strategic use of indigenous Palestinian folk song in-
volved two predominant musico- poetic formats: al- murabaʿ (quatrain) 
and al- muḥāwara (discussion). It was documented that he shied away 
from performing in other popular dance- dominated dabke song-types 
such as the aʿlā dalʿ ūnā, yā ẓarīf al- ṭūl, al- ghazalī, or al- jafrā as they were 
too limited for his purposes and far too rhythmic for the kind of response 
he hoped to engender.13 He believed that rhythmic dance styles made it 
far too difficult for the people to listen, understand, and interpret his po-
litical messages. If, for example, his poetry were set to a standard dabke 
tune, such as al- jafrā, participants would be too distracted in their danc-
ing to fully appreciate the nuance of his political message. Rather Ibrahim 
preferred to compose within repertories of Palestinian folk song where 
emphasis is placed on the meanings of the poetic texts and the vocal 
capacities of the poet- singer. Published collections of his work reveal the 
majority of his compositions are in the form of sung murabaʿāt (as in the 
above example of commemorative poetry) in which quatrains are deliv-
ered in a quick declamatory style following a prescribed rhyme scheme 
and melodic phrasing.
The muḥāwara is a bit more complex in that it involves a performative 
debate between competing poet- singers within a prescribed rhythmo- 
poetic rhyme scheme.14 Part of the genre of improvised sung poetry col-
loquially called al- ḥidā or al- zajāl, the muḥāwara or ḥuwār (discussion) 
is a very common occurrence in Palestinian indigenous celebrations 
(weddings, engagements, circumcisions, baptisms, or other family occa-
sions) where competing singers will choose to debate (battle) each other 
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on various topics through the rendering of poetic couplets (muzdawijāt), 
quatrains (murabaʿāt), or eight- lined stanzas (muthammanāt), accompa-
nied by responsorial refrains, rhythmic clapping, and enthusiastic audi-
ence exclamations.15 Performers improvise an even number of seven- to 
eight- syllable hemistitches within a prescribed rhyme scheme, on vari-
ous contextually appropriate topics (praise, politics, love, history, or other 
intellectual issues). These stanzas of poetry are then rendered, following a 
very simple melodic pattern with responsorial accompaniment.16
Among the fallāḥīn living under the British mandate, the performance 
of al- muḥāwara served several essential societal functions. Traveling poet- 
singers hired to perform at celebratory festivals brought with them news 
of current events, typically disseminated through newspapers and other 
print media. In the poetics of such performances it was quite common for 
performers to provide spaces for public engagement, dialogue and debate 
of important social and political issues. As each of the competing poet- 
singers would take up a particular subject position, audience members 
would show their support for one side of the argument through applause 
and responsorial singing. In many ways, these poet- singers enabled perfor-
mative spaces for the articulation of competing political discourses and the 
formation of popular consensus on a plethora of societal issues. While the 
performance of al- muḥāwara in celebratory spaces would typically explore 
only lighthearted topics for sheer entertainment and enjoyment (is it better 
to be young or old, rich or poor, blonde or brunette, single or married), 
in moments of crisis this repertory became a powerful tool for mobiliz-
ing public opinion and national sentiment around shared communal goals.
 “muhawara al- ʿarabi wa- 1 - sahyuni”  
(debate between the arab and the Zionist)
Nuh Ibrahim’s most popular muḥāwara, “Al- ʿArabi wa al- Sahyuni,” offers 
an interesting example of how this indigenous style of poetic debate, or 
dueling, might mobilize national sentiment in the service of the resistance 
movement. In it he positions an Arab and a Zionist against one another in 
a performative debate over who has the more legitimate claims to Pales-
tine. While Ibrahim’s strategic use of Ashkenazi Jewish cultural stereo-
types and misinformation is clearly intended to mobilize and manipulate 
popular sentiment against Zionist expansion, it is interesting to note how 
competing discourses of religion, politics, and the nation- state are articu-
lated within the performative structures of this folk song. Moreover it is 
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important to also recognize the clear distinctions being made between 
Arabs, as natives of the land of Palestine, and Zionists, as European Jew-
ish (Ashkenazim) settlers attempting to claim the land from its native 
inhabitants. The Arabs being represented here include Muslims, Chris-
tians, and Arab Jews (Mizrahim), whose presence in historic Palestine 
and the Arab world extends back for centuries. It is important to under-
stand exactly who is being represented under the terms “Arab” and “Zion-
ist,” as these two terms are used throughout the folk songs of the time. As 
the prominent folklorist Dr. Sharif Kanaana recounted to me, “Jews are 
rarely if ever mentioned in the folk songs of the British mandate” (1917–
48). “Rather, the enemy is clearly identified as Zionism [al- Ṣahyūnīya] or 
Zionists [al- Ṣahāyna]. . . . Interestingly, when Jews are specifically men-
tioned in these folk songs they are typically named, illustrating the differ-
ence between native Arab Jews of the region and foreign colonialists and 
settlers” (personal communication 2010). Within this performative con-
versation Arab and Zionist perspectives are nevertheless clearly expressed 
and identified, allowing competing national ideologies to emerge on a 
range of pertinent issues: historical presence, religious jurisprudence, for-
eign colonialism, national dislocation, and victimization.
The formal poetic duel begins with each participant opening with an 
introductory stanza stating his case. Following each stanza the audience 
sings a prescribed responsorial refrain (lāzama). The poetic structure of 
this debate is identical to the above example of murabaʿ (aaba, bbba, 
ccca, ddda, and so on).17
a: I am Arab, and by my eyes, when I die, cast me away,
I’ll erase the name of Zionism, in the protection of my country 
Palestine.
Refrain: From the deception of the colonizers.
Z: I am the well- known Zionist, my position in this world is 
obvious,
My wealth is from lies, and I must own Palestine.
Refrain: I must own Palestine.
a: You may own it in the tomb, where you will find only misery,
And are confronted with Munkar and Nakir, on the Day of 
Judgment, oh you wretched man.
Refrain: Until then you’d own Palestine.
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Z: Don’t forget the accumulation of wealth, betrayal and trickery,
With which I can buy the control of men, and perform the deeds of 
the devil.
Refrain: Because I must own Palestine!
These first initial stanzas offer each performer the opportunity to 
introduce himself to his audiences, establishing the position of each in 
the debate. The Arab seeks to protect his homeland from foreign coloni-
zation, to erase the name of Zionism and the malice of occupation. The 
Jewish Zionist, well known in world politics and business, promises to 
own Palestine through manipulation, wealth, and lies. This will happen, 
according to the Arab, only after the Zionist is confronted by the angels 
of death, Munkar and Nakir. Islamic practice in Palestine holds that upon 
one’s death the deceased will be visited by two of God’s angels, Mun-
kar and Nakir. Precisely when the funeral party has reached seventy- two 
paces from the grave, the two angels will appear and test the faith of the 
deceased by asking three important questions. The answer to these three 
questions determines the amount of time the deceased must spend wait-
ing to be resurrected into heaven. In this usage the Arab makes reference 
to Munkar and Nakir in an attempt to claim that the Zionist will own 
Palestine only after resting in his tomb. While Islamic practice and belief 
is asserted here as a threat against the Zionist, he counters with a threat of 
his own. Great wealth, betrayal, and manipulation can be used to control 
the actions of men to do the “deeds of the devil.”
a: Do your deeds arrogant man, in this world you are famous.
I’m the eagle, oh starling, and you are escaping the talons.
Refrain: And you want to own Palestine?
Z: I’ll run away and will not fight, my daughters will fight for me.
Because of them, I will not return disappointed. I win ninety out of 
every hundred.
Refrain: And I must own Palestine!
The exchange of threats continues between the two adversaries. The 
Arab notes that the Zionist is well known in the world for using great 
wealth and manipulation to attain power. But it is the Arab, identified as 
an eagle, who will be victorious against the weak Zionist songbird. The 
use of an eagle to signify the resistance is important to the meaning of 
the stanza and is quite typical in Palestinian poetry and song. In musico- 
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poetic performance the word eagle (nasar) becomes easily rhymed with 
its pseudohomonym, victory or triumph (naṣar). Based on shared asso-
ciations of power, strength, victory, and protection, the signification of 
triumphant Palestine as eagle is easily accomplished in the poetics of 
performance. Rather than confront the Arab with an equally profound 
display of strength, the Zionist responds with the promise not to fight. 
The Zionist claims victory by manipulating others to fight on his behalf. 
Zionism’s “daughters,” the British in this particular instance, will deliver 
90 percent of the time. The diminutive portrayal of the British colonial 
government as Zionism’s daughter/servant reflects a style of satire quite 
common in Nuh Ibrahim’s work. Here he reverses the power differential 
between the colonial regime and the nascent Zionist enterprise by por-
traying the British as willing servants to Zionism.
a: Akh! Spit on such men [Tafū!], they blather on and on!
I’ve lost hope in you, stuck in mud and tar.
Refrain: You’ve got to leave from here!
Z: Khabībī, listen to my words, whatever you have seen before me,
A national homeland is my intention, for the sake of Zionist 
Palestine.
Refrain: And I will own Palestine!
a: By God, in your life you’ll never see this. Instead you will remain 
dislocated,
The work of the lion, oh lamb, you’ll see the crows of doom,
Refrain: If you stay in Palestine!
Z: The world has given up on me, and from its nations I’ve been 
refused.
And you too are chasing me, to keep me out of Palestine,
Refrain: The land of my ancestors from long ago!
The debate escalates further as the tempers of both characters flare. 
In a sign of disgust the Arab makes a dramatic spitting sound, “Tafū!” 
To be heard, the Zionist then responds with a mispronounced gesture of 
friendship, “khabībī” (my sweetheart). Another sign of Ibrahim’s satire, 
the mispronounced Arabic “ḥabībī” is but another stereotypical insult 
at the Zionist, playing on the common misuse of “kh” among Eastern 
European Jewish immigrants to Palestine, a linguistic stereotype that still 
holds today. In his analysis of this poem, Samih Shabeeb suggests that 
Ibrahim’s purposeful mispronunciation here clearly indicates that the 
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Zionist character in this performance is European, delineating a political 
difference between foreign Zionist immigration to Palestine and the his-
toric presence of Arab Jews in the region.18 In both published collections 
and live performances of this muḥāwara, the mispronounced “khabībī” is 
retained, eliciting great laughter and suggesting that its satirical meaning 
is central to the piece. Following this both characters make mention of 
the global dispossession experienced by Jews around the world. While the 
Arab insists that Zionism will remain dislocated in the world, the Zion-
ist counters with an expression of victimization. “The world has given up 
on me.” He is refused by all nations, and even the Arabs are “chasing me” 
from “the land of my ancestors.” The Arab then reiterates the importance 
of Palestine to all three Abrahamic religions. This statement further sug-
gests that Ibrahim’s understanding of “Arab- ness” is determined not by 
religious affiliation but by a historic presence in and attachment to the 
land. It is the colonial expansion of non- Arabs in Palestine, under the 
guise of Zionism, that Ibrahim is arguing against.
a: Stop manipulating with your words, as if you’re submerged in 
sleep.
Palestine is the cradle of Islam, the Messiah [Jesus], and the 
prophets [Judaica].
Refrain: Where are you going, oh wretched man?
Z: It is not possible for me to leave, and I will fulfill my goal.
Win or lose, I won’t leave Palestine.
Refrain: And I will own Palestine!
a: You have to go!
Z: I won’t go!
a: Still there?
Z: I am not afraid.
a: Stay and witness your end.
Z: Do as you wish.
[The Arab pulls out a pistol from underneath his cloak and shoots 
the Zionist character.]
a: Bam, Bam, Bam, Bam!
Z: O my misfortune, the wealth, the capital is lost, and I have taken 
my leave from you, Palestine.
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In this final exchange the debate reaches its dramatic climax. Follow-
ing threats of violence, the Arab pulls out a pistol from underneath his 
robe and shoots the Zionist dead. Notice that in his final utterance, the 
Zionist first laments the loss of his great wealth and capital, only later in 
the stanza mentioning the loss of Palestine. In various performances this 
final exchange between the two characters is often significantly modi-
fied to be less violent, most commonly with the Zionist running away 
in defeat.
Embodied in performance it is easy to speculate the impact this 
muḥāwara might have had on mobilizing nationalist sentiment against 
the British occupation and the increasing Zionist expansion during the 
time of the Great Arab Revolt (1936–39). Playing on widespread cultural 
and ethnic stereotypes, collective fear, and political rhetoric, this folk 
song served to confirm or reinforce a specific politico- nationalist agenda 
within a culturally appropriate forum for political debate, consensus, and 
the amelioration of societal distress. The structure of the muḥāwara, in 
which participants collectively express their approval of a political opin-
ion through responsorial singing, engenders a discursive feedback be-
tween performers and audience members, creating the effect of politi-
cal solidarity. Feelings of solidarity and community become indexically 
linked to the political meanings of the texts through their articulation. As 
each character freely expresses his point of view, the audience joins into 
the debate with prescribed, even compulsory, gestures in support of Pal-
estinian self- determination and the end of Zionist colonialism. As per-
formative, this particular style of collective singing enacts or produces 
the effect that it names.19 The result is an affirmation of solidarity against 
Zionist colonization of Palestine.
Despite writing in support of the Great Arab Revolt against British au-
thorities and Zionist expansion for only a short time, the complete reper-
tory of Ibrahim’s work is quite large. He composed songs eulogizing com-
batants, satirizing the policies of British colonial officials, and debating 
pressing cultural and political issues such as Jewish colonization, martyr-
dom, nationalism, and the roles and responsibilities of women in the re-
sistance movement. One of his more famous works celebrates the sacri-
fices women must make on “the path of the nation” ( fī sabīl al- waṭan). In 
this poem Ibrahim sings of a mother who sells her only possessions to buy 
a gun so that her son may join the fight. In giving her son to the struggle 
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she is honored as the model for all Palestinian women.20 In other songs 
Ibrahim speaks of the need for national unity against foreign occupa-
tion across politico- religious lines. Throughout his work Ibrahim strate-
gically avoids purely Islamic references in favor of nonsectarian cultural- 
nationalist sign clusters. Christians and Muslims alike were called to join 
the struggle as Palestinian brothers, sons of the nation. Above all, how-
ever, the most significant characteristic of Nuh Ibrahim’s work is an over-
riding sense of irony, humor, and satire leveled at his targets. Drawing on 
colloquial dialect, slang, and double entendre, Ibrahim ridicules his sub-
jects to produce his desired response. He uses language idiomatic to the 
people and communicates his messages in an accessible form familiar to 
and congruent with the practices and lifeways of the rural fallāḥīn.
 “min sijn ʿakka” (From ʿakka prison)
With little question Nuh Ibrahim’s most popular protest song is the 
powerful funeral dirge “Min Sijn ʿAkka” (From ʿAkka Prison) (also known 
by the title “Al- Thalathaʾ al- Hamaraʾ” [The bloody three]).21 Initially a vital 
part of Palestinian folklore, this song was revitalized by Firqat Aghani al- 
Aʿshiqin in the late 1970s. Today it has been rerecorded and performed by 
intifada ensembles throughout the region and is widely considered one of 
the all- time classics of the repertory.
“Min Sijn Aʿkka” is a historical account of the execution of three Pal-
estinian militants at the infamous Aʿkka Prison on June 17, 1930. The pub-
lic execution of these three men had an extraordinary effect among the 
people, providing an initial rallying cry for revolt against British colonial 
authority. Several folklorists and artists with whom I worked cited this 
public execution as the catalyst for the Palestinian resistance movement. 
Ibrahim, then a young poet and former inmate at ʿAkka Prison, composed 
this song to memorialize the event (evia 14- s2070).22
The funeral procession set out from Aʿkka Prison,
For Mohammad Jumjum and Fuad Hijazi.
Oh how they punished them, my people,
Oh how the high commissioner and his people punished them.
Mohammad Jumjum with Aʿta al- Zir,
And Fuad Hijazi became honorable weapons.
See the fate and destiny,
How the oppressive army pronounced death upon them.
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Said Mohammad, “I want to be the first.”
“My fear, oh Aʿta, is to see you killed before me.”
Said Hijazi, “I want to be the first.”
“For we do not fear death.”
The introductory stanzas provide the setting for the execution of the 
three prisoners. Each prisoner, through his martyrdom, becomes an 
“honorable weapon” for the nation. Realizing their destiny as martyrs 
for the cause, each of the condemned volunteers to be the first executed. 
The confrontation with, and subsequent transcendence of, death and fear 
through martyrdom serves as the song’s most potent underlying theme. 
Reaching the gallows, each of the men then says his good- byes to his 
mother; the mothers in their sacrifice are equally martyrs to the cause.
My beloved mother calls out,
The nation has closed around her.
They called out, “Fuad the dearest of my heart,”
“Before we separate we must bid farewell.”
She called out from behind the door,
And awaits his response.
“ Aʿta oh Aʿta the greatest of youth,
Who attacks the army without fear.”
“Oh my brother, Yusef, take care of my mother,
And you, my sister, do not be sad.”
For the sake of the nation I have sacrificed my blood,
For the eyes of Palestine.
Following their execution the singer assumes the role of narrator, call-
ing out for the martyrs to be celebrated for their sacrifices, and for their 
mothers to extend their generosity further.
The three died as lions,
Mother be generous in giving more.
For the sake of the nation we sacrifice our souls,
And for its freedom they kill us.
Call out, oh people, there are beatings,
For on Tuesday they will hang the youth.
The courageous ones Aʿta and Fuad,
For they do not fear death.
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The melody for “Min Sijn Aʿkka” is an adaptation of the indigenous 
Palestinian dabke song- type, ʿ alā dalʿ ūnā, played at an uncharacteristically 
slow tempo so as to emulate the mood and pace of a funeral procession 
(see example 2.2). Indeed at virtually every performance of this song I 
witnessed, audience members would carry each other through the crowd 
wrapped in the Palestinian flag or kūfīya, emulating a funeral march 
(evia 14- a0876).23 The confluence of martyrdom, death, and sacrifice 
here serves to position resistance to the British authorities within the field 
of the noble national struggle. According to Hussein Munther (Abu Ali), 
lead singer and founding member of al- ʿAshiqin, the power of this song 
lies in its “remembering of Palestinian freedom fighters who died fight-
ing foreign occupation.” Their struggle, and ultimate martyrdom, dating 
back over eighty years, positions the current nationalist movement within 
a much larger discourse of Palestinian history. “Min Sijn Aʿkka” plays on 
the popular myths of the Palestinian struggle for self- determination ex-
tending far beyond the current moment, highlighting a history of foreign 
occupation in Palestine dating back for over one hundred years.
Ironically, however, virtually everyone I talked to, musicians and en-
thusiasts alike, knew very little about the actual history of this song or of 
its martyred heroes. For many the song carried no actual referential mean-
ing other than to celebrate the sacrifices of the three youths and to recall a 
particularly cruel instrument of British subjugation, the gallows of Aʿkka 
Prison. The historical details of the protagonists’ execution were largely 
unnecessary for the song to carry its intended meaning. Unbeknownst 
to many of my interlocutors, the three celebrated freedom fighters at 
example 2.2. ✹ “Min Sijn Aʿkka” (From Aʿkka Prison) and Palestinian “ Aʿla 
Dalʿ una” variant. Transcription from author’s field notes.
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Aʿkka were executed for their participation in a massacre of noncombat-
ant Orthodox Jews in Hebron and Safad. Although the operation took 
place within a larger context of national struggle against Zionism and 
British occupation, according to historical records these celebrated mar-
tyrs were not soldiers against the British colonial administration at all or 
even against the expanding Zionist forces. They were, in fact, accomplices 
in a premeditated attack on two peaceful Jewish communities of Arabic- 
speaking Mizrahim, resulting in the death of nearly 130 people.24 Those 
with whom I inquired about this song were astonished to learn the real 
reasons the youths were executed. Several refused to believe my explana-
tion, and many said that they now looked at this song “in a very different 
light.” Others felt that the actual circumstances of the martyrs’ execution 
were irrelevant.
Regardless of its historical context, for Palestinian communities across 
the region “Min Sijn Aʿkka” remains a powerful testament to martyrdom 
and sacrifice in the cause of resistance to colonial authority. Across di-
verse political, religious, and socioeconomic fields, “Min Sijn Aʿkka” 
was the most often mentioned song of Palestinian self- determination. It 
seemed that every interview, conversation, or rehearsal would eventually 
turn to an interpretation of this song. Many cited its historical context 
and relevance for interpreting current events. Others found meaning in 
its didactic and commemorative capacities. Still others cited the use of in-
digenous folk song, melody, and rhythm. Yet virtually everyone asked re-
sponded that “Min Sijn Aʿkka” powerfully articulated national sentiment 
through sacrifice and martyrdom, forging a sense of belonging through 
resistance to foreign occupation. And while many other songs from this 
time period remain in the collective repertory, none has the relevance and 
stature as “Min Sijn Aʿkka.”
Given that many of Nuh Ibrahim’s rural audiences were likely unable 
to read or understand literary classical Arabic, this style of sung poetry 
in local dialect resonated with rural communities and spread from vil-
lage to village very quickly. While a great tradition of classical nationalist 
poetry had emerged from the work of Ibrahim Touqan (1905–41), Abd al- 
Rahim Mahmoud (1913–48), and Abd al- Karim al- Karmi (1911–84), none 
achieved the kind of grassroots impact as Nuh Ibrahim.25 Based in perfor-
mative politics, Ibrahim was the poet of the rural, nonliterate villagers. He 
personally fought alongside farmers and laborers against colonial powers, 
and carried forth the legacy of Izz al- Din al- Qassam in poetry and song. 
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On October 18, 1938, at the young age of twenty- five, Nuh Ibrahim fell to 
British forces in combat. Although his career as a political poet- singer 
lasted a mere four years (1935–38), the legacy of his work can be easily 
seen in his many compositions continually performed throughout north-
ern Palestine, across the West Bank, and into cultural centers like Jaffa, 
Haifa, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, and Jerusalem.
Indigenous Palestinian Music: Reflections on al- Nakba
The trauma of the 1936–39 Great Arab Revolt, coupled with an upsurge in 
anti- British Jewish terrorism and an embarrassing campaign to prevent 
illegal Jewish immigration, had by 1947 convinced British authorities it 
was time to bring in the international community to help ameliorate the 
growing demographic crisis in Palestine. In an attempt to avoid further 
conflict, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (unscop) 
recommended a formal partition of Palestine into two states (Arab and 
Jewish) whereby the proposed Jewish state would be allocated 55 percent 
of the territory; 40 percent would go to an Arab state; and Jerusalem and 
Bethlehem, given their multireligious significance, would remain under 
international jurisdiction.26 While the Jewish leadership rushed to accept 
the proposal, among local Palestinian and neighboring Arab leaders it 
was loudly rejected, on the grounds that while Jews constituted 31 per-
cent of the population in Palestine, they owned only 6 percent of the total 
land.27 Within weeks Palestine had fallen into civil war, with the heavily 
equipped, highly trained, and well- organized Jewish forces (Haganah) 
securing large swathes of Palestinian land. When the British formally ter-
minated the Palestine mandate on May 15, 1948, the Haganah had consoli-
dated defensible boundaries of the Jewish state, neutralized or destroyed 
“internal” Palestinian enemies, depopulated major Palestinian urban cen-
ters, and entrenched itself for a possible invasion by Arab forces.
As expected the armies of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq in-
vaded in an attempt to secure the territories allocated to the Palestinians 
in partition, launching a regional war lasting until the final Arab defeat 
in December 1948. The combined invasion failed as a result, among other 
factors, of divisive inter- Arab politics and rivalries, mismanagement, and 
inferior training and weaponry. In addition the Arab forces were largely 
unprepared, poorly equipped, out- strategized, and outnumbered by Jew-
ish forces.28 By the time each of the Arab states had concluded armis-
Poets, Singers, and Songs ✹ 57
tice agreements with the newly proclaimed state of Israel, nearly 750,000 
Palestinians had been displaced from their homes, and Palestine had been 
effectively partitioned into three areas (Israel, the Egyptian- administered 
Gaza Strip, and the Jordanian- administered West Bank).29 Palestinian 
refugees expelled from the parts of Palestine that fell within the borders of 
Israel were scattered across the region into makeshift camps (tent cities) 
administered by the United Nations Relief Works Agency (unrwa). Dur-
ing its first year 960,000 refugees were officially registered for relief by the 
United Nations.30
Popular memories of exile and dispossession pervade collections of in-
digenous music and poetry in the years immediately following al- nakba 
(the catastrophe) of 1948. Refugees gathered into various camps across 
the region expressed a great sense of loss and defeat through perfor-
mance. Manifest in both formal and informal social gatherings, perfor-
mance served as a catalyst for the formation of new national communities 
and identities in exile. Dislocated and disconnected from their ancestral 
villages, their families, and their communities, refugees were forced to 
reconceptualize and refashion their sense of self and the social relations 
that defined them as a national community. Indigenous social formations 
based on village or ḥamūla (larger kinship group) distinctions were main-
tained only with great effort as families were scattered across the region. 
In food, dress, accent, music, and dance, refugees attempted to preserve 
their indigenous village practices. However, as families were separated 
and disparate villages were conjoined into cramped spaces of exile, new 
social formations of dispossession and national suffering took shape.
The profound social and cultural transformation to life in the refugee 
camps was documented in the many proverbs, folk songs, poems, stories, 
and dances emanating from this newly formed community of exiles. A 
study of these texts reveals pervasive feelings of shock, dispossession, be-
wilderment, and uncertainty, leading eventually to a new awakening of 
Palestinian nationalism. Situated within new frames of power and mean-
ing, indigenous expressive practices provided intriguing depictions of 
cultural life apart from the state- sponsored propaganda found in radio, 
print, and other public media. Palestinian folklorists have since published 
extensive collections of these works (songs, poems, proverbs, embroidery, 
dances, and other popular arts) gathered from refugee communities in the 
years following 1948.31 Collectively the research carefully documents the 
performativity of exile, the infinite ways newly formed communities of 
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refugees struggled to make sense of their world. Through collective per-
formance, intricate cultural forums of dialogue, debate, and social inter-
action and new understandings of self, community, and nation began to 
sediment into everyday practice.
In addition many songs of al- nakba (1948) are carefully preserved in 
the common practices of artists active in the Palestinian diaspora. These 
songs remain in common practice as a performative means of historiciz-
ing and commemorating the lasting traumas of life in exile. In this sense 
performance carries the promise of historical transmission and the possi-
bility of challenge and intervention into a world overcome with despair.32 
When asked why it is important to sing the songs of al- nakba, musician 
Kamal Khalil replied:
We sing the songs from al- nakba to keep them alive. I want my 
children to know the lifeways of their grandparents [ṭarīq al- ḥay 
al- judūd], and every grandparent who lived the cold of ’48, [in] the 
tents, everything taken [from them], banished from their homes. 
The wounds of the previous generations are our wounds [ jarīḥhum 
jarīḥnā]. We must know their wounds to know ourselves. . . . Also, 
in singing these songs I feel I can make some change in that his-
tory. I can give hope in our return to our homes.
The mutually constitutive collections of Palestinian folk song, archived 
in published folklore of the past or kept alive in the repertories of the 
present, interconnect as researchers and artists alike attempt to preserve 
and perform the nation.
In the camps people from distant Palestinian villages were gathered 
into extremely close quarters. Maintaining cultural diversity and varia-
tions in dialect, dress, food, child rearing and other social practices be-
came primary means for camp dwellers to both maintain local identi-
ties and to situate themselves within the developing Palestinian national 
imaginary. Imagined through al- nakba, camp refugees shared spaces, 
narratives, and experiences that were foundational for the development 
of national and communal interests. In these camps, native villages were 
the primary means of self- identification and spatialization of one’s sur-
roundings. Elements of Palestinian indigenous practice and identity were 
inscribed literally into the camps’ walls, mapping streets and buildings 
with national meaning. For the people inhabiting these camps ancestral 
villages provided the catalyst for sociospatial organization. Streets were 
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demarcated by ancestral village affiliations, with those from larger villages 
capable of dominating camp politics over their smaller- village counter-
parts.33
According to several prominent Palestinian folklorists, indigenous 
music and dance, as embodied in the work of the shaʿr al- murtajal (poet- 
singer), thrived in the refugee camps.34 Poet- singers were put into service 
of the community, announcing directives from the unrwa administra-
tion as well as providing an important means of communicating local 
news and other events (births, engagements, weddings, deaths). The shaʿr 
was then brought in to provide the necessary entertainment for families 
at these events. Networks of traveling village poet- singers proved instru-
mental in preserving and maintaining Palestinian communal life in exile. 
Their repertories of sung poetry safeguarded village practices against era-
sure and maintained a vital performative link to the homeland.
ʿatābā
Music and music performance, manifest in the art of the shaʿr al- murtajal, 
opened up social spaces where issues of dispossession and exile could be 
negotiated among displaced refugees. These artists created a new reper-
tory of popular folklore that expressed their experiences of exile from 
within indigenous performative frames. Poet- singers drew from estab-
lished repertories of indigenous song and dance to maintain and preserve 
cultural practices and to communicate widespread feelings of loss and 
dispossession. The following stanzas of ʿatābā, collected by Nabil Aʿlqam, 
provide an interesting example of this phenomenon.35
They say that these times have left us in a precarious situation.
The victory of the Jews upon us is very strange.
In these times I have seen a marvel.
The lion, oh Arabs, is in the mouth of the rabbit.
He said, believe what I tell you.
If you complain to anyone but God you only humiliate yourself.
The stray dog has succeeded, and the lion has been humiliated.
The fledgling of the owl is the one who now hunts the eagle.
Struggling to come to grips with the defeat of the Arab armies, and the 
forced exile of more than 750,000 refugees, the shaʿr here describes a very 
precarious situation. The world has literally been turned upside down. It is 
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a marvel to behold “the lion . . . in the mouth of the rabbit.” In the second 
stanza the shaʿr takes on the role of social mediator or elder, prescribing 
how the dispersed Palestinian community ought to deal with their loss. 
Quoting a widespread Palestinian proverb, the poet- singer reminds his 
audience that “if you complain to anyone but God you only humiliate 
yourself.” To maintain a sense of dignity in this troubled time, one must 
never complain to anyone but God. Popular proverbs such as this, trans-
planted into communities of exile, became powerful performatives of his-
tory and practice. Similar to the findings of Jihad Racy and Steven Caton, 
whose research on the role of the poet in Arab society goes into far more 
detail, the poets’ primary stature lies in their ability to index formative 
structures of meaning, affirming the nation, based on a deep history of in-
digenous beliefs, practices, and values.36 In their performativity, proverbs, 
poetry, food, song, and dance formed a vital repertory of everyday prac-
tice, which in their reiteration gave materiality to the nation in exile.
The final two lines continue with the first stanza’s theme of astonish-
ment at the situation. The stray dog has humiliated the lion, and the fledg-
ling owl hunts the eagle. The language used here is significant in that it 
expresses a very specific cultural meaning. The Jewish army is depicted 
here as a stray dog, or wabash, while the Arabs are a lion, sabaʿ. In both 
Islamic and Palestinian belief and practice a wabash is defiled as unclean. 
The association of Jews as a stray dog signifies both a moral and religious 
depravity. The Zionists, like a stray dog, have wandered without an owner 
from Europe to Palestine, bringing with them moral injustice. Here, as 
in the above example of al- muḥāwara, the noble Arabs are portrayed as 
a once- triumphant lion and eagle, humiliated by the unclean and unjust. 
The final line speaks to a perceived reversal of power in the region. The 
powerful eagle, a common signifier of the Arab world in Nuh Ibrahim’s 
poetry, is now hunted by the fledgling owl. In the lead- up to the 1948 war 
few Palestinians anticipated such a resounding Zionist victory against the 
combined armies of the Arab world. Government propaganda had as-
sured Palestinians that the fighting would end in a matter of weeks, and 
they would then be able to return to their homes. In the war’s aftermath, 
however, many refugees were shocked to find all routes of return closed, 
their homes and property seized by the Israeli state and given to Jewish 
settlers. In this example of ʿatābā we witness a confluence of myriad cul-
tural meanings: humiliation, shame, astonishment, and surprise.
Structurally the ʿatābā is an improvisatory rendering of poetic qua-
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trains within a prescribed meter and rhyme scheme. The key to this rhyme 
scheme is imaginative and sometimes virtuosic wordplay: double mean-
ings, irony, satire, riddles, and metaphor. The core distinguishing feature 
of the ʿatābā is the implementation of a specific rhyme scheme ( jinās) 
based on the principle of homonym. Within each stanza there are four 
separate hemistitches of eleven to fifteen syllables based on the poetic pat-
tern al- wāfar. In this pattern hemistitches are constructed in three group-
ings of short and long syllables (s- 1 - 1 - 1 / s- 1 - 1 - 1 / s- 1 - 1). Four hemi-
stitches then join together to create one poetic stanza. In the structure of 
ʿatābā the first three hemistitches must follow al- jinās whereby each ends 
in a homonym (a word identical in pronunciation but different in mean-
ing). The fourth and final line must end in a word with the final syllable 
“āb.” This jinās produces a specific rhyming structure (aaab) that must be 
present in any performance.37 The importance of following the jinās of a 
given ʿatābā is paramount. Performers are largely judged on their ability to 
improvise stanzas that are salient in meaning, yet imaginative and inno-
vative in variations of the rhyme structure. The following transliteration 
of the previous example of ʿatābā reveals the structure of jinās.
qāl aḥwāl al- dahr khalatnā ʿajībā
antaṣār al- yihūd ʿalaynā ʿajībā
wa hadhā al- dahr shafat al- kam ʿajībā
sabaʿ yā ʿarab fī thum arnbā
qāl ʿatābā wa mā baḥat lak madhlā
wa al- shakwā lighīr Allah madhlā
al- wabash illī najaḥ wa al- sabaʿ dhlā
wa faraḥ al- būm yaṣṭād al- ʿaqāb
In the first stanza the shaʿr builds his rhyme structure on the homonym 
ʿa- j- b (to surprise or amaze). In its various forms ʿajībā takes on differ-
ent meanings. From line to line it fluctuates as an adjective, a noun, and 
a state or condition of being. The final line ends the jinās with the word 
arnbā (rabbit). Given that the word arnbā does not end in the prescribed 
long vowel sound “āb,” it is most likely that the shaʿr switched the final two 
letters in performance in order to complete the desired rhyme scheme. 
In performance it is quite common, if not expected, for the poet- singer 
to mispronounce words in order to preserve the prescribed rhythmo- 
poetic structure. Indigenous folk poetry such as this is valued purely in 
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its ephemeral utterance, as a live performative or process, rather than as a 
finished product in its written form.
In performance, the ʿatābā begins with a long- sustained, descend-
ing melisma on the syllable “Oūf ” in maqām bayātī.38 As a sign of great 
pathos, pain, and suffering, the vocalist uses this improvisatory melisma 
to showcase his vocal talents before an audience of attentive listeners. This 
line is often repeated following each verse of poetry. Among performers 
the ʿatābā is widely considered to be the highest form of Palestinian sung 
poetry. In terms of popularity the ʿatābā is widely heard throughout rural 
and urban performance contexts. Shepherds and farmers typically sing 
ʿatābā during their daily work in the countryside. Hired poet- singers im-
provise continuous stanzas of ʿatābā at evening celebrations. Weddings, 
engagements, circumcisions, baptisms, and calendar festivals all provide 
opportunity for participants to contribute improvised and precomposed 
stanzas of ʿatābā (evia 14- a3387).39
ʿalā dalʿūnā, yā ẒarīF al- Ṭūl, and al- shurūqī
In contrast to the unmetered improvisatory ʿ atābā, indigenous Palestinian 
music is equally structured around the canon of rhythmic folk songs as-
sociated with the Palestinian line dance, al- dabke. Among the immense 
repertory of standard Palestinian dabke tunes, two stand out as the most 
prominent in contemporary performance practice: ʿalā dalʿ ūnā and yā 
ẓarīf al- ṭūl. In the following example of ʿalā dalʿ ūnā, collected in the years 
following al- nakba (1948), the poet- singer expresses a deep longing for 
the homeland, embodied in an imaginative conversation with a nightin-
gale (see example 2.3).
It has been a long time since my exile and separation
I swear to you, oh nightingale, send my yearnings.
To the beloved land I miss.
And I have only just arrived.
Oh beaches of Yaffa, tell me your news.
I have opened your sands, and know your secrets.
I await your birds, and ask your visitors,
Are you still loyal to me, or have you forgotten?
We boarded the boat, we put ourselves in it.
Oh sun of my country, we are deprived of you now.
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Please tell my mother to be content with me.
I pray to you, oh God.
I await your birds, and ask your visitors,
Are you still loyal to me, or have you forgotten?
The participatory dance structure of ʿalā dalʿ ūnā, with its pounding 
rhythms and quick pace, is predominantly used to accompany a dabke 
line dance (evia 14- a1093).40 Among performers it is perhaps the most 
common dabke song- type, found in melodic variants throughout the re-
gion. Its stanzas are structured around a simple poetic scheme whereby 
quatrains are broken into four distinct hemistitches. Each of the first three 
hemistitches rhymes while the fourth and final hemistitch ends in the 
long syllable “nā” (aaab, cccb, and so on). However the most idiomatic 
characteristic of the ʿalā dalʿ ūnā is its basic rhythmic and melodic pattern 
(see figure 2.5). While there are slight melodic variations found through-
out the region, in virtually all cases the recurring twelve- beat rhythmic 
pattern of the ʿalā dalʿ ūnā remains intact. Three measures of duple (2/4) 
time are repeated, with strong, heavy emphasis placed on the downbeats. 
Melodic and rhythmic emphasis on these downbeats becomes manifest 
in the prescribed dabke step associated with ʿalā dalʿ ūnā, wāḥid wa nūs 
(evia 14- a6184).41
In stark contrast to the more introspective and virtuosic poetics of 
the ʿatābā, the ʿalā dalʿ ūnā is not intended to showcase the improvisatory 
talents of the vocalist. Rather as a structured dance tune, the ʿalā dalʿ ūnā 
is valued precisely for the participatory feelings of community it engen-
ders in the dabke line. Its often- lighthearted rhetoric, improvised in per-
formance, serves to inspire and sustain intense participation among the 
dancers. Performances of the ʿalā dalʿ ūnā are judged not entirely on the 
creative wordplay of the vocalist, but rather on the level of social solidarity 
felt among dancing participants.
In its underlying poetics, the ʿalā dalʿ ūnā differs from the ʿatābā in its 
use of more simplistic colloquial texts and patterns. Stanzas of ʿatābā 
example 2.3. ✹ “ Aʿlā Dalʿ ūnā” melody variant. Transcription from author’s field notes.
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follow the classically structured pattern, al- wāfar, and performers often 
embellish their lines with linguistic markers of classical Arabic. The ʿalā 
dalʿ ūnā instead follows the more simplistic poetic pattern, al- basīṭ, and 
typically drops markers of classical Arabic linguistics, such as al- tanwīn 
and al- madda. Several poets I worked with spoke of al- basīt as the “ass of 
poetic meters” given that “all poets can effectively mount it.”42 It consists 
of two identical hemistitches each constituted by a schema of five long 
syllables grouped in three (ṣadr) and two ( aʿjaz) (1- 1 - 1, 1- 1 / 1 - 1 - 1, 1- 1). 
The following transliteration reveals the structural rhyming pattern of the 
above ʿalā dalʿ ūnā. In each of the first three lines the poet rhymes on the 
syllables “āqī,” cadencing the stanza with the required long syllable “nā.”
ṭālat al- gharba wa- ṭāl al- farāqī
bā Allah yā ṭīr tabalagh ashwāqī
li- 1 - arḍ al- ḥabība anā mashtāqī
wa ba dʿ mā al- gharba ṣārat sanīnā
Normative performances of ʿalā dalʿ ūnā involve a vocalist surrounded 
by a circling line of dabke dancers. Either the Palestinian indigenous flute, 
shabāba, or double clarinet, yarghūl, accompanies the singer, providing 
melodic commentary between stanzas and otherwise maintaining the 
melodic structure of the piece. Rhythmic accompaniment is provided by 
the ṭabla (ṭabla baladi) or darbuka and is supplemented with the uni-
son sound of the dancers’ stomping feet. As the ʿalā dalʿ ūnā is most often 
performed in celebratory contexts, such as weddings and engagements, 
topics usually focus on love, praise, longing, and overcoming obstacles to 
be with beloved ones. As evidenced in the above example, however, poet- 
singers commonly modified their lyrics following al- nakba to reflect love 
and longing of the homeland, praising steadfastness, and overcoming 
great tragedy to one day reunite with the beloved nation.
Among the repertory of dabke songs, yā ẓarīf al- ṭūl ranks just below 
ʿalā dalʿ ūnā in terms of popularity and importance to indigenous per-
formance practice. Its poetic structure conforms loosely to the classical 
pattern, al- ramal, in which each hemistitch is broken into three group-
ings of five, five, and four syllables (1- 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 / 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 / 1 - 1 - 1 - s). 
In performance, however, there can be significant modifications to this 
poetic structure based on regional variation and the poetic license of the 
performer. Very few poet- singers conceptualize these song- types in terms 
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of formal structure. Rather it is far more common for poets to conceptu-
alize each of these song- types in terms of its idiomatic melodic pattern-
ing. In performance then, the vocalist will simply improvise contextually 
appropriate lyrics that seem to “fit” within the rhythmo- poetic pattern 
of the melody line. This often involves lengthening or shortening words 
and phrases to sustain the melody line. The rhyme scheme of the yā ẓarīf 
al- ṭūl is identical to the ʿalā dalʿ ūnā in that the first three hemistitches fol-
low the same rhyme while the fourth and final hemistitch must end in 
the long syllable “nā.” In terms of melody and rhythm, however, the two 
song- types are quite different (see example 2.4).
Literally translated as “oh tall and slender one,” singers will often em-
ploy the yā ẓarīf al- ṭūl to praise the physical attributes of their beloved 
(long neck, slender waist, pretty smile, wide eyes, and so on). Lighthearted 
stanzas meant for common entertainment at weddings and engagements 
typically string together descriptions of female beauty and sexual long-
ing. However, so as to avoid transgressing the boundaries of socially ac-
ceptable behavior and decorum, poets routinely craft elaborate metaphors 
and double entendre to best communicate their message. Other topics 
may include aspects of social life (courtship, flirtation, family disagree-
ments) and the negotiation of appropriate engendered behavior (qualities 
of being a good man or woman, permissible social interaction between 
sexes). More politicized texts discuss the difficulties of exile, the status of 
the refugee, and separation and suffering of families. Much like the above 
ʿalā dalʿ ūnā, the following example of yā ẓarīf al- ṭūl, collected in the years 
following al- nakba, depicts pervasive feelings of separation and exile. The 
singer, returning from war, seeks his missing parents, only to realize they 
have fled to Syria. Themes of lost loved ones, longing, and detachment are 
quite common in the folk songs of the region more generally, reflecting a 
kind of nomadism common to life in Bilad al- Sham due to conscription 
into the Ottoman army, seasonal labor, and migration (evia 14- a5646).43
example 2.4. ✹ “Yā ẓarīf al- ṭūl” basic melody structure. Transcription from author’s 
field notes.
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yā ẓarīf al- ṭūl (oh tall and slender one) where are my parents now?
To Bilad al- Sham (the combined area of Syria, Lebanon, and 
Jordan) they packed up everything and were scattered.
I hope that the Zionist eyes burn to ashes.
For they have scattered the youth from our homeland.
yā ẓarīf al- ṭūl where shall I go?
My heart is wounded, and the wounds are deep.
And for the armies of the enemy, I wish their destruction.
For they have scattered the youth from our homeland.
Anger, blame, frustration, and revenge also constitute fundamental 
themes in the songs of al- nakba (1948). Framed within the deliberative 
structures of poetic dueling and debate, poets would often censure the 
many leaders of the Arab world for their incompetence and the interna-
tional community for their failures to recognize Palestinian suffering. In 
the following ʿalā dalʿ ūnā the singer accuses the Arab League of treason 
for refusing to support the Palestinians. The repeated use of village names 
lost to Zionist forces in 1948 acts as an important marker of locality and 
exilic identification.
Aʿkka, Haifa, and a long list of villages
Were unfortunately sold in a dirty act [cheaply]
Baisan calls out and al- Lyd and al- Ramla
Where did the Arabs go and abandon us?
Likewise in the following ʿatābā feelings of loss are coupled with a pro-
found sense of abandonment by the Arab forces.
I apologize to the playgrounds of our childhood, the owl wept to 
me
We left it, expelled, wailing
I wish I had died
And not have witnessed the betrayal of the Arabs
Anger and blame leveled against the combined Arab leadership reso-
nates throughout the music and poetry of the time. Countless verses of 
ʿatābā, shurūqīya, and murabaʿ accuse the Arab armies of paralysis, in-
competence, and ineptitude in their defeat to Jewish forces. The following 
shurūqī, originally collected in the early 1950s and later published by Nabil 
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Aʿlqam, remains an important song in the contemporary performance 
repertory of singer Adnan Odeh.44 Although Odeh’s live version of this 
shurūqī differs slightly from the published version in text, I have included 
Aʿlqam’s archival version below.
While the sacrificers [freedom fighters] and the nation were at 
Baruj al- ʿĀj
You were arguing over who would lead the troops [be President]
Your weapons were bankrupted while their armies were in need
And they returned, disgraced
While the enemy was abusing our land
We were begging of them [the Arab leaders], but they said, “there 
were no weapons”
Palestine complained, you massacred her
Liberate my heart, where are the Arabs to protect her?
They left humiliated, the lowly and dishonorable
When the colonizers asked them to leave
They did not serve like a loyal/faithful son
The fire burns those who touch it.
The shurūqī is a very common Palestinian song- type commonly asso-
ciated with the quieter, more contemplative moments of a wedding or 
similar life- cycle event or celebration. Among performers it is consid-
ered to be of high aesthetic and performative value because of its classical 
poetic structure and virtuosic manner of realization. Often likened to the 
classical qaṣīda, the shurūqī relies heavily on the poetic meter al- basīṭ, 
with stanzas composed of two hemistitches following a prescribed rhyme 
scheme. This rhyme scheme varies in performance. Typically the shu-
rūqī is identified by an alternating rhyme scheme between hemistitches 
(abab, abab, and so on). However, the above example follows a rhyme 
scheme whereby the first three hemistitches of each stanza rhyme, while 
the fourth hemistitch ends in the long vowel sound “hā” (see appendix 1). 
This fourth cadential rhyme recurs in each of the final hemistitches of 
every subsequent stanza (aaab, cccb, dddb, and so on). Similar to the 
ʿatābā, the shurūqī is performed as a series of unmetered melodic ex-
temporizations of the prescribed maqām (mode). These melodic extem-
porizations are preceded by a long, drawn- out descending melisma on 
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the syllable “Oūf.” However, unlike the ʿatābā, the shurūqī is realized in 
maqām sīga, where primary melodic emphasis centers around the inter-
val between the first (e half- flat) and third (g) notes of the scale. Poet- 
singers will typically employ the shurūqī for long narratives or running 
dialogue composed around a specific topic or occasion. Common topics 
and themes include didactic stories of chivalry, heroism, remembrance, 
and commemoration. These topics are found throughout the region and 
predate the Palestinian nationalist movement. Yet given these historical 
associations it is little wonder that poets would seize on this particular 
song- type in their assessments and remembrances of al- nakba. This par-
ticular shurūqī illustrates a fascinating moment of reflection, anger, and 
debate within the Palestinian refugee community in the years follow-
ing al- nakba. Here the Arab armies, believed to be a liberating force for 
Palestine, are denounced for their incompetence, unpreparedness, and 
inability to put aside their quarrels and collectively fight for Palestinian 
self- determination.
In the above examples, the ʿatābā, ʿalā dalʿ ūnā, yā ẓarīf al- ṭūl, and shu-
rūqī all provide a performative means of communicating prominent 
issues of astonishment, loss, anger, and blame. Depending on the context 
of the performance, performers freely shifted between these various song- 
types, at times breaking off into a dabke or stopping dance movement all 
together for more intimate presentational singing. Freely navigating be-
tween these song types, the poet- singer attempted to forge a performa-
tive environment based on his own inspiration, the perceived collective 
feelings of participants, and the overall flow of the event. The poet’s im-
provisations led participants through an aesthetic and emotional terrain 
of dance and contemplation, from exuberance and joy to longing and 
lament. Throughout such performances the interaction between partici-
pants and shaʿr was essential to the overall success of the event. Dialogue 
and interaction between participants through prescribed and exclama-
tory responses created a sonic environment of community and nation. 
With their bodies and voices, participants collectively lamented a shared 
condition of exile and affirmed a cultural stance of patience and steadfast-
ness in awaiting a return to their ancestral homes.
Poets, Singers, and Songs ✹ 69
Pan- Arabism, Ṣumūd (Steadfastness),  
and Ṣabr (Patience): 1948–1967
In the aftermath of 1948’s al- nakba the defeated leaders of the combined 
Arab armies scrambled to assess the damages and to secure their hege-
mony in the region. Though devastating, the defeat of the Arab forces 
served primarily as a catalyst for existing forces of social and political 
change. While true that within ten years every Arab head of state who 
fought against Jewish forces in 1948 was removed from power either 
through assassination, coup, or revolution, it is perhaps overly simplistic 
to attribute the ensuing political and social transformation to one fate-
ful event.45 The conventional historical narrative that such widespread 
transformation could be attributed only to Israeli military ascendance, 
Palestinian humanitarian crises, and the reordering of regional socioeco-
nomic power dynamics often obfuscates the entire picture, foreground-
ing a distinct Palestinian perspective and conceding an Israeli hegemony 
yet to be fully formed. The Arab social and political landscape following 
the 1948 war was in a process of dramatic transformation wherein a new 
wave of progressive military officers seized power from the old guard of 
feudal corruption and colonially pliant monarchies. Yet the ensuing trans-
formation was indicative of the rise of a new pan- Arabist ideological for-
mation deemed essential to confronting new social and political chal-
lenges. While the 1948 war is often cited as the watershed moment for 
this transformation, evidence would suggest that it was but one of several 
formative phases of ideological change. Regardless, the ensuing struggle 
for hegemony in the region following 1948 drove Arab state policy for the 
next twenty years, with Jamal ʿabd al- Nasser and his project of pan- Arab 
socialism emerging as the dominant sociopolitical discourse.
In Nasser many Arabs found a powerful new voice for change. His style 
was assertive and independent, and he was dedicated to the construc-
tion of a new Arab republic free of its imperial past and pointed toward a 
bright new socialist future. Through his intense energy and drive Nasser 
kindled a spirit of hope and belief in the strength of the Arab world to 
confront external colonial pressures and to redeem the great Arab nation. 
During his tenure as president he gave the region its first truly dynamic 
leader, one charismatic enough to unite the Arab world against foreign 
colonialism.
For many Palestinian refugees now scattered across Lebanon, Syria, 
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and Jordan, Nasser embodied a new future, and a new hope for return. 
Like many of the members of his Free Officers corps, Nasser fought in the 
1948 war and personally suffered the humiliating defeat to Israeli forces. 
The Free Officers overthrew the Egyptian monarchy of King Faruq in a 
spirit of progressive reform aimed at ending the British colonial presence 
in Egypt and eliminating the government’s dependence on foreign pa-
tronage. Through a reformation of the Arab states based on the principles 
of freedom, Arabism, and socialism, it was widely believed that Nasser’s 
leadership would usher in a new era of strength and autonomy in the re-
gion. Among other things, the Free Officers’ project for social reform was 
largely seen among Palestinian refugees throughout Bilad al- Sham as an 
important step forward in the quest to reclaim their lost homes and liveli-
hood.46 Throughout the communities of displaced refugees looking for 
answers, Nasser presented a new hope for an end to their exile. The fol-
lowing al- muraba ,ʿ performed by Palestinian poet- singers in the camps of 
Jordan, captures this spirit of hope and change.47
We want to tell you the news
A story of our courageous people
To inform you of what happened
To our Arabic nation
Fear drives America
They are shaking with fear
Scared of the Arab people’s advance
Toward freedom
They said the high dam is not developing We said the fight is 
necessary
Aʿbd al- Nasser, oh Jamal The hero of our Arab nation
You are our hope And the manifestation of our dreams
Likewise a similar al- murabaʿ collected in Jordan in the 1950s provides 
an example of the kind of support Nasser received from the Palestinian 
refugee community.
It is written on our foreheads Aʿbd al- Nasser is our beloved
It is written on our hearts Aʿbd al- Nasser is our beloved
Jamal served the Arab identity
And humiliation to Nuri al- Saʿid
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Nasser asserted his leadership and ideals of Arabism through a variety 
of overt and subtle means. Cairo had long been the cultural and media 
capital of the Arab world, with its radio program Voice of the Arabs reach-
ing homes across the region. Under Nasser’s direction the number and 
power of Egyptian radio stations expanded to the extent that transmit-
ters placed along the borders could reach Arab audiences in neighbor-
ing countries. Dueling propagandist radio programming broadcast from 
Egypt and Jordan provided a popular forum through which many of the 
ideologies of pan- Arab nationalism were played out. Both Nasser and 
newly crowned King Hussein of Jordan fought a bitter campaign for 
dominance over the nightly radio airwaves. Political commentary, slan-
der campaigns, and state propaganda were employed to maintain power 
and secure hegemony among their respective constituencies. In this way 
political song became one of the more potent means for instilling the 
precepts of pan- Arab nationalism among the people. Among Palestinian 
refugees living under Hashemite rule, support for Nasser’s leadership 
came with a heavy price. Those publicly supporting Nasser’s leadership 
subjected themselves to government harassment and arrest. Poet- singers 
wishing to sing in support of Nasser were therefore compelled to incor-
porate subtle political messages, codes, or double meanings into their 
poetry. The following verse of ʿatābā reveals one such poetic maneuver. 
Here the poet incorporates the letters j- m- a- 1 into the third hemistitch as 
a means to covertly lend support to the Egyptian president.48
Upon us, they blame
And we yearn to be united
If it was not for j- m- a- 1
Oh world, the Arabs would not rise
Legendary Arab composers and performers, many Egyptian but not 
all so, were also instrumental in creating music in support of the state’s 
project of solidifying Nasser’s leadership. Likewise the Egyptian movie 
industry produced and disseminated thinly veiled political propaganda 
in an attempt to destabilize neighboring regimes in Jordan and Syria.49 
In particular Jordan’s King Hussein was constantly berated and slandered 
on the Egyptian airwaves as a British lackey and a traitor to the Pales-
tinian cause. By less explicit methods, Nasserist ideology found voice 
in the many famous Egyptian singers of the era. Mohammad Aʿbd al- 
Wahab, Aʿbd al- Halim Hafez, and the legendary Umm Kulthum were all 
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vital mouthpieces for the regime. Umm Kulthum, for example, identified 
greatly with Nasser and rededicated herself to singing nationalist songs 
upon his ascension to power. In the years 1952−60 nearly 50 percent of her 
repertory dealt with nationalist themes.50
These songs expressed through music many of the fundamental ideals 
of Nasserism: progressive reformation, Arabism, and the ascendance of 
the Arab world into “modernity.” To this end, nationalist songs were ar-
ranged for large- scale orchestras incorporating many Western instru-
ments, harmonies, and compositional devices. These songs were typically 
martial compositions based on a strict duple “march- esque” meter. Large 
male choruses typically accompanied the lead singer, and texts exalted 
the united Arab nation, its shared religion, history, and cultural identity. 
Unquestionably the vast majority of nationalist songs produced and per-
formed at this time were directed toward an Egyptian audience. However 
several did make mention of Palestinian issues, namely the liberation of 
“Arab lands” and the collective struggle against colonial expansion. For 
the great Arab singers and composers of the day to be performing songs 
of Palestinian liberation only reinforced and affirmed the idea that Pales-
tinians, though scattered throughout the region, were not alone in their 
struggle. More importantly the doctrine of progressive reformism em-
bodied by Nasserist Egypt provided an escape from the historically en-
trenched, politically closed systems of patronage prevalent during Otto-
man and later British occupations of Palestine.
mohammad ʿabd al- wahab
The preeminent composer and performer of the time, Egyptian Moham-
mad Aʿbd al- Wahab, was perhaps the most effective and pronounced 
advocate for Nasser and the pan- Arab state. His work was instrumental 
in spreading and generating pan- Arab nationalist sentiment across the 
region. Among Palestinians struggling to survive in the camps, pan- Arab 
nationalist songs were influential insofar as they instilled a sense of hope 
for an eventual return to their homes and villages. In the tenets of pan- 
Arabism the liberation of Palestine was viewed as a shared Arab responsi-
bility, and many Palestinians were comforted by the notion that the great 
Arab powers were actively working for their repatriation. Especially in the 
few songs that overtly expressed support for Palestinian liberation, Aʿbd 
al- Wahab’s large- scale orchestral compositions were iconic of the pro-
gressive reformism espoused by the Egyptian state.
Poets, Singers, and Songs ✹ 73
 “al- watan al- akbar” (the great nation)
Aʿbd al- Wahab’s 1962 composition “Al- Watan al- Akbar” (The great na-
tion) is perhaps the most prominent example of this style of pan- Arab 
nationalist song. Composed at the behest of Nasser himself in 1961, “Al- 
Watan al- Akbar” is a large- scale musical celebration of the pan- Arab 
nation. Given the recent succession of Syria from the United Arab Re-
public (uar) the previous year, many have suggested that “Al- Watan al- 
Akbar” was intended to be a corrective of waning pan- Arabist sentiment. 
It was believed by many Palestinian musicians that Nasser commissioned 
this production in an attempt to reinvigorate, through grandiose musical 
spectacle, a final push for his pan- Arabist dream of a United Arab Repub-
lic. Aʿbd al- Halim Hafez (Egypt), Sabah (Lebanon), Fayza Ahmad (Iraq/
Syria), Najat al- Saghira (Syria), Shadiya (Egypt), and Warda (Algeria) all 
lent their voices to its production, suggesting the promise of Arab unity 
in song. Egyptian nationalist poet Ahmad Shafik Kamal composed the 
lyrics, and Aʿbd al- Wahab himself composed the melody and arranged 
the orchestrations. He also served as the maestro for its broadcast and 
recording. To cap things off, the famed Egyptian filmmaker ʿIzz al- Din 
Zulfikar was solicited to direct and choreograph the television broadcast 
of its premiere performance.
The televised broadcast of “Al- Watan al- Akbar” was an amazing spec-
tacle of nationalist signs and imagery and clearly demarcated the stylis-
tic and aesthetic differences between Aʿbd al- Wahab’s propagandist com-
positions and his earlier classical compositions.51 The standard Egyptian 
firqa (orchestra) was expanded considerably, incorporating a line of 
eight Western flutes and piccolos and four snare drums (signs of military 
parades and martial performance). All purely Arab instruments normally 
included in the standard Aʿbd al- Wahab orchestra (ʿūd, qanūn, naī, and 
tabla) were omitted from the composition. The use of instruments na-
tive to Western military drum corps (field snares, piccolos) produced the 
effect of a modern military march. Two large uniformed choruses (one 
male and the other female) supplemented the orchestra and provided an 
iconic sign of “the Arab masses” singing together in solidarity. With this 
a large regiment of uniformed men and women marched in formation 
across the stage carrying flags representative of each of the Arab nations. 
They marched in step to a quick duple meter as the chorus sang the intro-
duction, composed in major mode. The maestro, Aʿbd al- Wahab himself, 
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stood center stage atop a lighted platform in a tuxedo, conducting the 
masses with baton and a stoic look on his face. Periodically in the produc-
tion he was shown in close- up with a projected image of the various flags 
of the Arab world in the background over his shoulders. As with many of 
the aspects discussed here, the indexical, co- occurrence of national sign 
clusters (flags, fashion, gesture, and musical device) served to create and 
reinforce an asserted image of the unified pan- Arab nation inclusive of 
its cultural diversity. The imagery is one of an asserted possible national 
solidarity generated through the juxtaposition of various nationalist sign 
clusters. From behind the orchestra a second platform arose, bringing a 
singing Aʿbd al- Halim Hafez into view:
Waṭanī [my nation], my love, the greatest nation,
its triumph fills its life, each day its glories expand
My nation grows and liberates
My nation, my nation
My nation, my angel, your love is in my heart
One who called out for great unity, you are great, the greatest
You realized the beauty of the revolution
From all of its being, from all of its immortality,
Oh my nation, my beloved nation
The chorus responded with the operatic refrain as Aʿbd al- Halim was 
lowered beneath the stage. Moments later a finely dressed Sabah emerged 
on the same platform to sing the next verse. With each verse a different 
Arab singer would ascend from behind the stage to sing the virtues of a 
united Arab world, celebrating its unity and difference. In their idiom-
atic performance each of the Arab singers creatively indexed the cultural 
heritage of his or her homeland, either overtly through text or inadver-
tently through a noticeable accent, while at the same time glorifying the 
strength of the combined Arab nation.
Through each verse scenes of Arab folk life and practice were re-
enacted in the background behind each soloist. Men and women wear-
ing traditional Arab dress were shown mimicking indigenous dance and 
labor, saluting the flags, and marching together in unison. Finally, after 
the last verse, Aʿbd al- Halim ascended to the stage accompanied by all of 
the other soloists to reprise one final unison chorus. The concluding scene 
situated the combined voices of the soloists together over the maestro’s 
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right shoulder. Aʿbd al- Wahab’s profile and waving baton framed this 
final scene, with the orchestra and famous vocalists following his lead in 
locked time.
While “Al- Watan al- Akbar” played on the meanings inherent in 
Nasser’s ideals of socialism and pan- Arabism, other Aʿbd al- Wahab com-
positions were more focused toward specific nationalist issues. For ex-
ample, “Filastin” (Palestine) (1949) directly responded to the 1948 war by 
urging the collective Arab nation to redeem the Palestinian homeland. 
Similar national compositions were written for Syria (“Damashq”) and 
Kuwait (“Kuwait”). “Anashid al- Jihad” (Song of struggle), “Anashid al- 
Qassam” (Song of al- Qassam), and “Batal al- Thawra” (Heroes of the revo-
lution) all spoke to the heroic deeds of those fighting for the redemption 
of the Arab world against its enemies. “Sawt al- Jamahir” (Voice of the 
masses), “Huriyat Aʿrdina” (Freedom of our lands), “Al- Jil al- Saʿid” (The 
rising generation), and “Al- Shahid” (The martyr) all glorified the sacri-
fices of those who have struggled in the Arab revolution. In total Aʿbd 
al- Wahab wrote nearly fifty nationalist compositions during his career, 
many of which had a substantial impact and following among Palestini-
ans in diaspora.
Aʿbd al- Wahab’s nationalist compositions during the period leading 
up to 1967 were quite popular for several reasons. First, they espoused 
and affirmed the dominant sociopolitical discourse of the time, acting as 
a cross- modal mouthpiece for Nasser’s regime. Second, through Aʿbd al- 
Wahab’s hybridized compositional processes, incorporating Western in-
strumentation, harmonies, rhythm, and performance practice, he created 
a very strong iconicity between the progressive reforms and innovations 
of the state and the progressive innovations of his music. Nasserist ideals 
of Arabism, socialism, and nationalism were very much born of a cosmo-
politan discourse of modernist reformism whereby new cultures, politics, 
and practices were to “be forged as a synthesis of the ‘best’ or ‘most valu-
able’ aspects of local ‘traditional’ culture and ‘the best’ of foreign ‘mod-
ern’ lifeways and technologies.”52 Aʿbd al- Wahab’s compositional pro-
cess uniquely mapped onto this discourse by folding Western classical art 
music elements (major scales, harmony, duple- meter rhythms, timbre, 
dynamic contrast, instrumentation) and practices (dress, use of a conduc-
tor, rehearsed movements and formations) into indigenous Arab compo-
sitional style to synergize conceptions of the “Arab” and “modern” worlds. 
In such performances the Arab world, indexed through language, instru-
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mentation, melodic device, could be performatively reconceptualized as 
modern through a dynamic coupling with Western aesthetics and prac-
tices.53 Third, Nasser’s virtual control of transnational media in the region 
meant that artists such as Aʿbd al- Wahab and his catalogue of nationalist 
songs had a near total monopoly on state media: radio, television, and 
cinema. By sheer media presence and repetition Aʿbd al- Wahab’s nation-
alist songs were to have a substantial social impact across the region.
Nevertheless it should be noted that throughout this period of expand-
ing Arabist sentiment, indigenous Palestinian song continued among 
displaced refugee communities. The two musical repertories coexisted, 
one delivered via state radio broadcast and the other through indigenous 
sociomusical rituals and practices (gatherings, weddings, engagements, 
festivals, and so on). In the refugee camps especially, indigenous music 
was an essential means of preserving a distinct Palestinian national iden-
tity, rooted in the local practices of its displaced communities. Life events 
and informal social gatherings (diwānīn) of village leaders (mukhātar) 
were perhaps the most common spaces in which such rituals took place. 
These diwānīn routinely formed at various nodes in the camps, open 
spaces, or in the interstices of tents and alleyways. Young children often 
participated in these events by watching and listening to their elders sing 
stories of their native villages and their varying experiences of exile.54 The 
importance of the diwānīn as a primary site for the articulation of Pales-
tinian identity in the years following al- nakba was commonly cited by the 
many musicians, poets, and folklorists with whom I worked. For these 
artists and researchers, the performative spaces of the diwānīn enabled 
the emergence of a national consciousness from within cramped spaces 
of exile and dispossession.
As opposing forces, state-sponsored propaganda and  indigenous musi-
cal practices existed simultaneously. Each provided an important counter-
balance of social and political commentary. At times, the two coincided 
in their belief in the liberation of Palestine through Arabism and the re-
patriation of displaced refugees. In poetics the two soundscapes were 
quite different and occupied vastly different social and performative 
spaces. Nevertheless each had a profound impact on the development of 
Palestinian protest song. The dueling discourses of Palestinian indigeneity 
and pan- Arab cosmopolitanism commingled in political song and pre-
sented contrasting notions of national resistance idiomatic to the contexts 
of their articulation. In the recovery years, following al- nakba resistance 
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meant maintaining a steadfastness and patience in exile while the powers 
of pan- Arabism worked to repatriate refugees to their homes. Although 
by no means the only available option, alignment with Egypt was perhaps 
the most popular means of seeking this repatriation. Palestinian protest 
song therefore operated along two contrasting poles: one designed to pre-
serve and maintain a distinct Palestinian indigeneity in exile, the other 
engineered to propel a pan- Arabist project of cultural assimilation. In a 
unique intermingling of cultural politics and power, music in the years 
following al- nakba essentialized Palestinian locality while simultaneously 
advocating for a regionally defined national identity formation.
3
al- naksa and the emergence of political song (1967–1987)
The June War of 1967, Sheikh Imam, and  
the Emergence of Modern Arab Political Song
Despite severe infighting between the various Arab states, Nasser held to 
his dreams of creating a pan- Arab nation under his leadership. However, 
with a depleted Egyptian economy and a costly military intervention in 
Yemen, Nasser was never able to effectively realize that dream. So when 
an intelligence report stated that Israel was planning a large- scale military 
operation against Syria in retaliation for several Palestinian attacks that 
had been launched from within Syrian borders, Nasser immediately took 
the opportunity to bolster his regional presence by deploying his troops in 
the Sinai in an act of solidarity with the Syrian regime. By all accounts this 
was pure posturing, as Nasser did not have the means to wage a protracted 
war with Israel at the time. Nevertheless it was a move that proved success-
ful in reaffirming Arabism and Nasser’s role as the great Arab leader of the 
moment. Riding the waves of anti- Israel rallies and demonstrations, Nasser 
was emboldened further, requesting that all un forces be redeployed from 
the Sinai. He later took up military positions at Sharm al- Sheikh and im-
posed a blockade of Israeli shipping lines into the port of Elat.
In retrospect historians now realize that Nasser was most likely bluff-
ing in these actions, expecting either the United States or the Soviet 
Union to intervene and deflate the situation. He was in no position to 
enter into a second war with Israel while major segments of the army were 
still bogged down in a prolonged civil war in Yemen.1 However no such 
intervention came, and soon Nasser found himself in a position from 
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which he could not back down. Jordan’s King Hussein, struggling him-
self to maintain control of the waves of anti- Israel sentiment filling the 
streets, felt compelled to come to Nasser’s aid, signing a mutual defense 
pact on May 30, 1967.
Sensing the escalation in military activity and the build- up of Arab 
forces around Nasser’s leadership, the Israeli government took the posi-
tion that the blockade of the Straits of Tiran could not be tolerated. Thus 
on June 5, 1967, the Israeli air force launched a preemptive attack on air 
bases throughout Egypt. Within a matter of hours Israeli bombers had 
destroyed most of the Egyptian air force before a single plane had left the 
ground. When Syria and Jordan entered the fight, they, too, were quickly 
dispatched by the Israeli air force. Without an Arab presence in the skies, 
Israel easily defeated the Egyptian forces, seizing the Sinai to the eastern 
bank of the Suez Canal. Jordanian forces were also driven out of East Jeru-
salem and the West Bank, while Syria lost control of the Golan Heights. 
Within a span of a mere six days, Israel had defeated three Arab armies, 
and gained control of Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan, 
and the entire Sinai Peninsula. However the greatest Israeli advance was 
made not in territory, but in psychology. In defeating the combined Arab 
armies Israel had humiliated Nasser and put a final end to the dream of 
Arabism and the collective liberation of Palestine.
In fact, though the war lasted a mere six days, it had a profound impact 
on Palestinians throughout the region. With the retreat of the Jordanian 
army, close to one million West Bank Palestinians, many of whom were 
refugees from 1948, soon found themselves under Israeli military occu-
pation. In addition, another 354,248 Palestinians fled the West Bank seek-
ing refuge across the river in Jordan.2 Several new unrwa- administered 
camps were quickly constructed to house the newest wave of refugees and 
displaced persons. Al- naksa (the setback or the relapse), as the 1967 June 
War came to be known, identified a new wave of dispossessed and a new 
sphere of exile in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan.
The aftermath of al- naksa proved to be a period of great social and po-
litical transformation in the Arab world. Nasser had managed to remain 
in power, but his regime was shaken to its core and purged of many high- 
ranking officials. Within a little more than three years, however, Nasser’s 
rule abruptly ended when he suffered a massive heart attack in September 
1970. King Hussein also managed to preserve his throne, though the loss 
of Jerusalem and the West Bank would later pose a formidable challenge 
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to his legitimacy among Palestinian nationalists. The Syrian regime sur-
vived for two more years but was eventually overthrown by Hafez al- ʿAsad 
in November 1970. The political landscape was drastically reconfigured 
further with the ascendance of the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(plo). As a direct result of the June War various developing Palestinian 
paramilitary and political organizations began assuming a leadership 
position in the nationalist movement, launching small- scale attacks on 
Israeli targets and openly recruiting and training new combatants.
The social, cultural, and political reverberations of the June War were 
felt throughout Palestinian communities in exile. Heretofore Nasser had 
provided the dominant model for Palestinian liberation and a return to 
Arab hegemony in the region. Now, with the collective defeat of the Arab 
armies (and with them the ideals of Arabism itself), virtually the entire 
Arab world was sent looking for answers, reevaluating state interests, and 
reassessing national identities. Palestinians in exile had largely held fast 
to the idea of ṣumūd (steadfastness) and ṣabr (patience), waiting for their 
lands to be liberated by the combined Arab forces. Now, without such an 
option, a new generation of refugees took it on themselves to fight for 
their repatriation. The national construct of the fallāḥ al- ṣumūd (stead-
fast peasant) was being replaced by the uniformed fidā īʾ (freedom fighter).
From a political perspective the June War had several far- reaching 
consequences. Most noticeably the humiliation of the defeat forced a 
widespread reassessment of the conflict and the power relations among 
the various participating Arab states. With the dream of a collective Arab 
front dashed, each individual Arab state would later move to create bilat-
eral relations with Israel independent of the other Arab states. The appar-
ent ascendance of the Israeli army into a world power further destroyed 
the idea of ever returning to pre- 1948 borders. Instead each individual 
Arab nation- state would have to begin negotiating with Israel for the re-
turn of Arab lands occupied and an end to the refugee crisis. What is 
more, the June War accelerated the development of an independent Pal-
estinian nationalism focused on resolving the grievances of those directly 
under Israeli occupation and in exile. The establishment of a military oc-
cupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip reactivated political discourse 
of state borders in Israel and the Arab world, an issue that had not been 
publicly debated since 1949.
Culturally al- naksa put a final and crushing end to the collective pride 
and blind Arab nationalist rhetoric emanating from the Egyptian media-
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scape. Over time, as little progress was made in repatriating Palestinian 
refugees and solving the many socioeconomic issues facing the Egyptian 
underclassess, the once- supportive masses became dismayed by the long 
extended performances, expensive wardrobes, spectacle, and wealth of 
the Arab elite and instead began to see such gestures of status as a cover 
for avoiding real issues. The promises of reform that accompanied pan- 
Arabism failed to materialize.3 With this Cairo’s position of power and 
influence in cultural production waned considerably, allowing for the de-
velopment of local music scenes across the region. The war had revealed 
far- reaching systemic flaws in Arab ideology, society, and culture that sev-
eral new dissenting voices began to address. Perhaps the loudest and most 
prominent came from the legendary political singer Sheikh Imam ʿIssa.
sheikh imam ʿissa
Born Mohammad Ahmad ʿIssa on July 2, 1918, in the Egyptian village 
of Abu al- Nomros, Sheikh Imam grew up in a very religious home. As 
an infant he lost his sight to infection. His father, a devout Sufi, pressed 
him to study Qurʾanic recitation (tajwīd) formally by enrolling him in 
a special school for religious learning at age five. In 1929 the young boy 
was admitted into the Sunni Judicial Association at al- Azhar to further 
his religious studies. At the uncharacteristically young age of fifteen he 
earned the title of sheikh, and worked as a local religious figure chant-
ing appropriate sections of the Qurʾan at public occasions or ceremonies. 
After spending several years at al- Azhar he was forcibly dismissed for 
being caught listening to a radio broadcast of Qurʾanic verses delivered 
by the famously controversial singer Sheikh Mohammad Raf ʿat. Sheikh 
Imam spent the next three years of his life living on the streets of Cairo as 
a Sufi dervish. He made a living reciting the Qurʾan at weddings, circum-
cisions, birthdays, and holy festivals. During one such performance he 
made the acquaintance of famed Egyptian composer Sheikh Ahmad Za-
chariya. Working as one of Zachariya’s entourage exposed Sheikh Imam 
to a new tradition of Arab classical music—its forms, melodies, and theo-
retical structures. During these years he took up the ʿūd, stopped wearing 
the traditional clothing of a sheikh, and began performing only classical 
love songs. In an interview he stated, “The songs I used [to sing at the 
time] were light, sentimental, love songs. But I had been searching for 
poems to express the music I felt inside myself. Deep inside I felt I should 
do songs to benefit the people.”4
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In 1962 Sheikh Imam found the poems he had been searching for in the 
words of a young political dissident named Ahmad Fuad Nagam. After 
a brief introduction the two artists quickly developed a bond and began 
collaborating on new songs against the government. Nagam’s poetry was 
especially powerful in that it was written in the colloquial dialect of the 
streets and dealt with pressing social issues: food shortages, underem-
ployment, and the suppression of free speech. After the defeat of 1967 
the two began to write political songs harshly critical of the state and its 
corrupt leadership. His first few public concerts at the National Syndicate 
of Journalists were completely ignored by the government, but as Sheikh 
Imam’s notoriety increased, the Egyptian authorities began to collect a 
dossier of his songs and lyrics.
These songs were sharp, critical satire of the regime and its hypoc-
risy. In 1969, amidst massive student rioting, Sheikh Imam performed at 
a number of public events, leading to his first arrest on a charge of mari-
juana possession.5 Eventually Egyptian authorities assembled enough 
damaging evidence to have Sheikh Imam and Ahmad Nagam sentenced 
to life in prison for treason. While in prison the two were exposed to a di-
verse collection of dissidents, intellectuals, and other political prisoners. 
They continued to compose music in the courtyards and common areas of 
the prison and over time grew more and more popular among the rising 
generation of young intellectuals and political reformists. After Nasser’s 
unexpected death both Sheikh Imam and Nagam were released from 
prison in conjunction with Anwar Sadat’s “Corrective Revolution” of May 
1971. The two then resumed performing at student demonstrations and on 
university campuses, periodically imprisoned without trial for popular 
dissent. With each month spent in prison, Sheikh Imam’s fame and fol-
lowing grew until he was widely recognized as one of Egypt’s national folk 
heroes despite the fact that his music was banned from Egyptian media.
Interestingly what proved to make Sheikh Imam’s music so dangerous 
to the state was not an overt call to arms. Rather his music resonated with 
the people in its capacity to give new subaltern meanings to state pro-
paganda. He spoke to the marginalized, angry masses with a great sense 
of irony and satiric commentary about the misdeeds of the Arab leader-
ship, in effect transforming state media into a tool of political protest. He 
wrote songs that used the state’s own empty rhetoric, revealing the harsh 
realities of everyday life and the paradoxes of state- sanctioned moder-
nity.6 From a local perspective Sheikh Imam celebrated the contributions 
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of the Egyptian fallāḥīn (“Al- Fallahin,” “Al- Shaʿb al- Zayn” [The beauti-
ful people], “Bahubbak Ya Misr” [I love you Egypt]); commemorated the 
great sacrifices of Egyptian soldiers (“Misr Ya Bahiya” [Beautiful Egypt], 
“Dawla Min?” [The nation belongs to who?]); and glorified the rising gen-
eration of university students and activists (“Rajaʿu al- Talamidha” [Re-
turn of the students]). On a national stage Sheikh Imam denounced the 
government for its corruption and called for the nation to dispense with 
empty Arabist imagery and instead focus on real pressing issues such as 
economic instability, food shortages, and unemployment (“Kalb al- Sitt” 
[The lady’s dog]).7 In speaking out to the Arab world at large the sheikh 
wrote songs in solidarity with the Palestinian people (“Mawwal Filastini 
Masri” [A Palestinian Egyptian folk song], “Shayid Qasrak” [Build your 
palaces], “Filastin” [Palestine]) and encouraged an indigenous Pales-
tinian liberation movement (“Unadikum” [The nation calls out to you]). 
In matters of international state politics Sheikh Imam glorified a trans-
national guerrilla movement against Western imperialism, celebrated folk 
heroes of resistance to tyranny (“Givara” [Che Guevara]), and satirized 
the corruption of international leaders (“Marr al- Kalam” [Bitterness of 
words], “Sharaft ya Nixon Baba” [Welcome Daddy Nixon], “Valari Jiskard 
Dastayn” [Valerie Giscard D’Estaing], “Thātshr” [Thatcher]).
 “sharaFt ya nixon baba” (welcome daddy nixon)
As an example of Sheikh Imam’s ability to satirize government officials 
and criticize state regimes, there are few songs more popular than his 
“Sharaft ya Nixon Baba” (Welcome Daddy Nixon). At a time of Egyptian 
national instability, U.S. president Richard Nixon’s state visit was meant to 
give international support to President Anwar Sadat’s regime. However, 
under the cloud of Watergate, which would later lead to his resignation 
in 1974, Nixon’s highly publicized visit to the Arab world served as inspi-
ration for perhaps Sheikh Imam’s most recognized song.
Welcome Daddy Nixon the Man of Watergate
They have honored your arrival, the Great Sultans of beans and oil.
They rolled out the red carpet from Ras al- Tin to Mecca
And from there you could easily descend to Aʿkka
And then they could call you, “Ḥajī,” Ha! Ha!
The whole thing is just a Moolid, Oh family of the prophet, grant us 
blessings.
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The use of bābā (colloquially, father or daddy) here is especially im-
portant in that it suggests a paternal relationship of corruption and po-
litical malfeasance between the U.S. president and the Egyptian regime 
then celebrating his arrival. He is the father of all corrupt leaders and role 
model for Sadat’s Egyptian regime. The irony is extended further with the 
description of how Arab state politicians have welcomed the American 
leader with a red carpet stretched from his hotel in Ras al- Tin all the way 
to Islam’s holiest city, Mecca. Over the course of his presidency, Nixon 
held fast to a foreign policy that reinforced the subordinate position of 
the Arab states in relation to Israel and the international economy. Sheikh 
Imam reveals the hypocrisy inherent in welcoming such a notorious 
leader to the Arab world. In the following line the president is taken on a 
pilgrimage to the Israeli city of Aʿkka on his way to the holy city of Mecca. 
Given that Nixon did not visit Aʿkka during this trip, it would seem that 
it was employed as a joke of metaphorical contradictions. Despite visiting 
Mecca, it is only after descending into the Israeli city of Aʿkka, on his true 
pilgrimage, that the American president is called Ḥajī. These lines estab-
lish a recurring irony and juxtaposition of the sacred and the profane, 
reinforcing the absurdity of a criminally embattled American president 
making a holy pilgrimage to Israel and Mecca.
The rub of religious piety and political and moral corruption is pursued 
further in the following verse. Here Sheikh Imam likens the pomp and 
circumstance of the president’s visit to a moolid, a religious high holiday 
commemorating the birth of the Prophet or other religious figure. Al-
though the moolid is not celebrated among many conservative sects, the 
vast majority of Muslims celebrate the holiday by fasting, decorating their 
houses, and telling stories of the Prophet’s life. State officials are exposed 
as idolatrous worshippers of political power and prestige in their effusive 
hospitality of the disgraced American president. Feigning deference to 
the politicians worshipping Nixon’s power, Sheikh Imam asks, “the family 
of the Prophet grant us blessings.” The sarcastic sheikh toys with the idea 
that those of great wealth and privilege believe themselves to be close inti-
mates to the Prophet, if not prophets themselves. In comparing those of 
privilege and those of holy relation to the Prophet, the sheikh chastises 
those who feel that their financial status is divinely granted. These lyrics, 
sung by a lowly sheikh, no less, carry a profound irony among the poor 
and disenfranchised Egyptian masses. The second verse continues:
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The day you arrived, your spies made a great ceremony
Where the whores could shake their bodies seductively
And Sheikh Shamhawrash is riding on the backs of the world
Followed by an entourage of spiders, crawling from under the walls
In this verse the lyrics turn to deep colloquial Egyptian slang. Here 
Nixon’s spies are Sadat’s secret police in charge of the American presi-
dent’s arrangements. The ceremony they prepared for his arrival was one 
for the politically and morally corrupt, “where the whores [al- mūmas] 
shake their bodies.” Sheikh Shamhawrash is an ironic twist of the pious 
and the profane, characterizing Sadat as both sheikh (holy man) and 
Sham hawrash (Satan). As a corrupt leader who presents himself as pious, 
Sadat rides on the backs of the masses followed by an entourage of spiders 
(his state minions). Sadat is both sheikh and Satan, holy and corrupt.
They invited you and said, “come, eat Bon Bons and harīsa” 
[Egyptian sweets]
And because you are naive, you believed that we were easy prey
They follow you in a zaffa [wedding procession], oh groom of 
ignorance and shiftiness
Turn your face and we will dishonor you, shūbash, while the 
owners of the house will praise you
Here Nixon is likened to a spoiled child eating only bon bons and Egyp-
tian sweets. In his visit to the country he is sheltered from the realities of 
Egyptian society. In being celebrated by the state regime Nixon is paraded 
through the streets as if he were a “groom of ignorance.” He is oblivious 
to the true feelings and turmoil of the people. “While the owners of the 
house [elite] praise you,” “we [the lower classes] will dishonor you.” The 
word “shūbash” here is a powerfully gendered insult levied at Nixon. In 
Egyptian slang, “shūbash” is a disgusting epithet one woman might use to 
describe another woman before a larger, more physical altercation ensues. 
To call a former American president “shūbash” is an extreme form of dis-
honor in vulgarity and also in gender.
As a testament to the influence of Sheikh Imam among Palestinian mu-
sicians and activists, in the summer of 2002, “Sharaft ya Nixon Baba” was 
performed as part of the Jerusalem Festival celebrating “Songs of Free-
dom” from all over the world.8 In this festival a group of young Palestinian 
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musicians performed this Sheikh Imam classic for an audience of local 
Jerusalemites. However, in this particular performance the musicians de-
viated from the original version, adding their own final verse more appro-
priate to the current sociopolitical situation. Immediately upon hearing 
the newly composed verses the audience laughed uproariously at the play 
of meanings and the way this thirty- year- old classic might capture con-
temporary political events.
Sharaft yā Bush Bush bābā, oh my sister, may the name of Allah be 
upon you.
A cookie is stuck in your throat, the Arab peoples are praying 
against you.
A message for the big guy with the huge belly
Ṭūz! I don’t care about your occupation, Palestine will return once 
again.
The first line refers to the former American president in diminutive 
form. He is “Bush junior,” “little Bush,” or “Daddy Bush.” Sarcastically 
the singers wish God’s blessings be upon him, while slipping in a quick 
insult that he is their “little sister.” The child metaphor is extended fur-
ther in the line—there is “a cookie stuck in your throat”—as a spoiled 
child eats only cookies. Daddy little Bush, as depicted here, behaves like 
a self- interested child, a spoiled brat raised in privilege. The next stanza 
refers to the then Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon, “the big guy with 
the huge belly.” The musicians wish to send him the message that regard-
less of what he does, “Palestine will return once again.” The slang “Ṭūz” 
here is an attempt to discredit Sharon’s power, as if to say “whatever . . .” 
or “we’ll see about that.”
This line garnered the largest response from the local Palestinian audi-
ence. They identified with the lyrics and supported its message of resis-
tance against the occupation (specifically) and against state politics (gen-
erally). More importantly the crowd responded significantly to the insults 
thrown at the American and Israeli leaders. Much the same way that “Sha-
raft ya Nixon Baba” was originally written to mock President Nixon, the 
contemporary performance fit nicely into the current sociopolitical cli-
mate. Here Bush and Sharon were both the victims of satire, causing the 
local audience to explode in laughter and applause at the thought of these 
two imperialist leaders being held responsible for their transgressions.
Over the course of his career Sheikh Imam reached an unparalleled 
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level of fame among Egyptian and Palestinian activists, intellectuals, and 
the working class. His music was widely known across the region despite 
rarely being broadcast on public media. For many Palestinian musicians, 
Sheikh Imam represents the beginning of modern musical activism and 
political song. His legacy is one of singing against corruption and hypoc-
risy, and giving voice to the deprived and oppressed. By the 1970s he had 
risen to the level of a pan- Arab phenomenon. His model of refashion-
ing indigenous folk song, dialect, slang, and obscenity for political satire 
spread quickly among Palestinians feeling betrayed by their Arab leader-
ship. Of Sheikh Imam’s legacy, Lebanese poet Paul Shaoul wrote, “Sheikh 
Imam’s critical power, sometimes bordering on defamation, and his bitter 
cynicism, were neither part of the status quo nor a submission to it, or a 
means to anesthetize the consciousness of people, distract their attention, 
and afflict them with the plagues of surrender and depression; instead 
they were confrontation with governments using the logic of explaining 
away the policies of repression, deception.”9
With the emergence of Sheikh Imam as the prominent voice of politi-
cal dissent in the years following the June War of 1967, the constitutive ele-
ments of contemporary Palestinian political song had fully taken shape. 
Palestinian activists seeking new media for expressing nationalist senti-
ment and resistance to prevailing structures of power and domination 
took hold of Sheikh Imam’s repertory and adapted it to indigenously Pal-
estinian musical frames. Traces of his relentless criticism and satire can be 
found throughout the subsequent history of Palestinian resistance music, 
stretching from the late 1970s to the early 2000s. It is not coincidental that 
throughout my field research, artists, musicians, and activists from across 
the political and religious spectrum each cited Sheikh Imam as a foun-
dational figure in the Palestinian nationalist movement and a model for 
their own creative development.
The Rise of the Fidāʿiyīn and Thawrī Music  
in the Camps (1967–1982)
With the defeat of 1967, the end of Nasserism, and the occupation of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, a dramatic sociocultural transformation took 
place throughout the Palestinian diaspora. Refugee camps, hitherto sites 
of steadfast patience for an awaited return to Palestine (ṣumūd and ṣabr), 
were reinscribed with new forms of identity and subjectivity based on the 
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collective mobilization of the people to fight for their repatriation. This 
new generation of revolutionaries ( jīl al- thāwra) was born of the trans-
formation of refugee camps from transitory holding sites made of cor-
rugated tin to poverty- stricken urban ghettos constructed of stone and 
concrete. As refugee homes became more and more permanent, as the 
possibility of return became more and more remote, and as the first gen-
eration of refugees raised in exile came of age, camps across the region 
developed into sites of militancy and collective empowerment. The new 
generation of refugees soon began to seek out proactive means of reclaim-
ing their ancestral lands. Through various social, political, and cultural 
projects this new generation successfully transformed spaces of exile into 
platforms of resistance.
The sociocultural phenomenon most responsible for fueling this 
transformation was the nascent fidāʿiyīn (ones who sacrifice, or freedom 
fighters) guerrilla movement led by Yasser Arafat. This paramilitary wing 
of the secular nationalist political party al- Fatah developed quickly into 
a powerful militia of Palestinian resistance. Through various sociopoliti-
cal campaigns, Fatah was able to successfully harness the waves of youth 
culture, anger, frustration, and Palestinian nationalism flowing across the 
region. Despite widespread popularity, however, Fatah was at a severe tac-
tical disadvantage. Confined within and policed by its various Arab host 
states, spaces for active recruitment and training of paramilitary forces 
were quite limited. Moreover Jordanian and Lebanese authorities were 
largely unwilling to allow independent attacks against Israeli targets from 
within their borders. The threat of reprisal from the formidable Israeli air 
force compelled host governments to closely monitor Palestinian para-
military activities. Spreading outward from the cramped interior spaces 
of the refugee camps, where host governments could do very little to con-
trol nationalist activities, Palestinian resistance activities soon overtook 
both public and private spaces in Amman, Beirut, the hills of Ajloun, and 
the Jordan valley.
The rise of the guerrilla movement inside the camps had a profound 
impact on the performative processes through which Palestinians con-
ceptualized the body and body politic, home, community, and nation. In 
myriad identification processes the militarized, empowered refugee soon 
became the primary archetype of nationalist affirmation displacing the 
patient yet determined jīl al- ṣumūd (generation of steadfastness). An-
thropologist Julie Peteet notes that during the rise of the fidāʾiyīn, camp 
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dwellers began to identify themselves not by indigenous identity forma-
tions such as family, ḥamūla (larger kinship groups), or ancestral village 
but rather by political ideology and party affiliation.10 As social bound-
aries were redrawn from within politico- nationalist discourses, identifi-
cation processes and performances were equally redefined, influencing 
language, poetics, cultural practices, religious observance, public spaces, 
and the allocation of cultural and economic resources. Performatives of 
what and who defined the nation shifted, creating new ways of imagining 
the national community in exile. Political meetings, militancy, weaponry, 
activism, and other means of articulating empowerment reimagined the 
Palestinian nation away from indigenous social frames. The very notion 
of the “authentic” Palestinian experience was resignified within the dis-
cursive frames of resistance, political mobilization, and guerrilla warfare.
Julie Peteet writes, “Because they [refugee camps] housed the resis-
tance and refugees who had previously been peasants, they were places 
of an authentic Palestinian identity rooted in the land, struggle, and suf-
fering. In the Occupied Territories peasants were signifiers of an authen-
tic, rooted past, . . . while in exile, those now in the camps were imagined 
as being somehow more ‘Palestinian,’ more authentic in their capacity to 
represent key components of collective identity.” The camps also evoked 
widespread guilt among the more affluent urban Palestinians given that 
camp- dwelling refugees shouldered the largest burden of the national 
struggle, overcoming extreme loss and the threat of constant violence. 
Urban middle- and upper- class Palestinians combined guilt with admi-
ration for the camps’ militancy and distaste for their once- peasant, now 
quasi- urban lower- class standard of living.11
The inscription of Palestinian militancy was seen across a wide spec-
trum of social practices and served to redefine the concept of active resis-
tance against colonial occupation. Many camp dwellers refused to identify 
themselves as refugees (lāji īʾn), preferring instead militants, activists, or 
revolutionaries (thuwwar).12 The image of the fidāʾī quickly replaced that 
of the fallāḥ as the primary archetype of the nation. Whereas the fallāḥ 
represented a steadfast patience in exile, an older generation of innocent 
victimization awaiting repatriation, the fidāʾī signified the end of wait-
ing (passivity and humiliation) and the beginning of an inherently Pal-
estinian liberation movement. With this, new conceptions of national 
identity based on an empowered resistance movement served to inspire 
the resignification of indigenous Palestinian cultural practices. The Pal-
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estinian accent, kūfīya (black- and- white checkered headscarf), food, and 
other folk practices (music, dance, poetry, and embroidery) articulated 
with the uniformed fidāʾī and klāshin (Russian- made Kalashnikov auto-
matic rifle) as primary signs of national identification. An armed fidāʾī, 
klāshin slung over one shoulder, signified the new authentic Palestinian 
empowered to reclaim the nation against Israeli occupation independent 
of the larger Arab world (see figure 3.1). The following verse of mayjanā/
aʿtābā, collected in the hills of al- Bayadar outside of Amman, Jordan, 
Figure 3.1. ✹ Image of the fidā iʾyīn. Photograph by the Institute for Independent 
Social Journalism (1971).
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beautifully summarizes both the widespread feelings of blame levied at 
the Arab world for failing to live up to their promises and the calls for 
local empowerment prevalent in the years following al- naksa (1967).13
Oūf . . . Oūf . . . Oh my father!
Enough wiping away tears, oh my people
And we journey difficult paths to freedom
I screamed, “O sons of the Arab nation,” and found it cold as a 
crocodile
Oūf . . . Oūf . . . Oh my father!
In similar fashion a very famous photograph of fidāʾī operations in 
the hills of the Jordan valley was widely circulated in local popular media 
in the early 1970s. The iconographic juxtaposition of various politico- 
national sign clusters made it an empowered image of Palestinian resis-
tance. Moving together in formation through the fields, these three mili-
tants are dressed in army fatigues and equipped with knapsacks and rifles. 
Their heads wrapped in kūfīyāt, the soldiers convey a burgeoning mili-
tancy marked by the Palestinian past, yet empowered to resist through 
modern guerrilla techniques and tactics.
PAlestine lives! songs froM the struggle  
of the PeoPle of PAlestine
Countless images such as this, coupled with myriad performative media 
across diverse social spaces served to reflect and locate a new poetics of 
Palestinian resistance in the years following al- naksa (1967). However, 
in their repetition and redundancy, such practices (images, fashion, lan-
guage, songs, poetry) generated new national subjectivities in innova-
tive ways, forged in the performative citation of new discourses of power 
and politics. Over time, the reiteration of new forms of Palestinian mili-
tancy, embedded in powerful identification processes such as language, 
dress, graffiti, music, dance, image, and poetry, gave materiality to new 
national intimacies and affiliations. Reimagined in the cramped quarters 
of the refugee camps and embodied in the uniformed fidāʾī, the Pales-
tinian nation was re- formed, re- created, through everyday performances 
in both formal and informal contexts. As discursive practices these per-
formances served to forge new political identities, associations, and ide-
ologies, imagining a new nation and national community.
The rise of the plo in the public sphere had far- reaching effects on the 
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dynamics of national identity formation throughout the Palestinian dias-
pora. With each highly publicized guerrilla attack against Israeli targets, 
popular support for the fidāʿiyīn grew to the extent that Arafat was soon 
able to construct a mini- state within pockets of Palestinian- dominated 
communities in Jordan. Given their widespread popularity, King Hus-
sein could do little to rein in fidāʾī activities. Palestinian nationalism, as 
it was represented in the image of Arafat and the fidāʿiyīn movement, 
gripped the kingdom. By 1970 fidāʿiyīn soldiers were openly wearing their 
uniforms and carrying firearms through the streets of Amman, setting 
up checkpoints for the collection of “taxes” and “searching” vehicles.14 
Soldiers established independent offices and training camps throughout 
the kingdom and openly recruited and/or conscripted young Palestini-
ans into their ranks. Fatah officials drove state vehicles with Palestinian 
license plates around Jordan and refused to pay taxes to the Jordanian 
government.
As part of this nationalizing campaign, Fatah instituted a widespread 
project of popular media (journalism, propaganda, poetry, music, and 
other media) to elicit public support for the fidāʿiyīn and legitimize its 
leadership in the fight for national liberation. Artists were brought in to 
compose poetry, music, graphic design, and other artworks in support 
of plo activities, influenced by the aesthetics of transnational guerrilla 
movements active around the world. Several music ensembles, supported 
directly by the plo, were active at this time, performing in support of plo 
ideology. Foremost among these was Firqat al- Markaziya (The Central 
Ensemble), who during the 1970s dominated the production of propagan-
dized political song. Alluding to the various political branches of the plo, 
Firqat al- Markaziya attempted to perform the “center mainstream” of the 
political spectrum, bringing together secular- nationalist and socialist ele-
ments and themes. In addition to widespread airplay on local radio and 
a flood of cheaply produced cassettes, Paredon Records released a collec-
tion of their most influential songs in 1974 under the title Palestine Lives! 
Songs from the Struggle of the People of Palestine. The songs contained on 
this album reflect an interweaving of socialist martial hymns interspersed 
with indigenous Palestinian shaʿbī (indigenous) instrumentation, poetry, 
and rhythms.
Specifically al- Markaziya focused its performative efforts on the grass-
roots conscription of youth in the refugee camps across Jordan and 
Lebanon. More political propaganda than serious music, this ensemble 
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acted as informal recruiters, juxtaposing Palestinian resistance with other 
socialist- liberation movements in places like Algeria, Vietnam, and Cuba. 
In many ways this music made little attempt to maintain any sense of seri-
ous musicianship and freely drew on a tired and cliché lexicon of anticolo-
nial/anti- imperial/anti- Western rhetorical and artistic devices. Simple 
slogans and cliché musical phrases constituted this shallow repertory of 
political song. Performers were often active members of the fidāʾiyīn, un-
trained musicians, and would typically perform wearing their olive green 
army fatigues. Given their formal patronage to Fatah, during the years fol-
lowing al- naksa (1967), al- Markaziya performed publicly more than any 
other Palestinian ensemble.
Their large yet uninspired repertory of songs was fashioned predomi-
nantly by repetitive martial hymns made up of large male choruses. Par-
ticularly important to this repertory were songs that glorified socialism: 
the klāshin (Kalashnikov), the sickle (manjal) and hammer, the thuw-
war (militant), and a resignified interpretation of the fallāḥ as the idyllic 
“socialist” worker transforming the land. In one of the more popular al- 
Markaziya songs of the time, “Dayn al- Thuwwar” (The revolutionaries’ 
debt), the lead vocalist sings the propagandized slogan: wa ḥamaltu ra-
shāshī li- taḥmal ba dʿnā al- ajīāl manjal (and I carried the machine gun so 
that the next generation could carry the sickle). Imagery of the fallāḥīn as 
quasi- socialist proletariat allowed for established indexical sign clusters 
of Palestinian rural indigeneity to be reimagined as the foundation for a 
prescribed socialist transformation.
The poetics of an imagined Palestinian socialism carried further in 
the composition of many revolutionary songs of the fidāʾī. Percussion- 
dominated martial hymns emerged from the camps written by anony-
mous fidāʾī artists. Such songs were broadcast periodically on local radio 
accompanying news of strikes against Israeli targets.15 Common themes 
and images of wounds, bullets, chains, fire, paths, and roads collectively 
signified the militarized struggle or path of the fidāʾiyīn. The songs’ ubiq-
uitous percussion were iconic of the sounds of gunfire and artillery, 
the marching of soldiers, and the collective force of the people united 
together under the banners of anti- imperial liberation. A unison male 
chorus, singing in a deeply resonant tessitura, typically provided melodic 
counterpoint to a solo male vocalist. The ubiquitous male chorus, sing-
ing in an uncharacteristically low chest voice, indexically signified among 
audiences an empowered militancy through associations of masculine 
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power and solidarity and strategically departed from the indigenous Pal-
estinian high- pitched nasal vocal timbre of the shaʿr al- murtajal.
Voices joined together in tight unison, bereft of ornamentation and 
improvisatory device, iconically signified a musical as well as a prescribed 
social synchrony. These choruses represented a complete departure from 
the individuated poetics of the shaʿr al- murtajal, where value was placed 
on the individuals’ ability to compose and perform intricately layered and 
ornamented verses of improvised poetry. In the songs of al- Markaziya, 
little attention was paid to the nuance of vocal quality, melodic contour, 
and basic musicianship. Instead their songs served as sonic political 
posters, plastering political dogma into the public soundscape. Socialist 
patriotism represented in songs like “Al- Mad al- Mad” (The rising tide), 
“Tariq al- ʿAza” (The road to dignity), and “Masira Shaʿbna” (The march 
of our people) combined associations of populist movement along the 
great path to victory. The iconicity of waves, roads, and marches signified 
collective military action, a proactive amelioration of national trauma, 
and an end to the jīl al- ṣumūd (generation of steadfastness). These thawrī 
songs intentionally avoided dialect, ornamentation, improvisation, and 
idiomatic rhetorical device, so as to espouse a prescribed poetics of unity, 
synchrony, and redemption through collective militarized struggle. In 
addition the avoidance of Palestinian dialect could be interpreted as a 
motivated attempt to resignify Palestinian resistance (and by extension 
identity) into the faceless image of the fidāʾī.
The Fidā iʾyīn, “Black September,” and Intra- Arab Politics
Arafat’s rise to power in the Jordanian refugee camps placed a consider-
able amount of stress on the Hashemite monarchy to maintain its hege-
mony. The Jordanian government’s need to maintain domestic authority 
was contested by the commandos’ desire to establish an autonomous base 
of operations from which to launch their attacks against Israeli targets. 
The challenges placed on King Hussein both to negotiate the rising levels 
of popular support for the guerrilla movement and to maintain his sover-
eignty proved too much. By 1970 the commandos were operating beyond 
the king’s authority, conducting raids on Israeli targets that provoked 
harsh reprisals. Amidst threats of coup and an attempted assassination, 
King Hussein finally called in his army to restore order and to break the 
power of the plo guerrillas on September 15, 1970. The ten- day confron-
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tation resulted in the expulsion of the fidāʿiyīn from Jordan and the esti-
mated death of over three thousand Palestinian soldiers and civilians.16 
“Black September,” as it came to be remembered, was nothing less than 
an outright civil war pitting Jordanians (of both Palestinian and Jordanian 
ancestry) against one another.
In the end, the smaller bands of Palestinian commandos were no match 
for the better-equipped and trained Jordanian army. Within less than two 
weeks, King Hussein had successfully driven out the fidāʿiyīn from Am-
man and within a year had closed all plo offices and training camps in the 
northern hills. After the fighting had subsided the plo quickly transferred 
its power base to the refugee camps of southern Lebanon. Within a mat-
ter of years, the plo had replenished its ranks of fidāʾī fighters and taken 
administrative control of the Lebanese refugee camps.17
Operating independently of the much weaker Lebanese host govern-
ment in Beirut, the plo reproduced its strategy of recruiting and train-
ing paramilitary soldiers for attacks against Israeli targets. With each raid 
into Israeli-controlled territory, the popularity of Arafat and the plo in-
creased. However such operations brought with them Israeli retaliation 
affecting not only Palestinians in the camps but also neighboring com-
munities of Shiʾa villagers in south Lebanon. The ease with which Israeli 
forces were able to execute their reprisals created a public outcry against 
the Lebanese government. With Shiʾa communities fleeing their homes to 
escape Israeli bombs and Palestinian militants operating independently 
of government control, it was only a matter of time before the Lebanese 
government was forced to respond. A predominant issue that divided the 
country, one that contributed to a prolonged and devastating civil war, 
was whether or not the Palestinian commandos should be given unre-
stricted freedom to conduct incursions against Israel, with the inevitable 
Israeli response, or whether the government should reign in the militants 
and reassert its control.
The lengthy civil war between various Christian, Muslim, and Druze 
militia factions took on a new dimension with the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in June 1982. Under the direction of Israeli prime minister Men-
achem Begin and defense minister Ariel Sharon, Israeli forces advanced 
into southern Lebanon with the stated purpose of destroying the plo’s 
autonomous presence in the area, expelling Syrian forces uncomfortably 
close to the Israeli border, and establishing a mutually advantageous alli-
ance with the dominant Lebanese Christian Phalangist faction led by Ba-
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shir Gemayel. With Gemayel’s leadership solidified in Lebanon, Israel 
would then be afforded a pliant, cooperative neighboring state willing to 
crack down on plo forces. What is more, with the links between the plo 
and the West Bank dissolved, Begin would be able to turn his attention 
toward the larger project of formally annexing the Occupied Territories.18
After reaching their stated objective within a matter of days, defense 
minister Ariel Sharon ordered the outright siege of Beirut. Throughout 
the summer of 1982, West Beirut, the area with the highest plo concen-
tration, was subjected to a massive campaign of air, land, and sea bom-
bardment. The city was devastated by the attacks, which caused heavy 
civilian casualties. After nearly two months of deadly siege, an interna-
tional agreement was reached allowing for the peaceful evacuation of all 
plo forces out of Lebanon and the guaranteed safety of all Palestinian 
civilians left behind in the camps. Under U.S. supervision, the plo and its 
leadership were evacuated to Tunis on September 1, 1982.
With the plo expelled from Beirut, Bashir Gemayel elected president, 
and Syrian forces leaving the area, Israel had apparently achieved all of its 
stated goals. However, in late August, only two weeks after his election, 
opposition forces from the Syrian Social National Party assassinated Ge-
mayel. Following the assassination, Israel violated its pledge to protect the 
civilian Palestinian communities and allowed units of Lebanese Christian 
Phalangist soldiers to enter the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. After 
three days of house- to- house killing, with Israeli soldiers observing from 
nearby watchtowers, the Phalangist forces had massacred an estimated 
two thousand men, women, and children left unprotected by the evacua-
tion of the plo.19 During the night Israeli soldiers went so far as to fire 
flares into the air to provide light for the militiamen hunting down men, 
women, and children hiding in the dark.
The public outcry, among Palestinians and Israelis, at the atrocities 
of Sabra and Shatila had far- reaching effects throughout the Arab world 
and beyond. International media reported the massacres widely, spark-
ing protests against Israel all over the world. Israeli public opinion, which 
never conclusively supported the invasion to begin with, publicly ques-
tioned the invasion and the death of so many civilians at a time when 
Israel’s survival was not immediately at risk. In October 1982 an estimated 
four hundred thousand Israelis peacefully protested to demand a com-
mission of inquiry be set up to investigate the apparent culpability of the 
Israeli government.20 Investigations into Sabra and Shatila through the 
Al- Naksa and Political Song ✹ 97
Kahan Commission found Israeli officials indirectly responsible. Amidst 
public pressure Ariel Sharon was forced to resign his position as minister 
of defense. Menachem Begin later left office in 1983, following the death of 
his wife, his political career seriously tarnished by the event.
The plo had also suffered a tremendous loss. With Arafat and his 
cadre of officials exiled to Tunis, they were now farther away from Pal-
estinian lands than they had ever been. The loss of an autonomous base 
from which to operate strained the organization and left many plo offi-
cials questioning their leadership. The plo had lost its sense of unity and 
cohesion, popular support for the fidāʿiyīn was considerably shaken, and 
the empowered belief in independent military action against Israel was 
severely diminished. With little confidence in state leadership and formal 
military action, the resistance movement once again underwent consider-
able transformation, refashioned in the image of the people and in their 
indigenous lifeways and folk practices.
For many refugees the massacres at Sabra and Shatila were powerful 
markers of Palestinian suffering, dispossession, and dislocation. Without 
the protection of the plo or the international community, the dispos-
sessed residents of these two camps were left unarmed and at the mercy 
of the Phalangist militia. As a metaphor for Palestinian suffering, vulnera-
bility, and loss of agency, Sabra and Shatila became the subjects of wide-
spread nationalist painting, poetry, song, and dance deploring the tragedy 
and mourning the victims. Most importantly this tragic event marked the 
beginning of a new poetics of Palestinian nationalism based in a new per-
formative articulation of martyrdom, sacrifice, and suffering.
 “wayn al- malayin?” (where are the millions?)
Musically, reactions to the Israeli siege of Beirut followed along two aes-
thetic trajectories. First, artists working within the established mūsīqā 
al- thawrī catalogue continued performing martial hymns and marches 
espousing growing feelings of empowerment and militancy, as well as 
the failure of the Arab world to successfully fight for Palestinian libera-
tion. Second, protest singers became increasingly influenced by a grow-
ing folk revival of indigenous Palestinian music emanating from the West 
Bank into the near diaspora. Within the first category “Wayn al- Malayin?” 
(Where are the millions?) remains perhaps one of the most recognizable 
Palestinian protest songs of the jīl al- thāwra (generation of revolution-
aries). While the music and lyrics were composed by the Libyan composer 
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Ali al- Kilani, the song is most associated with the Lebanese artist Julia Bu-
trous. In it, she angrily sings out:
Where, where, where . . .
Where are the millions?
Where are the Arab people?
Where is the Arab anger?
Where is the Arab blood?
Where are the Eastern Arabs?
Where are the millions?
Where, where, where . . . ?
Butrous caustically chastises the empty rhetoric espoused by Arab leaders 
who proclaim to be the great protectors of Jerusalem yet have done very 
little to stop Israeli aggression. She dispels the myth of Arab solidarity 
and instead glorifies the independent Palestinian resistance movement.
God is with us and is stronger and greater than the sons of 
Zionism,
He kills, steals, imprisons, but in spite of all this my land will not be 
humiliated.
Red blood and the green tastes of lemons
The fire of the revolution will increase and we will be victorious.
Stronger than the mountains,
Greater than the sands,
Fight, struggle, and sing that our martyrs are still alive,
We fight and we will not kneel,
We will not be humiliated, we will not submit!
“Wayn al- Malayin?” articulates with a stock lexicon of shared signs of 
Palestinian militancy and empowerment. Butrous’s unfettered anger at 
the empty promises of Arabism is certainly characteristic of music and 
poetry of the time. Shielded within the protective spaces of the refugee 
camps, public expressions of Palestinian anger and frustration could be 
freely articulated without fear of retribution from government authori-
ties. This often allowed for the open and very public criticism of political 
figures and state institutions through popular media. Drawing on a series 
of nationalist sign clusters Butrous makes several claims of Palestinian 
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empowerment and primordial ties to the land. In particular she empha-
sizes specific color associations as iconic of the Palestinian nation. The 
introduction to the song calls for Palestinians to “fight in the day to end 
the night, and the coming of our freedom.” The body of the song por-
trays the revolution as a swelling fire, the Palestinian people as greater 
than the mountains, land, and sand. References to red blood (sacrifice), 
green orchards of citrus (Palestinian agricultural indices), and the black-
ness of night (the occupation) coalesce into the colors of the Palestinian 
flag. In the last lines Butrous makes her most powerful statements. Here 
Palestinians are defined not by their victimization, their humiliation, or 
their patience, but rather by their unwillingness to surrender. Speaking 
for and as the nation, Butrous declares, Palestinians “will not kneel . . . will 
not be humiliated . . . [and] will not submit.” The combination of these 
three statements frames the dominant meanings of the song and defines 
much of the repertory of the empowered mūsīqā al- thawrī (revolution-
ary music).
Musically “Wayn al- Malayin?” is a typical example of the predomi-
nant mūsīqā al- thawrī archetype prevalent in the years following al- naksa 
(1967). A quick martial duple meter, articulated in a string of running six-
teenths, sets up the initial introduction of the unison male chorus sing-
ing a countermelody against a powerful lead singer. The use of major 
mode, common to both Western and Arab repertories (maqām aʿjām fā 
or F major), reflects a militaristic influence bereft of any particular “Arab” 
or “Palestinian” associations (see example 3.1). In addition melodic ac-
companiment is provided by strings and a collection of Western picco-
los, frequently used to signify martial music from around the world. The 
rhythmic mode, ayūb, is equally ambiguous. This simple duple meter in 
syncopation is common to both Arab and Western nationalist musics, 
particularly military marches and quick- time processionals. As it is 
played here, the rhythm signifies neither a rural Palestine, through asso-
ciations with the dabke, nor the larger tradition of classical Arab art music 
in general. Drawing from a widespread repertory of revolutionary songs 
of the masses, “Wayn al- Malayin?” avoids any particular Palestinian 
folk- ethos in melody, rhythm, and instrumentation in favor of disguised 
international, militaristic musical device. This can be explained in at least 
two ways. First, both the composer- lyricist and performer were not Pal-
estinian, though they both identified with Palestinian issues. This song 
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might then be interpreted as a means of bridging the gaps between vari-
ous Arab communities. And second, this avoidance of Palestinian folk 
signifiers reinforces a larger aesthetic transformation taking place across 
the Palestinian diaspora. Resistance songs in the years following al- naksa 
both constituted and were constituted by a drive to create a “new” Pal-
estinian indigeneity, a new identity formation whereby Palestinian- ness 
was defined not through indigenous folk practices, but rather through 
militaristic tactics and guerrilla warfare. In sound, the adoption of West-
ern instruments and musical device operated similarly to the green army 
fatigues of the fighters themselves. They were both signs of a new direc-
tion in Palestinian nationalism, a new Palestinian, empowered to resist 
their prolonged exile from within, adopting the well-circulated signs of 
anticolonialism.
example 3.1. ✹ Melodic and rhythmic structure of “Wayn al- Malayin?” (Where are 
the millions?). Transcription from author’s field notes.
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 “sabra wa shatila”
In contrast to the established repertory of mūsīqā al- thawrī songs such 
as “Wayn al- Malayin?” musical reactions to the Israeli siege of Beirut 
also took the form of reconfigured folk songs and dances. Of particular 
note in this repertory is Abu Arab’s widely known funeral lament “Sabra 
wa Shatila.” Structured as an extended improvisation of poetic strophes 
based on a popular love song attributed to Sayyid Darwish, “Sabra wa 
Shatila” illustrates a profound shift in poetics in the mid- 1980s. Abu 
Arab’s characteristic singing style, derived from the traditions of the shaʿr 
al- murtajal, utilizes folk- poetic structures, vocal timbre, and dialect. In 
“Sabra wa Shatila” Abu Arab sings a free- flowing improvised realization 
of poetic strophes, interspersed with melodic improvisations performed 
on the nai and ʿūd. In much the same way al- ʿAshiqin reinterpreted the 
aʿlā dalʿ unā in “Min Sijn ʿAkka,” Abu Arab has slowed down this love song 
so as to emulate the cadence of a funeral procession. Rhythmic accompa-
niment is quite thin, provided by a single riqq (tambourine), outlining the 
simplified rhythmic structure al- hajaʿ al- ṣaghīr. Extended improvisations 
on the nai (rendered in maqām ḥijāz) serve to convey the sadness of the 
lament and to structure the melodic rendering of the mode. Idiomatic to 
shaʿbī performance practice the nai and ʿūd supplement the vocal render-
ing of poetic strophes with brief improvisatory melodic commentary. In 
rhythmic and melodic structure, vocal timbre, and poetic composition 
this musical tribute to the massacres at Sabra and Shatila represents a per-
formative shift in poetics from empowered and militarized resistance to 
mournful lament of suffering and martyrdom.
Pools of blood collected on the land, and Palestine has been drawn 
in it.
Pieces of the explosions will be planted in the land.
Ḥanīn [yearning/blossoming] as revolutionary flowers, they will 
grow and bloom.
I have heard the voice of Mary wailing.
Calling out to Jesus, “Oh beloved people of Jerusalem.”
“What good was it for you to spill your blood on the cross,
When there are monsters out there committing these crimes?”
Abu Arab’s powerful narrative of the massacres at Sabra and Shatila 
presents a graphic depiction of Palestinian exile, violence, and mourning. 
102 ✹ Al- Naksa and Political Song
In the pools of martyrs’ blood, dripping into the cracks and fissures of the 
land, the seeds of the nation are planted. Shrapnel, shards of explosions, 
pieces of the victims’ bodies themselves, are sown into the ground as revo-
lutionary seeds of resistance. As they bloom into flowers of revolution, so 
will the Palestinian nation. The double meaning of the word ḥanīn (long-
ing and to flower or bloom) further extends the metaphor of the martyred 
victims as blossoming flowers, nourished in blood, rooted in the land.
From this point, the song takes a very different turn. Here Abu Arab 
narrates an imagined conversation between Mary and Jesus. Wailing with 
grief, Mary questions Jesus’s sacrifice. “What good was it for you to spill 
your blood on the cross when there are monsters out there committing 
these crimes?” The overtly Christian- Muslim reference points toward the 
Lebanese Christian “monsters” responsible for committing these massa-
cres. In an interesting twist of meaning, Abu Arab seemingly turns the 
politico- religious underpinnings of the conflict inside out. Christian 
imagery is utilized as a means of engaging and counteracting aroused 
religious animosities between Palestinian Muslim and Lebanese Chris-
tian communities. The massacres at Sabra and Shatila were a horrific 
manifestation of political violence and state terror perpetrated under 
the guise of religious difference. In singing of Mary’s mournful lament, 
Abu Arab renders the religious interpretation of the attack obsolete. He 
asserts that there was nothing inherently “Christian,” or even religious, 
about the attack at all. To the contrary such a horrendous loss of innocent 
life negates Christ’s sacrifice. Throughout the Lebanese civil war religious 
difference became a powerful tool of mobilizing politico- nationalist for-
mations against one another. Through powerful Christian imagery Abu 
Arab repositions the massacres at Sabra and Shatila away from a simpli-
fied religious conflict into a more complex political frame. Such a perfor-
mative turn redefines the nation inclusive of both Muslim and Christian 
communities. Not unlike the folk poetry of Nuh Ibrahim before him, Abu 
Arab calls forth national subjectivity based on collective suffering and re-
sistance of all Palestinians (and by extension all Arabs) regardless of reli-
gious orientation.
I will be patient in the days of oppression.
I will wager, and am not afraid of the result.
If one child cries alone in the fields,
My violated rights will be redeemed.
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Sabra and Shatila, Shatila and Sabra
A tear in my eyes, and in my heart is agony.
With the traumas of the Lebanese civil war and the massacres at Sabra 
and Shatila, Abu Arab’s repertory of protest song marked an ongoing 
shift in poetics away from the empowered thawrī hymns and marches of 
the plo. In his memorialization of the massacres Abu Arab revived the 
poetics of the shaʿbī music performed in the years immediately follow-
ing al- nakba (1948). Patience, victimization, mourning, and redemption, 
hallmarks of indigenous folk song following 1948, reemerged as nostalgic 
performatives of the suffering nation.
The Palestinian Folk Revival and Shaʿbī Nationalists  
(1977–1993): Firqat Aghani al- ʿAshiqin
The embarrassing defeat of the fidāʿiyīn sent a powerful shockwave across 
the region. No longer, it seemed, could Palestinians put their hope for an 
end to the occupation and a return to their ancestral homes in the state 
leadership of the plo alone. What is more, in the devastating civil wars, 
which pitted conspiring Syrian, Israeli, and Lebanese forces against plo 
guerrillas, noncombatant refugees could no longer believe that any Arab 
state would come to their rescue. The folklorist Dr. Sharif Kanaana sums 
up the prevailing feelings of the time in a well- known proverb, “We must 
pull the thorn out of our hand” (lāzam inqalaʿ shuknā bidīnā). Palestinian 
repatriation could only come through Palestinians themselves.
The sense of loss, defeat, shame, and prolonged dislocation resonated 
throughout the performative arts of the early 1980s, carried forth via a 
new wave of cheap (both affordable and of poor quality), mass- produced 
cassette tapes. These new recordings were less dominated by the milita-
rized aesthetics of the fidāʾī and instead reemphasized the traditions and 
customs of al- shaʿb (the folk). This profound shift away from the milita-
rized marches of the fidāʾī can be attributed to several factors.
While indigenous Palestinian folk song and dance had continued to 
be performed both “inside” and “outside” the territories (West Bank and 
Gaza Strip), its influence faded considerably following the rise of the 
fidāʿiyīn and the establishment of a centralized resistance movement. 
The plo spent considerable resources on print media, radio broadcasts, 
graphic design, music performance, and so on as a means to reframe Pal-
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estinian identity around a new generation of revolutionaries working col-
lectively to reclaim the homeland from “outside,” ultimately locating Pal-
estinian nationalism and national identity in refugee camps and cities 
such as Amman and Beirut. This new identity formation strategically 
marginalized indigenous folk practices so as to assert a Palestinian mili-
tancy in line with other so-called modern anticolonial guerrilla move-
ments across the globe. The rural folk practices of the fallāḥīn, therefore, 
were seen as a hindrance, the outdated customs of the past, an obstacle to 
the militarized resistance. With the expulsion of the plo from Lebanon 
and the dismantling of the centralized resistance movement “outside” 
the territories, the ideational project of centralized militancy abated, and 
nationalist energies were refocused back “inside,” where a new cadre of 
highly educated folklorists were working diligently to preserve and pro-
mote indigenous Palestinian folklore as a form of collective resistance to 
Israeli occupation. Foremost among these folklorists were Dr. Abdellatif 
al- Barghouti, Dr. Sharif Kanaana, Dr. Nimr Sirhan, Dr. Nabil ‘Alqam, and 
Dr. Abdel Aziz abu Hudba. These scholars specialized in the fields of folk-
lore and anthropology, and beginning in the mid- 1960s they each began 
conducting fieldwork and preservation projects throughout the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. Their research reinforced the increasing importance 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the resistance movement and further 
displaced an aesthetics of exile and militancy with an aesthetics of in-
digeneity. The increased emphasis on folklore and folk practices set into 
motion a widespread revival of indigenous Palestinian song and dance.
This large- scale folk revival centered around this group of scholars 
as well as a burgeoning network of cultural organizations dedicated to 
the collection and preservation of traditional Palestinian folklore (songs, 
stories, proverbs, material culture, and so on). Led by these Palestinian 
folklorists, these organizations contributed by sponsoring the publica-
tion of books and journals, museum collections, and cultural festivals 
all aimed at preserving indigenous cultural practices. Foremost among 
these was the Jamʿiya Anʿash al- Usra (Society for the Preservation of the 
Family), located in the West Bank city of al- Bireh. The various publica-
tions, exhibits, and events sponsored by Jamʿiya Anʿash al- Usra served to 
reintroduce Palestinian folklore to the larger cosmopolitan community.21 
Due in large part to the efforts of these organizations, the national folk 
revival of the early 1980s had a profound effect on popular conceptions 
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of Palestinian identity: first, by preserving indigenous cultural practices 
against colonial erasure, and second, by stifling change and creativity.
In the field of Palestinian protest song the national folk revival spawned 
a resurgence of indigenous folk songs as a specifically motivated form of 
resistance. Though the marches and hymns of the fidāʾī, and the heavily 
orchestrated classical songs emanating from Egypt, did not disappear al-
together, protest song in the early 1980s was predominantly focused on 
the revival of the “folk” and the preservation and dissemination of popu-
lar heritage (turāth al- shaʿbī). Anxieties over preserving rural Palestinian 
folk practices against assimilation, coupled with the absence of the state 
institutions of the plo, inspired many artists to concentrate their efforts 
on the people (al- shaʿb), the community (al- umma), and the nation (al- 
waṭan).
In a similar fashion musical groups operating both inside and outside 
the territories began appropriating and developing new forms of al- zajal, 
the repertories of folk song performed at life- cycle events and calendric 
festivals common throughout Bilad al- Sham. Leading the movement to 
revive and preserve indigenous Palestinian music within the contexts of 
the resistance movement were two ensembles, born of differing refugee 
experiences in Lebanon and Jordan. The Syrian- based ensemble, Firqat 
Aghani al- ʿAshiqin (The Songs of the Lovers Ensemble), and the Jordan- 
based ensemble, Firqa Baladna (Our Nation/Our Homeland), both rose 
to prominence in their respective communities based on the reinscription 
of indigenous folk music into the nationalist movement.22
Firqat aghani al- ʿashiqin (the songs  
oF the lovers ensemble)
The group credited most with reviving Palestinian indigenous music in 
the nationalist movement was Firqat Aghani al- ʿAshiqin. Its origins began 
with a unique collaboration between the poet Ahmad Dahbour and the 
composer Hussein Nazak. Working as artists for the Dāʾira al- Thaqafa 
al- ʿAlam (Department of Culture and Media), a plo- funded arts orga-
nization producing cultural programs for Syrian state television, the two 
adapted a well- known Jerusalem area folk song for public performance. 
The song, “Wa Allah 1- Azraʿak bi- 1 - Dar” (I swear I will plant you in the 
home of Palestine), became the centerpiece of a theatrical production 
based on Palestinian exile. Dahbour adapted the original lyrics to reflect 
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contemporary political issues of displacement while Nazak reset the 
melody and structure of the piece so that it would appeal to a larger, more 
cosmopolitan audience. Specifically, Nazak shifted the mode from bayatī 
to ḥijāz, eliminating the “Oriental” (sharqīya)–sounding quarter- tone in 
the lower tetrachord while allowing the song to be more easily played on 
Western instruments. In addition Nazak changed the time structure of 
the piece from a slow 5/4 to a quick and percussive 4/4. Once a mournful 
lament, this adapted version was more accessible to cosmopolitan ears, 
intended to mobilize audiences into action, to get them, as lead singer 
Hussein Munther recounted, “out of their seats and into the streets.”
Within a matter of weeks the song became a huge hit, drawing the 
attention of the director of the Dāʾira al- Thaqafa al- ʿAlam, Abdallah Hou-
rani. Rehearsing after work, with funding from the plo, the group began 
to reset traditional Palestinian folk songs into anthems of political protest. 
Following their debut performance at the International Political Song Fes-
tival in Helsinki, Finland, al- ʿAshiqin cassettes flooded the streets in refu-
gee camps across Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank. Especially 
active during the crisis in Beirut, al- ʿAshiqin performed countless con-
certs in support of Palestinian liberation and an end to the civil war.23 In 
fact many of the original members of the ensemble were at one time offi-
cials in the plo. Mohammad Diab, Nizar al- ʿIssa, Hussein Nazak, Hussein 
Munther (Abu Ali), and Khaled Habbash were responsible for developing 
the group’s unique repertory of shaʿbī nationalist songs. What initially 
distinguished al- ʿAshiqin from their contemporaries was their perfor-
mative juxtaposition of two dominant ideational archetypes, fluctuating 
seamlessly between thawrī and shaʿbī repertories. Onstage the group pro-
moted the images of both the militarized fidāʾī and the rural fallāḥīn in 
music, song- style, and dress. Male members of the group performed in 
military fatigues, kūfīyāt wrapped around their necks. In contrast female 
members wore beautifully embroidered indigenous dresses (thawb), in-
dicating their ancestral village or region of origin. In performance and 
appearance the group espoused a juxtaposition of militancy (fidāʾī) and 
indigeneity ( fallāḥī) constructs (see figure 3.2). Their repertory of songs 
and dances were derived from indigenous sources yet were “modernized” 
with Western militaristic elements. The texts were almost entirely in thick 
dialect, and the group often performed alongside a formally trained pre-
sentational dabke troupe. Musically al- ʿAshiqin based its repertory on the 
revival of indigenous Palestinian folk songs, poetry, and dances largely 
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marginalized in the years since al- naksa (1967), periodically mixing in 
militarized marital hymns and other typical war songs of the recent past. 
The combined articulation of both militant and indigenous indices in 
song- style and dress transformed protest singing in the early 1980s and 
opened the door to a new folk revival across the Palestinian diaspora.
In its early years, al- ʿAshiqin was directed by the prominent com-
poser and folklorist Hussein Nazak. A Jerusalemite born in 1942, Nazak 
served as al- ʿAshiqin’s principal composer and artistic director up until 
1985. Under his direction the group produced some of its most famous 
songs. The majority of this repertory consisted of slightly modified shaʿbī 
nationalist song- types ( aʿtābā, dalʿ ūnā, ẓarīf al- ṭūl) set with the contem-
porary poetry of Mahmoud Darwish, Samih al- Qassam, Ahmad Qabour, 
Tawfiq al- Ziyad, Abu Sadaq, and the folk poets Yusuf al- Husum and Nuh 
Ibrahim. The combination of well- known contemporary and past Pales-
tinian poetry with modernized shaʿbī folk song created a new style at 
once indexical of contemporary themes and issues while rooted in Pal-
estinian history and practice. In particular the group is credited with re-
viving the folk poetry and folk songs of the 1936–39 Great Arab Revolt. 
Dahbour and Nazak’s formal training in folklore and performance offered 
Figure 3.2. ✹  
Firqat Aghani  
al- ʿAshiqin’s Min 
Sijn Aʿkka cover art.
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a unique opportunity for reimagining the political songs of the past. Their 
use of folk poetry and song from the Great Arab Revolt offered new ways 
of performing resistance beyond the ideational constructs of the milita-
rized fidāʾiyīn.
Four al- ʿAshiqin songs in particular have risen to the level of national 
anthems of Palestinian self- determination. “Min Sijin ʿAkka” (From ʿAkka 
Prison) (detailed in chapter 2) recounts the execution of three Palestinian 
rebels in 1930. “Yama Mawil al- Hawa” (Oh song of longing) (also detailed 
in chapter 2) is a mournful lullaby depicting the traumas of al- nakba and 
the rise of the resistance movement. The two remaining songs differ in 
that they dealt with contemporary themes and issues. “Hubbat al- Nar” 
(The fire swelled) and “Ishhad Ya Aʿlam” (Witness oh world) were com-
posed following the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982. Moreover each is 
based on pronounced dabke rhythms, using forceful sonic and textual 
signs of indigenous Palestinian lifeways and practices. “Hubbat al- Nar” 
(The fire swelled) is a call to arms for young Palestinians in the camps to 
rise up and defend their nation through the repeated articulation of space 
and place (see example 3.2) (evia 14- s6760).24
The fire swelled and the rifles sang,
Call to the youth, oh nation, and give hope.
The fire swelled from Aʿkka to al- Tira
A handful of children raised on straw mats,
And now they became youth and did not forget the homeland.
And who would forget the paradise of Palestine,
The fire swelled.
The fires of resistance swell from Aʿkka to al- Tira, two prominent Pal-
estinian cities associated with the revolts of 1936 and 1948, calling on the 
poor youth “raised on straw mats” (refugees) not to forget their home-
land.25 The swelling of the fires of resistance is iconic of the rising genera-
tion of youth assuming a leadership role in the new liberation movement. 
The associations of Palestine, paradise, and collective memory are essen-
tial to understanding the meanings of this text. To “forget the homeland” 
is to forsake the nation in exile. Songs, dances, embroidery, and other 
performative media are powerful means of “remembering the nation.” 
Nested within the rhythms of the dabke, this line is a powerful resistance 
performative that, in its articulation, compels a remembering of Pales-
tinian folk practice. The discourse of “remembering as resistance” implied 
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in these lyrics, and at the heart of the larger Palestinian folk revival, pro-
duces the very effect that it names. The dabke line itself imbues the act of 
“remembering” a somatic materiality, flesh and bones moving together 
in a collective performance of Palestinian history and practice. Further, 
the associations of Palestine and paradise call forth a long-established 
discourse of martyrdom, sacrifice, and the afterlife. Palestine, as nation 
and as land, awaits the sacrifices of the martyr in order to be fulfilled. 
Extending the discourses of folk remembering and sacrifice further, the 
example 3.2. ✹ “Hubbat al- Nar” (The fire swelled) in melody and rhythm. 
Transcription from author’s field notes.
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next verse calls forth the Palestinian wedding as a crucial metaphor of 
resistance.
The fire swelled, dignity, dignity.
The Palestinian with all dignity,
They became fidāʾīya [freedom fighters] and woe onto those who 
are blinding themselves.
The dawn of freedom will come through drawing the henna in 
blood.
The fire swelled.
The fires of resistance in this verse swell with dignity (karāma). In the 
first two lines of this verse the word karāma is repeated three times with 
a very specific intent. In Palestinian folk religious practices a karama is a 
miraculous act of God that defines and distinguishes the actions of a true 
martyr.26 The word karama here conveys powerful associations of sacri-
fice and martyrdom in the service of God, a miracle sacralizing the resis-
tance. The fires of resistance swell as an act of karama, a divine marker of 
God’s approval. In addition the Arabic word karāma is also an important 
historical reference to the battle of Karama, where the combined forces 
of the fidāʿiyīn and the Jordanian army successfully thwarted an Israeli 
invasion in 1968.27 Nested together the line brings together these deeply 
poetic meanings: in their dignity (karāma), with God’s graces (karama), at 
the battle of Karama, “they became fidā īʾya” (freedom fighters). Although 
the combined Jordanian and Palestinian forces battled to what amounted 
to a stalemate with the Israeli forces, the battle served to give the fidāʾiyīn 
credibility in the larger Arab world and especially among Palestinians. It 
was the moment when “they became fidāʾīya.”
This verse then shifts quickly to one of the most powerful references 
in Palestinian protest poetry and song. The final line foretells that “the 
dawn of freedom will come through drawing the henna in blood.” On 
the night before a rural Palestinian wedding both the bride and groom 
are often ritualistically bathed, their hands decorated with ornate pat-
terns of henna, a dark red ink. In this reference the henna is drawn in the 
martyr’s blood. In his sacrifice the martyr is celebrated as groom to the 
nation.28 The spilling of his blood enables the ritualized consummation 
of the nation and land, iconically conjoined through the metaphorical act 
of marriage.
Together, references to dignity, martyrdom, weddings, and the henna 
Al- Naksa and Political Song ✹ 111
position the resistance as an associative index of the home, family, and 
fertility. Honor and dignity derive from acts of sacrifice both for the na-
tion and within the home.29 The groom, whose blood is spilled in sacri-
fice to the nation, is reminiscent of the bride, whose blood is spilled in 
the consummation and reproduction of the family. Each gives honor and 
dignity to the family/nation in their acts of sacrifice and serves to main-
tain the community through acts of social and biological reproduction.
The Palestinian wedding is perhaps the most powerful social space 
in which conceptions of nation are defined, redefined, and transmitted. 
In exile Palestinian wedding songs hold particular significance in their 
power to encode and engender ancestral lineage, gather dispersed family 
members, and reaffirm the health and perseverance of the local commu-
nity through the passage of two of its members into adulthood. The path 
to freedom, as it is envisioned in “Hubbat al- Nar,” is refracted through 
personal sacrifice and the perseverance of indigenous Palestinian prac-
tices such as the henna and the wedding itself. In this way, the fires of 
struggle and dignity are one and the same, born of a collective history of 
shared experiences in exile. The pounding rhythm of this song, derived 
from the repertories of the dabke, equally indexes a wedding celebration. 
Both melodic and rhythmic structures of this song have their roots in the 
dabke. The melodic pattern of “Hubbat al- Nar,” in maqām sīgā pitched 
on A, is often adapted to dabke performance with various political and 
nonpolitical lyrics. The focus of the melodic line pivots on the interval 
between the root of the mode (A half- flat) and the neutral third below 
(F). The second half of the folk song proceeds upward stepwise in maqām 
sīgā, ultimately cadencing on a neutral sixth above the root. Rhythmically, 
“Hubbat al- Nar” is structured on a standard twelve- or six- beat dabke pat-
tern (īqāʿ maqsūm), shifting briefly into īqāʿ hajaʿ in the final four caden-
tial measures. Although this rhythmic shift is rarely noticed among par-
ticipatory dance lines, rehearsed presentational groups will often mark 
this transposition by shifting dabke step patterns.
The song most associated with al- ʿAshiqin, however, is another refash-
ioned dabke tune, this one narrating the Israeli siege of Beirut in the sum-
mer of 1982. “Ishhad Ya ῾Alam” (Witness oh world . . .) calls out for the 
international community to bear witness to the wounds of war and the 
attacks on Palestinians living in the camps of Beirut (see example 3.3). 
Not unlike its contemporary “Wayn al- Malayin?,” “Ishhad Ya ῾Alam” 
seeks to chastise the international community for standing complicit in 
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the horrors of Beirut. However, while the Julia Butrous classic obfuscates 
indigenous poetics in favor of large- scale militarized melodic and rhyth-
mic device, al- ʿAshiqin uses the tragedies of Beirut as a rallying cry to re-
member and revive indigenous Palestinian lifeways and practices (evia 
14- s0768).30
Witness oh world, upon us and upon Beirut, witness the people’s 
war.
And those who couldn’t see through the riddle, oh Beirut, they are 
as blinded as the eyes of America.
example 3.3. ✹ “Ishhad Ya ῾Alam” (Witness oh world) in melody and rhythm.
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By airplanes the first invasion, oh Beirut, invasion by land and by 
sea.
From Burj al- Shamali and from the sea, oh Beirut, Sur al- Hurra 
and Rashidiya.
Qalʿ at al- Shaqif, witnessed, oh Beirut, those who stomped on the 
head of the snake.
The trees and the stones fought, oh Beirut, and someone brought 
the patrols.
The mountain of burdens that our people are carrying, oh Beirut, 
Baʿin al- Hilwa and al- Nabatiya,
And we struck down the enemy, oh Beirut, by throwing the stones 
of Sayida and al- Jayya.
The continuous use of signs localized in place and space speaks to 
common tropes of shaʿbī nationalist song, rooting and singing the people 
directly into the land. In the same way poet- singers would collectively re-
member their ancestral villages in the years following al- nakba, here al- 
Aʿshiqin commemorates the sacrifices of the camps and villages fighting 
during the Israeli siege. Moreover repeated references to Beirut (the first 
hemistitch of each couplet ends in the word “Beirut”) and the Palestinian 
presence there elicit powerful associations of exile and dispossession. Fur-
ther, al- ʿAshiqin will often make reference to the indissoluble links be-
tween the “cedars (Lebanon) and olives (Palestine).” Although such a link 
was more myth than reality, the juxtaposition of the two national signs 
served to reinforce the metaphor that the people were natural products 
of the land: mountains, stones, and trees collectively repelling foreign in-
vasion. Specific references to place locate the people by their camps and 
villages, further reinforcing the direct associations of nation (as people) 
and nation (as land). Here those suffering in the Lebanese camps and vil-
lages define the nation. The following verses speak to international poli-
tics, the West’s negligent attitude toward Palestinian suffering, and the 
massacres at Sabra and Shatila.
The airplanes covered the sky, oh Beirut, and the sea confronted 
the war.
The raven of death, oh Beirut, we challenged this death.
Witness oh world, upon us and upon Beirut, upon Sabra and the 
hundreds and hundreds,
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Shatila and Barj al- Barajna, oh Beirut, in a museum they saw the 
massacre.
We didn’t raise the banner of surrender, oh Beirut, and we didn’t 
let our heads fall.
The path is difficult and long, oh Beirut, on it we place our purpose.
And those who couldn’t see through the riddle, oh Beirut, are as 
blinded as the eyes of America.
In depicting the Israeli siege on Beirut “Ishhad Ya ῾Alam” laments the 
devastation of war and the apparent unwillingness of the international 
community to come to the aid of the defenseless refugees at Sabra, Shatila, 
and Barj al- Barajna. The “eyes of America” are blinded by the subterfuge 
of Israeli politics and influence. Americans, ignorant of Israeli aggres-
sion, are unable to “see through the riddle” of international politics and 
deception to bear witness to Palestinian anguish. Despite this, however, 
the fidāʿiyīn “didn’t raise the banner of surrender” and therefore remain 
steadfast in the long arduous path to liberation.
Particularly important to this song is its use of indigenous Pales-
tinian musical devices. In this respect both “Hubbat al- Nar” and “Ishhad 
Ya ῾Alam” are structured in modes (maqāmāt) in which the fundamen-
tal pitch is A half- flat. Both maqām sīgā and maqām huzām are quite 
common in indigenous Palestinian folk song and dabke performances. 
Huzām, which differs from sīgā in that it has an augmented second in its 
upper tetrachord, possesses a very distinct sound commonly associated 
with Palestinian folk song (al- shurūqī, al- murabaʿ). Huzām pitched on 
Lā (A), places it within the register and pitch structure of several Pal-
estinian indigenous instruments associated with wedding performances: 
mijwiz, yarghūl, and shabāba. The most important sign of indigeneity 
lies in the grain of the lead singer’s voice. Hussein Munther (Abu Ali) 
sings these songs in a high tessitura, maintaining a strained and nasal 
“head voice” iconic of the long tradition of poet-singers. He further adds 
dramatic improvisatory flourishes before each song as if he were singing 
al- shrūqī or al- ʿatābā. These sign clusters give the music a pronounced 
“rural” character. To further index a Palestinian indigenous sound, al- 
Aʿshiqin often performs this song with mijwiz (Palestinian indigenous 
double clarinet) accompaniment. The characteristic buzzing timbre and 
loose tuning of the mijwiz reinforce a performative indigeneity, through 
idiomatic, individuated, ornamented, and improvisational folk- song per-
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formance. The sound of the mijwiz as the predominant melodic accom-
paniment, nested within the rhythms and melodies of the dabke, creates 
a very important sonic image of the Palestinian nation based in indige-
nous performative practice. Where it is difficult to find a mijwiz player, 
al- ʿAshiqin will typically substitute a synthesized keyboard approximation 
(instructing the keyboardist to continually bend the pitches so as to keep 
the pitch ambiguous). In every instance it is extremely important for the 
group to articulate the sound of the “folk,” the voice of the masses (ṣawt 
al- jamahīrī), in its performances of this celebrated song.
As a raucous dabke tune, with a driving beat and well- known folk 
melody, “Ishhad Ya ῾Alam” is typically performed at the end of the night, 
as the climax of the event. In each performance intertwining dabke lines 
form, weaving the performers and audience together into a human tapes-
try of music and movement. Often the musicians will vamp on the dabke 
rhythm and melody for an extended period of time, prolonging the dance 
as if it were being performed at a wedding. The crowds of circling dancers 
surround the stage in step to the beat. Their stomping feet reinforce the 
indigenous dabke rhythms and the collective remembering and witness-
ing of indigenous Palestinian song and dance.
4
the first intifada and the generation of stones (1987–2000)
Intifada Culture and the Jīl al- Ḥijāra  
(Generation of stones): 1987–1993
On December 8, 1987, as several hundred Palestinian laborers waited 
patiently to cross the Erez military checkpoint at the northern entrance 
to the Gaza Strip, an Israeli transporter careened off of the road into the 
line of waiting cars, crushing to death four and seriously injuring several 
others. Bystanders rushed to aid the victims but were unable to save those 
trapped underneath the rig. Within the hour Israeli radio broadcast news 
of the event in passing, another regrettable yet unavoidable traffic acci-
dent endemic to life in the territories. At first the news of the accident 
made little impact. Traffic deaths in Gaza are, unfortunately, nearly an 
everyday occurrence. However, in this particular instance, gossip began 
to swirl that this was in fact not an accident at all, but rather a premedi-
tated act of vengeance carried out by a relative of an Israeli who had been 
stabbed two days earlier.1 The driver of the Israeli truck, it was rumored, 
swerved purposefully into the car, attempting to inflict harm on the un-
suspecting passengers. Quickly the crash came to be seen not as an un-
fortunate occurrence but as a malicious attack, and by nightfall leaflets 
were being circulated in Gaza calling for all residents of Jabaliya refugee 
camp, home to three of the victims, to assemble en masse at the cemetery 
to protest the “malicious killings.”2
Funeral processions for three of the Jabaliyan victims assembled that 
night in front of the adjoining Israeli military base, with mourners throw-
ing stones into the compound. The next morning demonstrators con-
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structed barricades and set tires ablaze in Jabaliya and in several other 
Gazan refugee camps in defiance of the sweeping curfew orders doled 
out the night before. Israeli patrols were sent out to quell the disturbances 
and to remove the hundreds of ad hoc roadblocks set up throughout the 
camps. Stones and hand- held incendiary devices (Molotov cocktails) 
pelted the armored jeeps as they attempted to make their way through the 
streets. Undeterred by tear gas, the Israeli patrols fired live ammunition 
directly into the crowds of protestors, killing fifteen- year- old Hatem al- 
Sissi. Soon after, a young expectant mother went into premature labor due 
to tear gas inhalation, causing the death of her prematurely born daugh-
ter, Fatmah al- Qidri.3
With these tragic deaths began the first Palestinian intifada (uprising). 
All told, this spontaneous grassroots rebellion against Israeli occupation 
continued for nearly six years, officially ending with the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles provisioned in the Oslo Accords. By that time 
Israeli occupation forces had killed 1,124 Palestinians, including 250 chil-
dren. In contrast, forty- seven Israeli civilians and forty- three Israeli sol-
diers were reported killed during the six- year period.4 In hindsight it is 
difficult to fully capture the tremendous groundswell of popular senti-
ment manifest in this uprising. Within the first year alone 5,385 demon-
strations, labor strikes, and various protests were documented throughout 
the territories, an average of 103 demonstrations per week.5 During just 
the first initial months 4,148 casualties were reported, including 390 Pal-
estinian deaths.6 Yet beyond the shocking numbers of mass arrests, cur-
fews, injuries, and house demolitions, this incredible outpouring of public 
outrage against the occupation solidified a new direction in Palestinian 
history, politics, and culture. As a moment of intense national sentiment 
and reflection, generational change, and cultural revival, the intifada had 
an enormous impact on the ways many Palestinians conceptualized com-
munity, self, and other. While hundreds of thousands took to the streets, 
under the constant threat of injury and death, long- sedimented ideas of 
nation, resistance, violence, and politics became fields open to redress 
and possibility. New national intimacies were shaped, and new cultural 
identities formed. In popular civil disobedience, a new Palestinian na-
tional movement emerged, if only temporarily, founded on a renewed 
emphasis on the people, their shared experiences of dispossession, and 
the pervasive desire for self- determination.
In the many Israeli and Palestinian historical accounts that have since 
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emerged on the intifada, the role of performative media (music, dance, 
poetry, drama, graffiti, and so on) has largely been characterized as epi-
phenomenal, a mere artistic reflection of larger determinate economic, 
political, and social forces. In this respect many have argued, perhaps 
unintentionally, that the expressive media that emerged during this time, 
while a powerful means of giving voice to experiences of dispossession, 
did little more than capture in artistic expression an especially powerful 
historical moment of resistance to a brutal occupation.7 Yet it is striking 
how many of the Palestinians who participated in the demonstrations, 
walked the streets, and threw the stones, cited music, poetry, song, and 
dance as predominant means of social and political mobilization. Such 
media did more than simply reflect popular sentiment, comment on pre-
vailing power imbalances, or describe national identities and affiliations. 
Rather, songs, dances, poetry, leaflets, graffiti, and the like in fact gener-
ated such sentiment, shaped national and political identities and affilia-
tions, and provided performative spaces for subverting and resignifying 
entrenched power structures. Performative media provided an essential 
integrating tool for the masses walking the streets in public demonstra-
tions, allowing for new cultural and political identities to emerge. Col-
lective singing and dancing opened up spaces for the integration of new 
communities and ideologies. Such media did more than simply give voice 
to the subaltern experience of dispossession but in the act of performance 
offered an essential means of enduring that experience. Through perfor-
mance and performative gesture new ways of imagining Palestinian re-
sistance and nationalism emerged, opening spaces for contemplating new 
directions and new possibilities.
As thousands of demonstrators took to the streets across the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, an underground grassroots consortium calling itself the 
United National Leadership of the Uprising (unlu) formed, representing 
each of the four major political factions. Marwan Kafarna (pFlp), Tawfiq 
al- Mabhuh (pcp), Ihab al- ʿAshqar (Fatah), and Jamal Zaqut (dFlp) estab-
lished the unlu for the purpose of orchestrating the demonstrations, 
scheduling labor strikes, and defining collective goals and demands. Their 
leadership, revealed in a series of mass- produced communiqués (baya-
nāt), proved instrumental in maintaining the collective spirit of the pro-
tests, facilitating the means by which the intifada was to be enacted, and 
determining the appropriate methods of popular resistance.8 The ultimate 
success of the unlu in directing the intifada, however, arose not so much 
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in their tactical efforts to tie down occupation forces in thousands of pro-
tests and demonstrations, nor in their expertise at controlling the media, 
but in their ability to facilitate a widespread cultural transformation of 
Palestinian society from within. This transformation was based largely on 
a movement away from the divisive system of political notables and per-
sonalities (a top- down approach) toward a revival of the “shaʿb” (folk), the 
masses suffering under occupation (a bottom- up approach). In its anony-
mously signed underground communiqués, grassroots humanitarian 
efforts, and persistent calls for national solidarity, the unlu became a 
powerful voice for a new direction in Palestinian politics: a new direction 
that promised an end to the occupation not by protracted military en-
gagement with Israeli forces, but through concerted grassroots civil dis-
obedience. Based on this model, the path to self- determination would 
be forged by the masses coming together in nonlethal collective protest.
This dramatic political transformation was in part instigated by a pro-
found crisis in Palestinian culture and identity. In his ethnographic study 
of Palestinian folklore during the intifada, Nimr Sirhan identifies two de-
terminate factors in generating the uprising: the subjugation and repres-
sion of everyday life (material anxieties), and the attack on indigenous 
Palestinian culture and practices (cultural anxieties).9 In addition to re-
sisting their deplorable living conditions and social, economic, and politi-
cal oppression, Palestinians were expressing widespread fears of losing 
their “indigenous selves,” their “Palestinian roots,” to foreign occupa-
tion and encroachment. Based on his research the intifada was as much 
a cultural uprising as a political one. By taking to the streets Palestinians 
were making both a political and a cultural statement: that the occupation 
must end and that “Palestine” must live.
The unlu strategically articulated both of these anxieties in its many 
directives. The desired political transformation to grassroots activism was 
indexically linked to a revival of an imagined “authentic,” “pure” Pales-
tine of pre- 1948. In folding together the political project of ending the 
occupation with an ongoing cultural renaissance of Palestinian folklore 
and practice, the unlu fostered the development of a new political con-
sciousness among segments of the population that had previously been 
neglected in nationalist discourse.10 Rural Palestinians, refugee and youth 
communities, groups typically alienated from cosmopolitan politico- 
nationalist debate, were, by their proximity to “authentic” Palestinian 
folk practices and experiences, reimagined at the center of nationalist 
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discourse. Seeking to mobilize these communities in the service of the 
uprising, local leadership groups became adept at inserting references to 
popular folklore in their communications. Explicit political demands and 
instructions were layered between poetic references to Palestinian his-
tory, nationalist leadership, and the importance of solidarity in confront-
ing the enemy. It should be noted, however, that such articulations of the 
pure, uncontaminated, authentic Palestine were themselves byproducts 
of a larger politico- nationalist project of recruitment and conscription, a 
form of strategic essentialism whereby political leaders sought access to 
larger segments of the population.
This profound transformation of Palestinian resistance pivoted on a 
strategic resignification of cultural signs and practices. In an effort to 
better articulate both the political and cultural anxieties brought forth 
in the occupation, political leaders, artists, and intellectuals very strate-
gically sought to reconceptualize the resistance movement away from 
the once- ubiquitous image of the uniformed freedom fighter ( fidā īʾ) to 
the more sympathetic image of adolescents demonstrating in the streets. 
These aṭfāl al- ḥijāra (children of the stones) quickly superseded the uni-
formed fidāʿiyīn as the primary sign of the nation and the nationalist 
movement. In song, imagery, and rhetorical device the klāshin and rpg 
were replaced by the ḥijāra (stone), the maqlāʿ (sling), and the maṭīṭa 
(slingshot) as tools of resistance. This demonstrative transition from rifle 
to stone—from terrorist to activist—was a powerful means of resigni-
fying resistance from military engagement to grassroots civil disobedi-
ence while at the same time addressing cultural anxieties and enlisting 
the rural, poor, and youth communities into the struggle. The stone and 
sling were powerful signs of indigenous Palestinian lifeways and youth 
culture because of their associations with rural shepherding and folklore. 
Moreover this resignification successfully indexed the enormous power 
imbalance between Palestinian demonstrators and the Israeli army before 
an international audience of observers.
Cultural enthusiasts, folklorists, and musicians were quick to charac-
terize the intifada in terms of a peasant/folk rebellion against a foreign 
colonial force not unlike the Palestinian rebellions of 1834 and 1936.11 In 
his study of folklore during the intifada, Nimr Sirhan says that the inti-
fada brought Palestinians back to their “authentic” selves.12 It was an ex-
pression of resistance, “founded upon the practices of the people rooted 
in the heritage and emotions of Palestinians everywhere.”13 These “prac-
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tices of the people . . . heritage and emotions” could be found in the many 
cultural and artistic manifestations of the resistance movement. Poets, 
singers, and songs narrated the events of the uprising and called for the 
collective struggle to endure despite overwhelming opposition. Folk art-
ists emerged to compose new works focusing specifically on the shaʿbī 
character of children in the streets. Centers for the preservation of folk 
heritage, founded across the West Bank following al- naksa (1967), began 
sponsoring festivals for the performance and exhibition of indigenous 
performative and material folklore. All of these myriad efforts to pre-
serve and revive Palestinian folk practices were articulated within the dis-
courses of popular resistance and nationalism, where the gross disparity 
in power between stone- throwing youth and the Israeli army solidified 
the resistance as a noble and just cause against imperialism.
While Sirhan’s notion that the intifada brought people back to their 
“authentic” selves may have been quite popular, to the point of cliché, it 
nevertheless reveals an important strategic essentialism operative at the 
time. As is certainly true in earlier periods of Palestinian history popular 
folklore became a tool for uniting people for political ends by reducing 
complex subjectivities to a core set of few attributes projected as fun-
damental, primordial, and immutable to Palestinian identity.14 From the 
post- 1948 jīl al- sumūd (generation of steadfastness) to the post- 1967 jīl 
al- thawra (generation of revolution), this new jīl al- ḥijāra (generation of 
stones) was operationalized in popular folklore as a strategically imagined 
Palestinian identity, a construction. The so- called return to the authentic 
Palestine was yet another example of the way politico- nationalist groups 
strategically used different facets of identity in the service of their agen-
das, often shifting dramatically depending on context.
Nevertheless such reimaginings of Palestinian resistance were quite 
powerful in shaping collective notions of self and nation. In taking up 
the stone and slingshot against heavily armored Israeli tanks Palestini-
ans were developing a new resistance performative intended to articu-
late with political and cultural discourses. Essentially such a tactic ex-
pressed the political need for an end to the occupation and the cultural 
need to preserve indigenous Palestinian history, lifeways, and practice. As 
the technologies of modern warfare (rpgs, Kalashnikov rifles, uniforms, 
and so on) had proven ineffective at stopping Israeli attacks in the refugee 
camps of Lebanon, Palestinians interpreted the adoption of nonlethal re-
sistance, epitomized in the stone, slingshot, and Molotov cocktail, as a re-
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turn to their Palestinian roots. To lay down the klāshin, take off the green 
army fatigues, and instead walk the streets wearing the kūfīya around 
one’s head and neck, chanting indigenous songs and poetry, signified a 
strategic return to the folk, the embodied “pure” Palestine. Moreover this 
strategic revival of folk practices reinforced the notion that Palestinians 
were justifiably defending themselves from the aggressions of the Israeli 
military.
Such a dramatic transformation in the poetics of resistance rested 
on and was driven by an equally immense transformation in how Pales-
tinian identity was articulated across various fields. In demanding self- 
determination, it was imperative to confront occupation forces armed 
with implements of Palestinian history and indigeneity, signs that re-
inforced and legitimized their defensive struggle against colonial en-
croachment. Songs, poetry, posters, graffiti, scarves, and stones were 
framed as powerful weapons of resistance, signs of history and presence 
in the land. Such implements were also important in framing the resis-
tance as an engagement between a heavily trained and equipped colonial 
army and an indigenous population. Yet in the early phases of the up-
rising there was immense pressure to resort back to small- arms warfare 
and acts of terrorism.15 Demonstrators were reluctant, perhaps fearful of 
taking on the enormous resources of the Israeli military with such limited 
weaponry. However, confronted with ubiquitous signs of national senti-
ment, sacrifice, and the sacredness of the stone, land, and history, across 
multiple fields of sociality, demonstrators became more and more con-
vinced. Verses of folk poetry sung in the streets and painted on the city 
walls hammered home this ideational shift through their redundancy and 
affective power. The following protest chant reflects this sentiment, and it 
was a common theme in protest songs and graffiti at the time.16
There is no fear, There is no fear
For the stone has become the Kalashnikov
Oh world take a look, and people come see
Our stones are stronger than the Kalashnikov
Now is the time of defiance and not of fear
Whoever opposes us will become crazy
On the significance of the stone in intifada folklore, Nimr Sirhan goes 
so far as to say that among Palestinians under occupation it had become 
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increasingly apparent that “there ultimately was no cure for the contami-
nation of the land, but for the stone.”17 The binary of pure/impure, sacred/
profane, alluded to in Sirhan’s prose is found throughout the expressive 
culture and media of this time. To cleanse the nation of its contamination 
required the resurgence of the “pure” Palestine, embodied in the sacred 
relationship between the people and the land.
To throw a stone, a piece of the homeland, at a foreign occupying sol-
dier was a powerful resistance performative strategically engineered to 
reinforce the sacred relationship between the nation and the land. This 
relationship was further solidified in the act of transforming pieces of the 
land into implements of national resistance. The conflation of people and 
land is further exemplified in the act of throwing. In throwing a stone, 
Palestinians were performatively throwing pieces of the nation, pieces of 
their bodies, and pieces of the body politic at their enemies. The follow-
ing murabaʿ poem commonly sung at political demonstrations further 
explains the performative relationship between stone and man.18
Oh stones, oh stones
Do not leave our cramped quarters
You and I were raised together
Like the sea and the sailor
The slingshot (al- maqlāʿ or al- maqlīaʿ) was an equally powerful sign 
of peasant/folk resistance in its associations with the indigenous prac-
tice of shepherding. Young boys watching their family’s flocks would rou-
tinely use a slingshot in defense against predators and to prevent strays 
from wandering off. Similar to the shepherd’s flute (shabāba), the sling-
shot was a sign of rural folk practice, youth culture, and linkages to the 
“idyllic” Palestinian past. As Abu Faris, a musician and activist during the 
first intifada, would remind me, “many of the great heroes of Palestinian 
history were shepherds, al- Qassam in particular.” Interestingly it is com-
mon knowledge that al- Qassam was not a shepherd but a well- educated 
sheikh. The appropriation of the memory of al- Qassam as a shepherd was 
essential to a particular framing of the intifada as an extension of the 
Great Arab Revolt of 1936. As the slingshot became the preferred weapon 
in the streets of Gaza, protesting youth, so it was thought, reclaimed 
their indigenous folk heritage. Urban youth taking aim at an Israeli tank 
with only a stone and a sling consecrated a performative gesture of self- 
defense, courage, resistance, history, and a righteous and noble cause. In 
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local dialect the words al- maqlāʿ and al- maqlīaʿ are both derived from the 
same root (q- 1 - ʿ), meaning to throw or cast out, to expel, oust, or evict. As 
young boys took to the streets with their slingshots, they were in essence 
giving a performative display of expelling and evicting, casting out, occu-
pation forces from Palestinian lands, utilizing implements of Palestinian 
history.
In music, the revival of indigenous folk practice and imagery (sling-
shot, stone, youth) was aided by the ongoing folk revival taking place 
in the territories since the early 1970s. In the West Bank and Gaza the 
thawrī songs of the plo were never as popular as politicized shaʿbī folk 
songs ( aʿtābā, aʿlā dalʿ ūna, and ẓarif al- ṭūl) performed by local musicians 
at political rallies, demonstrations, festivals, and other social events. Since 
the early 1970s popular heritage festivals in the West Bank featured folk- 
poets (zajjālī, ḥādī, shāʿrī) as representatives of national culture and prac-
tice. Inside the territories activists recorded and produced cassettes in 
makeshift “underground” studios, distributing their work at rallies and 
demonstrations (see figure 4.1). Many of these artists assumed pseudo-
nyms to avoid prosecution. For example, Sabaye al- Intifada (Youth of the 
Intifada), Ibna al- Bilad (Son of the Nation), and al- ʿAmal al- Shaʿbi (The 
Figure 4.1. ✹ Boom box as weapon of resistance. Photograph by Neal Cassady 
(1988).
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People’s Work) were the underground names of important artists and en-
sembles working inside the resistance movement. A remarkable photo, 
taken by Neal Cassady in 1988, captures one of the thousands of demon-
strations taking place during the first few months of the intifada. A pro-
cessional crowd of young men, heads wrapped in kūfīyāt, march carrying 
makeshift flags mounted to pieces of lumber. At the center of the proces-
sion two demonstrators assume a leadership position. One carries a boom 
box, the other a bullhorn. No doubt, the bullhorn leads the procession in 
directing call and response chants, while the boom box provides musical 
accompaniment (see figure 4.1).
For musicians inside the territories several obstacles prevented local 
protest song from fully taking shape. Without basic recording studios or 
a commercial infrastructure to accommodate locally produced cassettes, 
the development of Palestinian protest song “inside” the territories was 
slow and often dependent on imports from Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. 
In addition, during the early intifada years singers were harshly prose-
cuted by the Israeli government for incitement. Concert halls were shut 
down, their doors chained, only hours before a performance was sched-
uled to begin. Likewise musicians were commonly arrested or detained 
the night before a scheduled concert. Activists found in possession of 
political media (leaflets, recordings, books, and so on) also faced steep 
consequences, arrest, and physical abuse.
Suhail Khoury, a young musician and activist from Nablus, became 
a central figure in the West Bank music scene during the early months 
of the intifada. As a classically trained clarinetist and composer active 
in the resistance movement, Khoury focused his talents on producing 
music in support of the intifada. His first project, Sharrar (Spark), was 
a collection of reconstituted folk songs designed to spread news of the 
intifada throughout the territories. The recording was intended to serve 
as an immediate response to the events of the previous days—the defeat 
of Israeli forces in Nablus, the numbers of dead and wounded, the sched-
uled boycotts and demonstrations, and so on. Speaking of this first inti-
fada cassette- recorded and produced inside the territories, Khoury envi-
sioned Sharrar as a type of “musical newspaper” designed to encourage 
support for and spread news of the uprising across disparate Palestinian 
communities. Through the immediacy of the music audiences from dis-
tant camps and villages could learn about what others were doing in the 
struggle. Khoury hoped to counteract the policy of “divide and rule” im-
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plemented by the Israeli occupation forces by giving a communicative 
voice to demonstrators reaching across different corners of the territories.
With the completed cassettes sitting in a box in the backseat of his car, 
Khoury was stopped at a military checkpoint. The finished tapes were im-
mediately confiscated, and Khoury was taken into custody. After a highly 
publicized trial, Khoury was convicted of incitement based on a colonial 
ordinance left on the books since the early British mandate. Seeking to 
deter other musicians from producing and distributing similar record-
ings, Israeli authorities sought to make an example of Khoury, sentencing 
him to fifteen months in prison. Of the mandated fifteen months, Khoury 
served only six. However, while incarcerated he was subjected to vari-
ous forms of physical and psychological abuse, torture, and mistreatment. 
Upon his release, Khoury rejoined the uprising as a celebrated political 
prisoner and activist.
Khoury’s highly publicized trial generated a great deal of interest in 
Sharrar. Palestinians throughout the territories clamored to find a copy 
of the cassette that caused such a severe response from Israeli authorities. 
Unbeknownst to Khoury, one copy of the original cassette managed to 
find its way into the local community and was copied well over a hundred 
thousand times. Sharrar emerged as the first locally produced intifada 
cassette inside the territories and signaled the beginning of a new reper-
tory of protest song recorded, produced, and performed entirely under 
occupation. In one of our interviews Khoury recollected:
People wanted to hear for themselves the songs that caused the 
Israeli government to react so severely. It was one of the first tapes 
directly about Israel, made here in Palestine, based on common 
folk songs with new political lyrics. There were other singers in 
Lebanon, Syria, or Jordan, but this was about the intifada from the 
inside. It was about events that happened only days before, and 
then people could listen to it and immediately hear what was going 
on in Nablus or Gaza or Jerusalem. . . . We needed the music to feel 
united with one another. People couldn’t see the demonstrations 
taking place in other towns and villages, didn’t know if anyone had 
been killed. They didn’t know what was going on. With these cas-
settes we were trying to spread news, like a newspaper, to people, 
letting them know what was going on, helping people to see the big 
picture. So that they wouldn’t feel like they were alone.
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What is ironic is that the Israelis threatened to sentence me to 
ten years in prison. So everyone wanted to know what kind of tape 
would cause such a huge reaction. People were clamoring to get a 
copy of it, wondering what was on it that would cause such a re-
action. . . . Soon it was everywhere. I still to this day do not know 
how one [of the tapes] got out.
the rise oF hamas and anashīd al- islāmī
As the demonstrations continued throughout 1988 several other socio-
political organizations formed in opposition to the unlu. The most sig-
nificant of these was al- Harakat al- Maqawma al- Islāmīya (Islamic Re-
sistance Movement), known colloquially by its Arabic acronym, Hamas. 
Established as a Gazan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas was 
formed in 1988 by a group of highly educated Palestinian university stu-
dents and activists representative of a new generation that rejected the en-
trenched system of family and ḥamūla patronage and loyalty. In contrast 
to the plo, Hamas framed its activities in specifically Islamic terms. This 
is revealed by its continued insistence on preserving the land as a sacred 
waqf, an inalienable gift endowed by God. As such, no part of Palestine 
could be relinquished to foreign (that is, non- Muslim) occupation. Al-
though Fatah often claimed a sense of legitimacy, using religious rheto-
ric, Hamas distanced itself from the plo because of its strict religious in-
terpretation of the nationalist movement. Among poor disenfranchised 
refugees in Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas provided an unwavering 
hard-line stance against the occupation and hence emerged over time as 
a formidable political counterbalance to the plo. Their social and political 
activities were most visible through a diverse network of local community 
organizations, charitable funds, educational institutions, mosques, and 
other religious societies.19
In direct contrast to the various secular nationalists and socialists of 
the plo, Hamas proclaimed a certain degree of religious legitimacy to 
lead the resistance. What is more, given their commitment to social wel-
fare programs and charitable organizations, Hamas gained a reputation 
for honesty and philanthropy in the camps and crowded urban spaces. 
Arafat and his political cohorts were notoriously suspected of widespread 
corruption, nepotism, and political maneuvering to secure their leader-
ship. Hamas, as envisioned in the persona of its spiritual leader, Sheikh 
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Ahmad Yassin, presented itself as honest, pious, and committed to Pales-
tinian liberation through social enrichment and a return to Islamic juris-
prudence.
Coupled with the rise of Hamas, a second stream of religiously ori-
ented protest “song” (anashīd) emerged alongside the shaʿbī nationalist 
folk songs of Fatah and the plo.20 Between the two repertories there were 
significant differences in poetics, text, instrumentation, and melodic and 
rhythmic device. While secular nationalists of both the shaʿbī and thawrī 
catalogues drew from an established lexicon of Marxist third- world guer-
rilla warfare against imperialism and the preservation of a specific folk 
ethos, anashīd was derived largely from the language of the Qur’an. Ref-
erences to Qur’anic scripture and the sunna (the recorded deeds of the 
Prophet) formed the core vocabulary for imagining Palestinian libera-
tion. The nation itself was envisioned as a pious community of believers, 
or umma. To this end, anashīd presented a reconceptualized vision of the 
nation framed within the discourses of religion and faith. Land provided 
a powerful connection to the greater Islamic world and the history of 
Islamic development. Palestinian liberation was promulgated not specifi-
cally for the restoration of indigenous culture and heritage, but rather for 
the redemption of the holy land from foreign occupation. Essentially the 
nation was detached from its direct associations with the land and instead 
reinscribed into the greater Islamic history and community. In text these 
songs often glorified the lives and deeds of famous Muslim heroes: the 
Prophet Mohammad, Saladin, Sheikh ʿIzz al- Din al- Qassam, and others. 
References to famous battles between Muslim forces and the enemies of 
Islam were also common.21
In musical device the differences between shaʿbī and anashīd reper-
tories were at times strident. Many pious Muslims believed that the 
dance- inspired dabke songs of secular nationalists were at best problem-
atic in terms of religious jurisprudence and modesty. Public dancing was 
not considered an appropriate activity in mixed (male/female) contexts. 
By and large, anashīd did not contain many of the core components of 
shaʿbī nationalist song. Indigenous folk instruments such as the shabāba 
and yarghūl were omitted as well as classical instruments such as the nai, 
ʾūd, and qanūn. Vocalists predominantly sang solo melodic extemporiza-
tions on Islamic texts without accompaniment or, in rare cases, accompa-
nied by a chorus of unison male voices. In song style, accent, and decla-
mation these songs emulated Qur’anic recitation (tajwīd) and the more 
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classically derived religious song forms. The majority of these texts were 
sung in an unmetered free rhythm. However, it was not uncommon for 
vocalists to be accompanied by modest percussion, perhaps one or two 
daffāt (frame drums).22
The absence of melodic accompaniment placed considerable empha-
sis on the voice itself and the meanings inherent in the politico- religious 
texts. Vocalists were celebrated for their ability to engage the minds of 
their audience and inspire a sense of religious purpose and dedication. 
The aesthetic of religious determination and piety carried through into 
the performance environment. In contrast to the participatory dabke 
songs of groups like al- ʿAshiqin, anashīd was predominantly presenta-
tional. In these performance spaces a single vocalist would perform be-
fore a seated audience with little direct interaction. The absence of physi-
cal interaction (dancing, collective gestures, singing, and so on) between 
performers and audience was said to preserve the purity of the texts and 
the sincerity, dignity, and piety of the performance.
The absence of melodic instrumentation and dance rhythms in Islamic 
anashīd can be further explained more practically in terms of political 
strategy. According to the musician and activist ‘Issa Boulos, many of the 
anashīd performers were not well trained and therefore couldn’t include 
instruments in their performances. Moreover, at a time when Hamas was 
strategically attempting to present itself as a moral/ethical counterbalance 
to the plo, it was important for Hamas to reinforce, if not campaign, its 
overt religiosity. In terms of music, this meant creating stark distinctions 
between anashīd and contemporary shaʾbī protest song. To emphasize the 
idea that melodic instruments (and dancing) were forbidden then be-
comes a strategic means of reinforcing the idea that Hamas, whose music 
has no melodic instruments (or dancing), is somehow more aligned with 
God. The alignment of anashīd with the aesthetics of Qurʿanic recitation 
carves out a performative space between Hamas and the plo and further 
indexes a sense of religiosity and piety.
sabreen and the “new palestinian sound”
A third stream of resistance song emerged during the intifada by way of 
the Palestinian ensemble Sabreen. Although Sabreen had been founded in 
1980, it wasn’t until four years later, on the release of their second album, 
Dukhan al- Barakin (Smoke of the volcanoes) (1984), that they began to 
influence Palestinian music in Israel and the West Bank.23 Unlike the 
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musicians and ensembles traveling throughout the region performing 
in refugee camps and political rallies, Sabreen was one of the first en-
sembles to have had a significant impact among middle- and upper- class, 
university- educated Palestinians. Formed of a mixture of Palestinian and 
Palestinian Israeli musicians, Sabreen developed into one of the better 
known and internationally recognized nationalist groups. Their fame de-
rived in large part from their incorporation of cosmopolitan musical de-
vice, and the blending of Western and Arab musical forms, instruments, 
and aesthetics with the poetry of well- known writers such as Mahmoud 
Darwish, Samih al- Qassam, and Hussein Barghouthi.
Ironically, when the group began performing in support of the up-
rising they simultaneously incorporated several Arab instruments so as 
to reach a broader Palestinian audience. Prior to this time, Sabreen used 
only Western instruments in their compositions (keyboards, drums, gui-
tar, and so on). With the rise of an indigenized Palestinian nationalism 
following the massacres at Sabra and Shatila, the group leader and com-
poser Said Murad began writing music using specifically Arab instru-
ments. In an early interview Murad states, “The Lebanese experience af-
fected us deeply . . . we had been using organ and drums for a long time. 
We wanted to reach ‘the street’—simpler songs, more down to earth. We 
faced a very serious question. Should we put the western instruments 
aside and use the ʿud and the qanūn instead? Or both? . . . The question 
was how to make music that was personally convincing and how to dis-
cuss the Palestinian crisis in an appealing way.”24
The result was Dukhan al- Barakin (Smoke of the volcanoes) (1984), 
a compilation of newly composed songs set to texts by Mahmoud Dar-
wish, Hussein Barghouthi, Abd al- Latif ‘Aql, Abd al- Aziz al- Maqalah, and 
Samih al- Qassam. Though many of these poems were over twenty years 
old by the time of release, Sabreen found their commentary of arrest, tor-
ture, and sacrifice to be extremely relevant to the sociopolitical situation 
facing Palestinians in the mid- to late 1980s. The initial success of Dukhan 
al- Barakin, however, was felt only among small pockets of cosmopolitan 
nationalists, students, and urban audiences in Jerusalem and Ramallah, 
remaining largely unknown in the greater Palestinian diaspora.25 Never-
theless these small successes encouraged the group to continue recording 
in this style, but with more emphasis on reaching out to the mainstream.
Sabreen’s second major project, Mawt al- Nabi (Death of the Prophet), 
was recorded as the uprising first began in 1987. On this album the group 
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focused on the work of the West Bank poet Hussein Barghouthi. In both 
of these two major albums Sabreen distinguished itself from its nationalist 
contemporaries by emphasizing the blending of indigenous and cosmo-
politan musical aesthetics. Similar to the programmatic works of Marcel 
Khalife, the political ballads of Mustapha al- Kurd, and the guitar- infused 
power anthems of Ahmad Qaʿbour, Sabreen attempted to forge new 
ground by folding in Western pop forms, harmonies, and instruments. 
The influences of jazz, blues, and reggae are noticeable in the many syn-
copated bass lines, back- beat rhythms, and guitar accompaniment. The 
use of cosmopolitan musical devices, however, did not necessarily trans-
late into mass popularity among local audiences. In fact among youth 
outside urban areas and university campuses, Sabreen was marginal, if 
not completely unknown. Their “new Palestinian sound” conflicted with 
the many shaʿbī nationalist musicians performing at the time. Instead 
Sabreen found its audience among university students in urban centers.
The mixing of Arab and Western elements in Sabreen’s music speaks to 
an important aesthetic discourse pervasive throughout Palestinian music. 
Working from within both Israeli and Palestinian musical frames, Sa-
breen was highly versed in Western music theory and performance prac-
tice. Their exposure to Western popular music provided a diverse experi-
ence from which to draw. Early performances in the Jerusalem music 
scene formed the foundation for hybridity and innovation in their work. 
However, on another level, the fact that Sabreen arose from within a cos-
mopolitan artistic community meant that they were less encumbered by 
exilic nationalism, folk preservation, politics, and aesthetics. In her re-
search on patterns of adaptation, preservation, and innovation in Arab 
musical life, Anne Rasmussen offers an interesting theory to describe 
this process. Based on the notion of “marginal preservation,” Rasmussen 
theorizes the ways pressures to preserve “authentic” musical practices are 
differentially allocated between communities in the homeland and those 
in diaspora.26 Whereas Palestinian artists in diaspora were often com-
pelled to remain within the nationalist constructs of indigenous music 
and dance in order to preserve and promote their “authentic” Palestinian 
identity, Sabreen had little need to convince anyone that they were “real” 
Palestinians. Operating inside the territories they were less constrained 
to innovate, augment, and/or develop music and dance in ways that were 
perhaps unavailable or inconceivable to Palestinian artists in diaspora.
132 ✹ The First Intifada
The Post- Oslo “Honeymoon” and Voices of  
Peace and Reconciliation: 1993–1998
Throughout the intifada internationally televised images of well- equipped 
Israeli troops firing at unarmed teenagers caused widespread criticism of 
the Israeli government both in the Arab world and beyond. Despite di-
verse attempts to crush the uprising, support for the boycotts and dem-
onstrations strengthened. With each passing month it became clear that 
Israel had to reassess its policies in Gaza and the West Bank. In the face 
of staggering numbers of casualties, the intifada produced a poetics of re-
sistance in the territories immune to conventional modes of state repres-
sion. As the severity of state terror increased, demonstrators and activ-
ists found greater support among the mainstream Palestinian population 
and effectively contributed to a widespread political move left toward the 
Labor Party, led by Yitzhak Rabin.
Under these circumstances, negotiations were in Prime Minister 
Rabin’s best interests for ending the uprising. On his election Rabin 
promised to freeze settlement construction and stated a willingness to 
negotiate with the plo.27 In doing so he quickly restored strained diplo-
matic relations with a United States administration determined to see an 
end to the impasse. A cautious optimism emerged among some Pales-
tinians toward the new Israeli government. And when it was revealed in 
the summer of 1993 that a secret agreement had been reached between 
Israel and the plo, shockwaves reverberated throughout the world. The 
agreement provided for a mutual recognition between the two parties and 
further established a framework for the establishment of an autonomous 
Palestinian entity in the Occupied Territories. The sudden disclosure that 
Israeli and plo officials had been meeting secretly outside Oslo, Norway, 
for several months, and that the two parties had reached a momentous 
agreement, ushered in a new period of hope, reconciliation, and negotia-
tions between Israelis and Palestinians.
Following the signing of the Declaration of Principles (dop) on Sep-
tember 13, 1993, a tremendous social and cultural transformation occurred 
throughout Palestinian communities in Israel, the Occupied Territories, 
and the near diaspora. Though the dop was intentionally ambiguous and 
open to multiple interpretations, many believed it to be the foundation 
from which an Israeli- Palestinian dialogue would soon emerge.28 Pales-
tinian leadership inside the territories was strongly divided on the dop 
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along political lines. Islamist factions were quick to criticize the recog-
nition of Israel and the renouncement of armed resistance. Socialist and 
other nationalist parties were equally troubled by the document’s obvious 
ambiguity as well as its many concessions. Yet by all accounts discussion 
and support for the accords hinged on the assumption that final status 
parameters (final borders, Jerusalem, and refugee rights) would be nego-
tiated directly between the plo and the Israeli state.29 Arafat, in sign-
ing the dop, had finally received Israeli recognition and had transformed 
himself in diplomatic circles from a “terrorist” to a “statesman.” In so 
doing, Arafat was given the promise of future negotiations on final status 
issues, and permission to officially return to the territories from exile. 
Israel, for that matter, was lauded for making a historic compromise and 
a genuine commitment to negotiate a resolution to a nearly hundred- year 
colonial conflict. Both parties soon garnered international accolades from 
the United States and the European community for their efforts. Yitzhak 
Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Yasser Arafat were all awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize, and photos of the “historic handshake” on the lawn of the White 
House circulated throughout the world as a sign of the end to the conflict.
The ramifications of this historic handshake were felt throughout the 
Middle East. Watching Arafat and Rabin stand together in Washington, 
D.C., Jordan’s King Hussein was now free to pursue his own formal peace 
treaty with Israel.30 In fact the day after the dop was signed, Jordan and 
Israel had already agreed to a working agenda for peace negotiations. By 
July 1994 Jordan and Israel had issued a joint declaration ending hos-
tilities and on October 26, 1994, signed a formal treaty at Wadi Araba. 
Within three years of the dop Israel had formally established diplomatic 
ties with fifteen Arab states, investment and trade had suddenly become 
possible, and the Arab boycott was virtually lifted.
The sudden optimism and hope brought about by a year of secret nego-
tiations between the plo and Israel had tremendous social and cultural 
effects. The culture of mourning, sacrifice, and revolution had been seem-
ingly lifted, and families were no longer deterred from openly and publicly 
celebrating life- cycle events such as weddings, births, and circumcisions. 
Concerts were held in the streets, and musicians were called on to per-
form music for the Palestinian nation and its new era of peace and recon-
ciliation. The largest such celebration heralded the triumphant return of 
Yasser Arafat and his “Tunisian” cadre of aides and comrades to Gaza on 
July 1, 1994.31 Standing in the sunroof of his limousine Arafat waved to the 
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assembled crowds wearing his characteristic kūfīya and flashing the vic-
tory sign with both hands. Ironically, despite all the ceremony of Arafat’s 
triumphant return, in these early months few had actually seen the agree-
ment he had signed. The concessions Arafat had made in exchange for his 
return to Gaza were largely unknown to the general Palestinian public, 
who were under the impression that a genuine peace process was under 
way, and that within a few short years an independent Palestinian state 
would be established.32 Celebrations emerged in the streets of Gaza, Ra-
mallah, Amman, Beirut, and other Palestinian cities and villages. As a 
meaningful gesture, Palestinian men in the camps began kissing their 
rifles and handguns as a sign of both victory and farewell to the violence 
of the last five years. Working for National Geographic, journalist Alexan-
dra Avakian photographed a Palestinian man holding his young daughter 
in his arms while they both kiss the barrel of his pistol, a group of elder 
women standing in the background singing zaghrūd in celebration of the 
end of violence (see figure 4.2).33 Gestures such as these were an incred-
ibly poignant means of interpreting the moment, as many believed they 
were witnessing the end of the occupation and the birth of the indepen-
dent Palestinian nation- state.
Figure 4.2. ✹ A kiss good- bye to the fighting. Photograph by Alexandra Avakian 
(1996).
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For any musician who had made a career singing in support of the 
intifada, the dop presented two career choices: either follow the tides of 
hope and peace and sing in support of the peace process, or reject the 
accords and continue the protests of the intifada. Soon after the historic 
handshake there was a quiet in the streets. Rallies, demonstrations, pro-
tests, and other politically charged social spaces were quickly replaced by 
political debates, peace rallies, and victory celebrations. In effect intifada 
singers were out of business. With the struggle seemingly over, or at least 
on hold for the time being, nationalist musicians were left with no audi-
ence for their work. Intifada media seemed no longer necessary in a time 
of negotiation and hope for a just and equitable peace.
For many intifada musicians across the near diaspora the post- Oslo 
period meant a return to the already saturated workforce. In Jordan, Ba-
ladna founder Kamal Khalil, unable to find audiences for his political 
songs, returned to working as a carpenter and brick mason. In Syria and 
Lebanon, several founding members of al- ʿAshiqin turned their efforts 
to establishing children’s dabke troupes and other cultural heritage or-
ganizations. And in Jerusalem, Mustapha al- Kurd focused his attention 
on establishing an Arab music academy. Other once- famous musicians 
went back to day labor, driving cabs, and/or seeking odd jobs outside of 
the refugee camps, performing music at weddings and family celebra-
tions wherever opportunities arose. The more fortunate were able to ob-
tain work permits and visas in the larger Arab world, the Gulf States, 
America, Brazil, or Canada.
There were, however, many substantial opportunities within the devel-
oping Palestinian National Authority (pa) for those musicians and artists 
close to the plo and its dominant political party, Fatah. These artists were 
given bureaucratic positions, working to develop a sense of national af-
filiation and loyalty among the people and the newly formed pa. A former 
intifada singer, now a high- ranking official in the Ministry of Culture, 
characterized the process as “using traditions and customs [taqalīd wa 
aʿdāt] as a means to help ease the [plo’s] transition from an ‘outside’ po-
litical formation in exile to an ‘inside’ national government [naẓām barra 
lī naẓām jūwa].” The rigid social forces of wasta (nepotism, connections) 
created a great deal of animosity between artists left off the state pay-
roll. Still other artists refused to join the pa for fear that they would lose 
creative control of their work and be turned into propagandists for the 
new regime. Many highly talented and well- trained artists declined par-
136 ✹ The First Intifada
ticipation in the government for these reasons, choosing rather to pur-
sue their art in the private sector as freelance musicians, teachers, or ad-
ministrators.
Where formal employment in the developing Palestinian public sec-
tor was either unavailable or unattractive, artists found support in the 
many cultural nongovernmental organizations (ngos) developing in the 
West Bank and Gaza strip. With the opening of dialogue and interna-
tional recognition of the peace process, foreign aid began to flood into 
newly established ngos devoted to Palestinian cultural and humanitarian 
needs. Underground intifada singers in the West Bank were courted to 
establish presentational folkloric dabke groups, teach private lessons, or 
administer music and heritage programs in Palestinian refugee camps 
funded by international aid agencies. Many of these groups have over the 
years developed strong reputations and received critical acclaim in the 
international art world for their efforts to provide artistic instruction to 
Palestinian children.
sabreen and the rise oF reconciliation
While the majority of frontline resistance singers eventually faded from 
public view, there were several groups legitimately inspired by the wide-
spread feelings of hope and optimism brought about by the Oslo period. 
Among these, Sabreen is perhaps the best remembered. During the 
“post- Oslo honeymoon” Sabreen released its fourth major album, Jay al- 
Ḥamam (Here come the doves), in 1994 (see figure 4.3). Their signature 
piece, “The Doves Are Coming,” is often cited as the hallmark anthem of 
the period.34
Your food is a locust,
Dipped in a drop of honey.
Your dress, burlap and camel hair.
Your shoes are thorns,
Your path is thorns, its flowers few.
The moon on the outer edge,
A prophet exiled.
Calling in the wilderness:
Widen the roads, For the deer of love and peace.
Widen the roads, The doves are coming from the mountain,
The doves are coming.
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Taken as a whole, Here Come the Doves presents a truly imaginative 
tapestry of textual and musical dialogue. However, while it is true that its 
signature piece is indeed a testament to new feelings of hope and peace, 
in looking carefully at the remaining tracks it becomes apparent that this 
album is less a political celebration of the peace process per se than a pro-
nouncement of a new Palestinian aesthetic. The statement being made is 
not of political accomplishment but of cultural dialogue and catharsis. Sa-
breen’s liner notes state that it is their desire to create a new voice, a “mod-
ern originality,” akin to that of Sayed Darwish and Umm Kulthum.35 Their 
hope was to develop their own individual style born of transcending tra-
ditional musical relationships. To do this, composer Said Murad sought to 
balance “old and new,” “East and West,” melody and harmony in his com-
positions. “The world has become a small village, and music breaks down 
the borders and overcomes distances. It weaves diverse elements into one 
continuous and harmonious weaving—a contribution to the formation of 
the new Palestinian, the new Arab, the new Mediterranean.”36 This new 
Palestinian seeks to break down political borders through musical dia-
logue and discussion with the “outside” non- Arab world.
Musically the collection of songs on Here Come the Doves navigates di-
verse terrain. The opening track, “The Gypsy,” pays homage to the reggae 
Figure 4.3. ✹ 
Sabreen, Jay  
al- Hamam (Here 
come the doves).
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of Bob Marley with overemphasized strummed up- beats, reggae- esque 
set drumming, and syncopated bass lines. Yet the melodic contour, song- 
style, and mode (bayatī) are quintessentially Arab. “Ramallah 1989” is 
reminiscent of a slow mournful blues. “Yammay” is a stylish rendition 
of an indigenous Palestinian folk song given new life through virtuosic 
tabla, harmonic ostinati, and the use of the lesser-known Egyptian reed- 
flute, qawala, instead of the traditional Palestinian shabāba. “Thirty Stars” 
is an experimentation of sorts, mixing Latin jazz beats and harmonies 
with Arab melodic ornamentation, contouring, and extemporization 
on the ʿūd, violin, and nai. The most explicitly Arab piece on the album, 
“St. George,” also frustrates simple definition by its use of chordal ostinati 
and a pronounced electric bass line.
The texts of these pieces are equally enigmatic in form and content. 
Though each of the texts is composed by Hussein Barghouthi, there are 
only sparse moments of continuity between songs. Barghouthi’s dis-
jointed poetic style defies linear narrative and thus follows nicely in the 
tradition of Sabreen’s earlier work with Mahmoud Darwish and Samih 
al- Qassam. In contrast to Darwish and al- Qassam, however, Barghouthi 
brings a fresh voice and style to an otherwise exhausted repertory of resis-
tance poetry. As a sociology professor at Bir Zeit University, Barghouthi 
was more familiar with the popular slang and dialect of the younger gen-
eration of protestors and activists demonstrating in the West Bank.37 He 
developed a more conversational, free- flowing poetic style, incorporating 
the cadence and dialect of his university students. This was more acces-
sible to and idiomatic of West Bank youths than the canonized Darwish 
and al- Qassam. Of the more politically charged texts on this album, 
“Thirty Stars” is particularly illustrative of the hope, uncertainty, and 
youth culture characteristic of the time.
Thirty stars twinkling over a cypress valley,
Thirty stars twinkling,
My heart is an open cavern,
If only the pretty one
Would understand
That the moon is wounded,
But hope is power.
Thirty stars falling over a cypress valley,
Thirty stars falling.
The First Intifada ✹ 139
Half of a lifetime falling over a cypress valley
Half of a lifetime of falling
And the days have changed,
And dreams exchanged,
And a cypress tree has broken.
Imagery of the night, its protective stars twinkling over a cypress val-
ley, giving light to the darkness of war and occupation, each speaks to 
the stock repertory of intifada trope and metaphor. The cypress, a sign 
of northern Palestine/southern Lebanon, has been broken by the falling 
of stars and the wounding of the moon. Any source of light in darkness 
(stars, moon, fire) is said to represent life, hope, and resistance. Half a 
lifetime of falling stars signifies the sacrifice of Palestinians throughout 
forty years of occupation, resulting in the loss of days and the exchange of 
dreams. If only the youth of Palestine, or “the pretty ones,” would under-
stand that despite the darkness of occupation there is power in hope for 
a better future.
Barghouthi’s most powerful writing follows shortly after in the song 
“Ramallah 1989.” Sabreen sets this text as a slow blues, incorporating 
swung eighths, melodic and harmonic emphasis on a pentatonic blues 
scale (lowered third and seventh, dominant seventh chordal harmonies), 
and a pulsating backbeat brought out by acoustic guitar and creative 
brushwork on cymbals and snare drum.
Sometimes I walk alone
In the middle of the night,
And the night is like a river
My hands in my pockets
I whistle, or smoke
In so much bitterness.
The whole town is shattered,
No one around
But the void and the army . . .
I stand by the fence,
My chin in my hand.
I stand and think, how?
All that’s left of a lifetime
Is a month, merely.
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Yet I walk, whistle, or smoke,
In so much bitterness.
A blues aesthetic seems ironically appropriate for the setting of this 
text. Contemplative, mournful, and grief- stricken, “Ramallah 1989” eulo-
gizes the loss of social and cultural vitality long associated with the city of 
Ramallah. The bitterness of witnessing the devastation of such a vibrant 
artistic community causes one to walk the night smoking, whistling, look-
ing for answers. In song and text, however, there are no answers. The lis-
tener is left to contemplate, or to taste, the final phrase, hayk min kathar 
al- qahar (in so much bitterness). Al- Qahar, while figuratively translated 
here as bitterness, has a multilayered meaning. From the root q- h- r, al- 
qahar literally means to be subjugated by force, vanquished, overpow-
ered, or defeated. The “bitterness” of “Ramallah 1989” lies not only in the 
loss of a lively community and city to occupation, but also in the loss of 
hope and agency to even resist that occupation.
In relation to the established repertories of resistance song, “Ramallah 
1989” is truly transgressive. Written at the height of the intifada, it is one 
of the very few songs that refuses to characterize the resistance uncriti-
cally as a heroic struggle of the masses. Rather it very honestly depicts the 
intifada and its devastation in terms of a very personalized experience of 
wandering the streets at night without direction, an experience nonethe-
less shared among many. Moving beyond the empty rhetoric of faceless 
“resistance,” “Ramallah 1989” argues for a new style of Palestinian song 
that deals with personal experience and emotion. There are no right an-
swers, it seems. “Victory,” “liberation,” and “resistance” as they are char-
acterized in countless intifada songs are revealed as illusory byproducts 
of political discourse and do not capture the lifeways and experiences of 
the people grappling for meaning within its cages. Its critical imagining 
of the resistance in terms of personal experience, loss, and the bitterness 
of occupation marks “Ramallah 1989” as truly revolutionary in compari-
son to established repertories of nationalist song.
Immediately following “Ramallah 1989” Sabreen intentionally places 
the title track, “The Doves Are Coming,” to offer the listener some relief 
from the despair and emptiness of the previous song. Perhaps Sabreen has 
revealed that the ultimate solution to “Ramallah’s” bitterness and subjuga-
tion is found in the plea of “Doves” to “widen the roads” for the coming 
of peace. Indeed the coming of peace is likened to the return of an exiled 
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prophet, the dawning of a new moon. “Its food is locusts” (plague, vio-
lence, hatred), its “dress is burlap,” and its “path is thorns” (difficult, pain-
ful, treacherous). The coming of peace here is not the anticipated glorious 
victory espoused in the vitriolic nationalist songs of the intifada. Rather 
it is signified in the difficult, often- painful path of dialogue and recon-
ciliation.
What distinguishes each of these songs from its contemporaries is an 
innovative, if not trangressive, approach to poetry, melody, lyric, and in-
strumentation. Inasmuch as Sabreen’s hybridized approach to melody 
and rhythm signaled a new compositional style, so too did their lyrics 
enable new possibilities for depicting Palestinian trauma and experience. 
For a group such as Sabreen, which had made its name singing in sup-
port of the intifada, Here Come the Doves is a bold statement. Touted for 
its strong message of redemption through dialogue, Here Come the Doves 
provides a compelling benchmark of artistic and cultural production dur-
ing the early post- Oslo years. Though some have labeled Sabreen’s work 
during this period as merely reactive celebration, a close reading of the 
songs themselves reveals this to be a superficial interpretation.38 True, 
several of the songs on this album are explicitly supportive of the peace 
process (“St. George,” “Thirty Stars,” “The Doves Are Coming”). Yet in 
large part the overall power of this album lies not in its overt message of 
peace, but rather in its drive to innovation and dialogue across rigid cul-
tural, political, and aesthetic borders. Peace, in and of itself, is never the 
overt theme of the album. Rather Here Come the Doves is a testament to 
aesthetic and political dialogue between Palestinian and Israeli, Arab and 
Jew, East and West. Sabreen’s stated desire for creating a “modern origi-
nality” entailed drawing from a diverse tapestry of musical and textual 
devices. In blending cosmopolitan reggae, blues, and pop styles with clas-
sical and folk Arabic songs and instruments, Sabreen attempted to push 
the envelope of Palestinian nationalist song, “contributing to the forma-
tion of a new Palestinian.”39 Here Sabreen doesn’t celebrate “the coming 
of the doves” but rather “the coming of the new Palestinian.”
This is perhaps the most extraordinary legacy of Sabreen in particu-
lar, and of the “post- Oslo honeymoon” in general. Situated on various 
sociocultural axes, the post- Oslo period, though short-lived, had a for-
mative impact on processes of Palestinian identity formation. Sabreen’s 
emphasis on musical and cultural dialogue dovetailed nicely with wide-
spread feelings of hope for reconciliation with Israel and the non- Arab 
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world. Amira Hass, writing of her experiences living and working in Gaza 
at that time, observed that during episodes of high hope children began 
“playing soccer again; men were leaving the mosques [the only public safe 
haven during the intifada years] to cheer at the soccer field.”40 Hass goes 
on to mention that in 1994, as hopes again ran high, “the sale of hair- care 
products suddenly went up.” Women in Gaza, trapped in their homes by 
occupation and strict religious edicts to cover their heads, were starting 
to see the end of the curfews and began planning for their return to pub-
lic social life.
Musicians in Ramallah recounted to me how during this period the 
number of wedding performances increased exponentially. With the 
coming of dialogue, and an opening in the occupation, families were 
quick to seize the opportunity to marry off their children. The time offered 
a small window where wedding celebrations would most likely not be 
interrupted by curfews, closures, or incursions. Likewise, in Gaza and 
the West Bank, when curfews were temporarily lifted and soldiers were 
redeployed, the streets came alive with cafes, theaters, restaurants, and 
assorted falafel carts. Families and young couples assembled each night 
after work to stroll through the streets, picnic in the hills, or walk the 
Gazan coastline.41 Memories such as these, though incidental, are in fact 
significant for understanding how Palestinian sociality was so tremen-
dously altered by the hope for an end to the occupation.
As the so- called resistance musicians of the 1970s and 1980s faded 
into obscurity or the state establishment, their absence created a vacuum 
within which Sabreen was able to constructively promote its more cosmo-
politan vision of nationalist song. The intractable hold of the occupation 
on identity politics had, if only momentarily, released, allowing for inno-
vation and dialogue and bringing with it a new appreciation for cosmo-
politan music and aesthetics. Though many Palestinian musicians had 
always been interested in Western instruments, scales, beats, and har-
monies, up until the post- Oslo period Palestinian music was largely gov-
erned by a discourse of resistance that discouraged innovation in favor 
of the militant preservation of turāth al- shaʿbī (popular heritage) and 
other “national” musical devices. Musicians were charged with the task 
of preserving and affirming a distinct Palestinian identity besieged by oc-
cupation and forced exile. At a time when hope reigned supreme, such 
aesthetic obstacles momentarily lifted, allowing many musicians the op-
portunity to innovate, augment, or develop a “new Palestinian sound.”
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For the next five years the post- Oslo honeymoon continued. Pales-
tinian musicians seeking to develop and innovate new repertories of song 
and dance found fertile ground in networks of multinational nongov-
ernmental organizations, conservatories, and potential travel to Europe 
and North America. Collaborations between Israeli (Jewish) and Pales-
tinian (Christian and Muslim) artists were also commonplace. New net-
works of collaborating musicians and artists on both sides of the Green 
Line emerged, creating a new music scene born of hope and reconcilia-
tion. The intermingling of musicians from diverse Israeli and Palestinian 
communities coalesced with an intermingling of aesthetics, producing a 
unique musical and cultural hybridity.42
5
revivals and new arrivals
The al- Aqsa Intifada (2000–2010)
Al- Aqsa Intifada: Popular Culture and a Return to Conflict
On the morning of September 28, 2000, Likud Party leader Ariel Sharon, 
closely escorted by a thousand Israeli security officers with another three 
thousand Israeli police strategically stationed in surrounding neighbor-
hoods, entered Jerusalem’s Temple Mount and Haram al- Sharif, home to 
two of Islam’s most revered mosques, al- Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock. 
According to Sharon, he visited the holy compound “with a message of 
peace.”1 Sharon and his entourage toured the Temple Mount for less than 
two hours and left. As he began to leave, however, crowds of angry Pales-
tinians attempted to rush security barricades and hurl stones down onto 
the security forces from atop the compound. The Israeli police promptly 
responded with batons, tear gas, and rubber bullets, resulting in over 
thirty Israeli police and twenty demonstrators injured. The fighting soon 
spilled out onto the streets of East Jerusalem, where cars were overturned, 
businesses vandalized, and tires set ablaze. Immediately afterward similar 
demonstrations broke out in Gaza, Ramallah, and Nablus, where Israeli 
police were called on to quell stone- and firebomb- throwing demonstra-
tors with armored vehicles, Apache helicopters, and riot police. Fighting 
continued well into the next day with Israeli police firing live ammunition 
into the crowds, killing seven Palestinians.
In Gaza City, two days after Sharon entered the holy sites, several 
hundred protestors marched from a local university to the gates of the 
heavily guarded Israeli settlement of Netzarim. Amidst the demonstra-
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tors Israeli police reportedly heard gunfire and immediately retaliated by 
firing live ammunition down onto the protestors from the armored stone 
walls guarding the settlement. Caught in the crossfire were Jamal al- Durra 
and his twelve- year- old son, Mohammad al- Durra. While hiding behind 
a concrete water duct, Jamal was shot eight times trying to shield his son 
from the gunfire. Mohammad was shot four times and soon died in his 
unconscious father’s arms. An ambulance rushed into the fray to save 
them. But as the medic approached he, too, was shot and killed by Israeli 
snipers. A French television crew captured the scene in its entirety and 
broadcast the horrific images of al- Durra’s death throughout the Arab 
world, the United States, and Europe.
Within a week of Sharon’s visit and the death of Mohammad al- Durra, 
Israel and the Occupied Territories had fallen into open conflict with a 
reported sixty Palestinians dead and over one thousand injured. Heavily 
armed Israeli forces were deployed throughout Israel, Gaza, and the 
West Bank to combat demonstrators (both Palestinian and Palestinian 
Israeli). In Gaza similar clashes left nearly twenty dead and more than 
two hundred wounded. Jewish worshippers at the Wailing Wall, the site of 
Sharon’s visit seven days prior, were evacuated numerous times to avoid 
stoning while army helicopters patrolled Jerusalem’s riot- stricken streets. 
Points of entry into Israel were closed, and borders were strictly enforced, 
keeping close to one hundred fifty thousand Palestinian laborers from 
reaching their jobs inside Israel. A study conducted by the Israeli news-
paper Ma’ariv found that “in the first few days of the intifada, the Israeli 
Defense Forces (idF) fired about 700,000 bullets and other projectiles in 
Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] and about 300,000 in Gaza. All told, 
about one million bullets and projectiles were used.”2
Demonstrations soon began to take place outside of Israel and the 
territories as well. Throughout the Arab world thousands of Palestinian 
refugees and sympathizers protested Ariel Sharon’s provocation and the 
disproportionate reactions of the Israeli army. In Lebanon over one thou-
sand marched through Aʿyn al- Hilwa, Lebanon’s largest refugee camp, 
carrying pictures of al- Aqsa and Mohammad al- Durra. Several protes-
tors were seen tearing up posters of Yasser Arafat and burning effigies of 
Sharon. The characteristic chants of the first intifada, “By spirit, by blood, 
I will sacrifice myself for Palestine!,” returned en masse. Similar protests 
took place in Jordan, where on October 24, twenty- five thousand staged a 
“march of return” to the Allenby Bridge connecting Jordan with the West 
146 ✹ Revivals and New Arrivals
Bank. Likewise, an estimated two hundred thousand Palestinian refugees 
observed a general strike and day of mourning for the victims of Israeli 
state terror. Al- Durra was quickly deemed a martyr for Jerusalem, and 
various politico- religious organizations vowed vengeance against those 
responsible for his murder.
These two events, Ariel Sharon visiting the Temple Mount and the tele-
vised killing of Mohammad al- Durra, were the flashpoints for the end 
of the Oslo peace process and the beginning of a new popular uprising 
against the Israeli occupation. Pictures of al- Durra huddled behind his 
father became emblematic of the new uprising (see figures 5.1 and 5.2). 
Popularly called the al- Aqsa intifada, this newest round of riots and dem-
onstrations quickly escalated such that within a matter of weeks, more 
casualties, wounded, and arrests were recorded than in the entire first 
intifada combined. However, despite these initial flashpoints, the struc-
tural antecedents of this new uprising had been in place since the mid- 
1990s, with the failures of Oslo to produce any improvements in the lives 
of Palestinians still living under a harsh occupation and the unrivaled ex-
pansion of government support for the settler movement.3
With the beginning of the second al- Aqsa intifada in spring 2000, and 
its subsequent escalation in 2002, Palestinian society collapsed under the 
Figure 5.1. ✹  
Aʿla Abwab al- Quds 
(On the doors of 
Jerusalem), intifada 
song cover art.
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weight of extreme occupation. Checkpoints, curfews, raids, and targeted 
assassinations only provoked more open calls for violence in the territo-
ries. Support for the intifada, as represented in the many different socio-
political organizations (Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, pFlp), reemerged, 
with each competing for popular support through terrorist operations 
against Israeli targets. Posters depicting young martyrs wallpapered the 
streets of Ramallah, Gaza, and Nablus (see figure 5.1). Children memo-
rized their names and openly pledged to follow in their footsteps. With 
each passing month, Palestinians both “inside” and “outside” the territo-
ries sought to revive the intifada culture of the 1980s. Street- side kiosks 
and shops in downtown Ramallah and Amman, for example, were filled 
with flags, kūfīyāt, posters, music, and videos in support of the new inti-
fada.4 Key chains, headbands, plaques, and other Palestinian- inspired 
products were commonly seen on the streets and in houses of the exiled. 
However, under the banners of the second al- Aqsa intifada, “resistance” 
was framed quite differently. Gone were the peaceful mass demonstra-
tions, withholding of taxes, and public displays of nonviolent civil dis-
obedience, and in their place came open calls for violence and terrorist 
attacks on Israeli targets, both civilian and military.
Figure 5.2. ✹ 
Damaʿ al- Aqsa 
(Tears of al- Aqsa), 
intifada song 
cover art.
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At first the music of the new intifada was dominated by transnational 
Arab pop stars singing ballads commemorating Palestinian suffering. For 
example, two years earlier in the fall of 1998, following a disturbing esca-
lation of violence surrounding increased settlement activity in Jerusalem 
and several retaliatory suicide operations, twenty- three pop stars from 
across the Arab world joined forces to record “Al- Hilm al- ʿArabi” (The 
Arab dream), the first of several mega collaborations calling for Arab 
unity and the end to Palestinian suffering. Directed by Ahmad al- Arian 
and composed by Hilmi Bakr, this star production was the first attempt 
to revive the pan- Arabist poetics of the 1960s through the lens of Pal-
estinian suffering. Throughout “Al- Hilm al- ʿArabi” strategic musical and 
textual signs advocated for pan- Arab solidarity by alternating between 
solo verses, sung in native dialects, and ensemble choruses, where local 
accents blended into a unison whole. Indices of place and locality, ar-
ticulated predominantly through language (accent) and vocal tessitura, 
fluidly shifted from the national identity of the soloist to the international 
pan- Arab identity of the ensemble. Excerpts from the seventeen- minute 
pop ballad attempted to reinforce the solidarity of the pan- Arab nation in 
fighting for Palestinian self- determination.
From anywhere on earth we speak with an opposing tongue 
[Arabic],
With the loudest voice we have, we say unity.
Our children everywhere are the light of our nation.
Right, love, good is our message throughout time.
A song cancels national borders,
And its homeland is the heart.
As long as we live we will sing,
As long as we are able we will love.
Our dream has always been,
The unity of all nations.
All disagreements will disappear.
It is enough that you are a human being.
Although juxtaposed with poignant (and graphic) footage document-
ing fifty years of the Arab- Israeli conflict, stylistically “Al- Hilm al- ʿArabi” 
continues with the theme of unity through very abstract depictions of 
place. Thick synthesized orchestrations, heavy bass, and simple pop 
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rhythms signify a much larger domain of transnational Arab pop rather 
than more common musical elements of nationalist intifada song. What 
is more, although “Al- Hilm al- ʿArabi” was explicitly recorded as a testa-
ment to the tragedies of Palestinian suffering, nowhere in it are Palestini-
ans ever mentioned. Nor are there any actual Palestinians included in the 
recording. Only one reference is made, in the lines “The world is reorga-
nized by children with rocks in their hands.” As a whole the lyrics focus 
on the redemption of the (unnamed) Palestinian people through love, 
perseverance, unity, and hope for a better tomorrow. It is the “dream of 
peace” that brings these artists (and their respective countries) together 
in solidarity to end the violence. As a unique moment of transition, “Al- 
Hilm al- ʿArabi” articulates the poetics of collaboration, peace, and recon-
ciliation, idiomatic of the post- Oslo honeymoon, within a performative 
frame of escalating violence and instability.
Two years later, following the violent outbreak of the al- Aqsa intifada 
in September 2000, a similar type of production hit the airwaves, featur-
ing a new collection of pop artists singing for Palestine. “Al- Quds Hatarjaʿ 
Lina” (Jerusalem will return to us) went into production less than two 
weeks after the televised martyrdom of Mohammad al- Durra and the 
outbreak of the al- Aqsa intifada. This pop ballad featured the combined 
talents of thirty- six Arab pop stars, actors, and other celebrities repre-
senting virtually every Arab country (except Palestine). Once again the 
contrasting themes of Arab unity and diversity were performed as each 
singer took turns alternating between solo verses and ensemble choruses. 
In contrast to “Al- Hilm al- ʿArabi,” however, “Al- Quds Hatarjaʿ Lina” was 
far more graphic in its lyrical detail. Lyrics spoke of violence and terror, 
and the accompanying video depicted far more explicit images of Pales-
tinian suffering, beatings, and funeral processions marching through the 
streets. Presenting a message of mourning, the large collection of artists 
stood together on a stage set covered in barbed wire surrounding a large 
picture of the Dome of the Rock mosque.5
He was carrying his crayons, he was going to school.
Dreaming of his horse, his toys, his plane.
And when the treachery occurred, it killed his innocence.
His pure blood was spilled across his notebook.
A fearful father reached with his arms,
Protecting the life of his child.
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And when the child’s body twitched,
He became in God’s hands.
We all say our land.
Our land, Our blood, Our nation.
And even if millions die,
Jerusalem will return to us.
In the widely played video the assembled artists and actors stand de-
fiantly, dressed in black, singing with power and conviction about the 
young Mohammad al- Durra, killed while walking home from school 
carrying his “crayons and his notebook.” While several of the pop stars 
openly weep during the production, or angrily gesticulate during their 
solo lines, a small collection of young children is positioned at the cen-
ter of the stage. The children, wearing white blouses and shirts, stand out 
against the pervasive black clothing of the singers and the background of 
the soundstage. Coupled with the white head coverings of two of the fea-
tured singers, this articulation of white and black clearly signifies both the 
innocence of the children as well as the purity of Islam, against the black 
darkness of occupation. The message of collective outrage, lost innocence, 
and suffering is further articulated with graphic imagery of violence set 
amidst the holy sites of Jerusalem.
Not unlike the pan- Arab songs emanating from Egypt in the late 1950s, 
these two productions of “Al- Hilm al- ʿArabi” and “Al- Quds Hatarjaʿ Lina” 
drew from the same stock repertory of signs of Arab unity and a shared 
cultural- religious identity. The juxtaposition of diversity and unity played 
out in the transcendence of cultural difference around a common Arab 
(and Islamic) cause. More importantly both songs grew to become widely 
marketable hits. The videos for these songs were broadcast on satellite 
television throughout the Arab world, and performers were quick to capi-
talize on the success via overly marketed tours throughout the region.
The marketing successes of “Al- Quds Hatarjaʿ Lina” in October 2000 
inspired Arab superstars such as Kathim al- Saher, Aʿmru Diab, Najwa 
Karam, Nagham, Zakra, and many others to record pop songs dedicated 
to the memory of the twelve- year- old martyr Mohammad al- Durra, the 
atrocities of the occupation, or the siege on Jerusalem’s holy sites. Egyp-
tian superstar Aʿmru Diab’s “Al- Quds di Ardina” (Jerusalem is our land) 
eulogizes the memory of Mohammad al- Durra as a pan- Arab martyr for 
liberation, “son to all Arabs.”6 Nagham (Egypt) and Zakra’s (Tunisia) pop 
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ballad “Nahlam Ayh?” (We dream of what?) depicts Palestinian history 
through historical imagery of British colonialism and Jewish settlement, 
asking, “what are we left to dream?” Throughout the video, historical 
footage of Zionist expansion and the expulsion of Palestinians from their 
homes is shown in the background while the two pop stars sing of great 
loss and sadness, tears in their eyes.
While at first these pop songs, cds, cassettes, T- shirts, bumper stickers, 
and other paraphernalia were popular throughout the region, it was clear 
that this new wave of political song did not have the same sociocultural 
impact as the nationalist song of the 1980s. Missing from this culture of 
“pop intifadiana” was a sense of authenticity that these artists were suffer-
ing and struggling alongside those they were singing about.7 Clearly, this 
was music for Palestine, but not necessarily music of Palestine. The trans-
national Arab pop stars of the early 2000s were largely unable to capture 
the hearts of Palestinians simply because they could not reconcile their 
obvious fame and wealth with the daily suffering of those under occu-
pation. Recording their songs in Cairo or Beirut wearing a token kūfīya 
around their neck, these pop stars had little actual connection with the 
people most affected by the violence.
As the demonstrations continued to escalate, international pop songs 
soon faded as empty commodities. Ballads like “Nahlam Ayh?,” “Al- 
Hilm al- ʿArabi,” and “Al- Quds di Ardina,” with their soft idealist rheto-
ric, catchy melodies, and empty lyrics, did not adequately capture the 
severity of violence taking place on the streets of Jenin, Gaza, and Nablus. 
In neither form nor content were they especially political, nor did they at-
tempt to capture a particularly Palestinian poetics of resistance. Slogans 
of peace, understanding, and an end to the violence held little meaning 
for the many Palestinian communities forced to survive the occupation 
on a daily basis. Yet if the lyrics did not resonate with Palestinian audi-
ences, they did elicit and reflect a widespread sympathy for Palestinian 
issues throughout the Arab world at large. Moreover the speed with which 
this new collection of songs made it into the Arab marketplace, and their 
constant performance on satellite television, reflected the immediacy of 
newly developed communication networks and technology. These new 
technologies, served to bring the realities of the occupation into Arabic-
speaking homes throughout the world, creating a new sense of Arab soli-
darity. With the rise of Arab satellite television, al- Jazeera in particular, 
these collective notions of Arab unity became possible in dramatic ways.8
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On a different level, the fact that these songs were all written, pro-
duced, and performed by pop stars living and working in cosmopolitan 
centers like Cairo, Beirut, or Paris meant that they were sung from a so-
cial, political, and aesthetic formation where peace and understanding 
were possible, thinkable, or tangible ideas. As testaments to peace and 
understanding, these songs found considerably more traction among 
Arab consumers within transnational music markets. For these audi-
ences, such pop songs were a means of connecting with a humanitarian 
crisis played out on satellite television. Hence songs of unity, peace, and 
love resonated more easily among Arab communities not forced to deal 
with the humiliation of checkpoints, curfews, searches, and constant 
threats of violence.
Ultimately, however, these pop songs failed to have a lasting impact on 
Palestinian communities simply because audiences were unable to recon-
cile popular support for Palestinian issues with the overtly cosmopolitan 
lifestyles and aesthetics of the artists themselves. Medhat Salah’s partici-
pation in the collaboration “Al- Quds Hatarjaʿ Lina” caught many by sur-
prise, to say the least. For several years before he had been an outspoken 
advocate for normalization with Israel. Salah also publicly criticized Pal-
estinian musicians like Marcel Khalife for taking a hard- line stance on 
Palestinian rights. To suddenly lend his voice to a song memorializing 
Palestinian suffering struck many as hypocritical. Similarly Kathim al- 
Saher’s widely played duet with Sarah Brightman, “The War Is Over” 
(2004), served only to anger a community of Palestinians very much em-
broiled in a daily struggle with perceived “Western” occupation and im-
perialism. Although the two artists intended this song as an homage to 
John Lennon and Yoko Ono’s 1971 release, as an intervention in the on-
going Iraq war, for Palestinians the war was far from over. Given that 
Kathim al- Saher is one of Iraq’s most famous pop stars, and that “The 
War Is Over” was played ad nauseam on the American- funded radio sta-
tion Radio Sawa after its release, the song took on a very different mean-
ing. For many Palestinians “The War Is Over” became a testament to the 
continued American occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. By extension 
it became easy to conflate the Israeli and American occupations within 
a larger complex of Western imperialism in the greater Arab world. This 
complex of American/Israeli occupation stretched beyond politics into 
the realms of popular culture, movies, products, fashion, and so on. 
Aʿmru Diab and Najwa Karam, for example, could not be taken seriously 
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in their empathetic songs for Palestinians while their faces were plastered 
on billboards all over the Arab world advertising Pepsi- Cola. Their music, 
image, videos, and pop lifestyle celebrated and in many ways imitated 
Western aesthetics deemed antithetical to the struggle against the per-
ceived Israeli and American imperialism in the Arab world.
revivals: baladna, al- ʿashiqin,  
abu arab, and samih shaqir
In response to these transnational Arab recordings, many Palestinians 
sought out the protest songs and singers of the first intifada. By the fall 
of 2003 the revival of intifada music and culture had strengthened to the 
extent that many protest singers of the 1980s had been lured back into 
the public soundscape. Samih Shaqir found supportive audiences for 
his repertory of shaʿbī nationalist folk songs at music festivals in Syria, 
Lebanon, and Jordan. Kamal Khalil was literally pulled off a construc-
tion site to sing at a political demonstration in 2004. Covered in dirt, 
sweat, and cement from a day laying concrete blocks, Khalil borrowed 
an ʿūd from an audience member and performed a set of his famous inti-
fada tunes from the 1980s. A sense of nostalgia for the uprising of 1987 
drove the crowds into a frenzy, leading to several commitments for new 
concerts at weddings, political rallies, and demonstrations. Likewise 
Mustapha al- Kurd was brought to Amman to perform at a symposium 
for Palestinian arts in the summer of 2004. His twenty- year- old political 
ballads resurfaced in Jordan amidst rejuvenated nationalist sentiment and 
nostalgia for the intifada.
Led by its founding vocalist Hussein Munther (Abu Ali), al- ʿAshiqin 
began performing once again their famous catalogue of resistance songs 
in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. Over the years, however, many of the 
group’s original members had left to form their own groups, been ar-
rested, or simply disappeared. Teaming up with ʿūd player Adnan Odeh, 
the two envisioned a triumphant return to the forefront of Palestinian re-
sistance song and hurriedly put together a collection of young musicians 
for a small regional tour. These musicians, too young to have ever heard 
al- ʿAshiqin perform live, were each given a copy of the twenty- year- old 
cassettes two weeks prior to the first performance. Originally the plan was 
for al- ʿAshiqin to perform five concerts in Jordan and the United Arab 
Emirates before returning to Damascus. After the first two concerts in 
Amman, however, the tour was abruptly cancelled when the production 
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company posted a net loss of over jd$28,000 (approximately us$40,320). 
Difficulties publicizing the events, constant police harassment, and an 
overestimation of local interest resulted in the remaining performances 
being called off and the members of the group sent home without prom-
ised wages.
The initial failures of al- ʿAshiqin to make a significant impact in their 
“reunion tour” resulted largely from a poor marketing strategy and an 
overemphasis on the commercial, money- making potential of the group. 
Unlike Kamal Khalil, who rarely sought remuneration for his perfor-
mances and preferred smaller venues, al- ʿAshiqin was determined to capi-
talize on the new waves of Palestinian nationalism by booking large ten- 
thousand- seat arenas for their shows. In order to streamline profits, the 
two leaders of the group decided to leave in place the Syrian- based en-
semble for future performances but, in addition, form a second ensemble 
made up of local Palestinian musicians in Jordan. The plan was to create 
a local al- ʿAshiqin chapter in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon and then bring 
in group leaders Abu Ali, Ali Munther, and Adnan Odeh for each set of 
concerts, thus minimizing travel expenditures and the hassles of crossing 
borders with Palestinian papers.
Members of the group were clearly promised wages from the outset 
of auditions, yet in the first nine months of production few received pay-
ment. Frustrated, many decided to leave, forcing Odeh to continually re-
stock the ensemble with less experienced artists willing to perform for 
free. Many of these younger musicians were content to join the group 
just to get valuable performance experience and to be associated with 
the famed ensemble. The quality of the group suffered considerably as 
musicians came and went. Despite problems in production and rehears-
als, performances for the group were well supported by the local Pales-
tinian communities in Amman and Damascus. With little variation, a 
loyal contingent of activists and other young nationalists turned out to 
sing and dance the famous intifada songs. Several young dabke groups 
were brought in to perform alongside al- ʿAshiqin, and future concerts 
were planned with other famous Palestinian musicians including Samih 
Shaqir and Mais Shalash. Although there were always difficulties navi-
gating the local bureaucracies prohibiting explicitly political events, al- 
Aʿshiqin nonetheless performed periodically in various outdoor venues, 
hotels, and social clubs between 2003 and 2010. At each of these events 
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it would seem that the same cohort of young activists would show, with 
little noticeable impact among the general Palestinian community.
new arrivals: “the voice oF Freedom,” mais shalash
The new intifada was also not without its own coterie of younger singers. 
‘Abd al- Fatah ‘Auynat, Samih Zariqat, Ayman Ramadan, and Omar al- 
Sayeedi recorded Islamic inspired anashīd in support of the intifada. Abu 
Ahmad, Khalil ‘Abid, Abu Ratib, and Abdullah Kiwan also released newly 
composed protest songs under the al- Fursan recording label in Amman 
and Damascus. Among several others Hani Shaker, Fadil Shaker, and 
Mustapha al- Ja’fri appeared on many bootlegged intifada cds sold on the 
streets of Ramallah. Foremost among these new singers, however, was 
Palestinian Jordanian Mais Shalash. Colloquially known as al- ṭifl (the 
child) or ṣawt al- ḥurrīya (the voice of freedom), Shalash began her career 
at the young age of eleven, singing newly composed anashīd in refugee 
camps, hospitals, and universities in Jordan (see figure 5.3). As she be-
came better known among activists in Jordan, Shalash started performing 
across the region at various political events and music festivals. Between 
2002 and 2006, she recorded two very popular albums, Sawt al- Hurriya 
(The voice of freedom) and Istura al- Jenin (The legend of Jenin), and col-
laborated on several others. Each album made an important contribution 
to the established repertory of resistance song and further propelled her 
reputation as a young singer for Palestinian self- determination.
Mais Shalash’s contribution to the field of Palestinian protest song lies 
in her blending of traditionally distinct repertories of music. Although 
anashīd and other Islamic- inspired musics have had a profound, yet often 
neglected, impact on the nationalist movement, Sawt al- Hurriya marked 
the arrival of a new style of protest song conceptualized as a hybridization 
of shaʿbī rhythms, Islamic poetry, and contemporary sound drama. The 
combination of shaʿbī folk song and religious poetry transgressed perfor-
mative and political boundaries in new ways, combining into a unique 
new form of protest song illustrative of contemporary poetics, political 
debates, and ideology. Especially among disgruntled communities seek-
ing a new direction in the entrenched nationalist leadership, Mais Sha-
lash gave voice to an alternative national identity formation aligned with 
Islamist doctrine. She offered a performative space within which audi-
ences could imagine a new path to self- determination beyond the stale 
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politics of the plo, advocating a return to local grassroots activism based 
in core religious values, simultaneously nationalist and Islamist.
Due to local laws governing Islamist activities in Jordan, Mais Shalash 
performed primarily at informal community meetings, for labor syndi-
cates, on university campuses, and at other cultural events beyond the 
gaze of government censors. In contrast to al- ʿAshiqin, Mais preferred to 
perform before smaller, more intimate audiences. Nested between po-
litical speeches, religious sermons, and reports from the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, Mais would take the stage armed with a binder of songs di-
rectly linked to the immediacy of the occupation. As first- hand reports 
of the Jenin invasion emerged, for example, she would incorporate those 
testimonials into her lyrics, emphasizing the voices and experiences of 
those currently under siege. Among her audiences this gave her music 
a profound sense of immediacy and authenticity to the struggle, locality 
in experience, and loyalty to cultural- religious jurisprudence. According 
to Saud Shalash, Mais’s father and principal composer, her music has an 
aesthetic quality unlike that of any other political singer. People are more 
affected and inspired by her youth and innocence. “You always feel some-
thing more deeply when it comes from a child,” Saud explained to me. 
Figure 5.3. ✹ Mais Shalash. Photograph by Saud Shalash (2002).
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“The fact that her voice is so beautiful, and that she sings with such power, 
makes her even more popular among our people. Plus, the fact that this 
occupation has had its greatest impact on children makes Mais’s voice 
even more illustrative of the nation” (personal communication 2002). In 
her publicity posters and cd liner notes Mais is strategically marketed 
as, “the child,” drawing many accusations of pandering and exploitation 
from several of her contemporaries.
Given that local Palestinian and Jordanian media representations 
of the intifada focused primarily on human suffering, often imagined 
through the lenses of children and dominated by images of Moham-
mad al- Durra, Mais’s stature as a young child was an essential element 
to her music and public image. Her public persona effectively articulated 
with a discourse of humanitarian suffering and martyrdom central to the 
nationalist movement.9 Yet to fully understand her impact within the field 
of Palestinian music it is equally important to emphasize the ways her 
persona creatively played on established discourses of gender and the na-
tion. Onstage she would strategically perform the core religious principles 
espoused in her music. Wearing a beautifully ornamented thawb (Islamic 
gown) and ḥijāb (headscarf), standing motionless onstage, the adolescent 
Mais put forth the engendered image of the innocent, pure, vulnerable 
Palestinian nation in need of defense and collective sacrifice. In perfor-
mance her body and child- like voice simultaneously called forth cultural 
imperatives of protection and steadfastness to core Islamic principles 
(modesty, justice, integrity). A similar phenomenon has been discussed 
regarding Qur’anic recitation practices in Egypt. Michael Frishkopf has 
suggested that vocal purity and a “child- like tessitura” are new Islamic 
emphases signifying an “unmediated directness (the straight path) and 
spiritual innocence.”10 Much like the propagandized posters of child mar-
tyrs papering the streets of Jerusalem, onstage, Mais Shalash emphati-
cally articulates an imagining of resistance and sacrifice in “defense of 
the defenseless.” And while such a strategically motivated stage persona 
caused a considerable amount of controversy among competing musi-
cians, it proved highly effective among mainstream Palestinian audiences. 
Amidst a field of cosmopolitan pop stars selling their bodies and prod-
ucts on billboards, and a dysfunctional national leadership bending to 
international will, for her audiences Mais Shalash presented an alternative 
Palestinian identity formation rooted in an uncompromising devotion to 
Islamic values and ideals. She offered a counterbalance to the dominant 
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“pop intifadiana” on satellite television, advocating a new direction in the 
performative politics of the nationalist movement more aligned with the 
growing tides of Islamism.
Interestingly Mais’s stature as a young Palestinian girl living in exile 
was only rarely a point of criticism among her contemporaries perform-
ing in the West Bank. Many were simply unaware that she was living in 
Jordan. Two Ramallah- based performers, Mohammad Yaqub and Nader 
Jalal, while impressed with the quality of her voice and the production of 
her recordings, were openly critical of the fact that Mais was not “strug-
gling” under occupation. In essence her singing about “stone- throwing 
youth” from the safety of Amman, where no active “resistance” was taking 
place, became a marker of dislocation and therefore inauthenticity in her 
work. Reflecting further, Nader Jalal continued, “But I guess she is try-
ing to do her part, then, singing about the intifada from Jordan, trying 
to increase support over there.” When approached about this issue Mais 
responded to me defiantly, “If I could go to Palestine I would.” “In fact, 
that’s the whole point of why I am singing . . . to one day return to Pales-
tine.” “This is how I can join the struggle/movement (ḥarakāt)” (personal 
communication 2005).
Drawing from the established repertory of religious song, her perfor-
mances typically began with a series of extemporized religious chants, 
sparsely accompanied by single frame drum (daff ), reed flute (nai), 
and male chorus. This initial performance of religious poetry typically 
led to more rhythmic sets of folk, wedding, or dabke songs reinscribed 
with politico- religious lyrics. In text, metaphor, and musical device she 
freely and strategically navigated between secular nationalist and reli-
gious frames. Traditional dabke tunes were tempered so as to deaccen-
tuate dancing and the body. Presentational poetic genres such as aʿtābā 
and shurūqī were given more strategic weight in her performances, in-
dexing Palestinian indigenous music and practice without allowing such 
performances to be burdened with unbridled rhythmic dancing. During 
several of her performances it was clear that songs were often chosen 
based on the negotiation of religious and secular frames. Audience mem-
bers attempting to form a raucous set of dabke lines would often find the 
next song fluidly shift into an unmetered extemporization of religious 
poetry attesting to the need for religious purity in meeting nationalist 
goals. The combination of her young adolescent voice and her appearance 
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as a muḥajjaba (one who wears a headscarf) was performatively used to 
signify an innocent purity, reinforced by the Islamist poetics of her per-
formances. “Min Rahm al- Ard” (From the womb of the earth) captures 
many of the most important poetic components of Shalash’s repertory.
From the womb of the earth we will come out
To fight with stones.
Let the angry earth give birth to the free people.
Spawn weapons that challenge the occupying army.
No humiliation for my people, I vow!
And my people will never quit.
In this first stanza the eternal relationship between the land and the 
people is further signified with the imagery of the “angry earth” giving 
birth to the resistance, spawning weapons (stones) to “challenge the oc-
cupying army.” A common trope in the repertory of shaʿbī nationalist 
protest song, the earth has given birth to the Palestinian people to fight for 
the nation. Significantly the weapons of resistance (stones) and the people 
themselves are born of the same mother, products of the same womb, sib-
lings to the nation, intrinsically linked in the symbiotic act of resistance 
(throwing). Further, by employing imagery of the “womb,” the nation is 
depicted as the engendered mother of the Palestinian people. Palestinians 
are hence born from the earth’s womb and in their sacrifice (death) return 
to their mother’s embrace. In the following verses Shalash sings about the 
methodology of resistance itself.
Run from one alley to another,
Teach them to throw stones.
From one refugee camp to another,
The lion cubs are coming out.
Carrying in his hand a stone and a slingshot,
In the right hand a banner and
With the left assist the people of the alleyways.
Throw stones, shoot, give them fire.
Come and draw them out.
The blood of the martyr is never in vain.
From one town to another a unity of free people,
From the water to the water raise the banner!
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In these verses the ideational construct of the stone- throwing youth 
(aṭfāl al- ḥijāra) is resurrected with the common reference to “the lion 
cubs” (ashba). Youth trained for armed resistance during the first inti-
fada were given this name by Fatah. Their role in popular media rep-
resentations of the intifada was incredibly important, indexing a power 
differential between sides and sacralizing the resistance in the defense 
of the nation and its holy sites. With the left hand the youth offer assis-
tance to the “people of the alleyways,” while the right hand carries the 
green banners of Islam, proclaiming the shahāda, “There is no God, but 
God.” In a conglomeration of nationalist and Islamist poetics the “blood 
of the martyr” unites the free people in the lands between “the water to 
the water” (the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea). While blood is an 
extremely common trope in secular nationalist protest song, referencing 
the primordial linkages to history, the land, and the people, the repeated 
references to raising the banners of Islam between the waters of the Jor-
dan River and the Mediterranean Sea fulfill an Islamist poetics’ reclama-
tion of the holy land.
In another major hit, “Sadayna al- Shawariʿ” (We blocked the streets), 
Shalash presents a history of the Palestinian experience of exile and 
further comments on the politics of al- ʿawda (the right of return). At a 
time when refugee rights were the subject of intense debate “Sadayna al- 
Shawariʿ” resonated forcefully among Palestinian nationalists living in 
exile. In the fall of 2003, as Shalash was performing this song at various 
political events in Amman, the debate over whether Palestinians would 
or should be allowed to return to their ancestral lands was boiling. The 
Declaration of Principles outlined in the Oslo Accords was intentionally 
ambiguous on final status issues, and with the swelling of violence in the 
al- Aqsa intifada, hope for a just resolution to refugee issues was grow-
ing increasingly remote. Singing at a political demonstration against the 
Geneva Accords in 2003, Mais Shalash performed “Sadayna al- Shawariʿ” 
for an enthusiastic crowd of intellectuals, students, and local authorities. 
Given the anxieties of potentially losing all claims of repatriation to pre- 
1948 Palestine, the themes and issues raised in this song were particularly 
meaningful (evia 14- s7686).11
We blocked the streets. We never forgot our life in the tents,
No shelter, shivering in the cold.
We slept in exile away from home.
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Reminding us of home, we left the tents young men.
The eyes swear we were free and people witnessed.
We blocked the streets, and came out to throw our ration cards.
We carried the guns and left, declaring, no, no to naturalization.
If you gave us the world with its treasures and millions,
It is not worth a grain of the dust of Palestine.
We blocked the streets and declared children and adults,
The right of return and the right to decide the future.
This performance of “Sadayna al- Shawariʿ” was an excellent example of 
Islamist anashīd. The song began with Mais Shalash rendering the initial 
verses of poetry unaccompanied in an unmetered melismatic line. After 
each line of text a unison male chorus, singing in a deep chest voice, re-
sponded with a repetition of the cadential words (lazama). The timbre of 
the voice, ornamentation, and placement of the text were derived from 
Qur’anic recitation (tajwīd) and other religious songs and chants. To fur-
ther index religious poetics, the voice was amplified using a pronounced 
reverb or “echo effect” commonly heard in Islamic sermons and commer-
cial recordings of tajwīd.12 As an aesthetic choice the addition of reverb 
to a recording or performance is said to index a sense of the sacred, via 
its associations with the acoustical reverberations heard in the vast spaces 
of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina (Haramayn). Following this intro-
ductory unmetered rendering of the text, a single goblet drum (darbuka) 
outlined the rhythmic pattern ayūb. Situated on this rhythmic structure, 
the song was then repeated aʿlā waḥda (on the beat) in unison by a soloist 
and male chorus. Despite the pounding rhythm, participants in this per-
formance (and in every performance I witnessed) largely refrained from 
any outward bodily movement (dancing), preserving the religious char-
acter of the event.
After thunderous applause, it was clear that “Sadayna al- Shawariʿ” elo-
quently espoused a refugee position on the issue of al- ʿawda in support 
of the right of return. To block the streets speaks to the common tac-
tic of burning tires and creating makeshift roadblocks, thus preventing 
Israeli patrols from gaining free access into the refugee camps. Extending 
the camp experience further, the song testifies to early life in the tents, 
the cold, and the loss of home, memorializing and commemorating the 
catastrophe of al- nakba. As the camps became more solidified in the city-
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scape, young men threw away their unrwa ration cards (indices of de-
pendency on the international community), left the tents, and formed the 
Palestinian resistance. Empowered, carrying guns through the streets, the 
youth denounced naturalization and assimilation. For them, “the world 
and its treasures . . . were not worth a grain of the dust of Palestine.” 
This line comments on the various proposals of potential compensa-
tion offered in exchange for the right to return. As Shalash sang out the 
final line of the chorus, “The right of return and the right to decide the 
future,” the crowd erupted in ovations of support and agreement. For 
those attending this political rally against the Geneva Accords, “Sadayna 
al- Shawariʿ” epitomized the very heart of the issue. Who ultimately has 
the right to decide the future for the millions of Palestinian refugees and 
their descendants? For many of the participants at this rally with whom 
I spoke, the loss of al- ʿawda implied the renouncement of national iden-
tity. To give up one’s right of return is to forsake the nation. Regardless of 
how many Palestinian refugees would actually seek repatriation if given 
the opportunity, it was the right to freely decide for oneself that was at 
issue. Indeed for these Palestinians the right of return was all that was left 
of their Palestinian identity. Without it they were simply “Jordanians of 
Palestinian ancestry.” As one member of the audience said to me, “Even 
if I decide not to return, shouldn’t my son be able to make the same de-
cision for himself when he is older? Is he any less Palestinian than me?”
The issue of al- ʿawda came up on several occasions in my interviews 
with Mais Shalash and her father, Saud. Interestingly during our conversa-
tions the then twelve- year- old singer would often describe with amazing 
detail her family’s ancestral estate in Jaffa and proudly boast of her many 
cousins still living in the West Bank. Music was her way of reaching out to 
them and sharing in their struggles. Distanced from a home and home-
land that she has been raised to covet, and yet has never experienced, 
Mais Shalash assumed that she would one day marry and raise a family in 
Palestine. Over the course of our initial interviews I would often ask her, 
“What do you plan to do if and when you are ever able to return to Jaffa?” 
Without variation she would answer unequivocally, “I’ll sing, of course!”
6
“My songs can reach the Whole nation
Baladna and Protest Song in Jordan
 “On the trunk of the olive tree . . .”
Sitting beneath the olive tree in his family’s front courtyard, Kamal Khalil, 
leader of the once- famous intifada music ensemble Baladna (Our home-
land), recounted to me many of his experiences performing in support of 
the Palestinian struggle for self- determination and an end to the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Regardless of the topic, our 
late- night conversations always seemed to revolve around this olive tree. 
It was our escape from the summer heat and our shelter from the autumn 
wind. It blanketed the small courtyard of his Ruseifa home and provided 
us with a sense of privacy where we could talk late into the night of music, 
life, history, and politics.
Underneath its branches one or both of us would sit comfortably on an 
old discarded sofa, sharing a late- night dinner of assorted mazzāt (stewed 
tomatoes, lentils, hummus, falafel, yogurt, and so on). Periodically one of 
his six children would bring out a tray of sweets, fruits, and coffee or tea. 
After placing the tray of refreshments before us they would usually linger, 
absorbing their father’s soft voice, his words, and his stories. Memories 
of his native Palestinian village (Taiba), his family’s home, and lifeways 
were called forth with a surprising clarity—brought out as one might leaf 
through a photo album. At times some of the older college- aged chil-
dren would contribute their own memories or opinions of events as they 
remembered them from their childhood. Meanwhile the smaller chil-
”
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dren would ask to hear descriptions of and stories about their family and 
neighbors still living in Taiba, the contours of the land, the smell of the 
rain, and the taste of the olives.
It seemed our conversations usually lasted well into the early morning. 
Long after the children had gone to bed Kamal and I would stretch out 
under the olive tree until one of us fell asleep in midsentence. The more 
time we spent together the more comfortable and informal our conver-
sations became. Subjects and ideas once taboo were soon available for 
discussion. More than just music, memories of harassment, imprison-
ment, beatings, and torture eventually emerged, revealing the painfully 
violent consequences of political activism. In time these became per-
missible areas of inquiry. Soon our conversations moved beyond simple 
nationalist posturing of stale tropes and metaphors. National pride and 
righteous victimization, hallmarks of superficial national sentiment, were 
supplanted by a sense of heartfelt political realism, shame, desperation, 
and embarrassment. The very notion of Palestinian resistance became 
open to critical introspection and debate.
Our friendship and understanding for each other grew until there was 
a great trust between us. Through our nights under the olive tree I was al-
lowed entrance into the remembering and the re- membering of a family 
history in exile, each episode carefully depicted in song: exile, disloca-
tion, imprisonment, and violence (see figure 6.1). Yet it wasn’t until sev-
eral months after we had begun working together that I finally began to 
understand the significance of that olive tree.
My whole life I had been playing music for the Palestinian people, 
my people. And when I was [arrested,] put in jail, I knew that the 
problem was closing in on me. I started to feel everything more 
personally. All this time I had been singing for Palestinians fighting 
to return to their homes and land. I always thought that my sacri-
fices here in Jordan were nothing compared to what they were deal-
ing with every day. But now it was me as the victim. It was me and 
the thirteen soldiers tying my feet together and beating me until 
the blood came off of my body. And the days and weeks of being 
locked in a solitary box, never knowing if I would ever see my wife 
and kids again. Unspeakable things you cannot imagine done to 
me. . . . Then, I found this poem in a book we had from Palestine. 
We had two books in prison. One by Samih al- Qassim and another 
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one for Tawfiq al- Ziyad. There was a poem that Tawfiq wrote, “ Aʿla 
Jidaʿ al- Zaytuna” [On the trunk of the olive tree]. And even though 
this poem was written maybe twenty years before, when Tawfiq 
was arrested and imprisoned by Israeli soldiers, I knew this poem 
was talking about me. This poem gave me strength and comfort 
when I was in prison. So I decided to write music to it.
Because I do not weave wool,
Because every day I am in danger of detention,
And my house is in danger of visits from the police
To search and to cleanse,
Because I cannot buy paper,
I shall carve the record of all my sufferings,
And my secrets, On an olive tree
In the courtyard of the house.
Figure 6.1. ✹ 
Kamal Khalil. 
Photograph by the 
author (2004).
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I will carve my story and the chapters of my tragedy, and my sighs
On my grove and on the tombs of my dead.
I will carve all the bitterness I have tasted,
Erased by one tenth of the sweetness to come.
I will carve the number of each deed
Of our usurped land,
The location of my village and its boundaries,
The demolished houses of its peoples,
My uprooted trees,
And each crushed wild blossom.
And the names of those master torturers
Who rattled my nerves and caused my misery,
The names of all the prisons,
And every type of handcuff
That closed around my wrists,
The files of my jailers,
Every curse poured upon my head. . . .
And to remember it all,
I will continue to carve
All the chapters of my tragedy,
And all the phases of al- nakba,
From the beginning
To end,
On the olive tree in the courtyard
Of the house.1
Late at night I would sing this song to myself, and I knew that one 
day things would be made right. With each time that they would 
bring me into the torture room I would be humming this song. 
While it was happening I would be planning how one day I too 
would be writing all of these things on the trunk of an olive tree. 
I could see and even smell the olives in my mind, swaying in the 
summer breeze. It was my escape and my motivation. I learned 
the names of the prison guards, the ones who beat me. I learned 
the names of the prisons, the wardens, the prisoners, everything. 
Someday I would be home again, and I would write what they did 
to me. . . .
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After I composed that song I had to get it out to the people. They 
arrested me right as we were recording our second album, and I 
had to keep giving my brothers songs for the group to play while 
I was gone. I had the idea to get it out by my kids. Every couple 
weeks when my daughters were permitted to visit I would sit them 
on my lap and sing to them a piece of the song that I had written. 
I would sing it over and over until I knew that they understood 
and could sing it back to me. Each of the girls would learn a verse 
or chorus until I was convinced that they could together recite the 
entire song. Then, they would go back home and sing the song for 
my brothers, who would learn it and put it on the next cassette or 
concert.
Then I had the idea to tell my wife to plant this olive tree in front 
of the house, because the song was about an olive tree. For me this 
tree was a way of watching over my family while I was away. . . . My 
daughters watered, loved, and cared for this tree as if it were me, 
and watched as it grew, marking the years of my absence.
Look! [placing his hands on the now thriving and fully matured 
trunk] This has survived, given us food, shelter, and a bridge to our 
nation, to our land, that no prison or police could take away. This 
olive tree represents us, the Palestinian people. . . . From prison my 
arms could not reach my family, but I knew that my songs could 
reach the whole nation. (personal communication 2004, emphasis 
added)
And in fact they did. After the group’s inception in 1977, Baladna (see 
figure 6.2) rose to become one of the most famous nationalist ensembles 
in the Palestinian diaspora. Performing at street rallies, political demon-
strations, cultural festivals, weddings, and funerals, Baladna wrote and 
performed the soundtrack for popular protest in refugee camps across 
Jordan. At a time when Palestinians in Jordan were recovering from the 
expulsion of the plo in Black September, Baladna developed a musi-
cal model of “resistance in exile,” preserving and commemorating Pal-
estinian culture against assimilation and actively seeking repatriation 
through social and political activism. In this sense “resistance in exile” 
required a performative transference of the pains of occupation into new 
ideational frames. Although Kamal’s experiences of imprisonment and 
torture were under different circumstances than the two inspirational 
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poets Samih al- Qassim and Tawfiq al- Ziyad, the appropriation of their 
lyrics into his music was a necessary and strategic maneuver of reframing 
national resistance. Palestinians in Jordan, distanced from the traumas 
of occupation and often marginalized in the national imaginary, sought 
out a performative means of articulating their Palestinian- ness. This re-
quired a broadening of the very notion of “resistance” inclusive of those 
not living directly under occupation or actively fighting against occupa-
tion forces. Through their performances Baladna created social spaces 
wherein Palestinians in Jordan might feel, remember, and imagine them-
selves as fully experiencing dispossession and actively working toward its 
amelioration. Their music gave voice to the Palestinian experience in exile 
and in so doing opened up spaces for public discourse within the restric-
tive, if not impenetrable, Jordanian public sphere.
Baladna has a fascinating story typically absent from contemporary 
portrayals of Palestinian nationalism, history, and diaspora. From pris-
oners of the state in 1981, to honored guests in 1984, to prisoners once 
again in 1989, to exile throughout the 1990s, and a revival in 2002, Ba-
ladna and its leader, Kamal Khalil, have a history that mirrors the Pal-
estinian struggle itself. In the following two chapters I draw out this 
ethnographic history in an attempt to interrogate the development of Pal-
estinian protest song as it was experienced in exile by one of its most in-
fluential performers. Moving beyond the chronological narrative that has 
heretofore dominated this book, with the remaining chapters I pursue an 
ethnographic exploration of Palestinian protest song.
While Palestinian artists express their collective resistance to the 
Figure 6.2. ✹ Baladna in performance. Photograph by the author (2004).
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Israeli occupation through a canon of shared myths, signs, and mean-
ings, the articulation of such meanings is always contingent on a field 
of local power dynamics. The negotiation of these local power dynamics 
shapes the forms that resistance may take and hence defines the processes 
which govern the so- called subversive poetics of collective resistance.2 In 
presenting a broadly defined history of Palestinian resistance music it is 
crucial not to lose sight of the local “on the ground” relations of those who 
composed, performed, and otherwise consumed this repertory of music. 
The dynamics of popular resistance can be fully understood only through 
a careful ethnographic analysis of its social, cultural, and political impli-
cations as they were (and are) experienced, felt, and negotiated by real 
actors in space and time.
Here I focus specifically on the dynamics of music and cultural pro-
duction in an attempt to provide a more “thick description” of Palestinian 
national identity formation within one particular sociopolitical milieu.3 
In tracing the histories of Baladna and Kamal Khalil and his career as a 
cultural activist, the dynamics of Palestinian exile and the struggle for 
self- determination emerge in myriad ways. As a powerful voice in the 
uprising, Baladna contributed to the creation of a specific Palestinian cul-
tural narrative in diaspora. Through song this narrative communicated 
experiences of conflict, the dislocation of social reality, and a pervasive 
formation of violence and sociocultural trauma. In approaching their 
repertory as performance space, I seek to interpret these narratives as 
they were acted on and within an emergent field of exilic nationalism and 
cultural dislocation. Building from the notion that within fields of state 
violence, transformative processes of self and other emerge across various 
domains, this chapter offers an opportunity to document the capacities of 
music and music performance to ameliorate the lingering effects of dis-
location and social trauma.4
As Kay B. Warren writes, the anthropological study of violence and 
social trauma is particularly concerned with issues of “experience, repre-
sentation, and arrays of meaning elaborated in the practice of culture by 
people with a multiplicity of identities and social connections.”5 Indeed 
it is only through the lives of its subjects that violence becomes a know-
able social fact. Warren continues, “The issue for anthropologists is to 
unlock meanings of conflict and change in cultures and political systems 
in which symbolic languages, social realities, and conflicts are not easily 
translatable into conventional Western categories of social analysis.”6 In 
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the course of performance the songs of Baladna give shape to the forms 
and practices of violence and the various means through which actors 
have appropriated, resisted, succumbed to, or transcended such forces. In 
this chapter my goal is to investigate Kamal Khalil’s varying experiences 
of exile, focusing specifically on his struggle to make sense of the fields of 
dispossession through which he performs and operates. What does “re-
sistance” mean for an artist living and performing in Jordan? How did 
Kamal Khalil fashion his music to bridge the ideational gaps between 
disparate Palestinian communities? And in what ways did he attempt to 
represent the disorienting and dominating nature of state terror while 
simultaneously finding performative routes to resist its pressures? Even 
in the most dire situations of arrest, imprisonment, and torture, musi-
cians, poets, dancers, and other artists have attempted to reclaim agency 
and create meaning. Such efforts are fundamentally important for under-
standing the potentialities of performative action to ameliorate the effects 
of violence and social trauma.
Origins of Baladna and Palestinian Protest Song in Jordan
Amidst a Palestinian community still recovering from the fighting of 
Black September, the ousting of the plo, and the defeat of the Palestinian 
fidā iʾyīn, many Palestinian Jordanians were left to wonder what their role 
would be in the Jordanian national imaginary. The royal court had con-
sistently insisted that it provided the best opportunity for an end to the 
Arab- Israeli conflict. King Hussein had long argued that his sharīfian lin-
eage (holy lineage traced to the Prophet Mohammad), his family’s role in 
the Great Arab Revolt, and his continued protection of Jerusalem’s holy 
sites made him the most qualified leader to negotiate with Israel. He also 
actively sought the allegiances of the Palestinian refugee population by 
offering full citizenship, passports, development aid, and public- sector 
jobs and opportunities. Yet, despite these efforts, Palestinian nationalist 
sentiment and allegiance to the tenets of Palestinian self- determination 
exemplified in the various political factions remained strong among 
refugees and the stateless lower classes. In particular the refugee camps, 
growth points, and industrial villages provided social and cultural spaces 
where indigenous Palestinian lifeways and identities were actively pre-
served, rearticulated, and reimagined in daily practice, a means of pres-
ervation against Jordanian assimilation and steadfastness for a desired 
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return. In these neighborhoods, families divided themselves spatially 
as well as socially based on indigenous Palestinian customs, villages of 
origin, ḥamūla relations (extended family relationships), and family lin-
eages. Likewise in the refugee camps, streets and alleys were demarcated 
into miniature neighborhoods defined by ancestral villages.7 Efforts to 
maintain these societal divisions and relationships were seen as a neces-
sary means of preserving Palestinian identity structures and maintaining 
a united front for a possible return to their native homes.
Kamal Khalil: Early Life and Musical Influences
The village of Ruseifa, a small satellite of the predominantly Palestinian 
city of Zarqa twenty- five kilometers northwest of Amman, developed 
originally as a hostelling district for migrant workers at a local phosphates 
mine. Prior to 1948 many Palestinian laborers moved freely across the 
Jordan River to seek employment and better economic opportunity. Men 
would routinely work in the factories until they had earned enough money 
to marry in their native villages. With the outbreak of the war of 1948, 
workers who had traveled from inside the armistice lines were forced to 
remain in Jordan indefinitely. Those from villages in the West Bank were 
still free to travel back and forth across the Jordan River until 1967.
Kamal Khalil’s father had originally moved to Ruseifa from his native 
Palestinian village of Taiba, just across the armistice lines from the Israeli 
city of Umm al- Fahm. He worked as a laborer in the local phosphates fac-
tory. While pregnant with Kamal, his mother decided to return to Taiba 
to give birth at home with her mother and close relatives at her side in 
July 1957. Then, after giving birth, she returned to Ruseifa to be with her 
husband. At the time, movement between the East and West Banks was 
largely unencumbered, and families could routinely move back and forth 
with little difficulty. Following the 1967 war, however, such movement was 
impossible, making those living and working in Jordan forced exiles or 
nāzaḥīn (displaced). Given that the Khalil family was living in Jordan at 
the time of the 1967 war, they were denied refugee status by unrwa and 
hence excluded from receiving humanitarian aid, education, health care, 
and international recognition.8
Over time, many of these workers who had settled in the area built 
homes, neighborhoods, and social relationships based on ḥamūla (larger 
kinship groups) connections and lineage. It is within this cultural envi-
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ronment that a young Kamal Khalil began performing music publicly. 
Raised in Ruseifa, Kamal grew up singing the folk songs of his grand-
fathers. In addition he would often listen to the great stars of the Arab 
world perform late at night on the radio. Each repertory had an equally 
formative influence on him. Singing and dancing at weddings awakened 
a sense of family and cultural identity, stretching beyond Ruseifa to his 
native Palestinian village. These folk songs spoke of the landscape, village 
history, family quarrels, proverbs, and other life experiences. Most im-
portantly, through these initial music experiences Kamal first learned of 
his Palestinian “catastrophe,” his family’s relocation to Ruseifa, and their 
ongoing struggle to return.
Years later, after many of the famous Egyptian stars had faded, Kamal 
became fascinated by the nationalist work of Marcel Khalife. In these 
songs Kamal found a sense of authenticity absent in the “empty” nation-
alist songs of Egypt. It had become apparent in the years following 1967 
that the Arab nationalist songs emanating from Egypt were blatant in-
struments of the state. Their messages of Arab unity and collective lib-
eration rang hollow among refugees witnessing defeat and continued dis-
location. For Kamal, Marcel Khalife carried forth the ideals of Palestinian 
nationalism. His work was especially powerful in that it celebrated Pal-
estinian self- determination, documented Palestinian suffering, and was 
never officially associated with formal Arab state politics. In Marcel Kha-
life, Kamal found a voice for Palestinian liberation unfettered by state 
ideology and true to the great repertory of poets like Mahmud Darwish, 
Samih al- Qassim, and Ibrahim Tuqan. In setting the work of these famous 
poets to music Khalife opened himself up to harsh censorship and harass-
ment from Lebanese authorities in much the same way that Palestinian 
authors and artists were treated in Jordan.
For Kamal a pirated copy of a recording by the famed Sheikh Imam 
ʿIssa proved pivotal in developing his political voice. Such recordings were 
very rare at the time, and for Kamal to find one signaled to him that there 
were powerful voices of political opposition working throughout the 
Middle East. If Marcel Khalife had celebrated Palestinian nationalism in 
his programmatic orchestral work, Sheikh Imam offered a very different 
approach. The myths and dreams of Arab nationalism and the Palestinian 
cause were laid bare by the sheikh’s exposing government corruption, hy-
pocrisy, and malfeasance. In the sheikh’s voice Kamal found a razor- sharp 
political wit, a drive to speak for the people, and courage to speak out de-
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spite potentially violent consequences. Sheikh Imam’s powerful criticism 
of Arab leadership and the humor through which he satirized the “Great 
Protectors of Palestine” were a powerful inspiration for Kamal to begin 
writing and performing political songs in Jordan. While the folk songs of 
his youth provided the substance of his music, and the work of Marcel 
Khalife provided its most artful forms and structures, Sheikh Imam gave 
direction to Kamal’s composing. Sheikh Imam offered an important 
model for Palestinian political song, one that recognized the people over 
the state, the harsh reality of exile over nationalist myth, and thought- 
provoking satire over simple slogans and propaganda.
ibrahim nasrallah
While attending various political meetings the young Kamal made the ac-
quaintance of a like- minded poet named Ibrahim Nasrallah. They forged 
a bond and began writing together. Ibrahim’s overall impact on Kamal 
was immense. His poetic compositions were powerful invocations of 
popular memory, exile, and dispossession. Drawing from the literature of 
the great Palestinian poets among both the intelligentsia and the fallāḥīn, 
Ibrahim wrote in a style that was accessible in both the refugee camps and 
the coffee houses. He composed lyrics of great sophistication and mean-
ing yet based in the vernacular of the streets. The imagery of his prose 
carried powerful associations of time and place. Steeped in the tradition 
of public oration, or ḥakayāt, Ibrahim composed lyrics drawing from a 
popular memory of displacement and resistance to foreign occupation.
The life and career of Ibrahim Nasrallah began similarly to that of 
Kamal. Born in 1954 and raised in the al- Wahdat refugee camp on the 
southeastern edge of downtown Amman, Ibrahim studied in the unrwa 
educational system, eventually earning a teaching certificate. He later 
taught humanities at a school for foreign workers in Saudi Arabia. His 
experiences working and living abroad led to the publication of his first 
novel, Prairies of Fever (1978). Reflecting on his experiences Ibrahim saw 
Prairies as his testimony to overpowering feelings of alienation and suffer-
ing while trying to survive in exile. Unable to find solace in Saudi Arabia, 
he returned to Amman in 1978 to begin working as a writer and columnist 
in the local Jordanian press. It was at this time, on his return to Amman, 
that he began working with Baladna as its principal lyricist.
In the early 1980s Ibrahim Nasrallah found a popular forum for the 
performance of his work through Baladna. Published collections of his 
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poetry and short stories were in press, but in order to create the type of 
social impact he desired Ibrahim believed that “words must be carried 
to the people through popular song.” In speaking about these songs 
Ibrahim noted that “set to Kamal’s melodies, my poetry seemed to take 
on a life of its own.” Young, idealistic, and fearless, the two would sit up 
nights together singing the folk songs of their youth, composing what 
they hoped would become the protest songs of the next generation. Their 
friendship blossomed as well during these nights together. Reflecting on 
this period Kamal joked, “Ibrahim was just so special . . . his words were 
so important and inspiring. I was just so lucky that he had such a horrible 
singing voice, otherwise there would have been no need for me at all.”
Indeed Kamal wasn’t the only one to admire Nasrallah’s work. It 
seemed with each performance Baladna’s popularity grew in the early 
1980s, taking them from small weddings and family occasions to large 
concerts in youth clubs, labor syndicates, and street festivals. Their rise 
in popularity was aided by the political climate in Jordan as well as in the 
territories. What originally separated Baladna from contemporaries such 
as al- ʿAshiqin, Firqat al- Markaziya, Marcel Khalife, and other famous en-
sembles of the day was an overpowering emphasis on local Palestinian ex-
periences in Jordan: the dynamics of Palestinian- Jordanian relations and 
the dialogics of their competing claims to nation and state.
 “aghniyat hubb li- shahid al- karak” or  
 “ahmad majali” (a love song For the martyr  
From karak, ahmad majali)
One particularly potent example of this is seen in Baladna’s well- known 
song “Aghniyat Hubb li- Shahid al- Karak” (A love song for the martyr 
from Karak, Ahmad Majali). In a time of great social turmoil and distrust 
between Palestinians and Jordanians this song eulogized the memory of 
the first native Jordanian soldier to join the plo and die fighting for Pal-
estinian liberation, Ahmad Majali. For Palestinians in the greater dias-
pora the story of the “shahīd al- Karak” (martyr from Karak) is perhaps 
completely unknown. However, in Jordan the story gripped the nation 
and remains important in popular memory today. Over time the story of 
Majali has been used as political ammunition for various nationalist orga-
nizations. He is often cited not only as a martyr for Palestine but also as a 
model for collective military action against Israel and the recruitment of 
Jordanians into the fidāʾiyīn movement. The song’s lyrics were written by 
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Ibrahim Nasrallah, while the music was composed and later recorded by 
Kamal Khalil (evia 14- s6800).9
“Aghniyat Hubb li- Shahid al- Karak” begins with an improvised real-
ization of the main melody performed on the ʿūd. Kamal introduces 
the tune and its maqām structure (sīgā lā) instrumentally before sing-
ing the first two stanzas in the form of a traditional Palestinian mawwāl. 
Throughout this introduction he extemporizes on the maqām in order to 
both present the tonal material of the melody as well as to showcase his 
vocal interpretation of the lyrics.
This is the nation of the people, we are its defenders.
The honor of defending this country will raise our heads.
Blood is no longer blood if it is imprisoned,
And if it is the dowry in wars.
Oh rejoicing eyes of my mother do not fear.
The most beautiful youth are fighting alongside of me.
My blood is a sudden melody of dignity, listen to it.
The land of al- Quds [Jerusalem] is the sun and your hems are a 
wellspring.
As Kamal cadences this initial extemporization, the song quickens, 
shifting into a pulsating duple meter, iqaʿ waḥda mukallafa. A chorus of 
mixed voices then sings the refrain:
The moon sings zaghrūd for him, and the most beautiful of cities 
sings to him.
Ahmad triumphs over death,
What is most beautiful is your sun, oh nation.
A flower for every little one in the lands of Karak
For the sheikhs and the mothers who said,
Oh angel, this land gives and will continue to give and love and 
receive you.
Transitioning into the next verse, the rhythm again shifts to iqaʿ mas-
mūdī saghīr or balādī, a popular dabke meter. Participating dabke dancers 
experienced enough to feel the difference between these two meters will 
mark this shift in rhythm by changing their step patterns instinctively or 
by the instruction of an informal lawīḥ (line leader). At this moment, the 
original melody returns, this time sung as a straightforward dabke tune:
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Who saw the small child who said goodbye to his mother?
And he was so young and beautiful.
Who saw him return and smile, as flowers arose from his weapons?
This Palestine is yours, it is yours.
Like childhood and the bosom of your mother.
Karak is yours,
Palestine is yours,
Those who raise your banner and clean dust of the night will be 
yours.
Sing zaghrūd for the beautiful one.
“Aghniyat Hubb li- Shahid al- Karak” is an excellent example of in-
digenous shaʿbī nationalist song. Its nonmetric, improvised introduc-
tory mawwāl, call- and- response interaction between soloist and chorus, 
and shifting dabke rhythms call forth the shaʿbī music routinely heard at 
weddings and other social gatherings. In text, although modified slightly, 
this song closely follows the stock lexicon of resistance metaphor and 
imagery common during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Particularly im-
portant here is the exalted relationship between the soldier/fighter and his 
mother, the sanctity of blood and honor in defending the nation, the act 
of resistance as wedding celebration, and the primordial relationship be-
tween the people and the land (sun, moon, flowers, and so on).
Beyond its somewhat clichéd depictions of land and honor, the signifi-
cance of this song lies in how it directly engages both Jordanian and Pales-
tinian national imaginaries. In so doing, this song offers a fascinating look 
into the dialogics of Palestinian Jordanian identity formation. First, in 
performing a musical tribute to Ahmad Majali, a young Jordanian from a 
powerful Bedouin tribe, Baladna is strategically reaching out to the (non- 
Palestinian) Jordanian community. To engage this particularly Jordanian/
Bedouin ethos Baladna sings of family honor, prestige, and loyalty inclu-
sive of both Palestinian and Jordanian communities. Specifically this song 
pays tribute to the honor of the tribe and family (al- Majali) by commemo-
rating the actions of the individual. By extension, Ahmad Majali’s martyr-
dom fighting for Palestinian liberation in the Lebanese civil war honors 
his family, tribe, and native city (Karak).
The introductory stanzas establish an ongoing metaphorical relation-
ship between the soldier and his mother, the people and the nation. Like 
mothers to sons, the nation gives birth to its people. To defend the nation 
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in blood is to dignify the family and the mother of the martyr. Kamal 
sings for the mother “not to fear,” that fighting with him are the most 
beautiful youth (the sons of Jordan). Fighting alongside his Jordanian 
brothers, the soldier’s blood is dignified (karāma). The use of the word 
karāma here is particularly important in that it denotes great honor yet 
also references the historic battle of Karama, where Jordanian and Pales-
tinian forces collectively engaged the Israeli army in 1968 (see chapter 3). 
The battle at Karama holds an important place in the national histories of 
both the plo and the Jordanian monarchy, each marking it as an impor-
tant military victory against Israeli forces.10 In these lyrics karāma refers 
to this military victory as well as the dignity and honor of the martyr’s 
acts. Indeed to elicit the image of Karama (and karāma) in the popular 
memory of both Palestinians and Jordanians is to strategically index the 
imagined ties between the two nations, and the potential for shared vic-
tory through collaboration.
Repeated references to the city of Karak and its children are equally 
powerful associations of place, as in the line, “a flower for every little one 
in the lands of Karak.” Karak is of great national and historical signifi-
cance in Jordan. It was one of the more important cultural and politi-
cal capitals of the early Trans- Jordanian emirate and remains a strong-
hold of native Jordanian tribal influence in the royal court. The seat of 
power in Karak has long been held by its most powerful tribe, the Majali, 
whose family members have served in the highest positions of the Jor-
danian government. Given its southern location and conservative Bed-
ouin reputation, few if any Palestinians settled in Karak post- 1948, and 
today it remains predominantly, if not completely, a (native) Jordanian 
city. In honoring the “sheikhs and mothers” who in their generosity have 
given to the struggle, Baladna makes an interesting overture toward the 
tribal leaders of the city and its ruling families. Use of tribal imagery is 
extremely rare in Palestinian protest songs and should be seen here as a 
particularly motivated attempt to reach out to a Bedouin audience.
The song ends with a final dedication to the beautiful one, Ahmad 
Majali. Because of his sacrifice he may now claim Palestine as his own. 
“Palestine is his, Karak is his.” All those who raise the banner of collective 
Palestinian liberation sing “zaghrūd [ululations sung at wedding celebra-
tions] for the beautiful one.” The metaphorical references of marriage and 
martyrdom are perhaps the most potent facet of this piece. In associat-
ing the martyr with the bridegroom “Aghniyat Hubb li- Shahid al- Karak” 
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references the transition from boyhood to manhood, and from life to 
death. Through death the martyr becomes a man, transforming his so-
cial status from shabāb (youth) to rajāl (man).11 In the first stanza Kamal 
sings, “Blood is no longer blood . . . if it is the dowry in wars.” Blood 
spilled for liberation is a dowry or gift of marriage for the union of the 
martyr and the nation; for giving his life the young martyr is celebrated 
with zaghrūd as a bridegroom to the nation. He has chosen the nation 
as his beloved rather than sought a traditional wife. The act of burial, in-
terring the martyr directly into the land, thus fulfills the consummation 
of that marriage.
The metaphorical use of blood throughout this song affirms a gen-
dered, primordial depiction of the nation and its people and further 
establishes an iconic relationship between rituals of marriage and rituals 
of resistance. The hems of the mother’s dress, like the lands of Jerusalem, 
are a wellspring from which to bathe and cleanse the body. Flowers of the 
resistance, sown of the martyr’s blood and nourished by the sun/mother, 
are to be given to the “little ones in the lands of Karak.” On the martyr’s 
return to the nation, iconically depicted in the act of burial and the con-
summation of marriage, flowers arise from his weapons. As Ahmad Ma-
jali sacrificed himself for the nation, the moon and the most beautiful 
cities sang zaghrūd. The act of zaghrūd, a performative means of cele-
brating the joining of man and woman, husband and wife, in marriage, is 
depicted here as a ritual for commemorating the martyr’s wedding to the 
nation. Blood is the dowry demanded in the conjoining of the martyr and 
the nation. In exchange for his blood, the nation submits and accepts the 
martyr into its body (burial), consummating their eternal relationship.
When it was first performed, “Aghniyat Hubb li- Shahid al- Karak” was 
a powerful political statement. Following years of cultural tension and 
distrust between native Jordanians and Palestinian Jordanians, including 
the outbreak of civil war in 1970 and the purging of Palestinian nation-
alists from the state, Baladna sought to reunite Palestinians and Jordani-
ans under a common banner of collective resistance against Israeli oc-
cupation. The memory of Karama was employed to identify a common 
enemy and purpose for reconciliation. So, too, with the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon and the horrific massacres of Sabra and Shatila, support for 
the plo was at an all- time high. Jordanian volunteers (both Jordanian 
and Palestinian Jordanian alike) assembled in large numbers at the Syrian 
border to join the fighting, bringing with them aid packages, food, cloth-
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ing, and medical supplies. Most of these volunteers were turned away 
by the Syrian border patrol, their aid packages confiscated. On returning 
to their homes many found that their passports had been revoked, pre-
venting them from leaving the country indefinitely.12 Ahmad Majali was 
one of the few who successfully made it into Lebanon, where he joined 
the fidāʾiyīn and was later killed in combat in 1983. For many Palestini-
ans, Majali, a young man from a connected Jordanian tribe in a Bedouin 
stronghold, signified the collective Arab sacrifice necessary to achieve 
Palestinian liberation. He embodied the idea that one need not neces-
sarily be Palestinian by blood or lineage in order to believe in and fight 
for its cause.
The performance of a song such as this further opened up spaces for 
dialogue within the larger Jordanian public sphere, encouraging and cele-
brating Jordanian engagement in the Palestinian resistance movement 
and formal collaboration with the plo. Among performers and audiences 
this song was intended and interpreted to be an act of subversion against 
the self- proclaimed leadership of King Hussein to represent the Pales-
tinian people. Instead “Ughniyat Hubb li- Shahid al- Karak” celebrated the 
sacrifices of all those willing to cross ideological lines of difference and 
fight for Palestinian self- determination.
Identity Politics in Performance, Identity  
Performance in Politics
Although more myth than reality, imagery of Palestinian and Jordanian 
collaboration was a popular and necessary trope in the early 1980s. Com-
peting ideas of nation and national sentiment between the plo and the 
royal court regularly resurfaced in performance as well as politics. The 
cultural politics involved in defining the nation became increasingly sen-
sitive at a time when Jordanian and Palestinian Jordanian nationalists 
were calling for more influence in matters of the state. However, through-
out the 1970s and into the early 1980s, with the plo fully recognized as the 
“sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,” many tribal 
leaders insisted that King Hussein must reassess his policies to reflect 
a distinctly Jordanian national character. Initially the king held fast to 
his rhetoric that Palestinians and Jordanians were of “one tribe and one 
family.” But under extreme pressure he began reducing the number of 
Palestinians in his administration and drastically slashing government 
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subsidies to the West Bank in place since 1948.13 All these moves were seen 
as logical steps in a new project of renewed Jordanian nationalism under 
the twin banners of “East Bank First” and “Jordan Is for Jordanians.”
With the 1981 reelection of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 
King Hussein was confronted with yet another ideological threat to his 
sovereignty on both the East and West Banks of the Jordan River. Em-
boldened by the many public pronouncements that “Jordan was Pales-
tine,” advocates for the “Palestinian Jordan option,” predominantly nested 
within the Likud, believed that Israel should have done more to help the 
plo topple the Hashemite regime during Black September and that it was 
in Israel’s best interests to facilitate a Palestinian coup against the king. 
According to this point of view, with a Palestinian state proclaimed in 
Jordan the plo would be less opposed to Israeli settlement in the Occu-
pied Territories, paving the way for total annexation of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip.
Angered by such a position, King Hussein set in motion several efforts 
to combat the notion that “Jordan was Palestine.” First among these was 
to initiate a Trans- Jordanian cultural movement in distinct opposition to 
the Palestinian nationalist model espoused by the plo. For this to hap-
pen it was imperative for the king to showcase a native Jordanian national 
culture set apart from and distinctive to its more widespread Palestinian 
counterpart. The centerpiece of this movement was Jordan’s native tribal 
(Bedouin) identity, its leadership role in the Great Arab Revolt, its his-
torical and archeological significance, and most importantly the persona 
of the king himself.14
In matters of public culture this shift was clearly seen in a resurgence of 
“Bedouin” lifeways and aesthetics in television and radio programming, 
music performance, and cultural policy. Jordanian nationalists sought out 
folkloric representations of Bedouin life prior to its “contamination” in 
1948. Composers and performers like Jamil al- Aas, Taqfiq al- Nimri, and 
Mohammad Abdhu were given center stage on Jordanian television and 
radio for their performances of contemporary nationalist “Bedouin” folk 
songs. Within these performances Jordanian nationalists asserted a dis-
tinct cultural identity, history, and heritage in contradistinction to Pales-
tinian folklorists working simultaneously in the West Bank.
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the First annual jerash Festival  
oF culture and the arts (1981)
Of the many cultural programs designed to highlight or enhance a native 
Jordanian cultural identity, none was to have as lasting an effect and as 
much overall success as the annual Jerash Festival of Culture and the Arts. 
In October 1981, under the direct patronage of Queen Noor al- Hussein, 
the first Jerash Festival was inaugurated. This festival made use of a Jor-
danian archeological treasure, the Roman city of Jerash, with its two beau-
tifully preserved amphitheaters, for a three- day event of music and dance 
performances and arts and crafts exhibitions. The colonnaded streets and 
plazas of the Decapolis city were adorned with banners and accommo-
dated crafts vendors and performances so as to revitalize and restore the 
city’s cultural identity. It was the queen’s hope that such a festival would 
celebrate Jordan’s cultural and architectural history and the people’s cul-
tural heritage, promote tourism, and revitalize the economy of one of the 
kingdom’s struggling communities.15
Following the success of the first Jerash Festival the queen immediately 
began preparations to expand it into an annual ten- day event that would 
include international Arab artists and performers. In her memoirs the 
queen wrote, “I was hopeful that we could strike a balance between paying 
tribute to popular traditional Arab and Muslim art forms and introduc-
ing contemporary regional and international culture.”16 For the queen, 
Jerash’s beautiful “outdoor theatres and monuments would provide ex-
traordinary settings not only for Jordanian talent but also for Arab and 
European orchestras, Chinese acrobat troupes, Shakespeare performed 
by the British actor’s theatre company, . . . the Caracall Dance Theatre of 
Lebanon, . . . and flamenco dancing performed by Spanish Gypsies.”17
Throughout its planning and implementation the Jerash Festival was 
designed to capitalize on and enhance Jordan’s image as a progressive, 
developing monarchy open to and celebrative of global culture, while at 
the same time promoting a distinctly Jordanian cultural identity. Espe-
cially at a time when Jordan’s national identity was being openly con-
tested by forces foreign and domestic, it was particularly important for 
the royal court to promote an image of national stability and prosperity 
to the outside world. Cultural festivals such as this were an astute way to 
promote cosmopolitan aesthetics from within the local Jordanian com-
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munity while concomitantly associating Jordan’s national culture with the 
international world. This project thereby sought to influence how Jordan, 
as national construct, was conceptualized by both its citizenry and the 
world at large. The festival provided performative spaces where political 
fracturing would dissolve, and the nation would appear stable, histori-
cally rooted, and uncontested by its participants. In the Jerash Festival 
it was possible for the monarchy to construct a stylized depiction of its 
national culture, dress, food, and song naturalized within its present state 
structure and leadership.
Queen Noor’s commentary about the arts is telling of what she hoped 
to accomplish in the Jerash Festival.
Cultural programs extended the ripple effect of such projects. I saw 
the arts as a way to provide opportunity for people of varied socio-
economic backgrounds, ethnicities, religions, and political orienta-
tions to come together and contribute to a contemporary Jordanian 
culture that would transcend their differences. Through programs 
that emphasized pluralism and diversity as well as traditional Arab 
artistic expression, I believe culture could have great political and 
even national security value. The more closely people could connect 
through literature, drama, and art, the greater would be their sense 
of cohesion in a society made up of often disparate and competing 
elements.18 (emphasis added)
Queen Noor’s initial impetus for the event was of profound signifi-
cance in combating a very real sociocultural crisis. Her vision was that 
this event would promote a “contemporary Jordanian culture,” transcend-
ing differences in ethnicity, religion, and politics. Yet her ambitious goal 
of connecting “often disparate and competing elements” was ultimately 
accomplished not so much by the celebratory nature of the event, the 
“connection through literature, drama, and the arts,” but rather through 
the forceful silencing of dissent. Any artists or performers not explicitly 
“Jordanian” enough were excluded from participating in the event. In his 
recollections, Kamal Khalil offers a very different perspective on the first 
Jerash Festival and its impact in Jordan.
When I heard that the queen was starting a national music and 
culture festival I knew that this was our chance to be a part of the 
musical revival that Jordan needed. . . .
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When we got to Jerash on the first day of the festival my 
brothers and I set up our instruments on the street outside the 
gates and played for the people as they walked into the city. We 
played Palestinian folk songs, mostly shaʿbī, things that we knew 
everyone would know. Songs from [Palestinian] folklore, . . . songs 
we were brought up singing. Soon we gathered a large crowd of 
maybe 200 people who were listening to our songs. Some of the 
people even began to dance. Even some of the police showed up. At 
first, I was scared, but the police stood by and just listened.
I remember that the last song we played was “Laya wa Laya” 
[see example 6.1]. This is one of the most famous Palestinian songs 
everyone knows. Ibrahim [Nasrallah] had re- written some of the 
lyrics, but for the most part it was from folklore [min al- turāth 
shaʿbī]. After we finished the song, the police commander immedi-
ately ordered our arrest for inciting the crowd. . . . The people danc-
ing and singing along must have scared him. . . .
We were held in the detention center at Jerash. My younger 
brothers were all still very young, so they let them go after three 
days. I was kept in prison for several weeks. Each day they would 
come in . . . tie me up and take turns hitting me with various clubs, 
chains, or ropes. I wasn’t allowed to sleep or eat. The whole time 
my family was trying to get a hold of me, but they were all in Ru-
seifa and I was being held in Jerash. Finally, they were able to get 
me transferred to the Ruseifa jail so that they could come and visit 
me. The beatings were more than I could take. I was so young at 
the time [twenty- four], and I only thought that I would be creating 
music like I saw in Germany, and maybe make a few dollars. My 
family couldn’t find the money to get me out of prison. And for 
weeks I was held. . . .
example 6.1. ✹ “Laya wa Laya.” Transcription from author’s field notes.
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The guards would mock me, and the head commander of the 
jail would come in and lead the beatings. He would hit me so hard 
in the head that my ears would ring for days. I was [a] dirty [Pales-
tinian] to him. . . . My teeth were kicked out, and the blood would 
run down my throat until I choked. . . .
Finally after I was released they were giving me back my clothes 
and my ʿūd, the guards all lined up and asked if I would play them 
“Laya wa Laya” one last time before I went home. They were seri-
ous. They gave me back my ʿūd, and told me that they really liked 
my voice and wanted to hear the song one more time. I couldn’t 
believe it. The song that I was singing when they arrested me was 
the song that they wanted to hear as I was being released.
I was so angry I didn’t know what to do. In the end, I didn’t play 
for them. . . . I wasn’t going to give them the satisfaction (evia 14- 
s0790).19
Laya, Laya oh my daughter
The prison narrows around me,
And closed the path to my nation,
From the water to the water.
The exiled one was broadened,
I want to run through the land.
And they removed the mines from my path laid by an American 
tank.
They widened the dungeon,
Yaffa is vigilant in my chest.
And our olives thirst,
Wanting to drink freedom.
They widened exile for me,
Wanting to breathe Haifa
And even the night is purified,
In the bullets of the fidāʾī.
They widened the enclosure [ḥūṭa] and sang that the wedding is a 
part of us,
How do we sing about it being the soul of the people?
The wound is written in letters that
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Only the mother of the martyr sees,
And she sings zaghrūd, Oh God, encircle our Kaʿba of the coast.
Set to a haunting, well- known melody in maqām ṣābā, “Laya” is a 
powerful testimony to life in exile. Although in performance the song is 
usually set to iqaʿ maqsūm or saʿīdī, giving it a participatory dance quality, 
privately Kamal prefers for the song to be played without percussion. He 
finds the song releases an intimate beauty when sung solo with ʿūd ac-
companiment, as one might sing to a child. On the studio recording the 
song begins with a long drawn-out taqsīm (instrumental improvisation) 
on the nai played to introduce the character of maqām ṣābā, its mourn-
ful sadness, and to index the sound of the indigenous Palestinian sha-
bāba and its associations with fallāḥī culture and lifeways. The text fol-
lows within a poetic structure and rhyme scheme similar to murabaʿ and 
muḥāwara (aaab, cccb, dddb, and so on). The first three lines of each 
stanza rhyme internally. The fourth lines rhyme with each other. In per-
formance each stanza is sung solo; the first stanza also serves as a refrain, 
sung by a female chorus.
The text, as written by Ibrahim Nasrallah, begins as a testimony of 
desperation sung by a father to his young daughter, Laya. In hearing her 
father’s lament, Laya learns of his time spent in exile’s prison, al- manfā. 
For the father, al- manfā is a prison that has closed his path to the nation 
“from the water to the water.” The father wants to run through his home-
land free of the American landmines (deadly obstacles) laid in his path. 
Signs of indigeneity figure conspicuously throughout shaʿbī nationalist 
song, especially in wistful and nostalgic longings for the “lost homeland.” 
The rootedness of the trees becomes indexical of the revered qualities of 
“patience” and “steadfastness,” refusing to be uprooted from the soil. The 
Palestinian city of Yaffa, today engulfed by Tel Aviv, is steadfast in the 
chest of the father while “the olives of our nation are thirsty to drink free-
dom.” The olive tree as national emblem provides the quintessential trope 
of Palestinian secular nationalism, articulating a sense of rootedness in 
the land prior to displacement and dispersion.20 Its fruit, the olive, repre-
sents the people themselves growing and thriving in the nation’s soil. “The 
thirst of the olives wanting to drink freedom” signifies the struggles of 
the people to restore the nation. Thirst, as it is articulated here, implies a 
complex of meanings associated with drought, stunted growth, untended 
fields, neglect, desire, and the harsh living conditions many refugees suf-
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fered crossing into the Jordanian desert. By extension thirst is also a com-
mon trope for life in exile, a nation/land separated from its people, loyal, 
waiting to be liberated, nourished, and irrigated. In resistance art thirst is 
typically depicted by cracked, barren, dry land and is a standard icon of 
life under occupation (see figure 6.3).
As the Palestinian people are metaphorically framed as the fruit of the 
olive trees, the tree itself represents the cultural history and indigenous 
lifeways of the people. Its roots dig deep into the nation’s soil.21 The col-
lective branches of the olive tree act as the cultural links, as they are the 
shared repository of beliefs and practices constitutive of the nation. It is 
the olive tree that acts as the intermediary between the people (olives) and 
the land. The tree bears its fruit in much the same way as culture and cul-
tural practices generate a sense of community and belonging.
As the trees of culture thrive as part of the national landscape, rooted 
in the soil bearing its fruit (the Palestinian people), they are nourished 
by the waters of sacrifice. This tripartite metaphor, which positions the 
land, the people, and their culture collectively in the image of the olive 
tree, is a powerful, if not overdetermined, marker of Palestinian identity. 
Under occupation and in exile this symbiotic relationship is disrupted, 
separating the people from the land. In metaphoric representations of the 
Figure 6.3. ✹ Depictions of thirst in intifada cover art, Sawt al- Hurriya  
(The voice of freedom).
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occupation, the land is depicted as barren, bereft of life. Its dry, cracked 
soil lays dormant without its necessary nourishment. To reclaim the land, 
and to restore the olive trees, the nation must be watered with the blood 
of sacrifice. Countless songs employ this trope of “watering the olives in 
blood.” This trope signifies the metaphorical nourishment of the land 
through the sacrifice of resistance and the spilling of Palestinian blood. 
To “water the olives in blood” is to irrigate the nation’s fields and to sus-
tain its people. As water nourishes the land, blood sustains and fuels the 
nation. The iconic substitution of blood for water personifies the land 
and the nation as primordial determinants of the people. In the spilling 
of blood the nation’s thirst is quenched, and the olive trees may thrive.
Like Yaffa, the Palestinian city of Haifa is represented as unable to 
breathe through the smoke of gunfire. The darkness makes it difficult to 
see, but the gunfire of the fidāʾī purifies the night and shows us the path 
to redemption. To openly sing lyrics about the fidāʾī in such an overtly 
“Jordanian” cultural space was perhaps the final straw that led to Kamal 
Khalil’s arrest. As enemies of the state, a competing national entity, and a 
fighting force currently engaged in a war against the Israeli army in Bei-
rut, the fidāʾiyīn represented a threat to Jordanian and particularly Hashe-
mite sovereignty. To glorify the fidāʾī in song may well have been inter-
preted by these local police commanders as treason against the king.
In the fifth stanza the singer speaks of the Palestinian wedding. In this 
instance, as before, we see the standard trope of marriage between martyr 
and nation with a slight variation. Here the wedding is proclaimed as 
a site for the construction of familial intimacy. The lyrics state, “They 
widened the enclosure [ḥūṭa] and sang that the wedding is a part of us.” 
Traditionally, after the formal wedding celebrations have ended and only 
the close family of the bridegroom remains, families create what is called 
the ḥūṭa, a circle or enclosure. Here brothers, sisters, close cousins, aunts, 
and uncles all sit together and sing wedding songs until morning. Tradi-
tionally it is one of the few moments in a formal (Muslim) Palestinian 
wedding where men and women openly celebrate together. In this enclo-
sure there are no strangers or outsiders to the family’s inner circle. Within 
such a space men and women may sing and dance together without fear 
of immodesty or impropriety.
The Arabic root ḥ- ū- ṭ literally means to embrace something to the point 
of knowing it thoroughly; to be completely familiar with something; and 
to guard, protect, and preserve something cherished. To be included in 
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the ḥūṭa implies participation in one of the most private and intimate of 
family spaces. In these lyrics the father is calling for the ḥūṭa to widen to 
encapsulate the entire Palestinian nation, one family united in struggle for 
the preservation of community. The wedding referenced here, however, 
is not of two families. Rather it is the wedding of the martyr (shahīd) to 
the nation. As before, the young man who has martyred himself is said to 
have died a groom to the nation. His death and burial are metaphoric ref-
erences to the act of marriage. The spilling of blood by the martyr is iconic 
of the bride’s spilling of blood on the wedding night. Both are honored 
and dignified in their sacrifice for nation and the family. Where a man has 
martyred himself for the nation, “Laya wa Laya” calls for his death to be 
celebrated within a ḥūṭa encapsulating the entire nation.
The final stanza speaks of the mother of the martyr (umm al- shahīd) 
and her spiritual connection with her son. She, in fact, is the only one 
who sees the true wounds and suffering of the martyr and yet, neverthe-
less, sings zaghrūd for his death/wedding. Her final call is that God and 
the Muslim world treat the cities of Haifa and Yaffa as the “Kaʿba of the 
coast.”22 She prays for the Muslim world to protect its Palestinian cities as 
they would Mecca and Medina, calling Haifa, Yaffa, and Gaza the Pales-
tinian Kaʿba, holy to its inhabitants and worthy of sacrifice.
In performing “Laya wa Laya” informally on the streets of Jerash dur-
ing the inauguration of the kingdom’s largest cultural festival, Kamal 
Khalil perhaps should have expected political consequences. A lament of 
this sort would no doubt have caused an uproar among Jordanian nation-
alists and the mukhabarāt (secret police), attempting to preserve the king-
dom’s united national front to the outside world. What is more, given that 
the group had attracted such a large crowd, the lyrics and overt political 
commentary most assuredly were seen as potential incitement at a festival 
designed to celebrate a peaceful “contemporary Jordanian culture.”23 In 
its references to the fidāʾiyīn, exile, and betrayal, “Laya wa Laya” explicitly 
trespassed various nationalist taboos. By articulating Palestinian iden-
tity and experience from within the Jordanian national imaginary, it as-
serted a Palestinian presence in Jordan potentially subversive to the state- 
espoused position that Jordan had succeeded in securing a safe haven for 
all its refugees. Any formal attempt to fight for Palestinian interests out-
side of Jordanian state hegemony might then be considered an offense to 
the king’s generous hospitality.
Outward expressions of loyalty to the plo exposed the fractures and in-
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consistencies inherent in the Jordanian national imaginary and reinforced 
a particularly tragic episode of civil war and social neglect. “Laya” pre-
sented a counterhegemonic ideology that directly challenged the king’s 
self- proclaimed leadership in representing the Palestinian people. Perfor-
mances such as this were particularly subversive in that they enabled pub-
lic debate, questioned existing power structures, and proposed potential 
alternatives. Carried forth via well- known folk songs and dances, Baladna 
gave voice to Palestinian experiences of exile and betrayal and offered a 
performative means of interpreting dispossession outside the discursive 
reach of the Jordanian state. “It was obvious what they [the Jordanian gov-
ernment] were doing,” Kamal recounted. “They wanted everyone to see 
Jordan as this great modern country. But they didn’t want anyone to see 
us suffering, waiting, and fighting for our freedom.”
In a similar fashion, Queen Noor was also attempting to overcome 
perceived threats and vulnerabilities to national identity politics. Queen 
Noor’s original assessment that such cultural festivals are an opportunity 
for people of various ethnicities to come together and transcend their dif-
ferences reflects the predominant cultural project of reaffirming a distinct 
Jordanian national identity amidst domestic unrest and foreign threats 
that “Jordan is Palestine.” In the Jerash Festival the queen could stage Jor-
danian national artists performing for the nation, erasing all doubt that 
hers was a kingdom derived from a historic cultural heritage and identity 
deeply seated in and legitimated by a shared Bedouin ethos. The ultimate 
goal was to perform the nation and hence remove all doubt that “Jordan 
is Jordan” and “Palestine is Palestine.”
Unfortunately this was but the first confrontation Kamal Khalil would 
have with the secret police. He later found out after inquiries with the 
prison commander that his arrest was ordered by the head of the mukha-
barāt for “illegal political activities.” The young musician was given only 
his first taste of political activism in Jordan. Today he looks back on this 
experience as a watershed moment in his career, a moment when he 
found purpose in his music and strength in the conviction that he was 
singing for “his people.” Among his supporters, Kamal’s arrest generated 
a great deal of publicity. As a political prisoner Kamal had made a name 
for himself and for Baladna as artists dedicated to Palestinian causes. 
Through this first experience at Jerash, Kamal also came to realize that 
despite the political overtures made by government officials (including 
members of the royal family), Jordan in practice did not celebrate its cul-
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tural and political diversity to the extent that he once imagined. With time 
the injuries suffered in prison healed, but there were lasting psychological 
effects: he would never walk onstage again without first considering the 
consequences of what he was about to do. He knew that at any time he or 
anyone in the group could be taken away, beaten, or even killed.
Partnership, Reconciliation, and the  
Plo Honeymoon (1982–1988)
In the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the expulsion of 
the plo from Beirut, King Hussein believed that his current relationship 
with the plo was untenable and that a lasting partnership between the 
two needed to be forged if either were to survive. Israel, with its political 
shift to the right, had intensified its hard- line stance regarding the Occu-
pied Territories and the status of Jerusalem, making the prospect of nego-
tiations dim. The combination of these political forces seemed to make 
the king’s position all the more necessary. A partnership between the king 
and the plo was deemed crucial to reaching a political settlement with 
Israel and hence avoiding the potential exodus of hundreds of thousands 
of additional refugees across the Jordan River. Over the course of the next 
six years (1982–88), King Hussein made several attempts to achieve a last-
ing, mutually beneficial relationship with Arafat and the plo.
Struggling to maintain his leadership while exiled to Tunis, Arafat 
seemed to have little choice but to seek alliances within the Arab world. 
With this, relations between the royal court and the plo warmed such 
that on November 21, 1984, the Palestinian National Congress (pnc) for-
mally met in Amman. At this congress King Hussein revealed his goals 
for reconciliation and rapprochement to an audience of politicians and 
delegates he had forcibly evicted from his kingdom only thirteen years 
earlier. “I send a salute of loyalty to the people of Palestine, and through 
you, the representatives of the Palestinian people, I salute every Pales-
tinian. We welcome you in Amman, among its people, or rather, wel-
come you among your people, your tribe, your brethren, your family, your 
brothers and your brothers- in- law; we welcome you in Jordan, the light-
house of men and the castle of steadfastness.”24
In the end, Arafat ultimately declined any formal federation between 
the two nations and instead would speak only of the “special relation-
ship” between Jordanians and Palestinians. Frustrated by this lack of co-
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ordination, King Hussein attempted to shore up loyalties among the West 
Bank elite, reviving parliament on June 16, 1984 (suspended since 1974) 
and appointing several prominent West Bank officials to his royal court 
and cabinet.25 The message was clear: there was a partnership available to 
Palestinians regardless of the plo’s agenda. More than a year of intensive 
negotiation yielded little result, forcing the king to formally announce his 
“inability to continue political coordination with the plo” on February 19, 
1986.26 The king’s termination of ties with the plo once again resulted in 
the closing of all plo offices in the kingdom and a renewed program of so-
cial aid and incentives to win the support of the unaffiliated notables in the 
West Bank. Such monies would ostensibly serve to improve the local lives 
of Palestinians living under occupation, create jobs (and hence curb the 
flow of immigrants across the border), and most importantly, strengthen 
a local leadership outside the plo’s influence. Ultimately, though, each of 
these attempts failed to secure a lasting Jordanian- Palestinian political 
relationship and to create the kind of sociocultural legitimacy the king 
needed for his claims to represent and lead the Palestinians in negotia-
tions with Israel. In effect, the so- called honeymoon had ended.
For Palestinian Jordanians the rapprochement of the plo and the royal 
court signaled a brief window of opportunity wherein Palestinian cultural 
practices were allowed entrance into the mainstream Jordanian public 
sphere. It was imperative that the king put forth the image that there was 
no animosity between Palestinians and Jordanians and further highlight 
the contributions of Palestinians to the kingdom. At no other time were 
Palestinian authors, poets, musicians, and other artists celebrated in Jor-
dan as contributing members of the nation- state. During this brief win-
dow of time folkloric performers of Palestinian music and dance were 
given unfettered access to state resources such as venues, permits, and 
publicity. What is more, Palestinian musicians previously harassed and 
scrutinized for their politics were asked to perform publicly in high- 
profile national events. The goal was to frame Palestinian culture from 
within the Jordanian state imaginary, thus aligning the plight for Pales-
tinian self- determination as a stated or implied Jordanian state interest.
a return to jerash
It was within this brief opening in the spring of 1984 that Kamal Khalil 
was officially asked to perform on the main stage of the Jerash Festival. 
As might be expected, the news came to him as a great shock. He saw the 
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gesture as a ploy to circumvent the plo and secure loyalty to the king. It 
would seem that Baladna’s growing popularity had become such a force 
that the monarchy was left with an important choice: either use it, or 
silence it. In this instance the monarchy chose to use Kamal Khalil as a 
tool of cultural integration between Palestinian Jordanian and Jordanian 
communities. The sight of Baladna performing on the queen’s stage would 
be a powerful sign of Hashemite legitimacy to rule over one “united Jor-
danian family.” Despite his initial reservations, however, Kamal jumped 
at the chance to perform for such a large audience. Moreover he felt that 
a Baladna performance on the main stage at Jerash would provide sweet 
retribution for his previous experiences there in 1981. Reflecting on the 
experience Kamal stated, “I knew that in this festival I could sing my 
songs anyway I wanted, and there was nothing the police could do about 
it.” In fact, many of the same local policemen responsible for Kamal’s 
arrest were working the night of Baladna’s concert three years later. The 
concert featured his usual set list, including “Laya wa Laya,” and audience 
reactions were so favorable that the group was asked to return the follow-
ing year (1985).
In an ironic twist, Kamal was invited to attend a reception for festival 
participants hosted by the king and queen at the royal palace. Standing in 
the receiving line waiting to be welcomed by their majesties, Kamal was 
overcome. “Three years earlier I was thrown in jail for weeks, beaten . . . all 
for singing my songs. And now, here I am waiting in line to be welcomed 
by the king and queen for singing those same songs.”
As he approached their majesties Kamal could not contain himself, 
“It took everything I had inside of me not to scream out, or cry, or laugh. 
What was I supposed to say to them? How could I look them in the eye? 
Afterwards, I knew more than at any other time that I was singing for the 
right reasons. Regardless of whether they put me in jail or invited me to 
meet the king, I was going to keep singing [my songs].”
Palestinians, the Intifada, and Formal Disengagement
While December 1987 marked the beginning of the intifada in Gaza and 
the West Bank, it marked an equally powerful moment in the lives of 
Palestinians living in Jordan. Public support for the uprising was very 
strong, evidenced by the formation of local leadership councils, commit-
tees, and fund- raising projects. Intifada culture had gripped society in 
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Jordan much as it had in other Arab capitals throughout the region. For 
many Palestinian Jordanian families, the beginning of the uprising caused 
great stress and hardship. The violence reported on the radio exacerbated 
feelings of dislocation and separation. Many felt powerless to help friends 
and family members still living under occupation.
In the Jordanian public sphere the escalation of the uprising paradoxi-
cally had the effect of both generating national sentiment for Palestinian 
liberation and at the same time forcing Palestinian Jordanians to admit to 
their peripheral relationship to the conflict. If participation in the intifada 
and collective suffering under the occupation had become the primary 
modes for conceptualizing Palestinian identity, then for many Palestinian 
Jordanians the intifada pushed them outside of the national imaginary. 
Unlike those in the territories participating in protests and boycotts and 
engaging the Israeli military in the streets, Palestinians in Jordan went 
about their daily lives, following the intifada via television, radio, and the 
newspaper. Left with only performative action to engage the uprising, 
many chose to articulate their sense of Palestinian identity through social 
performance and activism, demonstrations, protests, concerts, and public 
speeches. In the process fundamental notions of Palestinian nationalism, 
identity, and resistance were subjected to resignification. “Resistance” 
took on a very different meaning, based in local power dynamics. To re-
sist meant to lend support, to campaign, to raise money, or to otherwise 
lobby the Jordanian government for a more active engagement in Pales-
tinian issues. For others resistance meant remembering, preserving, and 
commemorating Palestinian culture and practice.
perForming the intiFada in exile
Initially the intifada was well supported in both Palestinian Jordanian 
and Jordanian communities. Solidarity campaigns, boycotts, demonstra-
tions, and other modes of political activism were widespread within the 
refugee camps and predominantly Palestinian Jordanian cities (Zarqa, 
Irbid, Amman), but also in native Jordanian cities (Karak, Ramtha, Salt). 
Despite such widespread support, the mukhabarāt continued to rigor-
ously police public demonstrations. Interrogation, surveillance, arrest, 
and harassment were all common tools for maintaining quiet on the sub-
urban streets of Amman as well as in the twisted alleys of the Husseini, 
Wahdat, and al- Baqaʿ refugee camps. In these camps, police action was 
most severe, and demonstrations (planned or spontaneous) were met 
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with riot police, batons, tear gas, and mass arrest. In Amman the severity 
of violence against protestors depended on the organization sponsoring 
the event, its planned route and location, and the relationship between the 
protest organizers and the local authorities. Certain professional unions, 
such as the syndicates for lawyers and engineers, were treated differently 
than others depending on their abilities to conciliate local authorities. 
Others less fortunate, those sponsored by the refugee camps, were relent-
lessly harassed for even the slightest city ordinance infraction.
Baladna, over the course of its various engagements with the state and 
widely popular recordings, had developed a reputation as the foremost 
Palestinian protest ensemble in Jordan. Kamal Khalil’s early experiences 
with the mukhabarāt afforded him a great deal of credibility among the 
lower- class camp dwellers. Coupled with high- profile performances on 
the main stages at Jerash, Baladna grew to be equally popular among the 
suburban/cosmopolitan middle classes of lawyers, doctors, and engi-
neers. Patronage from both groups proved instrumental in bringing the 
ensemble into the mainstream. Popular support for Baladna in the camps 
meant continued performances at the various youth clubs and social or-
ganizations therein. Likewise support in the upwardly mobile middle 
classes drew opportunities from the professional unions, syndicates, and 
other high- powered quasi- political organizations. Baladna was one of the 
few groups equally suited to performing in both the camps and the sub-
urbs.
With each performance the group would tailor its set list to accommo-
date the aesthetic dispositions of its specific audience. In the camps, Ba-
ladna stuck to straight shaʿbī dabke tunes, folk songs, and reconditioned 
wedding songs. In these performances it was essential for the group to 
get the people dancing, clapping, and singing along. Therefore they cre-
ated a performance environment more conducive to participatory music 
making reminiscent of traditional life- cycle celebrations. The songs were 
rhythmically driven, cyclically structured dance pieces with short respon-
sorial refrains and simple melodies. In the suburbs and the syndicates Ba-
ladna challenged the audience through more thought- provoking political 
commentary, instrumental compositions, and martial hymns. Among the 
cosmopolitan middle class Baladna performed more presentational com-
positions emphasizing poetic contrast, thick metaphorical and historical 
references, and more complex instrumental forms and structures. In a 
theater performing in front of a seated audience of political leaders, the 
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goal was not to “get them dancing,” but rather to “get them thinking,” as 
Kamal explained.
There were, however, a series of public laws and ordinances in place 
governing by what forms, and under what circumstances, support for the 
intifada could be expressed. So, for example, public support for the inti-
fada was acceptable as long as the event made no mention of associated 
political entities: the plo, Arafat, Jordanian state administrators, or the 
king himself. Signs of Palestinian nationalism and resistance were equally 
controlled. Flags, pictures, posters, and other paraphernalia had to con-
form to Jordanian state policies. It was acceptable to show support for the 
Palestinian people, but it had to be done from a position of loyalty to Jor-
dan and the Hashemite crown. Any transgression of these rules could be 
met with serious consequences to be meted out by the police or mukha-
barāt.
For Baladna the navigation of these ordinances required that their 
presence be explicitly explained in advance to the local authorities. The 
government placed a number of restrictions on the group and sent “rep-
resentatives” to speak with Kamal about his activities on several occa-
sions. Routine harassment and other obstacles limited the visibility of the 
group on the streets. Most effective among these were stiff bureaucracies, 
licensing offices, permits, and other official documents necessary to per-
form music in public.
They [the mukhabarāt] started bothering us, narrowing the paths 
in front of the political groups’ performances. Putting obstacles in 
front of the group. It was impossible to get permits for the perfor-
mances. So, the issue now has moved to being more like political 
operations laws and internal ruling systems, internal policies. If 
you want to sing here, you can sing here, in the frame of some pro-
grams for supporting the intifada. This intifada support committee 
had the right to do any activity, but for supporting the intifada only. 
So that was our window to the world. That was our way out. So we 
could sing for the intifada demonstrations, but if Nadi al- Wahdat 
or Baqaʿ club [refugee camp youth clubs] or Sahib club or Karak 
club wanted to arrange a concert, it was impossible, even if the 
mayor wanted it. So they started fighting us from this side.
Despite these obstacles formal (permits, licenses, bureaucracy) and in-
formal (harassment, surveillance, and intimidation), Baladna continued 
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performing in both sanctioned and unsanctioned events throughout the 
kingdom.
You cannot count how many concerts we played. Sometime we 
used to have two concerts in two places in one day. One afternoon 
in seventh circle [suburban West Amman], and that night in Ram-
tha [a small transit community near the Syrian border]. The whole 
country. Mafraq, Irbid, Karak, Aqaba, Tafileh [all predominantly 
Trans-Jordanian cities]. Only Maʿan we didn’t sing in.27 But from 
Tafila to Ramtha, Irbid, and all in between. At that time the group 
was ʿūd, percussion, voices, and no dancers. The people in the 
crowds used to be the dancers. Baladna was then made up of just 
my family, my wife with me, and my brothers, and my cousin.
As a site for communal interaction, political activism, and the asser-
tion of counterhegemonic ideology, music performances such as these 
were a powerful tool in the establishment and development of Palestinian 
nationalism in exile. Drawing on a collective musical folklore of songs, 
dances, and poetry, these performances provided social spaces where 
national identities could be embodied, performed, acted out. In perfor-
mance participants could say onstage what could never be said publicly 
on the streets or in the media. Lyricist Ibrahim Nasrallah recalled that 
within these concerts, “we were free to be Palestinian without fear or 
shame.” “We could chastise political leaders [except for the king], debate 
issues, and proudly proclaim our Palestinian identity.” Simply performing 
Palestinian music and dance became an act of subversion against a Jor-
danian monarchy that demanded loyalty and quiet in the streets.
Kamal Khalil elaborated, “in our songs we were talking about what was 
happening day to day, we wanted to tell the people what was going on, and 
make them feel as if they were there on the streets, too, with their fami-
lies.” Couched within these performances, participants could publicly ex-
press their support for the uprising, raise money for family members in 
the territories, and uplift the spirits of those wishing they could do more 
to help the cause. Widely known Palestinian folk songs reset with resis-
tance poetry created powerful associations of time and place capable of 
bridging the divide between those in exile and those under occupation. 
In performing these folk songs participants actively engaged in collective 
memory making, both in response to and as a symptom of the rupture 
between Palestinian communities. Perhaps most importantly, these per-
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formative acts of “resistance” served to engender feelings of intense soli-
darity, enabling those witnessing the intifada from afar to feel as though 
they were struggling alongside those demonstrating in the territories.
Through politicized texts and imagery Baladna’s songs described in 
detail the hardships of life under occupation and in exile, but they also 
prescribed how a new generation of Palestinian youth should interpret 
and act on their experiences of political dispossession. In this way, Ba-
ladna contributed to a narrative of resistance whereby Palestinians in 
diaspora were afforded a performative social space for engaging Israeli 
checkpoints, roadblocks, tanks, and bulldozers in absentia. They could 
communicate their experiences of conflict, express widespread feelings 
of disorientation at their shifting political realities, and create dialogue 
in the assertion and representation of the Palestinian nation. These songs 
opened up social spaces for dialogue, spaces where various images, texts, 
and ideas could be confronted and reconfigured into the myths and nar-
ratives of a new Palestinian national identity.
Baladna’s performances revealed how music directly indexed a sense 
of locality, a sociorelational construction of community or solidarity, with 
the people and places most affected by the struggle. Such locality emerged 
not so much from the free movement of texts and ideas, but rather in 
response to conflicting assertions and competing claims of authority. 
Palestinians in Jordan faced an ideational crisis, negotiating a position 
of displacement and ambiguity in their lives. Singing the songs of Ba-
ladna aided in negotiating this crisis. For many, attending performances 
of Palestinian resistance song engendered profound feelings of solidarity. 
Others were motivated through song to pursue formal means of political 
activism (boycotts, charity drives, fund- raising). But it would seem that 
the true power of this music lay in its capacity to ameliorate the distances 
that separated Palestinian communities. Singing and dancing in support 
of the intifada enabled an emotional transference whereby Palestinians 
in Jordan might feel connected to the uprising, somehow contributing 
to its goals of civil disobedience. Music became a performative means of 
resisting in absentia, a means of connecting and identifying with those 
in the territories. Ultimately such acts of performative resistance allowed 
Palestinians in Jordan to pursue their everyday lives as Jordanian citizens 
feeling as though they had done something for the cause.
Essentially, performances of protest song mediated spatial, political, 
and cultural relationships with the uprising. On the front lines of Gaza, 
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Ramallah, Nablus, and Jerusalem, stone- throwing youth called for mass 
demonstrations and sacrifice against the occupation. In Amman, the Jor-
danian government (and to an extent the plo) pleaded for patience and 
a return to negotiations, exerting considerable resources to quiet Pales-
tinian dissent. Local Palestinian Jordanians were then left to navigate the 
highly contested middle ground. The absence of any real option for Pal-
estinian organizing under the repressive Jordanian regime made cultural 
preservation and performance particularly apt sites for articulating soli-
darity with the intifada. The following chapter seeks to better understand 
the performance- as- resistance dilemma faced by Palestinians in exile.
7
imprisonment and exile
Negotiating Power and Resistance in Palestinian Protest Song
 “Dawla”
Over Baladna’s history, several of its songs managed to make their way 
into the popular vernacular of Palestinian resistance music. In some 
cases, either in lyric or melodic device, songs became so popular that they 
took on a life of their own. “Laya wa Laya” was an example of a power-
ful resistance song using the common repertory of Palestinian folklore. 
“ Aʿla Jidaʿ Zaytuna” revived a famous poem by Tawfiq al- Ziyad, giving it 
new life in popular melody. In other cases, songs touched the community 
through their engagement with salient sociopolitical issues of the time. 
“Aghniyat Hubb li- Shahid al- Karak” inscribed itself into the national 
imaginary through its appeal for bridging Palestinian- Jordanian politi-
cal difference. It served as a message of reconciliation, cooperation, and 
collective struggle against colonialism and foreign domination. Of all of 
the songs in the Baladna catalogue, however, there is one that reached a 
level of fame and notoriety unlike any other. In melody, text, and socio-
political content, this song captured the political moment in such a way 
that it has now taken on new meaning among activists as an anthem of 
social protest.
Over the years, “Dawla” (State/country) has come to define Baladna 
as a group and Kamal Khalil as a performer. It is the climax of any per-
formance and routinely elicits multiple ovations and calls for repetition. 
The text is based on a poem by Tawfiq al- Ziyad, and the melody itself was 
composed by former Baladna member Ziyad Mazid.1 In terms of its re-
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lationship with the established repertory of Palestinian resistance song, 
“Dawla” doesn’t seem to fit the mold. Its melody and rhythms are not 
based on Palestinian folklore. Its text is not particularly well known in 
comparison to al- Ziyad’s other work, nor does it engage the established 
discourse of nationalist imagery and metaphor. Likewise its political 
message is equally difficult to define; it is explicitly neither nationalist, 
Islamist, nor socialist, nor does it specify exactly who is its primary tar-
get. Moreover the popularity of “Dawla” has grown despite the fact that it 
was not included on either of Baladna’s two studio recordings. Remark-
ably, over the course of twenty years it has remained famous primarily 
through popular memory and live performance. By all accounts what sets 
this song apart from the standard repertory of Palestinian protest song is 
that it takes aim at a very different target, the Arab state itself.
By definition, the word dawla has several important meanings. First 
and foremost, it means the state and usually represents the political 
entity of the state apart from its cultural or national content. Addition-
ally, dawla is a political title often given to prime ministers, presidents, or 
high- ranking government officials (such as dawla ra īʾs al- ḥakūma [His 
Excellency the Prime Minister]). But as James Scott has written in his 
work on the subscripts of power discourses, such forms of ceremonial re-
spect and title are easy prey for satirists, dissenters, and resistant voices.2 
In this song, the word dawla carries with it a very different accusative tim-
bre and meaning. In Palestinian dialect the word dawl (from hadawl) is a 
demonstrative plural pronoun (as in the phrase “these books are heavy” 
[hadawl kutb thaqīl]). As Kamal repeats over and over the words “Dawla! 
Dawla! Dawla!” he is in effect saying two very different things. The most 
obvious meaning, “State! State! State!” (or “His Excellency”), is parlayed 
by a demonstrative subtext pointing toward state, empire, power, title, and 
privilege. In subterfuge Khalil points an accusative finger at the state by 
singing, “These officials! These states! These empires!” He salutes country 
and state tongue in cheek, impugning the dark side of power, corruption, 
hypocrisy, and deception. With each utterance, dawla both signifies the 
state and becomes a powerful epithet hurled at the state, its duplicity, and 
its privilege.
In performance “Dawla” is sung in call- and- response style by the per-
former and audience. Following each line the crowd repeatedly answers 
the accusations with the word dawla! The interaction between singer and 
audience creates an environment similar to a protest march or demon-
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stration and further elicits a commanding participatory sound environ-
ment (evia 14- s4997).3 Kamal begins by singing the refrain solo:
State State State . . . (State!)
State that sold my land . . . (State!)
State that ripped to shreds my dignity . . . (State!)
State State State . . . Oh My Eyes!
The second half of the refrain is a descending melodic sequence sung 
on the vocable “Ohh.” Throughout this section Kamal strums a block 
chordal (that is, homophonic) accompaniment on the beat, in quarter 
notes. Although this is an uncharacteristic method of ʿūd playing in Pal-
estinian song, Kamal routinely uses this technique to fill out the sound, to 
substitute for a missing percussionist, or to reinforce rhythmic structure. 
The strict 2/4 meter is carried through the verse with the crowds routinely 
clapping on the beat (see example 7.1).
State that sold my land . . . (State!)
State that ripped to shreds my dignity . . . (State!)
State that is selling the Arab oil so that they can drink Coca- Cola
example 7.1. ✹ “Dawla.” Transcription from author’s field notes.
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They rode in the saddle . . . (State!)
They put their hands in the saddlebag . . . (State!)
They said, “Shut Up! Do not even breathe for the sake of national 
security.”
And God provided for them . . . (State!)
And God entitles them . . . (State!)
The tighter the rope is stretched to imprison us, the easier it will be 
for that rope to fall on the heads of the State.
For Kamal there is sweet redemption in singing “Dawla” before a 
screaming, enthusiastic crowd. With each line he lashes out, denounces, 
and attacks Arab governments who have done little to better the lives 
of their citizens and who silence voices of popular dissent. He calls out 
the hypocrisy of Arab rulers who sell “Arab oil so they can drink Coca 
Cola.” “Dawla” gives public voice to a political problem often kept private, 
talked of only in hushed tones: the corruption of the state as it steals from 
the people. In the lines “They rode in the saddle, and put their hands in 
the saddle bag,” “Dawla” refers to a well- known Palestinian proverb that 
warns of “the man you allow to ride with you and yet still puts his hands 
in the saddle bag to rob you.”
The penultimate stanza of the song further traces the crimes of a cor-
rupt Arab leadership that has sold out their people’s interests for Western 
merchandise, stolen from the people’s resources, and silenced their voices 
for the sake of national security. The turn of meaning on the word dawla 
is extended further in the lines, “They said, ‘Shut Up! Don’t even breathe 
for the sake of national security.’” Here the lyrics could equally be trans-
lated as “Don’t even breathe for the sake of His Majesty’s security.” The 
constant rub of meaning between the state as structure and the state as 
individual propels the satiric irony at the root of this song.
As one who has spent his life singing songs for Palestinian self- 
determination, and suffered mightily for it, Kamal Khalil captures a sense 
of authenticity among his audience whenever he sings “Dawla.” For the 
sake of national security, he has lived his life in fear of the state and its 
apparatuses of social control. He has been tortured, beaten, and harassed 
for much of his adult life, and in singing “Dawla” he exacts his revenge. 
On that stage, at that moment, he is in control, he is in power, able to re-
lease or exorcise his demons in a public display of outrage and shame for 
what his government has done to him and his people.
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The final stanza provides the harshest and most volatile criticism of the 
state. In it a warning is given to those in power: although God has granted 
these rulers their power, they must remember that their ultimate respon-
sibility is to the people, for “the tighter the rope is stretched to imprison 
us [in a kind of tug of war], the easier it will be for that rope to fall on the 
heads of the State.” Statements such as these carry with them extreme 
consequences in the Arab world. Popular dissent and public criticism of 
government officials, let alone royal families, carry with them steep conse-
quences. Singing such a powerful song in a public performance, demon-
stration, or other political event sends a very clear message, especially in 
Jordan, where the monarchy has constructed its legitimacy to lead based 
on its holy lineage to the Prophet and its self- proclaimed status as protec-
tor of the great holy sites in Palestine. To cite holy entitlement here carries 
a strong association with the Hashemite crown. What is more, when 
Kamal sings of the rope “falling on the heads” (ra īʾs al- dawla) of the state, 
he explicitly refers to both King Hussein and Yasser Arafat, both of whom 
adopted the formal title al- ra īʾs al- dawla (head of state). This ambiguity 
is perhaps his saving grace. Remaining unclear, Kamal can get away with 
singing this song because its primary target is intentionally unspecified.
The popularity of this song among the people can be explained in sev-
eral ways. First, the energetic call- and- response structure of “Dawla” 
creates a level of participatory interaction between singer and audience 
highly conducive to social protest. Second, the lyrics speak to an issue 
that is rarely broached publicly even in the discourse of Palestinian re-
sistance. As demonstrated in the propagandist work of al- Markaziya, al- 
Aʿshiqin, and hundreds of other groups, blind nationalist tropes often lose 
their meaning through continued repetition in song, poetry, and litera-
ture. “Dawla” shies away from convention and calls out a new enemy, 
the state itself. The underlying question posed is: What good is libera-
tion or self- determination when Palestinians have suffered under Arab 
as well as Israeli domination? In this example, the state in question is 
unspecified, giving the song a more flexible interpretation, expanding its 
political reach and insulating its performance from government scrutiny. 
Third, the catchy melody, pounding rhythms, and acrobatic singing style 
of “Dawla” give it a power and resonance unlike other political songs. In 
performance “Dawla” lends itself to protests and demonstrations, by en-
abling constant and sustained participatory interaction between artists 
and audience.
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Imprisonment and Exile
Among activists and shabāb (youth) on the streets, Baladna’s second major 
recording was eagerly anticipated. With Ibrahim Nasrallah the group had 
composed over seventy different songs and struggled with the decision 
of what to include on their next cassette. Baladna’s first studio recording 
had an initial printing of two thousand copies, all of which were sold in 
a matter of weeks. The group fully understood that once the cassette was 
released they had little control over its reproduction and dissemination. 
Kamal had hoped that the cassette would circulate freely and was more 
content with his music being heard than with profiting from its sale and 
reproduction. Given that his music circulated outside the formal market-
place, relying on bootlegs and kiosks for distribution, profits from these 
recordings would have been virtually impossible to collect. Though the 
songs on the first cassette were never heard via mainstream public media 
(radio, television), cheap copies of the cassette spread quickly. Passing 
taxis and buses could be heard blaring the cassette at its captive passen-
gers, and street- side kiosks would play the cassette to attract customers. 
For Kamal, the cassette had achieved its goal of getting his message out 
to the people.
The second studio cassette promised to be equally popular. Through 
sales of the initial printing and private donations Kamal was able to raise 
enough funds to cover recording and production costs for the second 
cassette. The tape was made in the fall of 1988, at a time when the on-
going intifada had nearly reached its first anniversary. The first cassette 
had generated enough interest for Baladna to receive several substantial 
sponsorships. These local collections allowed Kamal and the rest of the 
group to quit their day jobs as laborers and to focus completely on com-
posing, rehearsing, and recording their music. Within weeks word began 
to spread that the cassette was in preproduction, provoking the interest 
of the secret police.
Once final preparations for the cassette were made, Kamal was called 
in once again to appear before the director of the mukhabarāt for “ques-
tioning.” Having experienced such questioning before, Kamal refused to 
appear and instead invited the director over to his house for coffee. The 
following day, while Kamal was rehearsing with the rest of the group, a 
red sedan pulled up to the gate in front of his home. Four plainclothes 
agents then took Kamal into custody on charges of illegal political activity. 
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The agents placed Kamal in handcuffs and confiscated the group’s musical 
instruments and sound equipment. The laws against participation in non-
sanctioned political organizations had been in effect since the mid- 1950s. 
Since that time any political activity, except for the activities of the local 
chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood or Islamic Action Front (iaF), was 
illegal. Crimes of participation in any other political organization were 
used as a blanket charge against virtually any known activist, intellectual, 
journalist, or subversive daring enough to challenge government policies.
I was prepared for what was coming. I knew that eventually they 
would come and pick me up. When you go into this [type of work] 
you know that there will be problems, you know that this could 
happen. It will not surprise you when it does happen, and this 
makes it a little easier. . . .
I did one hundred days exactly in a solitary cell in the mukha-
barāt building and one year in general prison. It was very hard. . . .
After one hundred days in solitary confinement by myself, they 
called me in to the interrogation room, and told me I had two 
choices. Either I go to jail for 4 years or go home now on one con-
dition. All they needed was just one thing from me. [They told 
me,] “You don’t have to come here to tell us about your friends 
what they say and what they do, just give us a phone call and you 
are free.” And they wanted from me just one call, not every week, 
they just wanted one call. I chose the four years.
They told me from the first day, it wasn’t because I was singing, 
they were accusing me of participating in illegal political parties 
that were against the government. Parties that wanted to demolish 
the regime . . . but during the investigation they never mentioned 
that they wanted me to stop singing, instead they only wanted to 
control me. . . .
As an example for all the people, they wanted me to work for 
them. They told me to “just go out and go to your activities, but 
give us a call . . . tell us what we want.”
They didn’t want the information from me. They only wanted 
me to call them one time so they could record the call, and tell 
people that I was working with them. They did this with many 
other people. They chose me because they knew who I was, and be-
cause everybody knew about me and my music. They didn’t get any 
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information about people from me, because they knew they could 
get all the information they wanted from their other sources. The 
only thing they wanted was to demolish my reputation, to destroy 
me. Then no one would come to hear me sing. But after the courts, 
and the prison in Swaqa, there were no questions after that. . . .
Here [in Jordan] the only way they can try and stop you is to 
corrupt you. They put you into a bad situation, and then use that 
information to control you. This is true everywhere. . . . They want 
to own you, and so they try to find out how they can get you to 
make mistakes, then they use that against you. It is the classic ap-
proach.
And this is what they tried to do with me when they arrested 
me. In the first intifada there were people in the streets after our 
concerts. If Baladna played a concert you were guaranteed to have 
hundreds, maybe thousands, of chanting people in the streets. Now 
how could they stop this? Even if they put me in jail they could not 
stop this. I told you we played in that place that had 1,800 seats, but 
when I sang there we had 3,000 people show up on a snowy day. 
When I was in jail and we sang in that same place we had 7,000 
people come. So they couldn’t stop the people from hearing my 
songs even if I was in jail. My wife, my cousin, my brother were 
singing and they had 7,000 people there. So they cannot stop this 
by putting me in jail. And they cannot stop this even by killing me. 
So what can they do?
They have to kill me alive. If they take my reputation, they take 
my power away. This is your hero.
During the first one hundred days of Kamal’s imprisonment he was 
subjected to various forms of torture, including rigorous interrogation, 
sleep deprivation, beatings, starvation, and other means of both physical 
and psychological abuse. This was the most difficult time in Kamal’s life, 
and in remembering he often showed visible signs of stress, anger, sad-
ness, and rage. In spite of our friendship, there were many things Kamal 
refused to talk about. For the sake of his own modesty he would rarely 
go into specifics about the methods and means of his torture. From testi-
monies recorded in interviews with other musicians active in protests at 
this time, it is known that it was common for political prisoners to be tor-
tured for weeks after their initial detainment by a variety of implements. 
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Electricity, water, fire, mutilation, and blunt force trauma were commonly 
cited as tools of physical torture, while humiliation, fear, and sensory dis-
orientation were the tools of psychological torture.4 Several musicians 
interviewed during this study related similar experiences of mistreatment 
in both Jordanian and Israeli prisons. For Kamal, however, the worst form 
of torture he encountered was the betrayal he felt knowing that his cap-
tors, his torturers, were not Israeli or American soldiers but instead were 
Arab Muslims like him.
After the one hundred days I was in the general mukhabarāt prison 
[Swaqa] for one year.5 There was a trial. I went to the courts, and 
they gave the lawyer a copy of the charges. He tried to read it, and 
the judge said, “there is no need; just give it to us.”
And after one month they came back and told me that I was 
sentenced to four years. I was ready for that, because when they 
took me from the house I told my wife, I will see you in four years. 
I knew from experience that four years was the usual sentence for 
this kind of thing.
After the first one hundred days, life in Swaqa began to slow down into 
normal routines. And with so much time spent in solitary confinement, 
it wasn’t long before Kamal began to feel the need to compose and sing 
again. He needed something in his life to make the time pass easier. Music 
had always been his mode of expression and a way to make meaning in 
his life. Especially while imprisoned he sought to compose songs reflect-
ing his experiences. For a political prisoner like Kamal, however, it was 
extremely difficult not only to compose but also to get his compositions 
out to the people.
The political prisoners were aside from the others. We had special 
treatment because they wanted to spy on us everyday. They didn’t 
have to do this with the other criminals in the prison. They used 
to bother our visitors, my wife, our families. They used to search 
them. They didn’t search for drugs or anything else, but for a piece 
of paper or information. They didn’t want me to get any songs from 
outside, but at that time we had the right to read the newspapers. 
So my friend [Ibrahim Nasrallah] used to put his poetry in the 
newspaper. And it was very easy for me to get the lyrics. Whenever 
he would write anything, he used to work as a reporter, he would 
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put it in the newspaper. And the next day I would see it. And this 
is what we did with many songs. I wrote more than five songs in 
prison. One for Tawfiq al- Ziyad, one for Mahmoud Darwish, two 
for Ibrahim [Nasrallah], and one for another guy who used to 
be with us in prison.6 He used to write inside. So there were five 
songs . . .
Life in Swaqa brought Kamal to his physical and emotional limits. The 
abuse he suffered at the hands of the mukhabarāt was only one aspect of 
the prison experience. Living in Swaqa he constantly feared for the safety 
of his family, never knowing if the government might seek retribution 
against his children. Furthermore he began to doubt whether spending 
his life singing in support of Palestinian liberation was worth the conse-
quences. Kamal worried that his efforts would never be enough and that 
he and his family would never be able to return to Taiba. Throughout his 
incarceration, however, there was one thought that provided solace.
The reward you get is the message. When you can get your mes-
sage out to the people, when your message is reaching people you 
get a great reward. But if you want money or fame, this will make 
the time in jail very hard. To look for fame in jail is a very hard way 
to spend the time. I was looking only to get out my message, and 
I knew that even in prison my message was being heard; this was 
enough. And it made the time in jail go much easier. . . .
So, the song must be the target. And this is a big difference. If 
the song is your target, then you will do anything to get it to the 
people, but if you have targets through the song [fame, money, ac-
claim], it will not reach the target. In prison it didn’t take me too 
long to find this out.
For Kamal, knowing that Palestinians (both in Jordan and beyond) 
were singing his melodies on the streets meant that his suffering in prison 
was not in vain. To write a song carrying a message of liberation was a 
powerful means for Kamal to situate himself in relation to the nation and 
the struggle. In song he knew that he mattered and that his work would 
take on a life of its own, regardless of whatever befell him.
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Palestinian Folklore Day 1989
As a well- known musician Kamal found support among many of his fel-
low inmates. Even in prison these political prisoners tried to maintain 
many of their usual practices and relationships with the outside world. 
Political affiliations, village, family, and ḥamūla ties remained an impor-
tant means for the prisoners to survive their incarceration. Palestinian 
food, poetry (shaʿr), stories (ḥakayāt), and songs (aghānīyāt) were shared 
and traded among the inmates as treasures. National holidays such as al- 
nakba, al- naksa, or Palestinian Folklore Day were commemorated inside 
the prison’s walls. At these times Kamal was often called on to sing songs 
to the other prisoners to lighten their spirits or pass the time. If done 
quietly and beyond earshot of the prison administration, such songs were 
tolerated, but if the music drew enough attention there were severe con-
sequences. In July 1989 several prisoners decided to celebrate the annual 
Palestinian Folklore Day by assembling as many of the inmates as possible 
to sing songs and to dance the dabke. The singing and dancing caused 
alarm among the prison staff, and the warden was called in to dispel the 
crowds. As Kamal was in the center of the dabke line, leading the celebra-
tion, he was the first to be taken into the director’s office for questioning.
I was sitting in the office of the director [of the jail], it was July 
the first, Palestinian Folklore Day, we had arranged a party inside 
and we started singing folk songs, so they came and took me. And 
while I was waiting for the director to come in to question me, 
there was a small television sitting beside his desk. On the tv they 
were showing some promotional commercials for the upcoming 
Jerash Festival, they were showing past concerts from the last festi-
vals, it was like an ad. . . . There were about two seconds that I ap-
peared with my ʿūd in that ad.
And then the officer came in and said, “Who is he?”
So someone else told him, “This is the artist from the political 
group.”
And he was picking on me, he says, “So you are an artist?”
I said, “Yes.”
“Funny, we never see you on tv.”
At that moment I was on tv. And I said, “Oh, that’s me,” pointing 
at the tv in the director’s office.
210 ✹ Imprisonment and Exile
He sent me back. I should have gone to the cell [solitary con-
finement] for at least two weeks, but he sent me back. It was like 
I spit in his face or something like that. He was picking on me, 
“oh so you’re an artist, how come we never see you on tv?” And 
it was just three seconds. But I think God was the director of that 
tv ad to show me at that exact time. I think if somebody was try-
ing to arrange it, he couldn’t do it. To get it exactly on tv at that 
moment. . . . They threw me back into my cell without any further 
punishment, when I knew that I should have been put in solitary 
for singing those songs. It was incredible. I couldn’t stop thinking 
about the whole situation . . . laughing.
Meanwhile the remaining members of Baladna continued to perform 
throughout Kamal’s incarceration. At each performance the crowds would 
chant for Kamal to be released, and collections were made for his legal de-
fense and future recordings. These events were predominantly sponsored 
by the local refugee camps and other cultural organizations for whom he 
had performed before. To this day Kamal is convinced that his time spent 
in prison did more to help the group than to hurt it. Former members 
of the ensemble noticed an upsurge in attendance at their performances 
after Kamal was arrested. “And the result was for them [the Jordanian au-
thorities] the opposite. They tried to stop me from singing. They tried to 
stop my voice, but they only enlarged it. The people all knew that I was 
in prison, and they all wanted to help, so they came out to the concerts.”
Riots, Liberalization, and Parliamentary Elections
While Kamal was serving his time in Swaqa, a public debate was raging 
on the streets of Jordan regarding the king’s recent disengagement from 
the West Bank, the ongoing intifada, and mass economic and political 
liberalization policies. Following the outbreak of the intifada in Decem-
ber 1987, regional power dynamics shifted, requiring King Hussein to re-
evaluate his relationship with the Palestinian issue. Although Jordan had 
once ruled the West Bank, extending legal, administrative, and financial 
services to the territories, the intifada had proven that such leadership 
was no longer tenable. Coupled with intense domestic pressures to “Jor-
danize” the state, the king took a series of strategic measures to sever all 
links with the territories, resulting in formal disengagement. At the same 
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time structural adjustments and a debt- rescheduling program directed by 
the International Monetary Fund (imF) forced the king to remove several 
long- standing food and energy subsidies, creating unexpected financial 
hardships throughout the kingdom.7 Riots eventually broke out in the 
southern city of Maʿan, where demonstrators burned down government 
offices and a local bank.8 In response to the riots the king opted to take a 
new course of action. Rather than pursue the traditional model of state 
repression, curbing free speech, and otherwise limiting public freedoms, 
the king chose to placate the demonstrating masses through political lib-
eralization and the expansion of civil liberties. It is worth noting that the 
statewide demonstrations denouncing the king’s structural adjustment 
projects were predominantly among the native Jordanian community, the 
king’s traditional power base. For the king to open up a political dialogue 
with these demonstrators rather than to encourage state repression is 
quite telling. Historically when Palestinian Jordanians took to the streets 
to protest state policy, they were met with harsh police brutality. When 
the banī al- bilād (sons of the nation) did likewise in 1989, the regime had 
a very different reaction.
In response to the upheaval the king began a widespread process of 
democratization, including new elections, expanded press freedoms, and 
the encouragement of active political participation. Analyses of the “1989 
Bread Riots” often state that when “the people asked for bread the regime 
gave them democracy.”9 Marc Lynch has offered a different, and I believe, 
more convincing analysis. In taking to the streets in April 1989, Jorda-
nians were making a profound political statement reflecting a national 
crisis not of economic restructuring but of identity. The restrictions on 
public freedoms over the previous years had served to virtually sever all 
ties of communication between the people and the state, creating “the 
absence of a national public sphere within which new identities could 
be secured.”10 Formal disengagement from the West Bank and the on-
going intifada brought a great deal of anxiety and uncertainty. Jordanians 
desperately needed a viable public sphere from which to negotiate such 
drastic changes in their national goals and interests.11 In fact a 1992 sur-
vey of popular opinion found that 78 percent of those questioned believed 
that the riots were a result of the absence of press freedoms, 81 percent 
cited the absence of a representative parliament, and 89 percent recog-
nized an absence of dialogue between citizens and the government. Eco-
nomic interests alone, it seems, could not have been solely responsible 
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for the 1989 riots. However, the subsequent opening of the public sphere 
to debate and dialogue did not bring about the kind of democracy the 
people had originally envisioned. Although the state made considerable 
advances toward liberalization, it retained a tight control over all branches 
of government and the press. The lasting effect of the riots was felt in its 
effect on how Jordanians began to conceptualize democracy as an impor-
tant, if not essential, state interest.
release From prison and a return to ruseiFa
With the ongoing project of political liberalization taking place, including 
the establishment and active fostering of political debate through formal 
political parties and organizations, the Jordanian public sphere under-
went considerable change. Participation in state politics was legalized and 
encouraged. Parliament was revived, and elections were scheduled for the 
fall of 1989. Democracy gripped the kingdom, and the cities were practi-
cally wallpapered with campaign posters, flyers, and pronouncements of 
various slogans and ideology. Formal measures of state repression were 
curbed, and many political prisoners being held for activities that were 
no longer illegal were given early release or commuted sentences. It made 
little sense for the king to continue holding political prisoners on crimes 
of political activities when, following the elections of 1989, such activities 
were being actively encouraged.
On February 17, 1990, one of Jordan’s daily newspapers announced 
such an amnesty in a news story on the front page.12 Buried among the 
twenty- seven names of those released (on page 18) was one Kamal Khalil 
Salah Ibrahim. No information was given about the prisoners, save for 
one prominent Baʿthist leader. Their crimes were described as “those 
whose work in politics was clear, or whose work was linked to criminal 
activity.” In fact only one of Jordan’s three daily newspapers, al- Dustūr 
(the Constitution), even bothered to run the story at all. Such a small in-
significant decision by the royal court had an immeasurable effect on the 
life of at least one of those listed and his family forever.
For Kamal the news of his release was a welcome surprise. Although 
he had fully expected to serve out the remainder of his four- year sentence, 
to be told that he was given an early release by royal amnesty was “like a 
miracle.” Processing his final release papers, Kamal retrieved his original 
possessions: clothing, wallet, passport, and ḥuwīya (identity card). Weeks 
later, after inquiring about the status of his confiscated instruments, he 
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was told that they were available for him to collect from the mukhabarāt 
headquarters. Still recovering from the ordeal and understandably un-
easy about returning to Swaqa, Kamal asked that his instruments be de-
livered to his house. Within two days a familiar- looking red sedan pulled 
up, driven by the same agent who had originally arrested Kamal nearly 
two years prior. For Kamal to see the same agent driving the same car to 
return his instruments proved a fitting end to his life as a political pris-
oner. The agent remembered Kamal and told him that his instruments 
had been held and displayed in the director’s office as a trophy of sorts. 
Visiting officials or other invited guests were shown the instruments as 
tokens of the director’s reach and authority. “These are the weapons of the 
artist Kamal Khalil,” he often boasted. When the agent was instructed to 
return the instruments to their original owner, he removed them from the 
office much to the dismay and frustration of the director himself.
Upon his release from Swaqa, Kamal reunited with his family, friends, 
community, and bandmates as a folk hero. Crowds gathered around his 
Ruseifa home to welcome him, and offers for performances rolled in for 
the now- complete Baladna to return to the stage. These first few perfor-
mances drew crowds the likes of which the group had not yet seen. Venues 
were filled to capacity while the overflow stood outside trying to get in. 
Within weeks plans were made for a small tour through Europe and the 
United States later that fall. From September to December 1990 Baladna 
toured through Germany and the United States, performing in twenty dif-
ferent cities in eighty days.
People respected me much more when I got out of prison; they 
treated me very differently because they knew that I could not be 
bought, that I could not be corrupted. They treated me as a hero. 
When the election started, whoever wanted to bring people to lis-
ten to them to give them his message or program for the elections, 
he wanted me to sing at his party. Because if I came to his party 
he would get all of the people coming to see him. And if there was 
an ad for him, that Baladna is singing at his party, then the people 
knew that he was a good person or a clean person.
Baladna was in high demand to perform for various Palestinian Jor-
danian candidates, political parties, and professional organizations cam-
paigning for the upcoming elections. Nightly performances were sched-
uled throughout the kingdom. Kamal’s reputation for steadfastness and 
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determination afforded a degree of credibility to whomever he publicly 
supported. For these reasons Kamal was quite particular about for whom 
and under what circumstances he would sing. Personally and privately he 
believed in the pFlp and its locally affiliated institutions. But throughout 
the election years he was careful not to become formally identified with 
any political party. He would insist that there be no banners or flags indi-
cating party affiliation on the stage while he performed. For Kamal it was 
essential that his music stand independently of any one political platform, 
lest he be dismissed as a mere propagandist.
Oslo, Wadi Aʿrba, and the Peace Process
The news of an agreement between the plo and Israel in September 1993 
came as a great shock to King Hussein.13 At the time, Jordan was in prepa-
rations for its next round of elections, and both Jordanian and Palestinian 
Jordanian nationalists scrambled to assess the ramifications of such an 
agreement. For the king, however, the signing of the Declaration of Prin-
ciples (dop) removed the final roadblock preventing a peace treaty with 
Israel, and true to form, the following day Jordan and Israel signed a 
formal agenda outlining the principles and goals of a future peace treaty. 
On July 25, 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a declaration ending the formal 
state of war between the two countries on the White House lawn and on 
October 26, 1994, signed a formal peace treaty at Wadi Aʿrba.
The signing of the dop and the Wadi ʿArba treaties greatly affected Pal-
estinian Jordanians. Given that neither agreement made mention of the 
refugee issue, many interpreted this as the end of any hope for return to 
their native homes and villages. Palestinian Jordanians were left to won-
der what their final status in Jordan would be. Who would formally rep-
resent their interests? And what role could or should the refugees play 
in the newly democratizing Jordanian political sphere? The rift between 
Palestinian Jordanians and native Jordanians soon began to widen as Pal-
estinian Jordanians demanded that their status be formally resolved by 
the state. In what capacities would Palestinian Jordanians be allowed ac-
cess to state resources? Following the treaties, Adnan Abu Odeh, a long- 
time advisor to the king and representative of the royal court, was sent to 
meet with a group of refugee camp leaders to assess the situation. In their 
discussion of the general affairs and concerns of the refugee community, 
the camp leaders wanted to know specifically what their status would be 
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under the new treaty, and in tandem with this issue the group wanted to 
know “when and how the refugees would be compensated in terms of the 
un resolution concerning them.”14
This shift in ideology from return to compensation is indicative of the 
prevailing sentiment within the Palestinian Jordanian community at the 
time. Removing the refugee issue from the negotiating table drastically 
changed Jordan’s state interests and further refashioned its national iden-
tity. The majority of Palestinian Jordanians predicated their national iden-
tity on the idea that their presence in Jordan was temporary. As home to 
the world’s largest population of displaced persons, Jordan, for its part, 
had historically constructed its national identity on an active search for 
a solution to the Palestinian issue. By signing a formal treaty with Israel 
that made no mention of their status, Jordan substantially altered its state 
position, finally concluding its long process of disengagement from rep-
resenting Palestinians in their cause for self- determination.
The time immediately following Oslo brought Baladna’s performing 
career to an abrupt halt. The intifada had formally ended with the return 
of Arafat and the plo to Gaza in 1994. For a short while Palestinians both 
in the Occupied Territories and in diaspora were caught up in the mo-
ment of the “historic handshake” between Arafat and Rabin. After nearly 
seven long years of living the intifada, many Palestinian families were 
looking forward to resuming their regular daily lives. Men and women 
openly celebrated an end to the fighting both in the territories and dias-
pora and began planning what their new lives would be like under the na-
scent Palestinian Authority (pa) (see chapter 5).15 In Jordan especially, the 
end of the intifada and the opening of the public sphere signaled a new 
era of stability and reconciliation, but one in which Palestinian hopes for 
an eventual repatriation were no longer a priority. Kamal recounts how 
audiences once in solidarity with the intifada were suddenly concerned 
more with potential compensation for their lost homes than with their 
return to Palestine.
Imagine all of these people who were singing along with me about 
the need to return and to go back to their nation . . . were now con-
sumed with what they might get from Israel. It was like I found 
myself singing in another valley for another people . . . talking 
about the ridiculous idea, for refugees and their right to go back. 
But the people were all deceived by Oslo. And they deceived them 
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by telling them they would get money for this. And the people 
started talking about how much money that would be. Ten thou-
sand, twenty thousand, one hundred thousand for every person, 
and the people just started talking about money and how much 
they would get for selling their right to go back to their homeland. 
You could see it in their eyes. It was all people cared about. We have 
a saying here in Palestine, “you don’t get honey from the wasp.” 
This is exactly what they were trying to do, get honey from a wasp.
With the end of the intifada and the cessation of protest activities, mu-
sicians like Kamal were forced back into the workforce of day laborers, cab 
drivers, and street hawkers. With the return of over two hundred thou-
sand Palestinians from Kuwait following the first Gulf War, employment 
in the sprawling urban laborscape of Zarqa and Amman was difficult if 
not impossible for unskilled workers. Kamal became desperate to find 
work. The lack of performance opportunities pushed him to return to 
construction labor. Unable to find lasting employment, however, Kamal 
sought opportunities elsewhere. Drawing from his previous experiences 
performing in the United States, he was convinced that he could better 
support his family by working abroad. Through extended family ties he 
was able to secure a “family reunification” visa and move to Raleigh, 
North Carolina, working as a carpenter and contractor in 1996.
Homecomings and the al- Aqsa Intifada
For Kamal, the time spent living in his new American exile (al- manfā al- 
jadīd) was one of loneliness and hardship. Although he was able to find 
work in North Carolina and subsequently support his family through re-
mittances, Kamal desperately wanted to be closer to his family. He had 
spent too much time away from his children and missed watching them 
grow. Life was difficult in America, and after six years of struggling to 
keep working he finally decided it was time for him to return home to 
Ruseifa and be with his family. His attempts to secure a permanent resi-
dence in America had failed, and his work visa was soon to expire. Con-
tent to work as a laborer, Kamal had long given up on the idea of one day 
returning to the stage. Baladna’s time was finished, its songs long left to 
history, along with a popular movement seemingly transformed by a new 
generation of Palestinian youth. “Resistance” as he envisioned it had dra-
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matically shifted in the years following Oslo, replaced by new forms of 
Palestinian nationalism in exile.
Upon his return to Jordan Kamal resumed working as a day laborer in 
Zarqa and struggled to put food on the table. When opportunities arose 
Kamal would often work fifteen hours a day hauling cement blocks and 
shoveling concrete. Despite his efforts the family barely survived. In the 
summer of 2002, while Kamal was working in downtown Amman, the 
building manager arrived on the job site accompanied by a strange man. 
Covered in a pungent mixture of dirt, cement, and sweat from the sum-
mer heat Kamal introduced himself to the stranger. The man turned to 
him in disbelief. “Are you really Kamal Khalil?”
“Yeah, I’m Kamal,” he answered inquisitively.
“I can’t believe it is really you!” the stranger said, astounded. “I can’t 
believe I am face to face with Kamal Khalil. I went to all of your concerts. 
I know all of your songs. My children now listen to your old cassettes. 
Where have you been all these years?”
Kamal’s smile broadened in both pride and embarrassment. It had 
been nearly nine years since his last concert. In this man’s eyes he was 
still the great intifada singer, the famous political prisoner, and leader of 
Baladna. Yet looking down at himself he felt slightly embarrassed by his 
current situation, menial job, and obvious poverty. “I never know what to 
say to these people. Do I feel proud of my past or ashamed of my present? 
But it is interesting to see the people, you are doing the same jobs, but you 
find that this guy knows you and respects you but he doesn’t know that 
you are a worker. And you find this everywhere you go. This means that 
you were doing right.”
Chance encounters such as this soon turned into performance oppor-
tunities for Kamal at small weddings in al- Wahdat, al- Husseini, and al- 
Baqaʿ refugee camps. Word began to spread that Baladna was active again, 
and available for hire. Soliciting the talents of his older children, Kamal 
refashioned the group, performing its standard repertory of songs in 
small private gatherings. At first many of these performances were what 
might be termed “sympathy gigs” or “nostalgia gigs.” Fans of the original 
Baladna songs hired the group to play small weddings and other private 
parties simply because of their name alone. When the group would ar-
rive at the venue to set up, the hosts would often ask each other, “Which 
one is Kamal?” Participants in the weddings were shocked, and perhaps a 
little embarrassed, to find out that the once- great Baladna was now avail-
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able to perform for around jd$100 (us$140) a night. The stares and whis-
pering were not lost on Kamal, who openly admitted to his difficulties 
in finding work. He found himself accepting offers for concerts that he 
otherwise might have declined: fund- raisers, birthday parties, and other 
“money gigs.”
eFForts to revive baladna and  
protest song in jordan
With the growing tides of Palestinian nationalism flooding the streets of 
Amman and Zarqa, Kamal slowly began to imagine Baladna’s return to 
prominence in the Palestinian music scene. From 2002 to 2006 perfor-
mances for the group slowly increased, and with each event Kamal was 
able to enhance the group’s visibility and supplement his meager income. 
Soon small family weddings had turned to street events and cultural fes-
tivals drawing larger audiences. Yet despite his efforts, Kamal was unable 
to bring Baladna to the level he had once hoped. For lack of new material 
Baladna has been unable to effectively sing for the new intifada and hence 
remains a “nostalgia group,” keeping alive a repertory of songs made fa-
mous twenty years earlier. Kamal cites a lack of new poetry as the primary 
reason for the group’s failures; he notes that the al- Aqsa intifada requires a 
new lexicon, a new vocabulary, and a new poetry to narrate the struggle. 
“Resistance” means something very different now, he insists. “My songs 
were great for their time, but this is no longer their time.” Despite his 
search for a suitable lyricist Kamal has been unable to find anyone capable 
of capturing the essence of the new intifada in prose. Without a new voice 
to collaborate with, Kamal now fears that the group will merely repeat 
itself, circulating in tired metaphors, clichés, and phrases from times past.
I am trying, I haven’t come back yet. But I am trying to stay alive. 
So I am trying to participate in anything, when I am asked I go 
sing. And I am singing my old songs from the 80s and some from 
the 90s. I haven’t done any new songs because I haven’t seen any 
new poems. I can’t sing for this intifada because we need a new 
language now. And what we need I haven’t found yet, and I am not 
a writer. And when I call Ibrahim [Nasrallah] he is busy writing 
stories now. Sometimes I see him, sometimes I will see his photo-
graph somewhere in the newspaper or a magazine. But I haven’t 
found him. I have been pushing him to write new songs. Last time 
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I saw him was two months ago and we talked, and he said let’s 
meet, but I am very busy now bringing bread to the table. I don’t 
have the time to take off from work to go see him. I’m just trying to 
bring food right now.
I am still trying to find some new blood. Some young writers. 
They might have something. Whenever I hear about someone I go 
and see them and what they have, hoping that I will find something 
good to sing about. I know what I want to sing about, but I need 
the song to talk about the resistance in the same way [same quality] 
that I used to have in my old songs. Because I don’t want to make 
poor quality songs, and let the movement down. I also want to 
make sure that I don’t repeat myself. Because it is my responsibility 
to renew myself and my voice. Or the other approach is to just keep 
singing the same old songs so as to keep them alive for the new 
generation which wasn’t around the first time.
In an interview with the Jordanian daily newspaper Al- Rai, Kamal 
spoke very candidly about his efforts to revive Palestinian protest songs 
of the first intifada.16 In the interview Kamal calls for a renewal of politi-
cal song in reaction to the Arab pop culture currently filling the radio 
airwaves. Labeling such music “songs of the satellites,” Kamal accused 
pop artists of anesthetizing the Palestinian people to their national cause. 
He believes that today there are few protest singers because there is little 
money for it, and because the rich and powerful have attempted to keep 
political songs off the airwaves. In spite of pressing social and political 
issues facing the Arab world, and the Palestinians in particular, Kamal be-
lieves there has yet to be a full revival of political songs because of a lack 
of public support and interest. Kamal states, “Despite all of this, political 
songs will remain strong even if they are covered with dust, because they 
have roots, and these roots are deep in our Arab heritage, and they have 
meaning and spirit in depicting reality and our daily life.”
Kamal Khalil’s commentary on the state of Palestinian protest song 
is quite telling, even if it doesn’t accurately reflect the political moment. 
Despite his many protestations to the contrary, the public mediascape 
was, at the time of this interview, inundated with what might be easily 
recognized as Palestinian protest songs, solidarity songs, or songs on 
Palestinian issues. However, the fact that Baladna, al- ʿAshiqin, Mustafa 
al- Kurd, and several other “revival” groups struggled to gain a foothold 
220 ✹ Imprisonment and Exile
during the second intifada reveals how the political mediascape had so 
dramatically changed between the two historical moments (see chap-
ter 5). The grassroots mobilization of the first intifada, predicated on 
participatory dynamics, face- to- face interactions, and nonviolent civil 
disobedience, was supplanted by a “spectacle- based” movement involv-
ing presentational acts of violence and bombings sponsored by various 
quasi- political groups. The essence of the movement, of what “resistance” 
meant, had changed such that small- scale participatory musics no longer 
cohered with what was being broadcast daily on satellite television. For 
Palestinians both under occupation and in exile, there was little one could 
do to participate in the intifada beyond assuming a militancy of martyr-
dom and sacrifice outside the mainstream. Suheil Khoury, director of the 
Edward Said National Music Conservatory of Palestine and influential 
musician and activist, stated it thusly: “What’s going on today is not inti-
fada, it’s just killing. There are no boycotts, demonstrations, or commit-
tees. People used to help each other out on a daily basis; they were active. 
Today there is none of that. It’s just groups running around [killing each 
other] trying to make a name for themselves.”
In terms of music production, it would seem that the spectacle- based 
“songs of the satellites,” based in presentational aesthetics, visuality, and a 
distinct separation between actors and audiences, were more aligned with 
what was taking place on the streets of Jenin, Nablus, and Ramallah. The 
music of the first intifada was specifically designed to mobilize people to 
action, to uplift spirits, and to elicit feelings of solidarity among disparate 
and desperate Palestinian communities. In Jordan Kamal’s music offered 
those in exile unique opportunities to feel as if they were somehow con-
tributing to the intifada. This was no longer possible in the early 2000s. 
In contrast much of the second intifada was experienced via satellite tele-
vision and the Internet, among communities under strict twenty- four- 
hour- a- day curfews in the territories, as well as those in diaspora, watch-
ing from afar. As Kamal Khalil attempted to revive his repertory of past 
hits, he experienced a profound disconnect in the aesthetics of the sec-
ond intifada in that his was a music that did not effectively articulate with 
these changes in the national mediascape.
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Postscript: Ibrahim Nasrallah
In publishing an interview in one of Jordan’s most widely read daily news-
papers, Kamal had several goals: to get some much- needed publicity, to 
identify new poets with whom he could collaborate, and to bring political 
songs (of his generation) back into the public consciousness. But above all 
this interview was a desperate attempt to reach out to his former lyricist 
and friend, Ibrahim Nasrallah.
The experiences of the first intifada were never shared equally among 
the members of Baladna. When Kamal was taken into custody, several 
members of the group immediately quit, fearing for their own safety. 
Others, close friends and family members, remained committed to the 
group throughout Kamal’s incarceration. The pressures of writing in sup-
port of the intifada became a burden too great for many to carry. Ibrahim 
Nasrallah fared quite differently. His poetry had become well respected in 
Arab literary circles, and his journalistic work was equally lauded among 
the local press. What is more, since political poetry only occupied a small 
part of his literary output, he was able to avoid being labeled an activist. 
Although much of his writing dealt with political and nationalist themes 
(exile, dislocation, and dispossession), Nasrallah maintained a profes-
sional profile and non- political reputation for his short stories, novels, 
and poetry across various thematic lines.
During the first intifada Ibrahim Nasrallah was an active voice for Pal-
estinian liberation. Much like Kamal, he remembers constant harassment 
from the local police in the form of surveillance, interviews, detention, 
and other state coercion.
I wrote political poetry for the intifada, but that was not all that 
I wrote. Politics is only part of my work, not the whole thing. I 
always had problems back then, in the first intifada. I was never 
put in prison, but everything I did was closely watched, and when-
ever I made a public appearance at a reading or something there 
was always something that had to be done for the police. They were 
very strict with us, telling us what we could and could not say. I 
was fired and rehired from so many newspapers. It was always a 
fight to get heard. I was young and this is what I was consumed 
with. Afterwards I moved on to write about other things.
222 ✹ Imprisonment and Exile
In his writings Ibrahim became adept at recognizing and abiding by 
“the rules” governing what could and could not be said publicly. For many 
authors these “rules” became a literary field in and of themselves. An 
imaginative poet such as Ibrahim was pushed to create new phrases, turns 
of meaning, metaphor, or euphemisms capable of carrying the intended 
political meanings without offending state censors. Reflecting on the time, 
Nasrallah recalled with me that he was “consumed with the movement, 
young, and daring in his belief in the cause.” Once the movement faded 
from the public sphere, however, he began to write about different things. 
His work took a new direction, it matured, and changed to the point that 
today he looks back on his nationalist poetry with a sense of nostalgia—as 
the creative output of a “young idealist determined to change the world.”
In the years since his work with Baladna, Ibrahim Nasrallah has pub-
lished thirteen different collections of poetry, three novels, and a large 
catalogue of columns and articles in the international press. Over the 
course of his career he has been awarded several international Arab liter-
ary prizes, including the Arar Award (1991), the Jordanian Writers’ Asso-
ciation Honorary Prize, the Tayseer Sboul Prize (1994), and the presti-
gious United Arab Emirates Sultan Oweiss Award (1997). His stature as a 
prominent figure in the Arab literary world today is unquestioned, and by 
the time the second intifada had begun in 2000 he had created for him-
self an astonishingly successful career as poet, journalist, novelist, and 
literary critic.
In 1995 the Lebanese filmmaker Arab Lufti completed a documentary 
based on Nasrallah’s semi- autobiographical novel The Birds of Caution. 
The movie chronicles Nasrallah’s early childhood in al- Wahdat, focusing 
on his family’s expulsion from the village of al- Bruij near Jerusalem. In 
one very poignant moment Nasrallah speaks of the dispossession refu-
gees often felt living in al- Wahdat: “The distance between the refugee 
camp and Amman was short, one that a child could walk alone. The dis-
tance between the refugee camp residents and the Palestinian dream of 
returning to their land needs a lifetime.”17 As a poet and novelist Ibrahim 
has done much to bridge the distance.
Today he is celebrated as one of the most influential Palestinian writers 
of the late twentieth century (see figure 7.1). His many books and collec-
tions of poetry are widely regarded as among the greatest literary work 
originating from either Jordan or Palestine. By 2005 Ibrahim was serving 
as vice president of cultural affairs at the Khalid Shoman Foundation’s 
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Darat al- Funun (Home for the Arts). In this capacity Ibrahim coordi-
nated and oversaw the foundation’s many art exhibitions, lectures, con-
certs, and other activities.
Upon meeting Ibrahim Nasrallah for the first time I was at once 
amazed by how much his life had differed from Kamal’s in the nearly 
twenty years since they had worked together. What a contrast it was 
sitting with Ibrahim in his luxurious office at Darat al- Funun talking 
about his experiences writing for Baladna in the 1980s. Fine works of art 
and tapestries adorned the office walls. Carved bookshelves filled with 
leather- bound collections of great Arab literature stretched upward into 
the reaches of the ten- foot- high ceiling. Classical music softly spilled into 
the room from the adjacent art gallery, where an exhibition for new pro-
gressive Arab painters was currently being held. Sipping his tea, Ibrahim 
settled into his office chair, completely at home in the refined surround-
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ings. His well- manicured appearance, expensive clothing, and sophisti-
cated demeanor made his successes in the Jordanian cultural sphere all 
the more apparent. As a literary figure he remains active, giving poetry 
readings and lectures throughout the Arab world and Europe, and he has 
been featured in several collections of Arab poetry.18 With all this much- 
deserved success it came as no surprise to find that Ibrahim had little 
desire to return to writing in support of the second intifada. His experi-
ences writing in the uprising were part of a past he did not wish to relive.
In hearing about my research on the history of Palestinian protest song 
in Jordan, Ibrahim was quick to downplay his involvement in the move-
ment and to point out that political writings constituted only a small por-
tion of his creative work. It was apparent that he wanted to distance him-
self from Baladna, lest I represent him in my research as a purely political 
lyricist.
Later he went on to describe what he saw as the main differences be-
tween the uprising of the 1980s and the current al- Aqsa intifada.
Everything has changed. It has to. Back then the whole world was 
interested in what was going on in Palestine. They all wanted to 
help, even in America. People were interested and they were dedi-
cated. We were working together for a great cause against incred-
ible opposition everywhere we went as Palestinians. We could not 
live freely no matter where we were, and we tried through music 
and poetry to change things—to get people working together for 
the cause. Today there isn’t that same feeling. The people are not 
as interested as they once were. They can only think about what is 
going on in Palestine for five minutes before they switch the chan-
nel. Even here in Jordan things are much different. The mentality 
here has changed. There aren’t the same problems that we faced 
back then. And there isn’t the resistance movement here like there 
used to be.
Ibrahim and Kamal both recognized the political and aesthetic differ-
ences between the two intifadas, citing a lack of grassroots mobilization 
and public support in the second. Though they agreed on certain things, 
the two men differed markedly in their outlook on the current political 
situation. While Kamal struggled to revive and refashion a new repertory 
of protest songs for the next generation, Ibrahim had resigned himself to 
leaving politics in the past and pursuing other interests. He has moved on 
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to other literary fields and feels little need to return to a movement he feels 
is unsupported by the people. Moreover Nasrallah’s various speaking en-
gagements throughout Europe and the Arab world provide a new forum 
for talking about Palestinian issues before an international audience. His 
fame as poet and novelist has created a new forum for political activism 
less enacted by the throwing of stones and more aligned with intellectual 
discourse. Throughout our conversations, sitting in these luxurious sur-
roundings, it was difficult not to think of Kamal sitting underneath his 
olive tree talking about how difficult it was to feed his family. For Kamal 
performing was not only a means of spreading a message of Palestinian 
liberation, but also his best hope for economic survival.
Unfortunately relations between the two have been difficult over the 
years. Kamal’s time in prison and subsequent move to America left the 
once- inseparable friends distant acquaintances. In my conversations with 
the artists, they both looked back on their time together with a heartfelt 
sense of nostalgia and friendship. Yet given their very different lifestyles 
and career goals, it seems the possibility for a future collaboration is re-
mote. Unfortunately, without Ibrahim’s poetry Kamal is reluctant to write 
any new compositions. Of the approximately seventy songs in the Ba-
ladna catalogue, over 60 percent were written by Ibrahim. Having worked 
so closely with Ibrahim all those years, Kamal feels lost without the words 
of his old friend and collaborator. On several occasions Kamal remarked 
to me his apprehension about pursuing any other lyricists. “How could I 
replace Ibrahim, when his words were so perfect? He was as much a part 
of Baladna as I was.”
wahdat weddings
Late in the summer of 2004 I joined Baladna in one of its many per-
formances in al- Wahdat refugee camp. This was a wedding performance 
taking place in an alleyway between two apartment buildings. Colorful 
carpets were draped across the roofs and sides of the two buildings to cre-
ate a private enclosure for the festivities. Hundreds of plastic chairs were 
then squeezed into the tight quarters to seat the approximately two hun-
dred men invited to attend. This wedding celebration was not unlike any 
other I had experienced in Jordan/Palestine. Intertwining dabke lines of 
young men made their way through the crowds of seated, coffee- sipping 
elders. Trays of lemonade, coffee, tea, and various sweets circulated, while 
the more daring shabāb would slip away behind the buildings to share a 
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bottle of something more potent. The groom, recently bathed and deco-
rated with henna by his family, was periodically carried on the shoulders 
of his young friends, while Kamal led the congregation in singing zaffāt 
(indigenous processional wedding songs). Out of sight of the revelers, the 
bride’s party watched the men through the windows of an adjacent build-
ing, their stomping feet heard from the street below as evidence of their 
own raucous celebrating.
At one moment in the performance, however, my attention was sud-
denly diverted to an elderly woman dressed in a worn Palestinian thawb 
(an ornately embroidered Palestinian gown, the patterns of which often 
identify a woman’s native village or region) making her way up to the stage 
with great difficulty. Her age showed in her face and body as she labored 
to navigate the crowded dance floor on what appeared to be a horribly 
arthritic frame. For any woman to walk so boldly through the crowds of 
young dancing men was certainly an anomaly. As she approached the 
stage Kamal noticed her and signaled for the group to finish the song. 
He then descended from the stage and walked over to the woman as she 
pressed her hands to her face in a traditional gesture of respect. Kamal, 
for his part, kissed her hands and introduced himself (evia 14- a4295).19
“Auntie, are you ok? What is the matter?” Kamal asked.
Immediately the old woman’s eyes widened, revealing a blue- grey 
coloring. “I knew it was you,” she responded. “I heard the music, and I 
heard your voice. I knew you had come back.” She continued, “I told my 
daughters that it was you, and they didn’t believe me. But I just knew that 
it was you, Kamal.” As she spoke her arms repeatedly gesticulated wildly 
over her head in an obvious sign of excitement. Her hands then pressed 
against her cheeks. “I walked two blocks over here to find out if it was 
really you,” no small feat given her condition. “I thought that you were 
still in prison.”
Kamal demurred at the old woman’s astonishment. Shy to the attention 
she was showing him, he replied, “Auntie, I never left, never.”
“Allah ma cʿhum, Allah ma cʿhum” (God be with you), she responded, 
motioning to both Kamal and his sons performing onstage.20
Kamal then returned to the stage to begin the next set while the elderly 
woman took a seat along the far wall of the tent. Scribbling as fast as I 
could, I wrote down the brief yet touching conversation on which I had 
shamelessly eavesdropped. Scrambling for my video camera, I was able to 
record only the final moments of their exchange.
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Belief underneath the Olive Tree
For Kamal Khalil, Palestine is a home barely remembered. Exiled from 
Taiba as a young boy, he cannot fully recall his family’s house or the smells 
and sounds of the rolling West Bank hills. Yet imaginings and reimagin-
ings of home and homeland exist for him as a dominant marker of his 
Palestinian identity—an identity born of deep- seated feelings of dispos-
session and loss. It is through his intense belief in himself as Palestinian, 
in the Palestinian nation as a people, and in Palestine as a land that Kamal 
has been driven to compose music and suffer mightily for it.
Indeed it is the belief in nation, in God, in home, and in belonging to 
someone or something, somewhere, that underlies the struggle for Pal-
estinian self- determination. If we begin to think of nations as the prod-
ucts of a distinct consciousness in which communal identities are imbued 
with power, trust, and faith, we come closer to understanding the felt, 
instinctive, and associative allegiances that nations generate. For many 
Palestinians, the conviction and faith drawn from living in exile have sus-
tained, even defined, the Palestinian nation, causing some to willingly 
sacrifice their bodies and minds for the perpetuation of this belief. Kamal 
Khalil’s insistent drive to fight for Palestinian self- determination through 
music, and to persevere despite its violent consequences, is not solely an 
act of desperation or of blind nationalism and opportunism, but rather 
one born of intense faith and belief.
In working with Kamal I attempted to uncover a history of Palestinian 
music not solely in terms of political ideologies and state relationships, 
but also in the context of one individual’s struggle to make meaning of 
the politics and discourses of everyday life in exile. Raised in a poor, pre-
dominantly Palestinian industrial village on the outskirts of Amman, he 
occupied a precarious position vis- à- vis the Jordanian state. He was not a 
refugee by the unrwa definition and was thus ineligible for humanitarian 
aid and education, and never fully indoctrinated into mainstream Jor-
danian society. Over the years, Kamal developed a very powerful means 
of both acting on and enduring his feelings of dislocation and disposses-
sion. Music was his platform, and his voice was his weapon for fighting 
against the state powers responsible for his forced exile and the occupa-
tion of his homeland.
Kamal believed that his songs were capable of “reaching the whole na-
tion.” He believed his music created performative social spaces in which 
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Palestinians could take control of their situation, affirm their national 
identity, and express counterhegemonic or otherwise dissenting ideolo-
gies against the state. In his efforts to do this, Kamal was brought to his 
physical and emotional threshold, withstanding arrest, violence, harass-
ment, and torture. Throughout his career Kamal has had the precarious 
honor of dining at the royal palace and the royal prison. He has shaken 
hands with the king and been beaten by the king’s men. Circulating 
within this distinct culture of violence and state terror Kamal has had dif-
ficulty making sense of the brutality and coercion of the state. Neverthe-
less, despite all this he has not given up on his intense belief in one day 
returning to Taiba.
More than a simple biographical sketch, Kamal Khalil’s varying ex-
periences of dislocation, repression, and dissent amplify the many twists 
and turns of the “resistance” movement as it was imagined within the 
Jordanian nation- state. It seems incomplete to provide a mere politi-
cal history of predominant trends and ideas without delving into how 
these very ideas and forces were lived and experienced. Sudden changes 
in state interests and policies had lasting and formative effects for those 
living along the border zones of the Jordanian/Palestinian national imagi-
nary. Jordan’s fluctuating state policies regarding its relationships with the 
Palestinians (both in Jordan and the West Bank) had a profound effect on 
the lives of individuals struggling to navigate between and within each na-
tional imaginary. As home to the world’s largest population of displaced 
persons, Jordan has struggled to negotiate national policy, marginaliz-
ing Palestinians in identity politics yet depending on them for economic 
expansion and growth. Moreover the establishment of an autonomous 
Palestinian representative body has yet to effectively address the needs 
and rights of its refugee and displaced populations. Negotiations between 
Israel and the pa now begin from a discursive position wherein the rights 
of refugees have been all but forfeited. Kamal, for his part, has struggled 
to make sense of the uncertainty, the ambiguities, of this political situa-
tion, in the end finding music to be a powerful modality for articulating 
these anxieties.
Yet Kamal Khalil’s life story is not simply about music, or resistance. 
Rather Kamal’s life story illustrates the ambiguous position of displaced 
Palestinians in Jordan, more generally—the vagaries of their situation, as 
they are nested between and marginalized from two national imaginaries. 
Living on the peripheries of the nationalist movement, Palestinian Jorda-
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nians fashioned new means of “resisting” the occupation in a displaced 
fashion, performing resistance onstage as a means of active identification 
and belonging. The essence of resistance in these performances reflects 
a cultural liminality, a perpetual drive to connect to a homeland under 
siege and occupation.
Since his return to Jordan in 2002, Kamal has been confronted with 
new challenges. Underemployment and economic hardship now consti-
tute a new front of struggle. More than at any other time, performance 
opportunities, when they materialize, are a necessary means to supple-
ment family income. What was once “singing for the nation” has now 
turned into financial necessity. Regrettably, it would appear that pressures 
to provide for his wife and six children have become the driving force 
behind his pursuit to revive past intifada hits. This is the cruel reality 
for many artists attempting to perform in support of Palestinian causes. 
Squabbles over money, publicity, and prestige plague performance inter-
actions far more than ideological or religious differences. His inability to 
revive the protest songs of the past reveals widespread aesthetic changes 
in the Palestinian soundscape. Performed within a new political moment, 
such songs do not resonate with the aesthetics of the current generation 
of Palestinian youth seeking an end to the occupation. In style, sound, 
and performative dynamics, the songs of the first intifada simply fail to 
resonate with the media- based spectacle of the new “resistance.” Left to 
the past, the songs of Baladna are tokens of nostalgia, overmatched by the 
“songs of the satellites” and the growing trends of new transnational Pal-
estinian pop (hip- hop, punk, metal).
With each passing day of his imprisonment, Kamal was comforted by 
two things: his belief in nation and his belief in the power of music to 
overcome. For a man who has dedicated his life to an idea, he has bene-
fited very little. Tortured, abused, bones broken, and his life and those of 
his loved ones interrupted, Kamal never lost faith that one day he would 
return to his family and that his family would one day return to Palestine. 
In the years since his release the dream of returning to Taiba has yet to 
materialize, and his six children are now reaching the age where they are 
looking to settle down and raise families of their own. With each passing 
year it becomes more apparent to Kamal that for him Palestine may exist 
only in song, and like the olive tree planted in his front courtyard, he, too, 
must firmly take root in foreign soil.
This beautiful olive tree. Planted at a time of family crisis, loss, and fear, 
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it has now fully matured, its branches stretching out over the courtyard 
of the house. Olives come every other year, and with them a deliciously 
pure oil for dipping breads and mazzāt. When planted, Kamal intended 
this tree to be his hope, his savior. He knew that one day he would return 
home and carve into its trunk the “chapters of his tragedy.” He would 
document his history of loss and dispossession, recording the names of 
all those who had ever broken his body and spirit. They would not go free 
from their crimes so long as this tree survived.
Today the olive tree is more symbol than savior. His past is a tragedy 
shared by many Palestinians in diaspora. Often hidden from view, shielded 
by national pride (or is it national shame?), Kamal goes about his daily 
life wondering about the choices he has made and the choices that were 
made for him. Exiled to Jordan, to prison, and to America, Kamal even-
tually returned to the cramped, crowded, twisted streets of Ruseifa. For 
him, each was an exile and each a safe haven. It seems ironic that all this 
time, through all those nights spent talking and singing, Kamal Khalil had 
accomplished one thing he had set out to do so many years ago. Though 
he did not carve them with a knife, the chapters of his tragedy were none-
theless recorded, by the hand of a young, overly idealistic American re-
searcher sitting with him underneath the olive tree.
8
new Directions and new Modalities
Palestinian Hip- Hop in Israel
Lyd
Tucked discreetly behind Ben Gurion International Airport amid rows 
of industrial factories and seemingly endless railway tracks lies one of 
Israel’s forgotten towns. Home to roughly 66,110 residents, Lyd (Hebrew: 
Lod; Greek- Latin: Lydda) is one of the most dangerous, drug- addicted, 
and crime- infested cities in the Middle East.1 Although the city boasts a 
mixed population of Russian and Ethiopian Jewish immigrants and Pal-
estinian Christians and Muslims (20 percent), in its Arab quarters Lyd 
suffers from extreme neglect. In the Arab neighborhoods Samekh Het, 
Warda, Shannir, Neve Yarek, and al- Mahatta, many of the houses and 
streets are unnamed or unnumbered, paved roads can be rare, and basic 
utility services are inconsistent and unreliable. The ultimate signs of ne-
glect are seen in the many open sewers, overflowing dumpsters, and dere-
lict buildings that line the city streets.2
More pressing, however, are rampant drug abuse and violent crime.3 
Children play soccer in streets overshadowed by massive tenement build-
ings covered in graffiti and suffering from disregard and ill repair. Nearby, 
drugs are freely bought and sold through slots carved into the neighbor-
hood’s concrete walls. Lights strewn over the slots, called atms, mark 
whether or not a certain drop- off point is open for business. From these 
points passersby stop for a moment to push their money through the 
opening and retrieve an envelope or plastic bag of illicit drugs: pills, 
cocaine, crystal meth, or something else.
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On this hot summer afternoon in June 2005, such activity doesn’t deter 
in the slightest the twenty Palestinian Israeli children playing soccer and 
riding bicycles through the neighborhood. Drugs and drug- related ac-
tivity are, unfortunately, part of the natural cityscape. It is 4:00 pm, and 
the hot summer sun has pushed the temperature to a sweltering 105 de-
grees. Maneuvering around potholes, barbed- wire fences, and abandoned 
buildings, many of these children pay no attention to the hallmarks of 
urban neglect that have infected this once- flourishing community. De-
spite the intense heat, there is much excitement in the air. Nearby in a 
vacant lot, a grassroots Israeli nongovernmental organization is hosting 
a festival promoting economic cooperation and minority empowerment. 
Not more than three hundred yards from the main bus station, tents and 
booths shelter representatives from various labor organizations and other 
social welfare institutions. Within these tents are hundreds of Israeli Jews 
selling buttons, books, pamphlets, and ideology on how to better address 
issues of minority rights, unemployment, and free trade between Israel’s 
Jewish and various non- Jewish citizens.
Also among the participants are local neighborhood Lyd kids curious 
to see what has brought such an event to their neighborhood. The clash of 
communities is strident. Young Jewish girls dressed in the typical Israeli 
summer fashion of long, flowing hippie skirts, tank tops, and sandals be-
come the none- too- obvious eye candy for Palestinian shabāb (youth) un-
accustomed to seeing women dressed so revealingly for the heat. Like-
wise, Jewish festival- goers remark candidly and condescendingly about 
the many Palestinian women covered in their ḥijāb (headscarves), sweat-
ing under the hot June sun.
Nearby, in a large parking lot adjacent to the bus station, a stage setup 
has been brought in from Tel Aviv complete with lighting and sound sys-
tem. Standing behind the stage with arms folded is Tamer Nafar, Israel’s 
most famous and infamous Palestinian rapper. He watches as the sound 
check is finished, the cables are strewn, and the crowds coalesce in front 
of the stage. His oversized athletic shorts, tank top, and basketball high- 
tops signal a fashion style far removed from the relaxed hippie braids and 
sandals sported by his Jewish audience, and the more traditional tight 
blue jeans, close- fitting shirts, and leather shoes of the local Palestinian 
men. At this moment, however, Tamer Nafar is the only Palestinian work-
ing to set up the stage area. The stage crew, sound engineers, security 
guards, and other participating artists appear to be all Jews working delib-
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erately in preparation for the highlight of the festival, a concert by the Pal-
estinian Israeli rap group dam.
As the workers prepare for the concert, Nafar observes each step, offer-
ing advice and conversation. At this concert he is the celebrity on hand 
that everyone is trying to meet. Throughout the preparations many par-
ticipants casually make their way onto the stage to introduce themselves 
or to get a photo with the artist. From afar, Tamer seems to relish the at-
tention. He is gracious, giving brief interviews to journalists, posing for 
photos with fans, and otherwise making himself accessible to various re-
quests. But there is an inherent contradiction in this fame. While in these 
few fleeting moments before the concert Tamer may be the star attraction, 
he knows all too well that after the concert ends, while the majority of the 
participants are driving home to suburban Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, he will 
be walking the few short blocks back to his family’s tenement apartment 
amidst the rubble, barbed wire, railroad tracks, and the overflowing piles 
of garbage.
By 7:00 pm the concert has begun. After a brief thirty- minute set, Jew-
ish rappers Kotej and Kwami surrender their microphones, and the crowd 
comes to life as dam (Tamer Nafar, Suheil Nafar, and Mahmoud Jrere) 
makes its way to center stage (see figure 8.1).
As the concert goes on a clash of communities becomes more and 
more apparent. Roughly five hundred people in attendance are mixed 
equally between visiting Jews and local neighborhood Palestinians. From 
talking with some of these young local Palestinian teens, it was apparent 
that few of them knew anything about rap music, nor the occasion for 
such a large concert in the middle of their neighborhood. The booming 
music, large crowds, and overall commotion were motivation enough to 
bring them out into the streets. In stark contrast, the crowds of Jewish 
festival- goers were singing along with the music, dancing prescribed hip- 
hop steps, wearing dam T- shirts, and openly enjoying the performance.
While the concert began with two separate and distinct audiences, over 
the course of the performance it was fascinating to watch small pockets of 
interaction. Young Palestinian girls began to emulate the dance steps of 
the more experienced Jewish twenty- somethings, and in turn, the Jewish 
twenty- somethings attempted to recreate some of the raqṣ sharqī (East-
ern belly dance) moves of the young Palestinian girls. Mostly among girls 
and young women dance circles slowly began to open up. Likewise over 
time several groups of young Arab boys began including some of the Jew-
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ish men in their carousing. Curious young Palestinian mothers pushing 
strollers through the crowd would stop and exchange pleasantries with 
Jewish mothers in attendance. If at first neither audience really felt com-
fortable in their surroundings, it wasn’t long before small moments of 
communal interaction began to take place.
As the concert progressed it became clear which audience members 
were participants and which were merely observers. In general, only 
the older Jewish rap fans were actively dancing and singing along to the 
music. Speaking between songs, dam addressed the crowd in Hebrew 
slang, building a rapport with the Jewish audience. Communal inter-
action between performers and audience was expressed through shared 
body movement, call- and- response phrases, and collective singing. Even 
when dam sang in Arabic, it was apparent that the lyrics were more famil-
iar to the Jewish than the Palestinian audience. Standing backstage, look-
ing out onto the crowd, it was fascinating to see only half the audience 
actively engaging the music while the other half stood silently in amaze-
ment at what they were seeing. At one point this caught the attention of 
Tamer Nafar, who yelled out, “Antū mash bihūn bitastannā maʿ ba aʿd. Fī 
Figure 8.1. ✹ dam performing in Lyd. Photograph by the author (2005).
New Directions and Modalities ✹ 235
aʿyūn anā bashūf ʿArab, bas . . . Yā ʿArab! Shaʿb al- ʿArabī wayn?” (You didn’t 
come here just to stand around together. By my eyes I am seeing Arabs 
here but . . . Yo’ Arabs! Where are all the Arabs?) (see figure 8.2).
Borrowing a line from Julia Butrous’s famous intifada song, “Wayn al- 
Malayin” (see chapter 3), Tamer Nafar very effectively attempted to draw 
the hundreds of Palestinian onlookers into the performance environment 
Figure 8.2. ✹ Tamer Nafar. Photograph by the author (2005).
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using an intertextual reference of profound national meaning. “Where are 
all the Arabs?”—calling forth as it does Julia Butrous’s impassioned plea 
of frustration and abandonment—here becomes a powerful means of 
compelling Arab participation in the concert. Immediately following this 
Tamer Nafar asked the audience to join him in an impromptu rendition 
of Ahmad Qaʿbour’s famous intifada anthem, “Unadikum” (The nation 
calls out to you). Suddenly the Palestinians in the crowd sprang to life.
The nation calls out to you,
I beseech you to rise up.
I kiss the land, under your shoes.
I sacrifice myself for you,
I give the light of my eyes to you,
And the warmth of my heart.
My catastrophe and my misery,
Is part of your misery.
The nation calls out to you
Here the flow of the performance shifted to the young Palestinians 
who all knew this song and could finally participate in what was hap-
pening onstage. The shouting of the crowd became so loud that after two 
choruses Tamer Nafar called out, tongue in check, “Khalas yā jamaʿ! Hay 
ḥaflitnā, mash ḥaflitach!” (Hey, cut it out, this is supposed to be our con-
cert not yours!). What is interesting about this comment was Tamer’s use 
of rural dialect in the pronunciation of ḥaflitach (your [plural] concert). 
The emphasis on the final ch sound is a common rural pronunciation of 
the standard second- person plural (kum) possessive suffix. In all my in-
formal conversations with Tamer as well as my recordings of his perfor-
mances, he never spoke or sang with a rural accent. Quite the contrary, 
Tamer was very cognizant that his language, style, and vocabulary re-
flected an urban, cosmopolitan vernacular. Hearing this noticeable shift 
to “the folk” in his accent immediately caught my attention as a powerful 
means to reinforce a common cultural bond with his Palestinian audi-
ence. This was a brilliant, if unrecognized, tactic that brought the Pales-
tinians, who were noticeably feeling a bit ostracized by the foreign styles 
of singing and dance, back into the performance. Though the Hebrew 
and Arabic verses espoused an antiracism, antioccupation message in-
side a deeply Palestinian neighborhood, up until this point the Palestini-
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ans in attendance looked and acted as though they were the outsiders. 
Here, by indexing the well- known words of Julia Butrous and Ahmad 
Qaʿbour, employing linguistic signs of the “folk” and “country,” Tamer 
Nafar reached out in a powerful way to his Palestinian audience.
After the concert I spoke with several local Lyd residents in an attempt 
to get their impressions of the concert both in terms of the messages re-
layed and the musical forms through which they were communicated. 
Many related to me their feelings of confusion watching Palestinians per-
form an African American style of music in support of Palestinian issues. 
“Buḥibb al- ma aʿna wa al- kalamāt, bas shū hadh? Li mīn bīghānū? Hay 
mash filasṭīnī.” (I love the message and the meanings of the lyrics, but 
what kind of music is this? . . . Who are they trying to sing to? This is 
not Palestinian.) Moreover so many Israeli Jews singing and dancing en-
thusiastically to the antioccupation lyrics created a spectacle that many 
could not reconcile. It was apparent that this concert, as well as the fes-
tival for which it was the main event, advocated the political position 
of the Israeli left and that those in attendance were very much a part of 
the Israeli youth movement seeking to distance itself from the “hawk-
ish” practices of the Likud- led government. Yet for the local Lyd resi-
dents, the spectacle of watching hundreds of Jews singing and dancing 
in protest against discrimination toward Palestinians was too much to 
comprehend. The apparent disconnect between the artists onstage and 
the audience was predicated on seeing, hearing, and experiencing for-
eign music, dance, and social interactions that did not jibe with the stan-
dard model of Palestinian political and nationalist ideology. In calling 
for the crowd to sing a famous intifada song, Tamer Nafar attempted to 
reposition the group, their music, and the event as an outgrowth of, or 
new direction in, Palestinian protest song. Moreover he signaled to the 
skeptical Palestinian crowd that he was familiar with and educated in the 
long- established tradition of political poetry and music. It was essential 
for dam to convince the Palestinians in attendance that they were indeed 
part of the same community, confronting the same issues, born from the 
same histories, residents of the same neglected neighborhood.
At this moment in the concert a noticeable shift occurred between the 
two audiences. Collectively singing “Unadikum” brought the Palestini-
ans into the performance environment, bonding with the artists onstage. 
More importantly, witnessing the Palestinian audience sing this song had 
a noticeable effect on the Jewish audience, as well. First, it brought the 
238 ✹ New Directions and Modalities
flow of the concert to a halt, which to this point was largely geared toward 
the Jewish audience in language, song, and style. Here Arabic became the 
primary mode of communication drawn from a tradition of nationalist 
poetry with which virtually every Palestinian in this neighborhood was 
intimately familiar. Jewish concert- goers stood silently, looking incredu-
lously over the crowd of singing and chanting Palestinians. Based on my 
observations, it was apparent that this pronounced shift in momentum 
signaled to the Jews in attendance that indeed they were the outsiders, 
that despite fame, admiration, and local recognition as rap artists, dam 
was really born of the same environment as the on- looking, at times in-
credulous, locals. Rap was the form that brought dam to such a high pro-
file among young Israeli Jews, but here in this concert those same rap fans 
were confronted face to face with the inspiration for dam and their lyrics. 
Fully taking in their surroundings—the garbage, the drugs, the effects of 
years of crime and neglect—these Jews seemed to be momentarily pulled 
into the song. dam and its internationally known front man, Tamer Nafar, 
were no longer famous artists heard and seen in international media, or 
on the radio or Internet; rather they were Lyd kids, children brought up 
under Israeli neglect, living in poverty. They were the shabāb running 
through the crowd, roughhousing, leering, and acting out against the Jew-
ish dancers. They were admired for their fame, style, and artistic talent, 
and yet simultaneously identified as “Arab street kids.”
Perhaps for many of these Jews in attendance there was a synergy 
taking place between the media construction of dam as internationally 
recognized rappers and the contextual reality from which they emerged. 
Seeing both the fame and the neglect, dam was both powerful and power-
less. Staging the concert in Lyd allowed the Jewish rap fans a brief look 
into the lives and lifestyles of the artists from whom they had just min-
utes before clamored to get autographs and pictures. In presenting them-
selves to the audience as Lyd kids, dam put forth an image of themselves 
as both stylish Israeli rappers and street kids from the slums. The confla-
tion of these two images, the famous and the infamous, also put forth a 
reconceptualized index of Israeli society inclusive of its non- Jewish Pal-
estinian residents on the fringes of the Israeli nationalist imaginary. If 
dam’s unique ability to speak to an Israeli Jewish audience using their 
own vernacular and a shared aesthetic style disabled the established Jew-
ish/Palestinian binary, doing so in Lyd most certainly raised an acute 
awareness of the dire situation facing this community. Furthermore, in 
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code switching between Jewish and Palestinian frames, dam was able to 
create an environment in which the traditional model of Jewish/Pales-
tinian cultural autonomy broke down, revealing constitutive relations be-
tween the two communities.
The various ways dam freely navigated the poetic and ideational dis-
positions of two very distinct audiences at this concert in June 2005 is in-
dicative of the many ways in which Palestinian Israelis must negotiate the 
discursive fields of identity and politics in their daily lives. The difficulties 
of being both Israeli and Palestinian, and at the same time neither Israeli 
nor Palestinian, are not lost on these musicians. Raised as second- class 
citizens, Tamer, Suheil, and Mahmoud live as a feared internal “other” in 
Israeli society, yet among many Palestinian nationalists early on in their 
careers, they were portrayed as collaborators and traitors for carrying 
Israeli passports, speaking Hebrew, and participating in Israeli politics 
and society.
What is especially fascinating about dam’s work is the way their music 
reveals how the established discourses of ethnonational purity (in the 
case of Israel) and direct linkages to the land and a particular fallaḥī folk 
ethos (in the case of Palestine) are both betrayed by social heterogeneity 
and new forms of transnational media and communication. In perfor-
mance, dam explicitly confounds the entrenched nationalist history of 
Israel based on Jewish homogeneity, throwing into relief a long history 
of interaction and indoctrination with and within the Arab world. More-
over, through the performance of an explicitly cosmopolitan popular 
music, these young rappers create spaces where traditional conceptions of 
Palestinian- ness are reconfigured to include media, aesthetics, and tech-
nologies from the non- Arab cosmopolitan world.
This concert was also an excellent example of how popular culture may 
fashion spaces through which often- conflicting modalities of class, gen-
der, nation, race, and religion are articulated, circumscribed, or recon-
figured.4 Here popular culture becomes a site for political engagement 
serving to either naturalize consent for the dominant order or to embody 
alternative values in opposition to that order.5 For many of the local Lydi-
ans dam’s style of dress, mannerism, and performance were a strange 
amalgam of musical and political identities. In content, the message of 
this performance was quite familiar (ending racism and discrimination 
against Palestinians in Israel), yet the forms through which this message 
was carried (hip- hop) were quite foreign. Likewise seeing dam perform 
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for the first time in Lyd forced many Jewish rap fans to confront a socially 
marginalized Palestinian neighborhood face to face. The overall popu-
larity of the music served to draw out an insular community of listeners 
into a foreign, strange, or perhaps even “dangerous” social space. For those 
in attendance less cognizant of the cultural differences in the crowd (the 
young girls teaching each other to dance, or the young mothers pushing 
their strollers through the crowd), dam spatially affirmed a diverse Israeli 
national imaginary inclusive of both Jewish and non- Jewish citizens.
The various ways that music, particularly a cosmopolitan form of hip- 
hop, serves to reconfigure conceptions of self and nation within the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict is the subject of this chapter. In looking at these pro-
cesses, this chapter addresses many of the social and political issues facing 
Palestinians of ’48 and their role in the Israeli/Palestinian national imagi-
nary. How does rap music articulate the political and ideational positions 
of these young Palestinian citizens of Israel? What might dam’s impact 
be on the identity politics of Palestinians in Israel, in the Occupied Terri-
tories, and in diaspora? How do the artists position themselves within the 
politically diverse framework of Palestinian protest song? What potential 
do popular music and culture have for reconfiguring ideas of Palestinian 
nationalism and the struggle for self- determination?
Palestinians of ’48, Relational Identities, and  
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But our destiny is to stay physically close to our lands,
And at the same time spiritually far away from our nation.
Who cares about us? We are dying slowly,
Controlled by a Zionist democratic government!
Ya, democratic to the Zionist soul and Zionist to the Arabic soul,
That is to say, what is forbidden to him is forbidden to me,
And what is allowed to him is forbidden to me.
And what is allowed to me is unwanted by me,
Because it is denying my existence.
Still blind to my colors, my history and my people,
Brainwashing my children so that they grow up to a present
That doesn’t represent them, the blue id card is worth nothing to us.
Let us believe that we are a part of a nation,
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That does nothing but make us feel like strangers,
Me? A stranger in my own country!
The above lyrics written and performed by Mahmoud Jrere in the song 
“Gharib fi Biladi!” (Stranger in my own country) offer intriguing insight 
into many pertinent issues facing the nearly one million Palestinian citi-
zens of Israel. As descendants of the approximately 150,000 Palestinians 
not expelled from their homes in the war of 1948, these Palestinians (’48s) 
have remained physically close to their lands yet feel spiritually distant 
from their national community. Living as an ethnic minority within a 
Jewish state, they are subjected to harsh forms of overt and covert dis-
crimination. Citizenship, nationality, land ownership, and access to state 
resources are predicated on religion (Jewish versus non- Jewish) in de-
fining the rights and obligations of the individual and the state.6 Pales-
tinian Israelis often find themselves victimized by an ethnic democracy 
that gives preferential rights and opportunities to citizens of one religion 
(Judaism) at the expense of another (Christianity or Islam). In this song 
Jrere feels controlled by a Zionist government “democratic to the Zionist 
soul and Zionist to the Arabic soul.” He writes of his own dispossession 
by a government that does not recognize his existence as a Palestinian 
citizen of Israel, “blind to [his] colors, . . . people, . . . [and] history.” Jrere 
laments that his blue identity card, an envied index of opportunity and en-
franchisement among many Palestinians, means nothing without a sense 
of belonging to a nation. Without this belief in belonging, he remains a 
“stranger in his own country.”
As Palestinian citizens of Israel, nationals of Palestine, and members 
of a minority faith (Christianity or Islam), their condition in Israel re-
veals the social, cultural, and political boundaries of the national imagi-
nary. In Israel, Palestinian Israelis are widely perceived as a threat to the 
state’s “Jewish” character, a feared fifth column. Socially they are internal 
others marginalized in the poor neighborhoods of urban Tel Aviv, Ram-
lah, Lod, Haifa, Jaffa/Yaffa, the Israeli triangle, and the rural villages of the 
Galilee and Negev. Demographically they are viewed as the single largest 
threat to maintaining Jewish hegemony in the state.7 Likewise in the West 
Bank they are largely ignored and neglected as Palestinians who are bi-
tyūḥid (Judaized) and therefore unwilling to participate in the nationalist 
project. Among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and near dias-
pora they are both hated and envied, their blue identity cards and pass-
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ports signifying increased rights and privileges as Israeli citizens and a 
presumed acceptance of the “Zionist state.”
Known colloquially as ’48s, that is Palestinians of ’48, Palestinian 
Israelis have throughout post–al- nakba (1948) history often been a ne-
glected and misunderstood community.8 Today Palestinians number ap-
proximately 20 percent of Israel’s total population and represent a signifi-
cant ethnic minority. Politically Palestinian Israelis predominantly accept 
Israel’s right to exist as a state, have accepted their status as an ethnic mi-
nority within the Jewish democracy, and feel satisfied with their lives as 
Israeli citizens.9 What is more telling, based on survey research conducted 
in the mid- 1990s, 82.7 percent of Palestinian Israelis polled answered that 
they would prefer to be citizens of Israel than any other country and that 
they believed that it is possible to change the Arab condition substantially 
through standard democratic procedures.10 These democratic procedures 
were exercised most effectively in the Labor- Meretz governments of the 
early 1990s. In the parliamentary elections of 1996 an estimated 77 per-
cent of the Palestinian Israeli population voted, nearly equivalent to the 
national average.11 When asked if they would prefer to live in a Jewish 
democratic state rather than an Arab nondemocratic state, a substantial 
85.6 percent answered affirmatively. In relation to the plo and the pro-
posed formation of a Palestinian state, 95.8 percent reported that they 
would not consider moving to any future Palestinian state. And 74.3 per-
cent reported that Palestinian communities in Israel should remain an 
integral part of the Israeli state in final status negotiations.12
The question of names is one of critical importance to issues of iden-
tity and community. Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel (both Christian 
and Muslim) largely refer to themselves in conversation as Palestinians 
or more generally as Arabs. An important study of Palestinian university 
students in Israel found that the preference is to define oneself as Pales-
tinian in Israel (43.5 percent).13 Other options were Palestinian Arab (25.7 
percent), Israeli Palestinian (10.6 percent), Palestinian Arab in Israel (5.5 
percent), Palestinian (4.1 percent), Israeli (2.7 percent), and Israeli Arab 
(1.4 percent). What is especially interesting is that the two labels most as-
cribed to this community by the Israeli and Palestinian governments, and 
most heard in American and international media, “Israeli Arab” and “Pal-
estinian,” were among the least popular choices. The students clearly did 
not see themselves as either purely Israeli Arab or Palestinian. Further-
more the use of “Israeli Arab,” a very common term since 1948 in official 
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Israeli state discourse, was felt to deny a distinct Palestinian national con-
sciousness and presence.14
What distinguishes ’48 Palestinians from those in the Occupied Terri-
tories and in diaspora is a conflicted issue that has received far too little 
attention in the literature on Palestinian identity. Among ’48s there is a 
penchant for labeling oneself as “someone who remained in the home-
land” or as a “Palestinian who did not run from the Jews in 1948” and 
who has remained “steadfast in preserving the nation.” And yet among 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Jordan, ’48s are colloquially derided 
as “traitors and collaborators to the nationalist cause.” They are Pales-
tinians who speak fluent Hebrew, benefit from the Israeli economy, and 
are largely unwilling to join the intifada. In fact in instances where Pales-
tinian villages in Israel were proposed to be ceded to the Palestinian Au-
thority, local residents have insisted that they remain a part of Israel. In 
studies on the ramifications of a proposed Palestinian state, 79.2 percent 
of Palestinian Israelis polled stated that they would remain loyal to Israel 
and that they did not consider the plo representative of their interests as 
Palestinians in Israel.15
DAM
Over the course of their short careers the three members of dam, Tamer 
Nafar, Mahmoud Jrere, and Suheil Nafar, have been the subject of wide-
spread international media coverage (see figure 8.3). Indeed their novelty 
as Israel’s first Palestinian hip- hop crew rapping in Hebrew, Arabic, and 
English has drawn the attention of the bbc, cnn, online news agencies, 
Rolling Stone, and a host of other various arts and culture magazines. They 
have performed at music festivals throughout Israel and the West Bank 
and throughout Europe and North America. Lead rapper Tamer Nafar 
has been interviewed in radio and television broadcasts throughout the 
Middle East and Europe and was featured in several award- winning docu-
mentaries: Channels of Rage, by the Israeli filmmaker Anat Halachmi; 
Slingshot Hip- Hop, by Jacqueline Salloum; and Checkpoint Rock: Songs 
from Palestine, by Javier Corcuera and Fermin Muguruza.16
dam has also built a large following of fans throughout Jewish and Pal-
estinian communities in Israel. In the posh discothèques of Tel Aviv dam 
has become a leading hip- hop performer alongside Jewish artists such 
as Subliminal, Shadow, and Hadag Nasach. Among the Israeli political 
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left, dam has built a strong following among Jewish fans by performing 
at antioccupation rallies and demonstrations. Likewise, dam is also quite 
popular in the largely Palestinian cafés and nightclubs of the northern 
Galilee. Here, too, dam has enjoyed great success performing at nation-
alist rallies in support of the intifada. Even in areas of the West Bank dam 
has developed a loyal following of Palestinian fans. dam’s ability to move 
among these various local, national, regional, and international musical 
scenes is what has attracted such focused media attention.
early rap inFluences and explorations
The idea to form a rap group came to Tamer Nafar in 1999. He, his brother, 
and his close friend decided to create the first Palestinian rap group in 
the Middle East. Their goal was to develop a new sound that reflected 
their Arab ancestry, their Israeli upbringing, and their love for Ameri-
can hip- hop culture. This love first began while they were watching Spike 
Lee movies about the black experience in urban America. The imagery 
of urban neglect, racial discrimination, ethnic inequality, and minority 
empowerment was all too familiar to the group. Rap was a music that 
spoke to them in ways that no other music could. “Rap is the language 
Figure 8.3. ✹ dam ( from left: Tamer Nafar, Suheil Nafar, Mahmoud Jrere). 
Photograph by dam (2011).
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of protest and challenge . . . it is the language of the youth that expresses 
their feelings and thoughts,” Mahmoud Jrere explained in an interview 
in Bethlehem.17 Their own experiences living as Palestinians in an Israeli 
slum inspired them to create their own rhymes similar to those of their 
American rap heroes.
The group was named dam with this sense of hybridity and empower-
ment in mind. First, dam is derived from the Arabic root d- ū- m, to be 
everlasting, immortal, or eternal. In Hebrew, dam means blood. In En-
glish, dam serves as an acronym for the phrase ‘Da Arabic Microphone 
Controller (mc). As Suheil Nafar explained it to me in 2005, “when put 
together dam has the total meaning, even if you attack us with blood, Da 
Arabic Microphone is eternal.”18
In the beginning dam’s music was largely an imitation of their Ameri-
can rap heroes. Sung in English, over beats taken directly off American 
records, dam tried to appropriate much of the American racial discourse 
into their own interpretations of their subordinate status in Israel. Tupac 
Shakur, Black Star, Notorious B.I.G., Common, Public Enemy, and others 
were their sources for inspiration and tutelage. “It was easier for us to 
rhyme in English, but we soon realized that our message wouldn’t be 
heard unless we started to sing in Arabic and Hebrew.” This early period 
of writing and singing was one of self- exploration and experimentation. 
In an interview with fellow rappers on an Internet blog Tamer wrote:
Up until the age of 17 I was writing all kinds of love songs, until 
I met Pac’s [Tupac Shakur’s] music. So I created a bubble called, 
“Hey, I’m the negro of the Middle East.” When Pac says, “how 
my brothers fell victims to the streets,” I was answering him with 
names of my late friends . . . dying here from drive bys. . . . So I 
published my first lp, “stop sellin’ drugz.” Then I studied crime 
knowledge [criminology] and noticed that there is a reason for 
crime, like poverty, unemployment . . . basically political reasons. 
But still I chose to ignore politics because I wanted to succeed. I 
was a coward until . . . one of my closest friends died from a drive 
by so I said, “fuck it, even if I am not touching it, it is touching me,” 
and began my lyrical war, began to be real . . . and what threw more 
gas on to my fire was that same month, when the second intifada 
began, Black October, that got me . . . back to my Palestinian roots, 
and I noticed that all my life (tv, books, school, environment) was 
246 ✹ New Directions and Modalities
created by Israel only to make me unconnected to my roots. So I 
started writing songs for the young Arabs to shorten their process 
of getting them to their roots in a way that I didn’t have.19
The above passage was quoted at length in order to convey the written 
thoughts of the author but also to reveal the process by which Nafar had 
internalized rap music to the extent that it was the most natural and ap-
propriate means for communicating his messages of resistance to the cul-
ture of drugs and crime that had gripped his community. However, what 
is especially interesting about these comments is Nafar’s usage of Ameri-
can hip- hop style to reclaim his “Palestinian roots.” Given the long history 
of “roots” music and dance, the rigid structures of national identity, and 
the dominance of cultural nationalists in the production of Palestinian 
music, how could rap music possibly index Palestinian roots? With this in 
mind, I asked Tamer directly how an African American music could help 
anyone discover their Palestinian ancestry. His response was quite telling, 
and is also worth quoting at length.
tn: It is spiritual . . . it is the things they say, the things they 
describe, it is the things I see. When they [rappers] describe 
something in hip- hop I don’t close my eyes and try to imagine 
a movie. When he [Tupac Shakur] says something about some 
guy who got a drive- by, I see pictures that I have seen in my 
life. . . . When he [Tupac Shakur] was saying that it is a white 
man’s world, this is what I see here. [Quoting Tupac lyrics] 
“They want you to pump your fist against a stone boy. You are 
going to hurt yourself.” So it is the same as what I see here. 
And “they say it is the white man I should fear, but it is my own 
kind doing the killing here.” That is Lyd. . . . So basically this 
is how it started, this is the connection to hip- hop; this is the 
connection to Tupac. This is first, then you grow up and you 
see that it is bigger than that. They have this four hundred years 
of slavery, we have our occupation. They have the speeches of 
Malcolm X . . . who got killed, and we have Naji al- Ali, who got 
assassinated.20 It is the big picture, and we just need this spot 
that you can see it. And get connected to this spot and then you 
can open your eyes and see the whole picture.
dm: But this is not Palestinian music . . .
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tn: What are you talking about, shaʿbī [Palestinian indigenous 
music] ? . . . So for me to be Palestinian I have to sing wedding 
songs about olive trees or farming or goats? What does that have 
to do with my life here and now?
Tamer’s life here and now is what especially motivated him to begin 
singing out against what he perceived to be gross inequalities between 
Jewish and non- Jewish citizens of Israel. Moreover this very honest as-
sessment of past Palestinian protest song underscores several of the rea-
sons artists such as Kamal Khalil were unsuccessful in bringing back the 
nationalist songs of the past. The tired clichés of olive trees, the land, and 
rural practice no longer resonated with a new generation of Palestinian 
youth living on the urban peripheries of the nation- state. His own neigh-
borhood offered the inspiration, style, and aesthetics for his writing. In 
addition, coming to terms with the murder of a close friend animated his 
pursuit of social change. But above all, the single most important moment 
in dam’s artistic lives happened in the first week of October 2000.
october 2000 and the outbreak  
oF the al- aqsa intiFada
The events of September 28, 2000—when Likud party leader Ariel Sharon 
forcibly entered the Temple Mount/Haram al- Sharif, igniting the al- Aqsa 
intifada—have been detailed in previous chapters along with their effects 
on and ramifications for Palestinian music in the Occupied Territories 
and near diaspora. However, these events had an incredibly powerful 
effect on Palestinians living in Israel, as well. As violence spread through 
the streets of East Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank, so, too, did Pales-
tinian gatherings in Israel spread through the streets of Nazareth, Umm 
al- Fahm, Haifa, and several smaller villages in the Galilee, to protest the 
vicious incitement by Sharon as well as the violent response by the Israeli 
army. Watching the horrors of the fighting on television, where Israeli 
police confronted stone- throwing demonstrators with armored vehicles, 
Apache helicopters, and live ammunition, Palestinian Israelis became in-
creasingly outraged. Palestinian deputy Mohammad Kanaan of the Israeli 
Knesset stated, “We are an integral part of the Palestinian Arab people 
and we cannot remain motionless when faced with the deaths of children 
and other horrors that are taking place in the Occupied Territories.”21
Many took to the streets in solidarity with Palestinians suffering under 
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occupation. However, these internal demonstrations revealed a political 
crisis brewing since Ehud Barak’s election in 1999. Barak’s government 
made a great effort to elicit votes from the Palestinian population on a 
platform of ethnic and economic reform. Accordingly, Palestinians came 
out in large numbers to support his platform only to see little change 
in the policies of the government after election. Their concerns with the 
gross disparities in employment, living conditions, social programs, and 
education were largely ignored, only exacerbating feelings of political and 
social dispossession. Deputy Mohammad Kanaan went on to say, “Our 
demonstrations also express the frustration of the one million Israeli 
Arabs faced with the striking inequality with Jews.”22 It seems the ini-
tial demonstrations of Israel’s Palestinian communities were a product of 
sympathy for the intifada as well as the continued discriminatory policies 
of the Israeli state.
Within the first four days of the rioting thirteen Palestinian Israelis 
were killed and more than two hundred injured by Israeli police. The 
deaths of these thirteen Israelis sparked outrage throughout the country, 
for it marked the first time in nearly thirty years that Palestinian Israelis 
were killed in demonstrations against the state. Funerals held in each of 
the villages quickly turned to stone throwing and mass vandalism. Roads 
leading to and from Palestinian areas in the Galilee were blocked, and riot 
police were called in to quell the disturbances. What was perhaps most 
damaging, however, was the way several of these demonstrators were 
killed. Eyewitnesses at the scene in Arabeh described to the media how 
they watched seventeen- year- old Asil Asleh beaten by soldiers and then 
shot in the neck.23 Others were shot by long-range snipers positioned on 
rooftops as they stood in crowds. And one victim reportedly died from 
stab wounds by police forces. The brutality of the police reaction, as well 
as widespread outrage across the political spectrum, brought to fore an 
ethnic conflict that had been gaining momentum for many years. Despite 
the formation of a special inquiry into the government response to the 
riots, little action was taken to assuage the fears of the Palestinian com-
munity or against the police responsible for the deaths.24
At the heart of the issue, however, was a crisis of identity: Palestinian 
Israelis who had lived for over a generation at peace with their Jewish 
neighbors were suddenly confronted with Israeli brutality against their 
Palestinian friends and family members. As the violence erupted in Jeru-
salem, and the Israeli military mobilized its response to the rioting, Pal-
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estinian Israelis were confronted with powerful images of national af-
filiation. However, in taking to the streets, the Israeli police treated the 
Israeli protestors of Nazareth, Arabeh, Sakhnin, and Jat as though they 
were those in Gaza or Ramallah. The ideational disconnect came in seeing 
their state apparatuses engage internal protests as if they were facing an 
external adversary. All of the signs of loyalty to the Israeli state put forth 
by Palestinian Israelis, the efforts to speak Hebrew, hold jobs, and partici-
pate in social and political life seemed irrelevant given the Israeli army’s 
deadly response to their demonstrations.
The horrible events of Black October had a significant effect on the 
direction of dam’s music. If experiencing firsthand the effects of social 
neglect had inspired dam to speak out against drugs and crime in their 
earlier work, watching Black October unfold only solidified their resolve 
to sing against the occupation as well. Speaking of the protestors in an 
interview with Reuters, Tamer Nafar explains, “I feel for them. I feel the 
attack against me and my people and I have something to say. I write it in 
rhymes and I do it in rap. Some guys burn tires, some shoot guns, this is 
my way” (emphasis added).25 Later in the same interview Nafar explains 
the effect the protests have had on his work: “It kills me. It leads me to hate 
the government even more, since the protestors are fighting for us and 
for what belongs to us. Still I don’t know exactly where I fit in. I know the 
Palestinians are aggressive, but they have suffered for years under Israel. 
And the bottom line to us and to them is the same, death to Arabs” (em-
phasis added).26
Nafar’s shifting of the pronouns “us” and “them” is especially indica-
tive of his conception of being both and yet neither Palestinian nor Israeli. 
“They” (the Palestinians under occupation) are his people fighting for 
“us” (Palestinian Israelis), and “they” (Palestinians under occupation) 
have suffered under Israel. Yet both (us and them) are suffering from the 
same political discourse of “death to Arabs.” As the violence escalated 
many Palestinians in Israel felt pulled in multiple directions. Tamer’s dif-
ficulty in articulating his dissected loyalties speak to this ideational crisis. 
In each case the established national construct had failed to account for 
these margins.
To memorialize the event, Tamer Nafar folded the names of each of 
the thirteen victims into a verse of the song “Gharib fi Biladi” (Stranger 
in my own country). In Arabic it is common for proper names to have 
specific meanings or roots describing characteristics, qualities, or actions. 
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Through an ingenious play of meaning, Nafar fashioned a coherently 
powerful verse of Palestinian resistance poetry using each of the thir-
teen names. For ease of reading, the translation of the verse is provided, 
marking each of the names in capital letters together with their meaning.
13 Martyrs, death is close when the stones are in the hand.
13 Martyrs the ala [elevated status] of our land, and the emad 
[foundation].
Black October proved that eyad [support/strength] is in our blood.
Everyone of them was walid [born] under occupation,
But still ramy [throwing] himself like a sharp stone,
Fighting the disease of those who think our blood is worthless.
Killing the musleh [the righteous] voices with live ammunition.
And the mother shouts, I am assil [falling down],
On Christ’s and mohammad’s cheek.
We are like a mountain that won’t be shaken by any wind or any 
storm.
We will remain rameZ [the image] of the nation, and the wissam 
[the badge] of freedom.
The light of our great grandparents will never fade away.
I’m a stranger in my own country, but I ahmad [praise] God,
That I’m still attached to my culture.
All of you can call us renegades or the inner Arabs or the Arabs 
of ’48.
Whatever, we’ll remain the roots of Palestine until the omar [the 
end of time].27
In prose, metaphor, and meaning this passage reveals a close relation-
ship with the established archetype of Palestinian protest song from the 
1970s and 1980s, even if it plays on, develops, and transcends the stock 
lexicon of nationalist myth and metaphor. Most notable of these are refer-
ences to stones, to the land, and the unwavering loyalty of a united Pales-
tinian nation. In addition Nafar brings in powerful allusions to birth and 
motherhood. The plight of the mother of the martyred (umm al- shahīd) 
is played out within a combined reference to Christianity and Islam, not 
unlike the ways this same trope was employed by Abu Arab and Nuh 
Ibrahim (see chapters 2 and 3). The people are “like a mountain” facing a 
wind and storm (of Zionism). And through this engagement the people 
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are an emblem of the nation and of freedom, proclaiming strength from 
generations (great grandparents) of attachment to the land.
However it is in the final two lines of this verse that Nafar breaks from 
the traditional rhetoric of political poetry and confronts a slightly differ-
ent, internal audience. In the lines “All of you can call us renegades or the 
inner Arabs or the Arabs of ’48. Whatever, we’ll remain the roots of Pales-
tine until the end of time,” there is a momentary yet significant shift. “All 
of you” can be interpreted to mean both Israeli Jews who commonly use 
the term “Arabs” to deny a Palestinian national identity, as well as Arabs 
in general who position ’48 Palestinians outside their national struggle. 
Palestinians in exile or in the Occupied Territories commonly use the 
terms “inner Arabs” and “ ’48s” to refer to Palestinian Israelis. It would be 
very unlikely for Israelis to use the term “inner Arabs” as it reinforces a 
Palestinian indigeneity that runs counter to Israeli nationalist myth. This 
particular use of the word renegade/traitor (khā iʾn) is significant in that it 
is employed in several other dam songs to mean Palestinians in collabo-
ration with Israel. From the Arabic root kh- ū- n (to be disloyal or faithless, 
to betray), khāʾin is a powerful epithet calling forth a betrayal of faith and 
treachery against the nation. To be called khāʾin in this context implies 
that someone is a traitor to his or her Palestinian ancestry and complicit 
in Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands. In a previous verse of “Gharib 
fi Biladi!” Suheil Nafar uses the term renegade similarly.
Raised in poverty, and poverty is the only thing in our minds,
But our hearts are still beating and our Arabian roots are still 
strong,
[But still our Arabian brothers are] calling us renegades! nooooo!
We never sold our country, the occupation wrote our destiny,
Which is, that the whole world until today treats us as Israeli,
and Israel until tomorrow will treat us as Palestinians.
I’m a stranger in my own country.
The word “renegade/traitor” in this song signifies a dual object. In 
both cases the artists are defending themselves from being labeled traitors 
from an outside force. The first example is ambiguous as to who makes 
up that force, Israeli Jews or Arabs. The line can be interpreted both ways. 
The second example is equally unclear. However, the original handwritten 
translation provided to me by Suheil Nafar included the bracketed words 
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“But still our Arabian brothers are” calling us renegades. Given that this 
line is not a part of the sung lyrics or the published translation, I inquired 
as to its meaning. Suheil and Tamer seemed unfazed by my inquiry. Su-
heil explained, “We are called renegades by both sides” (Israel and Pales-
tine). “That is why we are strangers in our own country.” His position 
was that they feel as though they are strangers twice over, dispossessed 
by both their state (Israel) and their nation (Palestine). The above trans-
lation, however, was provided to me by the artists themselves over a year 
before its public release. When the album finally hit the shelves, the very 
important bracketed phrase “But still our Arabian brothers are” was omit-
ted from the translation, further obfuscating to whom they are referring. 
In my opinion the reason for this omission was to soften their criticism 
of the Palestinian community who would most likely refer to them as 
“inner Arabs.”
The deaths of thirteen demonstrators were the linchpin for drawing 
dam into this struggle on two fronts. In seeking reform internally as well 
as an end to the occupation dam is making an important assertion of 
identity toward both Israeli and Palestinian national narratives. As Nafar 
admits, he doesn’t know exactly where he fits in all of this. The failure of 
the nationalist paradigm to account for hybrid, fragmented, and other-
wise disconnected segments of the national imaginary is perhaps the 
 reason.
 “posh’im ḤaFim mi’pesha”  
(hebrew: innocent criminals)
Within a matter of weeks after Black October, dam had completed the 
recording and editing of its first mainstream Hebrew song. The title, 
“Innocent Criminals,” speaks to the widespread feelings of fear and frus-
tration felt by Palestinian Israelis experiencing internal unrest at the be-
ginning of the al- Aqsa intifada. The violent clashes between the Israeli 
army and the citizenry only exacerbated the perception that Palestinians 
in Israel were second- class citizens, widely suspected and feared as poten-
tial terrorists. For dam, “Innocent Criminals” marked their first politi-
cized venture into the mainstream Israeli rap scene. Up until this point, 
dam had performed predominantly as a Palestinian or ethnic counter-
part to the established Mizrahi Jewish rap artists Subliminal and Shadow. 
In these performances dam would routinely be called up onstage along-
side their Jewish counterparts. Their niche was that they represented 
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the young, angry, hardcore Palestinian Israeli youth straight out of Lyd’s 
ghetto. As time went on, however, dam grew tired of rapping only in He-
brew in front of a Jewish audience largely unresponsive to their messages 
of Israeli state racism and inequality. The riots of 2000 only served to 
distance the artists further as Subliminal and Shadow began to take up 
a right- wing “hawkish” political stance in their music regarding the out-
break of the intifada and the strengthening of the Israeli occupation.28
In recording “Innocent Criminals” dam took a new direction, going 
directly to the Israeli mainstream. They wrote an amazingly powerful 
assault on the establishment and sought to be the voice of Palestinian 
Israelis suffering the consequences of the intifada. During the escalation 
of the fighting, searches and detainment were commonplace on the Israeli 
streets, and calls for the outright “transfer” of Palestinians across the river 
to Jordan were routine in Israeli media. For dam this was an important 
opportunity to state the case for Palestinian ethnic rights from within the 
Israeli state. Set to the music of Tupac Shakur’s “Hail Mary,” dam’s “Inno-
cent Criminals” speaks to issues of racism, equality, and reconciliation be-
tween Israel’s Jewish and non- Jewish citizens.
The minority is opening its mouth,
You say the Arabs are primitive,
You say the Arabs are aggressive,
You say we are criminals and barbarians, we aren’t
But just in case we are, this is what the government has done to us
Before you get me, before you feel me,
Slip into my shoes and your feet will hurt
Because we are the innocent criminals
Where is the equality when I live in a shack?
And he lives in a rich neighborhood
When I am not mentioned in the national anthem
There is a problem here, isn’t there?
Where is the peace? There isn’t any peace.
And where there isn’t any peace, there is a checkpoint for every 
dream.
Perhaps the most important theme in this passage is the artists’ plea 
for acceptance and tolerance in Israeli society. Nafar begins by trying to 
dispel the connotation that Arabs are inherently aggressive and primitive. 
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He beseeches the Jewish majority to understand the very real social issues 
that shape both the Palestinian condition in Israel as well as the ethnic 
relations between Jews and Palestinians. The events of October 2000 re-
vealed a striking discontinuity in the ways the Israeli police approached or 
confronted Palestinian citizens. “Jews demonstrate, the police take clubs 
in hand. . . . Arabs demonstrate, and the police take their lives.” Above all, 
however, “Innocent Criminals” should be read as an attempt to amelio-
rate the strife between Jews and Palestinians within the Israeli state. This is 
inherently an ethnic engagement, through which the subordinate ethnic 
group seeks greater access within the state social and political economy. 
Here Nafar is not singing for the destruction of the state and its Jewish 
dominant order. Nor is Nafar singing for the outright establishment of a 
state in the territories for the benefit of all Palestinians. Rather “Innocent 
Criminals” appeals for acceptance, to be heard, from within the state’s 
dominant order. For this to occur Nafar implores the Israeli Jewish main-
stream to “walk in [his] shoes.” In order for there to be understanding be-
tween the two communities, Jews must try to reconcile rigid structures of 
discrimination against and social neglect of the Palestinian Israeli popu-
lation. Nafar notes that the non- Jewish population is not represented or 
included in the Israeli national anthem. The answer, from this song, is one 
of mutual respect and understanding between two Israeli communities, 
meaning that in order for there to be peace, Israel must confront its non- 
Jewish ethnic self. “Otherwise, we will all be innocent criminals.”
innocent criminals collaboration with aviv geFen
In November 2002 Israeli pop star Aviv Gefen stumbled upon a copy of 
“Innocent Criminals” on the Internet and immediately saw a unique op-
portunity for collaboration. Gefen soon contacted Tamer Nafar with the 
idea of reworking “Innocent Criminals” so as to bring it to a much larger 
mainstream Israeli audience. Gefen believed that there was a unique op-
portunity for Israelis to engage a dissenting viewpoint, one that criticizes 
Israeli discriminatory practices against its Palestinian population as well 
as the discourses of violence and blind nationalism espoused by Pales-
tinian leadership. He saw dam as a cultural outgrowth of a new genera-
tion of Palestinian Israelis who, while struggling to secure equal footing 
within the Israeli political spectrum, were nonetheless coming to terms 
with their position as an ethnic minority. Knowing full well that without 
his support such a song would likely never gain access to mainstream 
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television and radio, Gefen decided to sponsor the production personally, 
financing the recording and editing as well as a large- scale music video.
Gefen, no stranger to political controversy, could not have anticipated 
how the Israeli music industry would react to the release of this collabo-
ration. Initially the single was censored. “No radio station would risk 
playing it,” recounts Tamer Nafar. However, posted on several websites, 
estimates were that the song was downloaded nearly twenty thousand 
times.29 Sustained interest in the song convinced television producers 
to broadcast “Innocent Criminals” on prime- time Israeli television. Al-
though dam had performed on national television in the past, this par-
ticular performance, with its vivid political message and imagery, had 
a sizeable impact and resulted in a great deal of publicity for the group.
For Gefen the broadcast signaled an important step toward freedom 
of speech and artistic expression in Israeli society. Yet the difficulties in 
getting “Innocent Criminals” recorded and later broadcast were as reveal-
ing as its successes. Although Gefen was widely known as a maverick, a 
rebel, and “the bad boy” of Israeli pop because he had taken controversial 
political positions in his music and lifestyle, “Innocent Criminals” high-
lighted unexpected difficulties that even Gefen had yet to encounter. In 
“Innocent Criminals” Nafar sings, “Step into my shoes and your feet will 
hurt.” When asked by a journalist in 2003 if in the process of making this 
song he did indeed “step into his [Nafar’s] shoes,” Gefen replied, “I’m try-
ing, but after I saw that our single was simply censored in Israel—it wasn’t 
played on any radio station—I realized how heavy and quite dirty these 
shoes are. . . . I realized how difficult it is to be an Arab Israeli.”30
Despite many aesthetic and political differences between these two art-
ists, Nafar and Gefen do share a passion for their craft and a calling to 
sing about the pressing issues they face as Israeli citizens. At moments 
the collaboration succeeds in bringing together two musicians attempt-
ing to push the envelope of freedom of expression. At other times the two 
find themselves polar opposites in their political beliefs. In his interview 
commentary Nafar often makes reference to various “inner occupations” 
(geographic, social, economic, psychological), claiming that Palestinians 
of ’48, as their brethren in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip, are 
still under Israeli occupation of a different type. Moreover, in a nationally 
televised interview, Nafar stated that he understood the motivations be-
hind the current wave of suicide bombings in Israel.31 To him there was 
no difference between a suicide bomber and a soldier, for they both kill 
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indiscriminately. Seated next to the rapper, Gefen immediately retreated, 
resulting in an eerie silence of shock and amazement. In later interviews 
Gefen remarked that while he certainly did not agree with Nafar, he sup-
ported and respected his right to freely express his opinion.32 This sup-
port extended to financing the collaboration as well as inviting dam to 
perform in several concerts. In the press leading up to its release Gefen 
expressed a social need for dissenting voices to be heard in the Israeli 
music industry, saying, “As an artist and as an Arab it is his [Nafar’s] duty 
to shout his protest . . . and I will help him in this.”33
Ultimately dam’s appeal to mainstream Israeli society through this col-
laboration with Aviv Gefen did not achieve its intended effect. Although 
dam had found a much larger audience, accessed the Israeli mainstream, 
and had garnered several large- scale performance opportunities, the po-
litical climate at the time was far less responsive to dissenting viewpoints 
in the so- called war on terror. Because of their political statements dam 
could not find opportunities to perform in front of Jewish rap audiences 
and instead took the initiative to begin performing specifically for Pales-
tinian audiences in Israel and the West Bank.
Their frustrations in trying to build a rap audience among Palestini-
ans unfamiliar with or put off by American pop culture forms were com-
pounded, however. In several interviews at the time all three members 
of the group admitted difficulties in engaging Palestinian audiences un-
familiar with hip- hop style. Among these audiences the political message 
was easily accepted, though the form for the performance became a sub-
ject of controversy. “There were times when we performed in front of four 
or five people,” Tamer recounted for me in an interview in Bethlehem. “I 
have often thought about writing a song about the history of rap . . . who 
the main rappers are and how to dance to it. That way we can create a rap 
scene for Arabs outside of [Israeli] Jews, and they will better understand 
what it is we are trying to do.”
As the siege of the West Bank continued unabated throughout the 
summer of 2002, political resistance to the occupation strengthened 
among Palestinian Israelis. More and more ’48s began to voice their opin-
ions through political demonstrations of Palestinian nationalism. Images 
of the assault on Gaza and the West Bank were broadcast daily through 
national and international media. The rise of Arab satellite news channels 
such as al- Jazeera, al- ʿArabiya, and al- Sharqiya became instrumental in 
shaping how the struggle was represented in the media and had a substan-
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tial effect on Palestinian Israeli public opinion. dam, for its part, began to 
tack with the rising winds of Palestinian nationalism, writing new songs 
in Arabic on nationalist themes and performing at protests in Palestinian 
communities in the Galilee and the West Bank. If they began their careers 
as struggling rappers trying to make it in the Israeli Jewish hip- hop scene, 
by mid-2002 dam had transformed itself into a purely Arabic- speaking 
rap group dedicated to growing a Palestinian rap audience. Whether this 
transformation was a result of purely political motivations or the need to 
develop new markets for their work is difficult to say.
In content and lyrical device their writing was closely aligned with the 
established tradition of intifada song. Most notably in politics dam had 
begun to write from a position of Palestinian solidarity and calling for 
an end to the occupation. The ethnic relations between Jewish and Pales-
tinian Israelis soon transitioned into a national engagement of Israel and 
Palestine. In an interview with an Israeli radio station in 2002 Nafar re-
counted how he saw no “difference between an Arab terrorist that blows 
himself up among twenty thirteen- year- olds and a soldier that goes in 
and shoots them.” He went on to say, “Just because a soldier wears a uni-
form doesn’t make him a terrorist.” “I think they are both terrorists” (em-
phasis added).34
 “Min Irhabi?” (Who’s the Terrorist?)  
and the Discourse of Terrorism
Building on this sentiment dam released its most famous song to date, 
“Min Irhabi?” (Who’s the terrorist?). Coupled with a powerfully edited 
video by Udi Aloni, “Min Irhabi?” is a scathing critique of the dominant 
political discourse that reads terrorism as the manifestation of blind Arab 
anger against the “civilized” world. In it dam speaks out against the vio-
lence of the occupation, the routine assault on innocent lives, and the col-
lective punishment of nearly five million Palestinians living under foreign 
occupation. Further dam sets out to reveal the gross inequality in force 
and consequence brought to bear on the Palestinian people. More to the 
point, in experiencing the horrors of the occupation both in their daily 
lives as well as during their intermittent travels to the West Bank, dam 
were mobilized to write against the effects of the discourse of terrorism. 
This discourse had served to create the commonsense perception that 
Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation in the territories was manifest 
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“terror” against the “liberated,” “civilized,” “free” world. Israel, taking its 
cue from the American neoconservative administration, had fashioned 
itself a humane retaliatory force seeking only to protect itself from “waves 
of terror” by “extremists.” The various forms of collective punishment 
leveled against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories in the form of the 
Israeli “security/apartheid” wall, the networks of checkpoints, routine in-
cursions into Palestinian towns, and forced curfews were legitimized as 
necessary tools of national security rather than as acts of terror against 
a civilian population. Terror, in this politicized equation, was defined as 
only acts of violence directed against civilians by organizations and indi-
viduals “hostile to Israel.”35
Seeking to interrogate this discourse dam asks the question, “Who Is 
the Terrorist?” The video begins with a quotation by former United States 
attorney general Ramsey Clark. “We’ve had fifty years of assault on Pal-
estinian rights. I think they are the most terrorized . . . people on earth, 
and have been for so many years. Practically every Palestinian lives in 
constant harassment, threat of violence, humiliation, [and] it’s been that 
way for a long, long time.” Quietly underneath Clark’s comments Tamer 
Nafar is heard opening the song, repeating over and over, “Min irhabi?” 
Accompanying Nafar, a solo female voice sings a traditional mawwāl im-
mediately before the outset of the sampled beats. As the introduction rises 
in dynamic level, the initial beat is given and Tamer Nafar sings,
Who’s the terrorist? I’m the terrorist?
How can I be the terrorist when I am living in my own homeland?
Who’s the terrorist? You’re the terrorist.
You’ve taken everything I own while I am living in my own 
homeland.
dam does not appear throughout the video. Rather their disembod-
ied voices narrate a collage of images and video footage of Israeli attacks 
on Palestinian civilians. Israeli soldiers are shown firing on Palestinian 
youths. Families, women, and children are held at gunpoint, “terrorized” 
by faceless Israeli soldiers. Following this the video shows the infamous 
image of Mohammad al- Durra, hiding behind his father in Gaza, mo-
ments before his murder in September 2000. Helicopters are shown firing 
missiles into Palestinian towns, and bulldozers chew up groves of olive 
trees and demolish houses, leaving the elderly crying on top of the rubble. 
Children confronting tanks with rocks in hand are glorified as heroes 
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while other images show protestors running through the streets avoid-
ing arrest and gunfire. One of the longest continuous scenes involves an 
unarmed Palestinian man being severely beaten by a circle of Israeli sol-
diers. They take turns with their boots, clubs, and stones, pummeling the 
young man. At one point a soldier holds out his victim’s arm while an 
accomplice breaks it solidly with a large stone. The images are graphic, 
and at times difficult to watch. From the background Tamer Nafar angrily 
sings out.
You’re killing us like you killed our ancestors
You want me to go to the law?
What for? You’re the witness, the lawyer, and the judge
If you’re my judge, I’ll be sentenced to death
Your countless raping of the Arab soul has given birth to your child
Named the suicide bomber
And then you call him the terrorist
Later in the song Mahmoud Jrere raps about the Israeli military’s ap-
proach to the occupation.
I am not against peace, Peace is against me
It wants to destroy me and my heritage
Whoever speaks out, he is silenced and oppressed
And who are you? Just where did you grow up?
Take a look at how many you have killed and orphaned
Our mothers are crying, Our fathers are in anguish
Our land is disappearing, and who are you?
And I’ll tell you who you are
You grew up spoiled, we grew up in poverty
Who grew up in freedom? And who grew up in containment?
We fight for our freedom, But you have made that a crime
And you, the terrorist, call me the terrorist
Taken as a whole, the video forms a hodgepodge of images meant to 
magnify the overall theme that terrorism should be seen in light of the 
debilitating effects of Israeli terrorism on Palestinian daily life. And in 
this respect the video is a powerful documentation of Israeli state ter-
ror against Palestinian noncombatants. However, the video and the song 
both fall into a blind counterdiscourse without engaging the substan-
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tive issues of the discourse of “terrorism” itself. dam asks the rhetorical 
question “Who is the terrorist?” in an attempt to elicit an argumentative 
space where mutual acts of violence between Israelis and Palestinians are 
revealed. The very notion of the word terror needs to be revisited so as 
to include all acts of violence against a civilian population, regardless of 
technology, tactic, or method. Nafar’s earlier comments on the nature 
of terrorism are further explicated in this song—that to him, there is no 
difference between a suicide bomber and a uniformed soldier because 
they both kill indiscriminately. From this ideological position, resistance 
to Israeli terror is particularly difficult. dam’s opposition against the au-
thority of the Israeli occupation and its methods generates only a superfi-
cial reshuffling of the same lexicon of violent acts. It is an argumentative 
space of content, not of form. Though the video goes far to show Israeli 
collective punishment of Palestinians, it offers very little space for think-
ing outside the discourse of “terror.” Rather, it simply attempts to turn the 
discourse on its head, revealing the brutality of “civilized” Israeli warfare. 
In avoiding the larger discourse of terror itself, the video leaves intact 
many of the deeper axioms of power and knowledge which are employed 
to justify Israeli war crimes against Palestinians under occupation and 
vice versa.
Aesthetic Transformations from the Local  
to the National and Beyond
The release of “Min Irhabi?” signaled the culmination of dam’s aesthetic 
and political transformation from singing about drugs and crime in their 
local neighborhood, to singing about issues of ethnicity, racism, and dis-
crimination, and finally to singing about Palestinian nationalism and soli-
darity against the occupation. If at first their primary goals were to suc-
ceed in the Israeli mainstream hip- hop scene, sharing the stage with many 
of Israel’s most famous Jewish rappers, by the summer of 2002 dam had 
dedicated itself to rapping in front of Palestinian nationalist and trans-
national cosmopolitan audiences.
The aesthetic and political transformation of dam’s music reflects 
larger processes of identity formation commonplace among Palestinian 
Israeli communities. Confronted with the images of the al- Aqsa intifada 
dam began to reassess their position as a subordinate minority in the 
Israeli state and found comfort and inspiration in their Palestinian an-
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cestry. Moreover, through popular music, dam found social spaces where 
the fragments of their Israeli and Palestinian identities could be articu-
lated against and within various cultural frames. Ethnic engagement 
within a discriminatory state, racial discrimination, and daily problems 
of crime, drugs, and poverty were indexed by African American hip- hop. 
Refashioning Palestinian nationalist imagery within a contemporary 
transnational frame offered an alternative to the twenty- year- old intifada 
cassettes sold on the streets and better represented their cosmopolitan 
Palestinian Israeli identity. Navigating between conflicting nationalist 
discourses, dam found rap to be the most natural form for expressing 
such feelings.
This performative negotiation across and between nationalist frames 
brings to the fore the inherent hybridity of Palestinian Israeli lives. In the 
next chapter I focus specifically on how the poetics of dam’s music inter-
sected with the dominant Palestinian nationalist frame. While traveling 
with dam on a brief tour through the West Bank in 2005, I documented 
the various ways dam engaged myriad Palestinian audiences. What were 
the aesthetic moves necessary for dam to perform in front of a Palestinian 
audience in the West Bank? How was their music received? And what 
effect did their Israeli citizenship have for traditional modes of conceptu-
alizing the Palestinian nation?
9
 “carrying Words like Weapons”
DAM Brings Hip- Hop to the West Bank
Touring the West Bank
During the summer of 2005 dam embarked on a small tour in the West 
Bank with promotions at various radio stations and two large formal con-
certs in Ramallah and Bethlehem. The performances were a rare occur-
rence for dam at this time given the potential risks involved in traveling 
across the Green Line into the West Bank. Israelis, especially Palestinian 
Israelis, were prohibited from traveling into the West Bank or Gaza with-
out special permits. Carrying blue identity cards, dam risked long de-
tainment or arrest if they were stopped at any of the Israeli checkpoints. 
Entering the West Bank is a simple process of walking through unattended 
turnstiles or finding back roads without checkpoints. It is when trying to 
leave the West Bank that credentials must be presented, bags searched, 
and questions asked. The fear of being arrested convinced the group to 
take back roads through the Jordan valley to get from Ramallah to Beth-
lehem. The circuitous route extended the drive to well over two hours, 
whereas the actual distance between the two cities is only about twenty 
kilometers (about twelve miles). Even on these back roads, however, dam 
risked driving into an occasional “floating” or mobile checkpoint.
I was extremely interested in documenting these concerts as they rep-
resented a compelling opportunity to observe how youth in the West 
Bank might receive a group of Palestinian Israelis performing an African 
American popular music in support of the intifada. Previous fieldwork 
in Ramallah and Bethlehem had shown that American popular culture 
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was widely viewed as destructive to Palestinian society and its national-
ist aspirations during the initial years of the second intifada. American 
popular music, while freely available on the Internet, rarely made an ap-
pearance in the mainstream public sphere. Street- side kiosks in these two 
cities carried little American popular music, and of these, few if any rap 
titles. Even in the widely cosmopolitan city of Ramallah, American media 
(music, books, and movies) were far less visible than in other Arab cities 
like Amman or Beirut.
In speaking to young people on the street it was difficult to find any-
one who was familiar with rap. Those who knew something were of the 
general impression that it was low- class “black” music, without aesthetic 
value or meaning. Professional musicians in Ramallah active in the up-
rising had an even stronger reaction. Many of these musicians were dis-
turbed and even angered by the idea of Palestinians singing an American 
popular music. “Those musicians are simply bitāmrāk (Americanized) 
and bityūhid (Judaized).” Some went so far as to deny the rap artists’ Pal-
estinian identity all together. A prominent folklorist and performer of 
indigenous wedding song stated, “These are not real Palestinians. Where 
is their identity? Where is their loyalty to their own people?” Another 
musician stated, “I understand that they want to help us, but why can’t 
they do it in their own kind of music?”1 A director of an established music 
ensemble and self- proclaimed expert in Palestinian culture, history, and 
folklore went so far as to deny that there were any Palestinians in Lyd 
at all. “All of the Palestinians from Lyd were driven out in ’48; if there 
are any Arabs in Lyd they are just Bedouin who moved into the empty 
houses. These young guys are most likely just Bedouin trying to pose as 
 Palestinians.”
The most outlandish and incendiary comments were made by a promi-
nent Palestinian folklorist who believed that “Lyd was only populated 
with collaborators from the West Bank who had asked to be given Israeli 
citizenship.” The overt message implied here was that these musicians 
were descendants of traitors to their own people. But the unstated mes-
sage was one of intense anxiety that these young Palestinian musicians 
were performing a style of music associated with the United States. I 
was amazed at how strongly people reacted to my explanations of dam’s 
music. Even when couched in terms of resistance to the occupation and 
an end to Israeli racism against Palestinians, many musicians by and large 
were unable to see any similarities between “our music,” from the estab-
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lished tradition of Palestinian folklore, and “their music” blindly imitat-
ing the Western (that is, American/Israeli) world. If these initial reactions 
were any indication, the performances promised to be significant points 
of engagement between contrasting aesthetic and ideational frames.
On several occasions I confronted Tamer, Suheil, and Mahmoud 
about these comments and was dismissed each time. I asked, “What will 
you do differently in performing before a Palestinian audience that has 
never been exposed to rap and that additionally may not look favorably 
on Palestinians of ’48?” Their answers were simple. “We are all Palestini-
ans suffering from the same enemy, but in different ways. If there are 
people there who have a problem with us, it is their problem, not ours” 
(see figure 9.1).
On another level this tour offered a significant opportunity to docu-
ment the different ways dam approached various Palestinian audiences in 
performance. I had ample data concerning dam’s performances for largely 
Jewish audiences in Israel and was especially fascinated to see what types 
of code switching would be employed between the two discursive fields. 
Figure 9.1. ✹ dam ( from left: Suheil Nafar, Tamer Nafar, Mahmoud Jrere). 
Photograph by dam (2011).
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In language, dress, behavior, lyrics, and gesture, would dam perform any 
differently for Palestinians than for Jews? More than simply a matter of 
performance, how would dam navigate a different aesthetic field in Ra-
mallah? Could they convince a Palestinian audience in the heart of the 
West Bank that they really were “brothers suffering from the same enemy, 
but in different ways?” Would the style of music impede the message? 
Hip- hop culture had taken root in the more cosmopolitan Israeli popular 
music scene in the late 1990s. And in fact, there had been a small num-
ber of Palestinian attempts at hip- hop by groups like Sabreen. However, 
in Ramallah, hip- hop culture, its styles of dress, dance, posture, declama-
tion, and performative interaction, remained relatively unknown. Could 
the crowd see beyond the xxxl clothing and basketball high- tops to even 
hear the message of the music?
On the night of dam’s first performance I approached the Kasaba The-
atre in Ramallah one hour prior to the concert. My heart leapt as I saw 
perhaps one hundred teenagers standing outside trying unsuccessfully 
to get tickets. The concert had been sold out (see figure 9.2), and there 
were crowds waiting around the block trying to get tickets any way they 
Figure 9.2. ✹ dam concert flyer in Ramallah. Photograph by the author (2005).
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could. More and more people kept showing up. I paused in amazement 
only to realize that I had yet to buy a ticket. I never would have guessed 
so many people would show up. I stood outside the theater amongst the 
crowd planning my next move. In desperation I quickly made a phone 
call backstage. Tamer answered, in his customary urban American ac-
cent, “Wassup?”
“Tamer, the concert is sold out, and I can’t get tickets,” I explained.
“Sold out? How many people are out there?” he asked.
“There are at least a couple hundred waiting to get in, and another hun-
dred or so still looking for tickets.” Based on previous concerts I knew 
the theater’s capacity to be between two and three hundred. Flyers placed 
on the doors of the building warned that the concert had sold out earlier 
in the morning but said that there would be another show the following 
night in Bethlehem. For these young fans, however, the following night’s 
concert might as well have been in South Africa, given the severe hard-
ships for Ramallah residents to travel outside the city at night.
“Don’t worry, you’ll be onstage with us,” Tamer said reassuringly.
Standing outside the theater I asked several bystanders what their im-
pressions were of the group and of rap music in general. Most weren’t 
familiar with either but had seen advertisements for the group and wanted 
to check them out. Others knew of the political nature of the music and 
were expecting an intifada concert or rally. One teenager told me that he 
expected to hear the group sing famous intifada songs. Others thought 
that it was going to be a dance concert. Concert attendees were mixed 
equally between young men and women, wearing the typical Palestinian 
fashions of kufīya, flags, and t- shirts with political or nationalist pictures 
and messages. Whether it was the politics or the spectacle of seeing Pales-
tinians from Israel rap, in talking with groups of attendees it was clear that 
there was a general feeling of curiosity in the crowd.
True to his word, within twenty minutes Tamer had me escorted back-
stage, where dam was giving an interview with a local newspaper and 
posing for photographs with a young twelve- year- old Palestinian Ameri-
can girl and her father. The mood was light, but I could tell that the group 
was a bit nervous to be performing in Ramallah. Once the doors were 
opened I found a seat in the third row and waited for the concert to begin.
As the music started most in the crowd sat silently, not quite knowing 
how to react. In the back of the theater a large group of shabāb (youth) 
began to chant the usual Palestinian political slogan ubiquitous to any po-
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litical rally or concert. Birūḥ, bidam, nafdīk yā ʿArafāt! (By spirit, by blood, 
we will sacrifice ourselves for Arafat!).2 For any Palestinian political con-
cert or rally this would be a perfectly acceptable and even expected form 
of interaction. For Tamer, Suheil, and Mahmoud, however, this style of 
chanting was more of an annoyance. It suggested that this was a political 
rally or a formal protest instead of a rap concert. Knowing dam’s overall 
distaste for politicians and their empty rhetoric of struggle and resistance, 
I was interested to see how they would react. Using the microphone as a 
makeshift baton, Tamer mockingly conducted the chanting until it ceased 
after no more than three or four repetitions. Then he took the microphone 
and calmly asked, Khalast? Kaffī? Ṭayyab Yahalla! (Is that it? Are you all 
finished? Great, let’s go!).
Tamer’s response to the chanting was a perfect way of setting the stage 
for the performance that was to follow. It made allowances for the ubiq-
uitous rhetoric that accompanies any formal political gathering, but also 
showed the audience that this was something different. The objective was 
not to champion or denigrate a political figure or ideology. This was a con-
cert. More importantly this was a rap concert with its own sets of phrases, 
slogans, practices, and poetics. Tamer was able to take control of the con-
cert without confronting the shabāb outright. Had he tried to sing over 
them, or to stop them altogether, he would have opened himself up to 
criticism for being against Arafat. This would have been considered dis-
tasteful in Ramallah, so closely following the leader’s death. If he had en-
couraged the shabāb, he would have lost control of the concert and been 
competing with these chants for the rest of the evening. Because Tamer 
allowed for the chanting, but then quickly moved forward with his own 
program, the shabāb did not attempt another interruption the rest of the 
night.
dam’s first song was a recently composed track used to introduce the 
rappers and to invigorate the crowd through responsorial singing. In the 
choruses dam introduced the type of music they were singing as well as 
themselves through posturing and self- praise. Then in the refrains dam 
encouraged the audience to shout out “Ramallah!” between lines. This 
technique successfully introduced the crowd to the group and achieved a 
sense of communal interaction between performers and audience. It al-
lowed the audience to powerfully shout out their pride in their city while 
also giving the impression that this song had been specially written for 
them.
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I said where you at? [Response:] Ramallah!
Where we going? Ramallah!
Who you with? Ramallah!
With each question the crowd shouted back instinctively “Ramallah!” 
In much the same way that rock musicians reconfigure the lyrics of some 
of their songs to recognize the city in which they are performing, dam 
brought these Ramallah teenagers, their local identity, and their sense of 
community into the show. The crowd loved it. The end of the first track 
brought with it thunderous applause. On a different level, however, “Ra-
mallah” called to mind the well- known dabke song “Wayn? al- Ramallah” 
(Where are you going? To Ramallah). Palestinian wedding ensembles and 
folkloric dance troupes throughout the region very frequently include this 
particular folk song in their repertory. What is more, virtually every Pales-
tinian wedding celebration includes this song as part of its dabke. When 
asked about this reference Tamer Nafar stated, “We know that song, I 
mean everyone knows that song, so while we weren’t trying to reference 
it directly, we did want to do something that got everyone singing with 
us.” For the teens in attendance, however, hearing dam create a rap song 
with a chorus similar to that of a well- known folk song was indeed strik-
ing. Musically the songs have little in common. Yet the similar beat pat-
terns and repeated phrases caused a group of shabāb to try to form a small 
dabke line in the back of the theater. They were quickly rebuffed, however, 
by theater ushers who did not want the crowd to leave their seats.
The second track was also participatory, but with a different theme. 
Here dam got the crowd involved by having them shout out the word 
“Rāb!” (Rap!) between each line.3 At each chorus dam would call out, 
“ Aʿrabī!” to which the crowd would reply, “Rāb!” This exchange, “ Aʿrabī 
. . . Rāb!” (Arab . . . Rap!) continued for several choruses. The collective 
singing served to conflate the two terms and the clusters of ideas that 
informed them. One of the main goals of this concert was to bring rap 
to a wider audience: to sell a new style of Arab music influenced by for-
eign sources. dam’s refashioning of African American rap within a Pales-
tinian nationalist frame was largely unknown to this West Bank audience. 
For these teens Arabic rap was a refashioned style of Palestinian protest 
song in text, metaphor, and imagery, yet drawn from foreign sources. 
By uniting these two terms in participatory responsorial singing, dam 
prompted the crowd to repeat over and over again the name for the style 
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of music they were hearing. Through reiteration they naturalized the idea 
of rap as an Arab style, and Arabic as a rap style. The song served as a basic 
primer of terms and phrases, teaching the crowd what rap is and how it 
might be thought of as something Arab.
Hawīya, Hegemony, and Performative Rituals of Subordination
If the first song pulled the crowd into the performance by signifying their 
local Ramallah identities, and the second song was an attempt to sell a 
new style of Arabic rap to an uninitiated and unfamiliar crowd, the third 
song was dam’s attempt to sell themselves. Speaking between numbers, 
Tamer opened his wallet and drew out his blue Israeli identity card, hold-
ing it above his head. “Does anyone know what this is?” he questioned. In 
a collective sigh of disgust and acknowledgment the crowd replied loudly 
with screams and hollers. Some even drew out their own green Israeli 
identity cards in response. The card, or biṭāqa al- hawīya (identity card), 
is one of the most hated and vilified manifestations of the occupation for 
Palestinians in the West Bank. It is both a manifestation of the subordi-
nate position of Palestinians to occupying soldiers, who at any moment 
may demand to see their “identity card,” and additionally it marks the 
single strongest measure of the Israeli state to divide Palestinians into dif-
ferent political and geographic entities.
Based on the color of their hawīya, and the information contained 
therein, Palestinians may or may not pass through various checkpoints 
or gates in the “security/apartheid” barrier. For example, at the time of 
this performance Jerusalemite Palestinians could pass through the Qalan-
diya checkpoint freely (both ways but not into Israel), while Ramallah 
Palestinians could not; Nablusi Palestinians could enter Ramallah but not 
exit into Jerusalem; Palestinian Israelis could enter Jerusalem but not the 
West Bank; Palestinian refugees in the camps were rarely, if ever, permit-
ted to leave their neighborhoods; and very few Palestinians were ever al-
lowed into the camps unless they were registered residents. These bound-
aries and borders were never fixed and routinely shifted according to local 
politics, times of the year (or day), and the ad hoc decisions by the Israeli 
army administration (or guards currently on duty). Thus at each instance 
when the hawīya is demanded, the holder rarely knows if he or she is in 
accordance with or in violation of the “law.” Moreover, just as Palestinians 
crossing checkpoints may not know the current laws, so, too, the Israeli 
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soldiers policing the checkpoints themselves often do not know the cur-
rent restrictions and must spend long periods of time calling company 
commanders for instructions.
The act of pulling out one’s identity card is a moment of severe dis-
tress and fear in daily Palestinian life under occupation, for there is a very 
real possibility of arrest, detainment, questioning, and/or routine harass-
ment each and every time it is demanded. It marks the most fundamental 
engagement between Palestinians and the occupying forces (that is, the 
Israeli state) and is both hated for its presence, yet envied by those who 
seek greater freedom of movement equal to some “other” Palestinians. In 
all cases it marks one of the most powerful and effectual means instituted 
by the Israeli state to coerce Palestinians into thinking of themselves as 
a fractured subordinate community with differing rights and privileges.4
In this performance Tamer Nafar used his hawīya as a way of bridg-
ing perceived differences between Palestinians of ’48 and Palestinians 
in the territories. He explained it to the audience: “Does everyone see 
this identity card? We are Palestinians from Lyd. There are over a million 
’48s [Palestinians living in Israel]. Together we suffer as one nation, one 
people, and one land, Palestine.” In pulling out his identity card Tamer 
was making a powerful statement. He was revealing himself to the audi-
ence as a Palestinian who must navigate the same restrictive structures 
of racism and difference as those affecting his audience. The measures 
of separation and forced exile were revealed to extend beyond the Green 
Line (West Bank) and into the heart of ’48 (Israel). Though Tamer Nafar 
travels with an Israeli passport, speaks fluent Hebrew, has the right to par-
ticipate in national elections, and was raised attending Israeli schools, he 
is bound to his hawīya in the same ways as his audience. He must present 
his hawīya at any moment, any time, to any soldier or policeman who de-
mands it.5 His hawīya is at times a curse. But at this moment it was his 
link to the collective experiences of his audience. For those in attendance, 
seeing Tamer’s hawīya brought forth powerful indices of their own ex-
periences dealing with the occupation. Such experiences served to link 
the audience together within a shared construct of state subordination. 
It seems that symbolic discourse simply could not convey the necessary 
meanings to connect these two groups in quite the same way. The perfor-
mative gesture of pulling out the identity card, as well as the signification 
of the identity card itself, was a powerful performative of Palestinian ex-
periences of subordination to the Israeli state.
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Immediately upon seeing the card the crowd seemed to come alive. 
Kānū Zaynā (They’re like us) was the response I heard from the crowd 
of teenaged girls sitting in the row in front of me. At this point, dam 
launched into their next song with the crowd cheering enthusiastically, 
many waving their hawīya high over their heads.
This was a powerful moment in the performance where the ice was 
broken between performers and audience. If there were questions as to 
the national loyalties of the performers and their experiences as “real” 
Palestinians, they were quickly answered. In terms of the many ways 
music and musical performance have been used to express feelings of 
nation and community, this gesture is worthy of further reflection, for it 
has been shown that in various contexts, times, and places, the struggle 
for Palestinian self- determination has been the principal discursive field 
through which the nation has been imagined and articulated. To be Pal-
estinian, whether living in Jordan, Israel, or the Occupied Territories, of 
differing social formations, is to be engaged in this struggle. Collective 
suffering at the hands of Israeli authorities accorded dam entrée into the 
West Bank national imaginary and bonded the two national constructs 
together.
On another level this gesture reflects many of the processes by which 
power may structure the subjectivities of subordinate groups. As indi-
viduals are confronted with infinite signs that substantiate or enforce the 
dominant order, subordinate groups become both the subjects of power 
as well as subjected by power. In other words, subordinates learn to self- 
identify by their inferior position within the dominant social order. 
Michel Foucault, for example, wrote very convincingly about the pro-
cesses by which the subject is constituted from within power/knowledge 
structures. Especially in his later works detailing what he calls the “tech-
nologies of the self,” Foucault was interested in mapping out how subjects 
fashion themselves in relation to received structures of knowledge and 
power.6 For Foucault power is analogous to a “web” of relations within 
which individuals circulate. Power is never localized in any one place or 
idea. Rather it is employed through various discourses or “regimes of 
knowledge.”7 Indeed “there can be no possible exercise of power with-
out a certain economy of discourses of truth which operate through and 
on the basis of this association.”8 Each society creates for itself a specific 
regime of knowledge that structures the relations between dominant and 
subordinate as well as its myriad mechanisms for subjugation. Caught up 
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in these webs, individuals “are always in the position of simultaneously 
undergoing and exercising this power.”9 Foucault believed that the indi-
vidual then becomes both constituted by these regimes of knowledge and 
is the primary means or vehicle for its transmission.
One of the more obvious methods for policing the Israeli social order, 
and the subordinate position of Palestinians within that order, is the issu-
ing of state identity cards. Here the definition of the individual is itself a 
performative act of power in its most capillary form. Palestinians are de-
fined in relation to the state based on the information recorded on their 
hawīya. This is but one technique of subjugation within which Palestini-
ans circulate and in the process become constituted by these relation-
ships and interactions. As Palestinians have come to identify themselves 
based on these relationships and interactions they police the dominant 
social order themselves in daily performances and rituals. The constant 
act of pulling out one’s hawīya, in its performative reiteration, gives ma-
teriality to the dominant order and serves as a primary identification pro-
cess through which the codes of Palestinian subordination are transmit-
ted and reified.
The power of hawīya, both in the literal and figurative sense, was not 
lost on the crowds attending this particular dam concert. In this per-
formance environment the dominant social order, as represented by 
these cards, was thrown into relief against the imposed conceptions of 
the Palestinian nation as fragmented and disjointed. Tamer Nafar and 
his companions found a particularly ironic way through the dominant 
power structure. They took one of its most potent indexical triggers, their 
hawīya, and turned the order on its head by using the identity cards as 
a tool for inclusion rather than exclusion. For them the performative 
submission of identifying oneself based on hawīya became the staging 
point for shared experience and collective identity formation. The effect 
of hawīya in this moment was to bring these Palestinians together, rather 
than drive them apart.
This exchange between dam and their audience also illustrates an im-
portant point concerning the nature of power and resistance. From Fou-
cault we see that power often reveals itself to be constitutive both of social 
relations between groups and of subjectivity itself. “The individual [and 
the relations between individuals] is the prime effect of power and at the 
same time . . . the element of its articulation.”10 But in creating subject 
positions antithetical to the dominant order, regimes of knowledge create 
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their own resistance. Power structures at all times are engaged and negoti-
ated through modes of resistance. Such resistance often takes shape in the 
form of subjects constituted within its web. Palestinians navigating net-
works of social control and occupation are at all times positioned outside 
the dominant social order. Their subordinate status guarantees resistance 
to that social order in the very act of submission.
In a famous poem by Mahmoud Darwish titled “Bitaqa Hawiya” (Iden-
tity card), also known colloquially as “Isajjal Ana ʿArab” (Record that I am 
an Arab), the author writes forcefully of this same process of being con-
structed and subjected as inferior through identification papers, as well as 
of the Palestinian resistance to this construction. The poem is especially 
poignant in showing how structures of domination inherently construct 
subordinate, resistive identities in opposition. Here, as in the concert 
above, the shared experiences of those who must carry the Israeli identity 
card offer common ground for collective identity formation.
Record! I am an Arab
And my identity card is number fifty thousand
I have eight children
And the ninth is coming after a summer
Will you be angry?
Record on the top of the first page:
I do not hate people Nor do I encroach
But if I become hungry
The usurper’s flesh will be my food
Beware, beware, of my hunger and my anger!11
In this poem Darwish writes of the engagement between himself and 
the occupying Israeli soldier. The poem takes place within the pensive 
moments of exchange between the occupier and the occupied. However 
in this instance Darwish takes the opportunity to supplement the inade-
quate information on his identity card with aspects of his life and history. 
His Israeli- fashioned identity insufficiently captures his personal concep-
tions of self and nation. He demands that the soldier record his family, 
his history, his children, his hunger and anger. He demands to be made 
known, to be understood, even to exist as more than a number ascribed 
by a faceless state bureaucracy.
Darwish’s 1964 classic poem has been the source of several different 
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intifada songs, most notably by Ahmad Qaʿbour in the early 1980s. How-
ever, within the repertory of shared Palestinian resistance literature, this 
poem ranks as perhaps one of the best known of all time. Based on the 
history of this literature, as well as the continued discourse of hawīya, it 
is little wonder that Tamer Nafar’s hawīya had such a powerful effect on 
his audience.
Break Dancing in Basements, Rapping in Ramallah
Later in the program a group of young boys came up to the stage and 
motioned over to Tamer Nafar. They spoke briefly into his ear, and a mo-
ment later Nafar took the microphone from his brother and addressed the 
audience. “It seems there is a break-dancing group here in the audience 
tonight, and they would like to come up onstage and dance for you while 
we sing the next song.” The crowd clapped excitedly for the teens to take 
the stage. Tamer looked inquisitively down at the youngsters, no more 
than fourteen years old, and asked, “So what is the name of your group?”
“We have never danced outside of our basement so we don’t really have a 
name,” was the response offered by the most courageous of the three boys.
“Well, you must have a name,” Tamer commanded.
“We’re the ‘Break-Dancing Club’” (Nādī al- Braykdānz). It was the only 
name the young boy could think of on such short notice standing in front 
of 250 people.
Laughing at the situation Tamer brought all three boys up onstage to 
thunderous applause. “Please welcome . . . the Break-Dancing Club!” As 
the music started the three boys gathered into a semi- circle and began 
throwing themselves into extremely difficult combinations of b- boy 
moves they had never before attempted in public (see figure 9.3). Their 
private fascination with hip- hop and its associated dance forms had yet 
to be seen outside of their parents’ homes. And here in front of a live 
rap crew, these boys saw their opportunity to actualize an aspect of their 
own musical identities in public. This was a rare opportunity in which 
their love of hip- hop could be articulated as natural to their surroundings. 
Sharing the stage with three Palestinian rappers, in front of a supportive 
Palestinian crowd, their love of break dancing, baggy clothes, and spiked 
hair was momentarily normal, acceptable, and even supported.
To say that the crowd was enthusiastic would be an understatement. 
With each twisting flip or spin, drawing shouts of praise and amaze-
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ment, the crowd realized that hip- hop was not as foreign an art form as 
they had once imagined. To the contrary, they were watching a group of 
young kids from their own community dancing onstage to the music in 
a style- appropriate way. These teens were a part of the rap scene from in-
side Ramallah’s walls, wearing its clothes, and learning its style. The last 
song, “Min Irhabi?” (Who’s the terrorist?), brought much of the crowd to 
its feet. Twenty to thirty young teens rushed up to the stage and danced 
alongside the three performers as dam sang their most famous hit. By the 
last chorus the entire crowd was singing along:
Who’s the terrorist? I’m the terrorist?
How can I be the terrorist when I am living in my own homeland?
Who’s the terrorist? You’re the terrorist.
You’ve taken everything I own while I am living in my own 
homeland.
After the concert had ended throngs of young teens flooded the stage 
to get autographs and pictures with dam. Many were still singing the 
Figure 9.3. ✹ Nadi al- Braykdanz (Break-Dancing Club). Photograph by the  
author (2005).
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lyrics to each other as they circulated around the theater. An hour later, 
after the crowd had finally dissipated, dam began to make its way out of 
the theater. By and large they were happy with the performance. There 
were the usual problems with the monitors and the mix, but on the whole 
they felt that the concert went as well as could be expected. However for 
dam it was the “Break-Dancing Club” who stole the show. “Can you be-
lieve those guys have been listening to our music and learning to dance 
in their houses?” Suheil exclaimed in disbelief. “There are six hundred 
million Arabs, we’re going to reach every one of them.” The whole situa-
tion only bolstered Tamer Nafar’s long- held view that rap was the next 
“big thing” to happen to the Arab world and that dam was going to be a 
pioneer of the movement. Listening to Suheil’s optimism I was reminded 
of what his older brother had told me weeks earlier during an interview 
in Israel.
dm: You want to reach the whole Arab world, but hip- hop isn’t all 
that big yet in Syria and Jordan. What will the future of rap be in 
the Arab world?
tn: After our album is released, it will happen. I am sure. I know. 
You can check the charts. . . . I can predict the revolution of 
hip- hop. Check out the beat. [Tamer plays a track from the 
newest dance cd to come out of Egypt.] It is black music. It is 
R and B. . . . It is coming, man. It is coming. We just have to give 
the right name for it. The kid is here [the baby is born]; we just 
have to name it.
Later that week after dam had finished its last performance on this 
small West Bank tour, I noticed Tamer removing a large four- square- 
meter promotional poster from the foyer of the Peace Center in Beth-
lehem. The large poster pictured the three young rappers together in a 
prototypical posture of power idiomatic of much of hip- hop culture. 
Carefully placing the poster on the floor, rolling it up as a final souvenir, 
I asked Tamer quite pointedly if he was going to hang it next to the large 
poster of Tupac Shakur already hanging on his bedroom wall.
“Maybe I’ll take ’Pac down and hang this one in its place,” Tamer an-
swered.
Given their early successes, their determination, drive, and commit-
ment to spreading hip- hop among a new generation of Palestinian youth, 
who knows? Maybe they just might “take ’Pac down” and hang in his place.
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Moving Forward, Moving On
Over the last twelve years dam has found its way into the Israeli, Pales-
tinian, and international mediascapes via new forms of technology and 
informal channels of consumption and distribution. Their ability to enter 
into different musical markets is directly attributable to new media, Inter-
net sites, bootleg recordings, concerts, and videos. However, their access 
to these various arenas has been predicated on their facility to navigate 
several different sociopolitical discourses. First among these is dam’s 
ability to express their message in Arabic, Hebrew, and English, drawing 
on common vernacular phrases, slang, obscenities, and references indige-
nous to each cultural frame. In three languages they index the interstices 
of at least three aesthetic communities in highly idiomatic ways. Travers-
ing between and across these modalities dam has attracted a diverse 
following of Israeli Jews, Palestinians, and transnational solidarity hip- 
hop fans throughout the world. Language is the primary means through 
which this has been accomplished and hence represents the most funda-
mental way dam has sought to communicate its message.
Tamer Nafar explains, “If I look out into the audience and see one Jew, 
I will rap in Hebrew. I do this because Jews are not my audience; they are 
my target. And if I rap to them in Hebrew they have to listen. They can’t 
dismiss me; even if they don’t like what I am saying, they have to lis-
ten to my message.” It would seem that the same holds for their work in 
Arabic and English as well. Shifting dialect and accent, dam repositions 
itself into specifically Palestinian frames, often urban but also rural. Like-
wise, before a transnational audience of solidarity activists and journal-
ists, Eng lish provides a gateway for telling their story and for drawing eco-
nomic opportunity and international attention to their cause. At a 2009 
concert in Richmond, Indiana, dam opened with a recently composed 
song, “Letters,” where the Arabic alphabet is introduced in rap to a non-
native speaking audience. Opening the song Tamer explained, “I learned 
English through hip- hop, and now you are all going to learn some Arabic 
through hip- hop.” In each case, their idiomatic usage operates to more 
fully express their message as well as to shape its potential reception. As 
Nafar often says, one must “carry words like weapons.”
The message being conveyed changes considerably depending on the 
context of its performance. In the early years, when Israeli shows for a 
Jewish audience were the norm, the message was one of ethnic engage-
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ment within the Israeli state, an end to discrimination against Israel’s 
Palestinian citizens. These performances, largely in Hebrew, featured a 
much more cosmopolitan aesthetic, exploiting references to urban Afri-
can American ghetto life and minority empowerment. For an audience 
already familiar with rap and African American cultural forms and iden-
tities, dam’s approach was to align preconceptions of urban America with 
the Palestinian condition in Israel. In form and content, dam identified 
itself as the “Gangstas of Israel”—soldiers for the same noble causes as 
famous African American rappers. By enacting a well- known discourse of 
ethnic empowerment, dam sought to exploit the similarities between the 
American civil rights movement and the current struggles of Palestinians 
in Israel. For Nafar there was no difference between the American slums 
of New York and his own neighborhood in Lyd.
As the second intifada intensified, the political context changed such 
that performances for Jewish- only crowds became rare. As a result of 
changing politics as well as the need to find new markets for their work, 
dam’s message shifted to the larger struggle for self- determination and 
an end to the occupation. The Ramallah concert outlined above was illus-
trative of how dam attempted to develop a new hip- hop community by 
drawing on the canonical signs of Palestinian nationalism. Most impor-
tant of these were shared experiences of domination and forced subjec-
tivity through the use of identity cards and other restrictions of move-
ment. Lyrically these songs employed the formulaic repertory of intifada 
song made famous in the early 1970s and 1980s, couched in a transna-
tional hip- hop aesthetic. Onstage dam strived to link their current explo-
rations in rap with the long-established tradition of Palestinian protest 
song. Samples of famous intifada poetry and folk song, along with strate-
gic inflections of accent, served as the sonic foundation from which dam 
constructed its rhymes. Nizar Qabani, Ahmad Qaʿbour, and Mahmoud 
Darwish (famous intifada poets and singers) were all cited in the per-
formance through lyric or musical quotation. dam and its modality of 
performance were packaged as a new direction in Palestinian nationalist 
music worthy of the same respect as the folk singers of the past, albeit in 
fundamentally different ways. More importantly dam hoped to sell them-
selves as Palestinians struggling alongside those under occupation, to sell 
that they were all “suffering from the same enemy, only in different ways.”
In these early performances dam matured and developed by strategi-
cally aligning itself within the nationalist trajectories of both Israeli Jewish 
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and Palestinian communities. Yet at the same time, in refashioning popu-
lar conceptions of Palestinian suffering and seeking dialogue with the 
Israeli mainstream, dam confounded nationalistic dogma. Their use of 
highly stylized Hebrew slang made a play for the incorporation of Pales-
tinians into the Israeli state imaginary. Their music, interviews, and activ-
ism revealed to Israeli Jews how their native language (Hebrew) might be 
appropriated and refashioned into an ideological weapon against Jewish 
ethnocracy. Such a move serves to betray the Jewish national discourse of 
homogeneity and difference from the “outside” Arab world. Rather dam, 
in their early career, reiterated through performance that Palestinians are 
in fact an internal constitutive element of the Israeli state.
During these initial formative years, dam presented challenges to the 
established Palestinian nationalist discourse as well. In language, culture, 
and politics, Palestinian Israelis typically run counter to the long- held 
view that Palestinians are united in their struggle against the “Zionist 
enemy.” Their appropriation of an American musical style of performance 
further frustrated the timeless, primordial aesthetics of Palestinian folk-
lore. Rather their music is a product of the here and now, thrown into re-
lief by the employment of new media in the production and distribution 
of their work. Strategically essentialized notions of national identity have 
largely dominated the history of Palestinian protest song. In style and 
aesthetics dam opened up new spaces for seeing and hearing Palestinian 
music in concert with the transnational (that is, Western cosmopolitan) 
world. Along with this, dam has proven that their fluency in Israeli so-
ciety has not diminished their capacity to speak, think, and feel as part 
of the Palestinian nation. Perhaps the single greatest fear of Palestinian 
musicians working in Jordan and the West Bank is that the eventual nor-
malization of relations with the Israeli state will precipitate the loss of 
their national aspirations for self- determination. dam has shown that de-
spite their “normalized” interactions with Israel, they are indeed still very 
much a part of the movement to end the occupation.
With the construction of the Israeli “apartheid/security” wall and the 
further restrictions of movement placed on Palestinians under occupa-
tion, the “interiorization of social life” has had tangible effects on Pal-
estinian cultural practices.12 Without access to indigenous community 
spheres, concerts, and festivals, families have been forced indoors— 
reliant on media for access to the outside world. In this way, the Internet, 
movies, popular music, and other culture have largely filled the void of in-
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digenous social practices (weddings, markets, cafes, public performances, 
political gatherings, and so on). The result has been an increase in the 
consumption of transnational popular media. The growing popularity of 
hip- hop is but one example of this process. New media and new tech-
nologies have served to relieve much of the spatial incarceration Pales-
tinians have been forced to endure. Alternative transnational communi-
ties reflected in hip- hop, break-dancing clubs, chat rooms, blogs, and the 
like have surfaced as a direct result of the “interiorization” of social life. 
These new communities of style and practice have had a profound influ-
ence on the various ways that Palestinian nationalism has been performed 
and articulated in the public sphere. The penetration of dam’s music into 
different Israeli, Palestinian, and international musical arenas speaks to 
the artists’ capacity to navigate many of these national and transnational 
communities. Yet the modality through which they have gained entrance 
to these arenas illustrates the discursive fluidity of popular music and cul-
ture more generally. Manipulating lyrical content and musical device is 
not the only means by which dam engages different cultural audiences. 
Their use of a transnational popular music repositions them in a different 
theater of meaning less constrained by conventional Israeli/Palestinian 
conceptions of race, religion, and nation.
In the years since these early concerts, the Palestinian hip- hop scene 
has developed and expanded in fascinating ways. What was once a very 
strange, and at times threatening, form of protest song has now become 
the mainstream. Through sustained international media attention, tours, 
and a series of successful documentaries, dam has, for better or worse, 
come to define Palestinian music in the twenty- first century. Buttressed 
by a new wave of Palestinian hip- hop artists from across the West Bank, 
Gaza Strip, Israel, and the near and far diaspora, hip- hop has now be-
come one of the dominant forms of political song among Palestinians 
and international audiences. If their first audiences were Israeli Jews, and 
later Palestinians in the West Bank and near diaspora, by 2008 the group 
had begun performing almost exclusively before international audi-
ences of solidarity activists in Europe and North America. In front of 
these audiences dam does little to acknowledge the relationality of their 
Israeli citizenship. They present themselves, and are presented by inter-
national media, simply as dispossessed Palestinians, despite the fact that 
their many tours throughout Europe and North America are made pos-
sible only because of their Israeli passports and the support of organiza-
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tions unwilling or unable to work with artists in the West Bank. In many 
ways such a strategic move allows for greater economic opportunity, as 
requests to perform and speak on college campuses across North America 
steadily increase. Yet at the same time, other lesser- known hip- hop artists 
from Gaza, Jenin, and Ramallah have struggled mightily to be seen (and 
heard) outside the literal and figurative walls of the occupation.13 In terms 
of logistics and funding it is far easier for international aid organizations, 
ngos, and colleges and universities to work with ’48s (Israeli citizens), 
rather than attempt to procure the necessary permissions for artists to 
leave the West Bank and Gaza Strip. What is more, new guidelines stipu-
late that any United States government–funded or –affiliated institution 
must require Palestinian artists (from Gaza and the West Bank) to sign 
a formal declaration “denouncing Palestinian terror” in order to receive 
funds. Given that Israelis are not required to do the same, many Pales-
tinian artists find it politically problematic and refuse to accept funding 
from the United States government.
However, inasmuch as the Israeli- Palestinian conflict has brought 
these young artists to the international stage and the pages of Rolling 
Stone, in many ways it has also overdetermined their public personae as 
artists. Hyped as the “soundtrack of Palestinian resistance” by interna-
tional media looking for a “hook” with which to engage the conflict, dam 
has struggled to break free of the expectations of “resistance.” As they 
move forward with their careers, dam has stated publicly their desire “to 
move beyond the political hype, to be musicians known for their beats 
and verses, not their politics.”14 Pushing back against these expectations, 
dam has asserted the need to branch out, to be able to sing about love, 
to be accepted as mainstream, commercial artists. Their newest album, 
provisionally titled Dabke on the Moon, takes dramatic steps in this di-
rection. Released in December of 2012, this new album is described by 
Tamer Nafar as adopting a “more human angle” of “telling stories” and 
“playing characters.” It is an attempt to move “above ground,” to position 
the group within the larger marketplace of Arab popular music. Only time 
will tell if this new venture can transcend dam’s political image, an image 




Like so many of the artists chronicled in this book, dam offers a fascinat-
ing case study in the myriad, and at times conflicting, ways that Palestini-
ans experience and articulate their dispossession through music. Similar 
to Nuh Ibrahim, Julia Butrous, Abu Arab, Sabreen, Kamal Khalil, and 
a host of others, dam have developed their own performative moves 
through which to access the Palestinian national imaginary and to present 
their unique chapter of the Palestinian story. Throughout this book it has 
been my goal to explore several of these chapters as a means of better 
understanding how national identities are constructed and reproduced 
by social actors. But more importantly my interests lay in uncovering how 
belonging is fostered, structured, and articulated through performance. 
In each of these chapters what becomes apparent is the varying ways that 
concepts like nation, resistance, and identity come to take on new mean-
ings. Each of the artists in this book employed music as a fundamental 
tool for fashioning Palestinian identity and validating national claims of 
self- determination. However, as exhibited in the songs discussed above, 
what it means to be Palestinian and what it means to fight for its recog-
nition are locally defined, contingent, and born of unique structures of 
power, experience, and consequence.
In addition the many aesthetic fractures and cleavages between reper-
tories of Palestinian protest song offer a unique opportunity for think-
ing critically about the nature of Palestinian nationalism, identity, and 
resistance. Here it is essential to point out how national aspirations are 
contested internally (among myriad Palestinian communities), and are 
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yet to be fully recognized externally (among the international commu-
nity of nation- states). The very act of identification as Palestinian, there-
fore, becomes a political act within a discursive space that does not fully 
recognize “Palestine.” Because of this, the ongoing project of legitimating 
Palestinian claims to self- determination becomes an overdetermining co-
efficient in matters of national identity. This is especially true in artistic 
realms where musicians are under great pressure to perform first and 
foremost in the service of the nation.
In all these case studies, music is a portal through which actors and 
institutions appropriate cultural signs into the national imaginary, ac-
tively contouring perceptions of the past in the service of the politics of 
the present. Palestinian national identities are performed, embodied by 
social actors who collectively remember the past through a lens shaped 
by the ruptures of dispossession and dislocation. Inherent in these per-
formances are the interventions of social actors, navigating deep- seated 
structures of feeling and consequence. Interpreting the scripts of these 
performances, seeking to understand the local power dynamics that in-
form these ruptured interventions, exposes the performativity of the na-
tion and the poetics of resistance. These performances of belonging, of 
identification, are not purely submissive acts of a victimized people. Nor 
do they constitute the essentialized “voices of the primordial masses,” col-
lectively struggling against foreign occupation. Rather the myriad perfor-
mative acts of identification and belonging discussed in the case studies 
underscore the varying topography of Palestinian history and experience 
and further reveal the potentialities for music performance to destabi-
lize or resignify deep- seated power relations. These music performances 
are a means of intervention, of subversion, of agency, that enables new 
(or consolidates old) meanings of self and other. This intervention is not 
one of power, per se, but one of perception. For within each moment of 
performance lies the opportunity to resignify what it means to be Pales-
tinian and what it means to fight for Palestine’s recognition. As Ernesto 
Laclau and Lillian Zac assert in their discussion on the crafting of politi-
cal identities, “Identification is not purely a submissive act on the part of 
the subject, who would passively incorporate all the determinations of the 
object.” “The act of identification, on the contrary, destabilizes the iden-
tity of the object.”1 Through the act of identification, through its perfor-
mativity, “Palestine” is subject to reimagining, change, and development.
It is in matters of resistance, power, and subjectivity that this process 
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becomes particularly important. A central focus of this book has been 
to understand the “poetics of resistance,” the performative processes 
through which “resistance” takes on meaning in the lives of Palestini-
ans differentially exposed to the traumas of exile. Both in its salience as 
well as its embodiment in the somatic landscape, resistance, through per-
formance, begins to matter.2 It takes shape. It structures bodies, spaces, 
places and the relations between them. Over time collectively understood 
notions of resistance become sedimented into daily practice. They be-
come commonsensical, unquestioned, even cliché. In the hands of po-
litical operatives arguing for territorial recognition and a primordial re-
lationship to the land, “resistance” becomes part of a larger discourse 
of emancipatory politics that overdetermines meanings, obfuscates the 
local, and presents several challenges to understanding power dynamics. 
This emancipatory politics can be read in the pages of scholarly books 
and journals as well as on the graffiti- covered walls of Jenin. In each of 
these contexts “resistance,” as it is casually employed, presumes an essen-
tialized Palestinian identity, sacrificing local experience for an accommo-
dation of difference. It becomes a discursive tool for building perceptual 
solidarity around a common cause by strategically essentializing a diverse 
field of history and experience. For the ethnographer seeking to uncover 
the “essence” of Palestinian identity the concept cuts both ways, stabiliz-
ing meaning while at the same time problematizing representation.
I began this book with an ethnographic introduction to three contrast-
ing voices for Palestinian self- determination, those of an activist (Kamal 
Khalil), an artist (Tamer Nafar), and an archivist (Abu Hani). My goal 
in presenting these three perspectives was to orient the reader to diverse 
landscapes of Palestinian nationalism. Through their words, I hoped to 
reveal three very different ways of conceptualizing Palestinian music, 
identity, and resistance. As members of three very different Palestinian 
communities, in exile (Jordan), under occupation (West Bank), and in 
’48 (Israel), each of these three men presented unique experiences of dis-
possession employing three very different fields of music making (folk 
song, political song, and hip- hop). Moreover these men were representa-
tive of three successive generations of exiles, coming of age in the shad-
ows of al- naksa (1967), al- intifada (1987), and al- Aqsa (2000). Refracted 
through the prisms of geography, generation, aesthetics, and experience, 
their voices were employed to dispel any primordial notion of a singular 
Palestinian identity and experience, and instead reinforce the need to ap-
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proach Palestinian identity as a performative construct, a voluntary act of 
identification and belonging informed by locally situated fields of power. 
They were each distinctively “Palestinian.” Or perhaps the very notion of 
“Palestinian” was in need of drastic reconceptualization in order to ac-
commodate these artists’ unique fields of identification. In much the same 
way, resistance needs to be understood as a performative construct, care-
fully scrutinized as an object of analysis and a means for collective identi-
fication. Resistance as it is imagined and employed by each of these men 
should be neither reified nor dismissed. Rather it should be understood 
as an index of identification and a diagnostic of experience.
Nevertheless, as I reflect on the voices and experiences of these three 
men, I am left with a deep sense of regret over the many artists and activ-
ists omitted from these pages. Unfortunately many significant voices for 
Palestinian self- determination have gone largely unheard in this text. 
Marcel Khalife, George Qirmiz, Mousa Hafez, Mustapha al- Kurd, el- 
Funoun, Thaer Barghouti, Reem Talhami, Said Murad, Kamiliya Jubran, 
Reem al- Banna, Samih Shaqir, Ahmed Qaʿbour, Reem al- Kilani, ʿIssa 
Boulos, Abeer al- Zinaty, Ahmed al- Khatib, Mohammad el- Farrah, and 
Sanaaʿ Moussa are just a few of the musicians who have made substantial 
contributions to the field of Palestinian protest song but have not yet re-
ceived the attention they deserve. Likewise I regret that the voices of many 
Palestinian women artists and activists have not been highlighted in ac-
cordance with their overall contributions to Palestinian music. In writing 
this book I was forced to make uncomfortable decisions on how best to 
represent the immense field of Palestinian protest song. To be sure, this 
story is far too complex to be comprehensively discussed in a monograph 
such as this. It is with a great sense of optimism, however, that I leave this 
fascinating topic to future study. With this book, I hope to lay a founda-
tion for further ethnographic inquiry into the lives and experiences of 
those tremendous musicians absent from this text. Indeed as the elder 
Abu Hani once consoled me after I realized that I was but one of many re-
searchers to have passed through his office, “Maʿlaysh, yā Daoud” (please 
don’t worry, David), “there is much work left to be done.”
appenDix: song lyric transliterations
Chapter 2
“Yamma Mawil al- Hawa” [Oh song of longing]
music: Folklore, adaptation by Hussein Nazak
lyrics: Folklore
yammā mawīl al- hawā yammā mawīlīyā
ḍarb al- khanājar wa- lā ḥukm al- nadhal fīyā
wa- mashayt taḥt al- shitā wa- l- shitā rawānī
wa- l- ṣayf lammā atā wallaʿ min nīrānī
bayḍal ʿumrī infaḍā nadhr li- l- ḥurīya
yā layl ṣāḥ al- nadā yashhad ʿalā jirāḥī
wa- insal jaysh al- ʿidā min kul al- nawāḥī
wa- al- layl shāf al- radā ʿam yatʿallam biyā
yammā mawīl al- hawā
bārūdat al- jabal aʿlā min al- ʿālī
miftāḥ darb al- amal wa- l- amal bi- rijālī
yā shaʿbnā yā baṭal afdīk bi- ʿaynayyā
yammā mawīl al- hawā
“Murabaʿ ʿIzz al- Din al- Qassam”
music: Folklore
lyrics: Nuh Ibrahim, collected by Nimr Sirhan
ʿIzz al- Dīn yā khasārtak, raḥt fidā li- ummatak
mīn bi- yankar shahāmtak, yā shahīd filasṭīn
ʿIzz al- Dīn yā marḥūm mawtak dars li- l- ʿumūm
Ah . . . law kunt tadūm yā raʾīs al- mujāhidīn
ḍaḥayt bi- rūḥak wa- mālak li- ajl istiqlāl bilādak
al- ʿadū lammā jālak qāwamthu bi- ʿazm matīn
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“Muhawara al- ʿArabi wa- l- Sahyuni” [Debate of the Arab and the Zionist]
music: Folklore
lyrics: Nuh Ibrahim, collected by David A. McDonald
anā al- ʿarabī yā ʿuyūnī ʿind al- mawt irmūnī
bamḥī ism al- ṣahyūnī li- aḥmī bilādī filasṭīn
min kayd al- mustaʿmirīn
anā al- ṣahyūnī al- maʿrūf wa- amrī fī al- dunyā makshūf
rasmālī makr bi- yilūf wa- lāzim amlik filasṭīn
wa- lāzim amlik filasṭīn
bi- tamlukhā bakara mā tashūf hum taʿatīr
wa- taqābil Munkar wa- Nakir yawm al- qīyāma yā maskīn
ḥatā tamlik filasṭīn
lā tinsā kanz al- amwāl wa- l- ghadr wa- l- iḥtīyāl
bi- amlik fīhā riqāb rijāl wa- baf ʿal fiʿl al- shayāṭīn
wa- lāzim amlik filasṭīn
if ʿal fiʿlak yā maghrūr anta fī al- dunyā mashhūr
anā al- nāssir yā zarzūr wa- anta bi- tahrab min sakīn
wa- biddak tamlik filasṭīn?
yahrab anā mā baḥārab wa- banātī ʿanī taḥārab
fīhum mā barjaʿ khāyab wa- baksab bi- l- mi’a wa- tisʿaīn
wa- lāzim amlik filasṭīn
Akh! itfū ʿalā hayk rijāl wa- bi- iftakharuh bihā al- aqwāl
Khābat minik al- amwāl waqʿatak qaṭrān wa- ṭīn
Lāzim tarḥal yā laʿīn
khabībī ismaʿ kalāmī mahmā shuft quddāmī
al- waṭan al- qawmī marāmī ʿalishān ṣahyūn filasṭīn
wa- lāzim amlik filasṭīn
wa- Allah ʿumrak mā bi- tshūf wa- lāzim taẓallak mantūf
ʿāmil sabʿ yā kharūf lāzim tishūf ghurāb al- bayn
idhā baqayt bi- filasṭīn
kul al- dunyā zahaqatnī wa- min bilādhā rafaḍatnī
wa- anta kamān laḥaqnī li- taḥrimnī min filasṭīn
bilād ajdādī min sinīn
ḥāja takhabbith bi- l- kalām ka- annak ghāriq fī al- manām
filasṭīn mahd al- islām wa- l- masīḥ wa- l- mursalīn
fayn rāyiḥ yā maskīn?
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mish mumkin arḥal ʿanhā wa- lāzim ghāyatī anaffidhhā
yā baksab bakhsarhā mā barḥal ʿan filasṭīn




Z: anā mish khāyif
a: wāqif shuf akhritak
Z: iʿmal anta illī biddāk
a: bam, bam, bam, bam
Z: ah! khasārtī wa- yā muṣībatī ḍāʿ al- māl wa- l- rasmāl wa- rāḥit minnak filasṭīn
“Min Sijn Aʿkka” [From Aʿkka Prison] or “Al- Thalatha al- Hamraʾ”  
[The bloody three]
music: Folklore
lyrics: Nuh Ibrahim, collected by David A. McDonald
wa- min sijn ʿakkā ṭalʿ at janāzāt
Muhammad Jamjum wa- Fuad Hijazi
jāzī ʿalayhum yā shaʿbī jāzī
al- mandūb al- sāmī wa- rabaʿhu ʿumūman
Muhammad Jamjum wa- maʿa Aʿta al- Zir
Fuad al- Hijazi ʿizz al- dhakhīra
Unẓar al- muqadar wa- l- taqādīr
bi- aḥkām al- ẓālim yā ya dʿamūnā
wa- yaqūl Muhammad anā awwalkum
khawfī yā Aʿta ashrab ḥasratkum
wa- yaqūl Hijāzī anā awwalkum
mā nihāb al- radā wa- lā al- manūnā
ummī al- ḥanūna bi- l- ṣawt tunādī
ḍāqat ʿalayhā kul al- bilād
nādū Fuad wa- muhja Fuad
qabl nitfarraq yā yuwaddaʿūnā
bi- tindahu ʿalā Aʿta min warā’ al- bāb
waqaftu tistanẓar minhu al- jawāb
Aʿta yā Aʿta zayn al- shabāb
yahjim ʿal- ʿaskar wa- lā yahābūnā
khayyī yā Yusuf wa- ṣātak ummī
iwaʿī yā ukhtī ba dʿī tanhamī
li- ajl ha- l- waṭan ḍaḥayt bi- damī
kuluhu li- ʿuyūnik yā filasṭīn
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thalātha mātū mawt al- usūd
jūdī yā ummī bi- l- ʿAta jūdī
ʿalishān ha- l- waṭan bi- l- rūḥ najūd
wa- li- ajl ḥurīyathu bi- yʿalaqūnā
nādā al- munādī yā nās iḍrab
yawm al- thalātha shanaq al- shabāb
ahl al- shajāʿa Aʿta wa- Fuad
wa- mā yahābū al- radā wa- lā al- manūnā
“ Aʿla Dalʿ una”
music: Folklore
lyrics: Unknown, collected by Abdellatif Barghouti
ṭālat al- ghurba wa- ṭāl al- furāqī
bi- Allah yā ṭayr taballagh ashwāqī
li- l- arḍ al- ḥabība anā mushtāqī
wa- ba dʿ mā al- ghurba ṣārat sanīnā
yā shāṭiʾ Yafa qūlī ajbārak
baftaḥ fī ramlak taʿraf asrārak
bastannā ṭiyūrak bas’al zuwārak
ba dʿak ʿal- ʿahad wa- lā nasītūnā
rakabnā fī al- markab fawqā atʿalīnā
yā shams bilādī ḥaramat ʿalaynā
qūlū li- l- wāladha taraḍā ʿalaynā
rajāyā fīk yā rab al- kawnā
bastannā ṭiyūrak bas’al zuwārak
baʿadak ʿal- ʿahad wa- lā nasītūnā
“Ya Zarif al- Tul”
music: Folklore
lyrics: Unknown, collected by Nimr Sirhan
yā ẓarīf al- ṭūl wayn ahlī ghādū
ʿa- bilād al- shām shālū wa- ba dʿū
wadaʿī ʿal- ṣahyūnī ʿuyūnhu taramdū
shattat al- shabāb min bilādnā
yā ẓarīf al- ṭūl wayn rāyiḥ turūḥ
jaraḥt qalbī wa- ghamaqt li- jurūḥ
wa- jaysh al- ʿidā yā raythu madhbūḥ
shattat al- shabāb min bilādnā
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“ Aʿla Dalʿ una”
music: Folklore
lyrics: Unknown, collected by Abdellatif Barghouti
Aʿkkā maʿa Hayfa wa- qurā bi- l- jumlhu
biyaʿat yā khasārhu biturāb al- ʿamalhu
Baysan tunādī wa- l- Lid wa- l- Ramla
wayn al- ʿarābhu rāḥū wa- khalūnā
āsif malʿ ab ṣabānā al- būm nāḥbī
wa- kharajnā minnhu madḥūrīn naḥbī
ʿallū layatnī qaḍīt naḥbī
wa- lā shāhadt khadhlān al- ʿarab
“Shuruqi”
music: Folklore
lyrics: Unknown, collected by Nimr Sirhan
kunt al- fidā wa- qawmak fī Burūj
al- ʿAj yatajādalū min saya rās talkam al- afwāj
law salḥūk falast li- juyūshhum maḥtāj
bal abʿadūk likī yataḥakkamū fīhā
baynamā kān al- ʿadū li- arḍnā yajtāḥ
kunā nahīb bi- hum fī qūlū mākū salāḥ
shakat filasṭīn anta athkhanūhā jirāḥ
wa- aḥarr qalbī ayna al- ʿarab taḥmīhā
kharajū yajurrūn adhyāl al- khizī w- l- ʿār
li- mā daʿāhum li- dhalik dāʿī al- istʿamār
lam yudāfaʿū mithlamā dāfaʿ walīdhā
al- nār lā taḥriq al- nār li- arjal waṭīhā
“Al- Murabaʿ”
music: Folklore
lyrics: Unknown, collected by Nabil Aʿlqam
biddnā narwī likum akhbār
qiṣat shaʿbanā al- maghwār
ḥatā taʿrafū illī ṣār
fī ummitnā al- ʿarabīya
fī amrīkā dab al- khawf
ṣābhum daʾ al- rujūf
min al- shʿab al- ʿarabī al- zaḥūf
bihumhu naḥū al- ḥurīya
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qālū al- sad al- ʿālī ṭār qulnā amaḥnā al- qanāl
Aʿbd al- Nasser yā Jamal yā miqdām ʿarūbatnā
fīkum nabnī l- l- āmāl wa- binḥaqqaq wiḥdatnā
“Al- Murabaʿ”
music: Folklore
lyrics: Unknown, collected by Nabil Aʿlqam
maktūb ʿalā jabīnnā Aʿbd al- Nasser ḥabībnā
maktūb ʿalā qulūbnā Aʿbd al- Nasser maḥbūbnā
ʿizz al- ʿurūba li- Jamal
wa- l- dhul li- Nuri al- Saʿid
“Al- ʿAtaba Jamal Aʿbd al- Nasser”
music: Folklore
lyrics: Unknown, collected by Nabil Aʿlqam
ʿalynā kayf allī balūm wa allī lām
wa bintalahaf ʿalā jamaʿ al- shamal wa- l- lamm
wa lawlā al- jīm wa al- mīm alīf wa al- lām
yā ʿālam mā artifaḥ shān al- ʿarab
“Al- Watan al- Akbar” [The great nation]
music: Mohammad Aʿbd al- Wahab
lyrics: Ahmad Shafik Kamal
waṭanī ḥabībī al- waṭan al- akbar
wa- intiṣarāthu maliya ḥayāthu yawm warā’ amjādhu bi- takbar
waṭanī bi- yakbar wa- bi- yataḥarr waṭanī waṭanī
waṭanī yā mālik ḥubbak qalbī yā illī nādayt bi- l- wiḥda al- kubrā
anta kabīr wa- akbar kathīr waṭanī yā waṭan al- shʿab al- ʿarabī
ba dʿ mā shuft jamāl al- thawra min al- wujūd kulhu min al- khulūd kulhu
yā waṭanī waṭanī ḥabībī
Chapter 3
“Sharaft ya Nixon Baba” [Welcome Daddy Nixon]
music: Sheikh Imam ʿIssa
lyrics: Ahmad Fuad Nagam
sharaft yā nīksūn bābā yā bitāʿ al- watirgayt
ʿamalū lak qīma wa- sīma salāṭīn al- fūl w- l- zayt
farashū lak awsaʿ sikka min rās al- tīn ʿalā makka
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wa- hunāk tanfadh ʿalā ʿakkā wa- yaqūlū ʿalayk ḥajayt
mā huwa mawlid sāyir dāyir shillāh yā ṣaḥāb al- bayt
jawāsīsak yawm tashrīfak ʿamalū lak daqa wa- zār
tatqaṣaʿ fīh al- mūmas wa- l- qāraḥ wa- l- nazār
wa- l- shaykh shamhūrish rākib ʿa- l- kūdyā wa- hāt yā mawākib
wa- bawāqī al- zaffa ʿanākib zāḥfīn ʿalā ḥasab al- ṣīt
ʿazmūk fa- qālū taʿālā tākul banbūn wa- harīsa
qumt anta li- annak mahīf ṣaddaqt ān iḥnā farīsa
ṭabayt li- ḥaqūk bi- l- zaffa yā ʿarīs al- ghafla yā khifa
hāt wishak khudh lak taffa shūbash min ṣāḥib al- bayt
“Mayjana/Aʿtaba”
music: Folklore
lyrics: Unknown, collected by Nimr Sirhan
oūf . . . oūf . . . yā bāy
kafā damʿāt yā shaʿbī al- ḥurr tamsaḥ
wa- durūb al- ṣaʿba li- l- taḥrīr tansāḥ
qāl ṣiḥt yā ibn al- ʿarab wa- laqaythu timsaḥ
oūf . . . oūf . . . yā bāy
“Wayn al- Malayin?” [Where are the millions?]
music: Ali al- Kilani
lyrics: Ali al- Kilani, as performed by Julia Butrous
wayn, wayn, wayn,
wayn al- malāyīn?
al- shaʿb al- ʿarabī wayn? al- ghaḍab al- ʿarabī wayn?
al- dam al- ʿarabī wayn? al- sharq al- ʿarabī wayn?
wayn al- malāyīn?
wayn, wayn, wayn
Allah maʿanā aqwā wa- akbar min banī ṣahyūn
yasfik yaslib yasjin yaqtil arḍī mā bithūn
dam al- aḥmar wa- l- akhḍar fī ṭaʿm al- līmūn
aqwā min al- jibāl akthar min al- rimāl
qātil nāḍil ghannī shahadnā ḥayā
naqātil mā narkaʿ mā narkaʿ mā nahīsh
294 ✹ Appendix
“Habbat al- Nar” [The fire swelled]
music: Hussein Nazak
lyrics: Mohammad Diab, Nizar al- ʿIssa, Hussein Nazak and Khaled Habbash, as 
performed by al- ʿAshiqin
habbat al- nār wa- l- bārūd ghannā
wa- aṭlab shabāb yā waṭan wa- atmannā
habbat al- nār min Aʿkka li- l- Tīra
wa- khamsa ṣaghār rabīyu ʿa- l- ḥaṣīra
wa- hay ṣārū kibār wa- mā nisyūsh al- dīra
wa- mīn illī yansā filasṭīn al- janna
habbat al- nār
habbat al- nār karāma karāma
filasṭīnīya maʿa kul al- nashāmā
wa- ṭāllū al- fidāʾīya walīhu illī bi- yatʿāmmā
fajr al- ḥurrīya bi- l- dam yataḥanna
habbat al- nār
“Ishhad Ya ῾Alam” [Witness oh world]
music: Hussein Nazak
lyrics: Mohammad Diab, Nizar al- ʿIssa, Hussein Nazak, and Khaled Habbash, as 
performed by al- ʿAshiqin
ishhad yā ʿālam ʿalaynā waʿa Beirut ishhad li- l- ḥarb al- shaʿbīyya
wa- illī mā shāf min al- ghirbāl yā Beirut aʿmā bi- ʿuyūn Amrīkiyya
wa- l- ṭiyārāt awwal ghāra yā Beirut ghāra barrīya wa- baḥriya
Burj al- Shamali wa- l- baḥar yā Beirut ṣūr al- ḥurra wa- l- Rashidiya
Qalʿ at Shaqīf illī bi- tashhad yā Beirut ʿāllī dāsū ra’s al- ḥayya
al- shajar qātil wa- l- ḥajar yā Beirut wa- l- wāḥid jābhu dawriya
jamal al- maḥāmal shaʿbnā yā Beirut bi- ʿAin al- Hilwa wa- l- Nabatiya
wa- iḥnā raddīnā al- āliya yā Beirut bi- ḥijāra Sayīdā wa- l- Jaya
al- ṭiyārāt ghaṭṭū al- samā’ yā Beirut wa- l- baḥar jabha baḥariya
kānat ghirbān al- maniya yā Beirut wa- ḥanā itiḥadīnā al- maniya
ishhad yā ʿālam ʿalaynā wa- ʿa Beirut ʿā Sabrā wa- l- miīya miīya
Shatila wa- Burj al- Barajna yā Beirut bi- l- matḥaf shāfū al- maniya
lā rāya bayḍā’ raf ʿanā yā Beirut wa- lā ṭalʿ anā bi- hāma maḥniya
al- darb ṣaʿba wa- ṭawīla yā Beirut wa- ʿalayhā ʿaqadnā al- niya
wa- illī mā shāf min al- ghirbāl yā Beirut aʿmā bi- ʿuyūn Amrīkiya
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Chapter 4
Intifada poetry documented by Nimr Sirhan
mā fī khawf mā fī khawf
al- ḥajr ṣār kalāshinkūf
yā dunyā ṭullī wa- yā bashar shūfī
wa- ḥijārnā aqwā min kalāshnīkūf
waqt al- taḥaddī mā ʿanā khawf
wa- illī yaʿādīnā yaṣbaḥ majnūnā
“Al- Murabaʿ”
music: Folklore
lyrics: Unknown, collected by Nimr Sirhan
yā ḥijāra yā ḥijāra
iwʿaī tarūḥī min al- ḥāra
anā wayāk rabaynā mithl al- baḥar wa- baḥāra
“Jay al- Hamam” [Here come the doves]
music: Sabreen
lyrics: Hussein Barghouti
akalak jarāda mighammasa binuqṭat ʿasal
libsak khaysh wa- wabar jimāl
naʿalak shūk wa- darbak shūk zuhūrhu qilāl
yā qamar ʿa ḥudūd
yā nabī maṭrūd
wa- ṣawtahu bi- yandahu fī al- barārī
wassaʿū al- ṭuruqāt li- l- ghazlān al- maḥabba wa- l- salām





thalāthīn najma taḍwī ʿalā Wadi al- Saru
thalāthīn najma taḍwī
qalbī kahaf maftūḥ
law tafham al- ḥilwa
innahu al- qamar majrūḥ
bas al- amal quwwa
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thalāthīn najma tahwī ʿalā Wadi al- Saru
thalāthīn najma tahwī
naṣ al- ʿamar bihuwī ʿalā Wadi al- Saru
nuṣ al- ʿumr yahwī
wa- taghayyarat al- ayām





marrāt bamshī li- ḥālī bi- nuṣ al- layl
wa- l- layl mithl al- nahār
wa- iydī fī jaybī yā baṣaffar yā badakhkhan
hayk min kuthr al- qahar
kul al- madīna misakkara fishshi ḥadā
ghayr al- faḍā wa- l- jaysh
bawaqaf ʿaḥada al- sūr
dhaqnī ʿa iydī
bawaqaf wa- fakkar kayf?
kul al- layl ẓal min al- ʿumr khalqit shahr
wa- anā māshī yā baṣaffar yā badakhkhan
hayk min kuthr al- qahar
Chapter 5
“Al- Hilm al- ʿArabi” [The Arab dream]
music: Hilmi Bakr
lyrics: Hilmi Bakr
min ay makān fī al- arḍ
nāṭiq bi- lisān al- ḍād
wa- bi- aʿlā al- ṣawt wa- l- nabḍ
bi- naqūl al- wiḥda mīlād
aṭfālnā fī kul makān
ḍayy ʿuyūn al- awṭān
al- ḥaq al- ḥub al- khayr
risālitnā fī kul zamān
wa- l- ghinwā bi- talghī ḥudūd
wa- waṭanhā huwwa al- qalb
wa- mā dām ʿāyshīn ḥanghannī
wa- mā dām qādrīn hanhib
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ḥilmnā wa- fī kul zamān
wiḥdat kul al- awṭān
kul al- khilāfāt hatzūl
wa- kifāya innak insān
“Al- Quds Hatarjaʿ Lina” [Jerusalem will return to us]
music: Riyad al- Hamshra
lyrics: Dr. Madhath al- ʿAdl
kān shāyil alwānhu kān rāyiḥ madrasathu
wa- bi- yaḥlam bi- ḥiṣānhu wa- bi- laʿbhu wa- ṭayyārathu
wa- lammā anṭalaq al- ghadr wa- mawt ḥatā barāʾthu
sāl al- dam al- ṭāhir ʿalā karāsathu
ab wa- mad bi- khawfhu iydayhu
yaḥmī biʿumrhu ḍānhu
wa- lammā irtaʿash al- jasad al- ṭifal
wa- baqā fī iydayn Allah
kulnā bi- naqūl arḍinā
arḍinā damnā ‘umrinā
wa- inn māt malāyīn mininā
al- Quds hatarjaʿ linā
“Min Rahim al- Ard” [From the womb of the earth]
music: Saud Shalash and Abdalfatah Aʿyunat
lyrics: Jamal al- Khatib and Saud Shalash
min raḥim al- arḍ inhaḍ qātil bi- ḥajāra
khallī ha al- arḍ al- ghaḍbāna tuwallid aḥrār
tuwallid sawāʿid tataḥaddā jaysh al- muḥtal
lā hāma dhallat lā wa- Allah
wa- lā shaʿbī mal
iṭlaʿ min ḥāra li- ḥāra ʿalimhum ḍarb al- ḥijāra
min mukhayyam li- mukhayyam ṭallit al- sibāʿ
ḥāmil bi- iydhu nabbāḍa ḥāmil miqlāʿ
bi- l- iyd al- yummnā irfaʿ rāya
bi- shimālak maʿa ahl al- ḥāra
iḍrab bi- ḥijāra iṣlīhum nār
iṭlaʿ wa- taḥadā bijadāra dam al- shuhadāʾ mish khasāra
min madīna li- madīna wiḥdit aḥrār
min al- may li- l- may irfaʿ shaʿār
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“Sadayna al- Shawariʿ” [We blocked the streets]
music: Saud Shalash and Abdalfatah Aʿyunat
lyrics: Jamal al- Khatib and Saud Shalash
sadaynā al- shawāriʿ mā nasīnā ʿayshitnā fī al- khiyām
kīs ṭaḥīn wa- sardīnā fī al- ghurba kunā nanām
fakarūnā nasīnā min al- khayma ṭalaʿnā zlām
wa- l- ʿilm naḥnā asiyādhu wa- bi- tashhad al- anām
sadaynā ha- l- shawāriʿ wa- ṭalaʿnā narmī kart al- tamwīn
shilnā al- barūd sirnā wa- aʿalannā lā lā li- l- ṭawṭīn
law aʿaṭaytūnā al- dunyā bi- kunūz wa- malāyīn
mā tisāwī ḥabbat ramla min turābik filasṭīn
sadaynā al- shawāriʿ wa- aʿalannā wa- aʿalannā kabīr wa- ṣaghīr
ḥaq al- ʿawda bilādī maʿa taqrīr al- maṣīr
Chapter 6
“ Aʿla Jidaʿ al- Zaytuna” [On the trunk of the olive tree]
music: Kamal Khalil
lyrics: Tawfiq al- Ziyad
li- annī lā aḥīk al- ṣawf
li- annī kul yawm ʿarḍa lā wa- imar al- tawqīf
wa- baytī ʿarḍa li- zīryāra al- būlīs
li- l- taftīsh wa- li- tanẓīf
li- annī ʿajaz ashtarī warqa
saḥfar kul mā alqā
wa- aḥfur kul asrārī
ʿalā zaytūna fī sāḥat al- dār
saḥfar qiṣṣatī wa- fuṣūl ma’sātī
wa- āhātī
ʿalā biyārtī wa- qubūr amwātī
wa- aḥfur
kul mar dhaqathu
yamḥūhu ʿashr ḥalāwa al- atī
saḥfur raqam kul qasīma
min arḍinā sulibat
wa- mawqaʿ qariyatī wa- ḥudūdhā
wa- buyūt ahlīhā allatī nusifat
wa- ashjārī allatī uqtuliʿat
wa- kul zahra bariya suḥiqat
wa- asmāʾ alladhīn tafānnū
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fī lawk aʿṣābī wa- ataʿāsī
wa- asmāʾ al- sujūn
wa- naw‘ kul kalabsha
shaddat ʿalā kaffī
wa- dūsīhāt ḥadāsī




wa- kul marāḥil al- nakba
min al- ḥabba ilā al- qubba
ʿalā zaytūna fī sāḥat al- dār




hadhā al- waṭan li- l- nās wa- iḥnā ʿazwithu
mā yarfaʿ al- ra’s al- amjadhu wa- ʿazzithu
wa- l- dam aysh al- dam law kān inḥabas
wa- mā kān mahrhu fī al- ḥurūb wa- muhrithu
yā ʿuyūn ummī bi- l- faraḥ lā tadmaʿī
aḥlā al- shabāb hiya illī bi- taḥārab maʿaī
damī badhar laḥn al- karāma itsammaʿī
arḍ al- quds shamsī wa- kaffak manbaʿī
hillī bizaghrūdhu wa- qamar
wa- ghanīlhu yā aḥlā al- mudun
Aḥmad ʿalā al- mawt intaṣar
mā azhā shamsak yā waṭan
warda li- kul ṣaghīr fī arḍ al- karak
li- l- shaykh wa- l- umm illī qālat yā malak
hadhī al- arḍ aʿṭat wa- rāḥ taʿtī wa- ajat tistaqbilak
mīn shāf ṭifl ṣaghīr wadaʿ mīmmithu
wa- kān al- qamar yaghafā ʿa ṭallit ghurthu
wa- l- ward ṭālaʿ min silāḥa wa- juʿbithu
hadhi filasṭīnak illak, hīya illak
mithl al- ṭifūla wa- ṣadr immak
wa- l- karak hiya illak
hadhi filasṭīnak illak
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lalī bi- yarfaʿ rāyatak
wa- yamsaḥ ghubār al- layl ʿan martīnatak
hallī bizaghrūdhu wa- qamar
“Laya wa Laya”
music: Folklore
lyrics: Adaptation by Kamal Khalil and Ibrahim Nasrallah
laya wa- laya yā binaya
ḍāq al- sijin ʿalayya
saddū dūrub bilādī
min al- maī li- l- maī
wasaʿū al- ḥad al- ghurbī
biddī asrī li- arḍī
wa- shīlū al- lagham min darbī
wa- dabāba al- amrīkiya
wasaʿū hā al- zinzāna
yāfā bi- ṣadrī sahrāna
wa- zaytūnatnā al- ʿaṭshāna
bidhā tishrab ḥurrīya
wasaʿū lihā al- manfā
biddha tatanaffas Hayfa
wa- ḥatā hā al- layla taṣfā
bi- raṣāṣ al- fidāʾī
wasaʿū al- ḥūṭa wa- ghannū
hā al- ʿurs iḥnā minhu
kayf bi- nastaghnī ʿanhu wa- huwwa al- rūḥ al- shaʿbiya
hā al- jaraḥ ilū ḥurūfa
umm al- shahīd tashūfa
wa- tizaghrad yā allah ṭūfū




lyrics: Tawfiq al- Ziyad
dawla dawla dawla (dawla)
dawlat al- bāʿū arḍī (dawla)
dawlat al- hatkū arḍī (dawla)
dawla dawla dawla, yā ʿuyūnī
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dawlat al- bāʿū arḍī (dawla)
dawlat al- hatkū arḍī (dawla)
dawlat al- bāʿū al- nafṭ al- ʿarabī wa- sharabū fīhu kūkākūlā
rakabū ʿalā al- saraj (dawla)
maddūhā ʿal- kharaj (dawla)
qālū ikhras lā tatanaffas ʿalashān amn al- dawla
wa- allah wa- zawadtūhā (dawla)
wa- allah wa- takhantūhā (dawla)
kathr al- shad biyakhī al- ḥabl tawqaʿ ʿa- ra’s al- dawla
Chapter 8
“Unadikum” [The nation calls out to you]
music: Ahmad Qaʿbour
lyrics: Tawfiq al- Ziyad, as performed by Ahmad Qaʿbour
unādīkum
ashhad ʿalā ayādīkum
abūs al- arḍ taḥt niʿālkum
wa- aqūl afdīkum
wa- ahdīkum ḍayāʾ ʿaynī




“Gharib fi Biladi!” [Stranger in my own country!]
music and lyrics: Ran “Magic” Harush, Ori Shohat, Tamer Nafar, Mah-
moud Jrere, Suhell Nafar, Abir al- Zinati
maktūb līnā naḍalnā qurāb ʿalā arḍnā
baʿād min waṭannā
mīn yahimmhu humnā? mawt baṭīʾ yajrī bi- damnā
ḥākamnā hakam ṣahyūnī dīmūqrāṭī!
dīmūqrāṭī li- l- nafs al- ṣahyūniya wa- ṣahyūnī li- l- nafs al- ʿarabiya
yaʿnī al- mamnūʿ ilhu mamnūʿ ilī
al- masmūḥ ilhu mamnūʿ ilī
wa- l- masmūḥ makrūh ilī
li- annhu yankur kiyānī maḥā
wa- mādhāl yamḥī al- wānī, tārīkh nāsī ajdādī
yaghsil dimāgh wa- li- ādī illī ṭūʿā
ʿalā ḥāḍr mā yamthalhā, al- jansīya al- zarqa nablahā
wa- tashrab mayithā taqalnā iḥnā min al- shaʿb
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wa- l- shaʿb yaḥsasnā innhu iḥnā gharīb
anā? gharīb fī bilādī!
thalāth ʿashara shahīd al- qadar qarīb
lemmā al- ḥajar bi- l- ayīd thalāth ʿashara shahīd
Aʿlā waṭannā Aʿymād waṭannā
aktūbir al- aswad athbat innhu al- Ayād bi- damnā
idhā al- kul fīhum Walīd taḥt al- iḥtilāl
kayf mish Rāmī al- māḍī bil rāmī ḥālhu ka- l- sayf al- māḍī
yaʿārak salāḥ al- ḥasab damnā mī
yaqtil al- ṣawt al- maṣlaḥ bi- raṣāṣa al- ḥay
wa- damaʿat al- umm taṣīḥ anā asīl ʿakhad ʿarab
Maḥammad wa- l- masīḥ yā jabal mā ya hizzanā rīḥ
niḍāl Ramz al- qawmīya Wisām al- ḥurrīya
shuʿlat ajdādnā minawwara al- rūḥ al- shabābiya
anā gharīb bi- bilādī
lakin Aḥmad rabī annī mutamassik bi- turāthī
nādūnī khāyin ʿarab al- dākhil al- thamānīya wa- arbaʿīn
wa- iydak ʿarāsak iḥnā jidhūr filasṭīn li- ṭūl al- ʿUmar
narabā bi- faqar wa- faqar yirabbī ʿuqūlnā
lakin taḥīyā qulūbnā illī taḥīya jidhūrnā
illī yinādūnā khawanā? lā lā lā lā!
anā mā hunta fī waṭanī masī’ shaʿbī katabat lī qadarī
innahu al- ʿālam al- yawm yiʿāmilnā isrāʾīlīyīn
wa- isrāʾīl li- bukra taʿāmilnā filasṭīniyīn
gharīb fī bilādī
“Posh’im Ḥafim Mi’pesha” [Hebrew: Innocent criminals]
music and lyrics: Tamer Nafar, Suhell Nafar, and Mahmoud Jrere
ha’miut pote’aḥ pe yo tn, Joker
ha’raperim haʿaravim haʿrishonim
atem omrim she’haʿaravim primitivim
omrim she’haʿaravim agresivim
omrim she’anaḥnu posh’im ve’barbarim
anaḥnu lo
aval be’mikre she’anaḥnu ken, ze ma she’ha’memshala asta meitanu, yo
lifnei she’ata kolet oti
lifnei she’ata shofet oti
lifnei she’ata margish oti
lifnei she’ata ma’anish oti
kanes li ba’na’alaim ve’iḥav le’ḥa ba’raglaim
ki anaḥnu posh’im – posh’im ḥafim mi’pesha
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eifo ha’shivion she’ani gar be’paḥon ve’hu be’savion
kshe’lo mazkirim oti ba’himnon
erets le’nefesh yehudia, ve’ha’aravi keilu lo haya ve’lo nivra eifo ha’shalom
ein shalom u’kshein shalom, yesh maḥsom le’kol ḥalom
“Min Irhabi?” [Who’s the terrorist?]
music and lyrics: Tamer Nafar, Suhell Nafar, Mahmoud Jrere
mīn irhābī? anā irhābī?
kayf irhābī wa- anā ʿāyish fī bilādī?
mīn irhābī? anta irhābī?
mā kalmī wa- anā ʿāyish fī bilādī
qātilnī zay mā qatalt ajdādī
atijih li- l- qānūn? ʿa- l- qāḍī mā anta yā ʿadū
bi- tal‘ab dawr al- shāhid al- muḥāmī wa- l- qāḍī
ʿalā qāḍī bi- nihāyatī bādī
min kuthr mā ightaṣabtū al- nafs al- ʿarabiya
ḥabalat waladat walad ismhu ʿamalīya infijāriya
wa- hayn nādaytūnā irhābīya
anā mish ḍid al- salām, al- salām ḍidī
ʿalā baddū yaqḍī, turāthī baddū yamḥī
wa- illī bi- yaḥkī kalima bi- shad warā’ hamma bakūn zalama
bi- taʿmilū minhu rimma
wa- mīn antū? lissā mtā kabartū?
itṭalʿ aū qadaysh qataltū wa- qadaysh yatamtū
ummiyātnā bi- yabakū abiyātnā bi- yashkū
arāḍīnā bakhtafū anā ba’alkum mīn antū
anta kabarta bi- dalaʿ iḥnā kabarnā bi- faqr
mīn kabara fī wasaʿ? wa- mīn kabara fi juḥr?
ṣār fidāʾī, ʿamaltū minhu ijrāmī
wa- anta yā irhābī bi- tinādīnī irhābī
yaʿnī ḍarbatnī wa- bakayt sabaqatnī wa- iashtakīt
lammā dhakratak annak badīt naṭīt wa- ḥakīt
mānatū bi- tikhlū awlād ṣaghār yarmū ḥajār
malhumash ahl yaḍabūhum fī al- dār?
kanū nasīt abū salāhak ḍab al- ahl taḥt al- ḥajār?
wa- halā lammā wajʿaī thār bi- tnādīnī irhābī?
mīn irhābī? anā irhābī?
kayf irhābī wa- anā ʿāyish fī bilādī?
mīn irhābī? anta irhābī?




music and lyrics: Tamer Nafar, Suhell Nafar, Mahmoud Jrere
baḥkī waynaku? Ramallah!
wa- wayn manrūḥ? Ramallah!
wa- mīn maʿaku? Ramallah!
“Sajjil Ana Aʿrabi” [Record I am Arab]
poetry: Mahmoud Darwish
sajjil anā ʿarabī
wa- raqam biṭāqatī khamsūn alf
wa- aṭfālī thamānīya
wa- tāsaʿahum saya’tī ba dʿ ṣayf
fa- hal taghḍab?
sajjil anā ʿarabī
wa- ʿamal maʿa rifāq al- kadaḥ fī maḥjar
wa- aṭfālī thamānīya
as’al lahum raghīf al- khubz wa- l- athwāb wa- l- daftar min al- ṣakhr
wa- lā atwassal al- ṣadqāt min bābak
wa- lā aṣghar amām balāṭ aʿtābak
fa- hal taghḍab?
sajjil anā ʿarabī
salabt karūm ajdādī wa- arḍan kuntu aflaḥhā
anā wa- jamīʿ awlādī
fa- lam tatruk lanā wa- li- kul aḥfādī
siwā hadhī al- ṣikhūr
fa- hal satākhudhhā ḥukūmatkum kamā qīlan
sajjil bi- ra’s al- ṣafḥa al- ūlā
anā lā akrah al- nās wa- anā lā asṭū ʿalā aḥad
wa- lakinnī idhā mā juʿt akul laḥm mughtaṣabī
ḥadhār ḥadhār min jūʿī wa- min ghaḍabī
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used as a political tactic to gain public support, commemorate public or religious 
holidays, or otherwise present an image of benevolence and clemency to the people.
13. Queen Noor’s autobiography describes the king’s initial reaction as one of 
anger and frustration that he was not included in the negotiations; see Queen Noor, 
Leap of Faith, 361. Likewise a former advisor to King Hussein, Adnan Abu-Odeh, 
documents the king’s initial surprise and frustration upon learning of the negotia-
tions; see Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East 
Peace Process, 234.
14. Ibid., 235.
15. Hass, Drinking the Sea.
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16. Al- Rai (Amman), May 5, 2004.
17. Jordan Times (Amman), February 7–8, 2003.
18. Two of the most prominent collections of Palestinian poetry to have published 
Ibrahim Nasrallah’s work are Jayyusi, Modern Arabic Poetry; and Elmessiri, “The 
Palestinian Wedding.”
19. [http://purl.dlib.indiana.edu/iudl/eviada/14- A4295]
20. It is worth noting that the salutation Allah ma cʿhūm was spoken in a notice-
ably distinct Palestinian dialect emphasizing the ch sound instead of the classically 
pronounced Allah maʿkūm. Her use of a distinctly rural Palestinian dialect is signifi-
cant in that it caused Kamal to instinctively respond to her in the same style accent. 
In its linguistic code switching, their brief yet heartfelt exchange was itself a perfor-
mance of Palestinian nationalism.
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1. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel (Jerusalem: Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 2001).
2. For an interesting social history of Lyd and the relationship between its inhabi-
tants and the Israeli state, see Yacobi, “From Urban Panopticism to Spatial Protest.”
3. Official crime statistics from Lyd at this time are difficult to obtain; however, 
several articles in Israeli newspapers have documented the problems of drug addic-
tion and drug- related crime in Lyd. For this, see Ori Nir and Lily Galili, “The Jews 
Can Leave but the Arabs Have Nowhere to Go,” Ha’aretz (Jerusalem), December 3, 
2000.
4. Stein and Swedenburg, “Popular Culture, Relational History, and the Question 
of Power in Palestine and Israel.”
5. Bennett et al., Popular Culture and Social Relations.
6. The literature on Palestinians in Israel is extensive. Regarding issues of religion 
and citizenship in the Israeli legal system, see Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs 
in Israel, 77–98; and U. Davis, Israel: An Apartheid State, 13–74. In addition there are 
important contributions to the literature on Palestinians in Israel by Rouhana, Pal-
estinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State; and Rouhana and Ghanem, “The Crisis of 
Minorities in Ethnic States,” 321–46. A fascinating edited collection of essays on Pal-
estinian politics in Israel in the post- October 2000 context was published under the 
editorship of Alexander Bligh in The Israeli Palestinians. Most recently these issues 
were the subject of investigation in an volume edited by Daniel Monterescu and Dan 
Rabinowitz, Mixed Towns, Trapped Communities.
7. Kanaaneh, Birthing the Nation, 9–22. In her analysis Kanaaneh speaks of the 
“demographic demon” presented by higher birth rates among Palestinians than Jews 
in Israel.
8. The terms Palestinians of ’48 or Israeli Arabs have their own histories as well as 
political underpinnings. While it is beyond the scope of this book to engage in the 
debate as to which is the more appropriate appellation, who benefits from such a 
name, and who has the power to decide, I have chosen to use Palestinians of ’48 or 
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Palestinian Israelis simply because these are the most popular way the subjects of 
this chapter represented themselves to me, and have asked to be represented.
9. Smooha, “The Advances and Limits of the Israelization of Israel’s Palestinian 
Citizens,” 16; The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel; and 
“Ethnic Democracy.” It should be mentioned that these data were collected in the 
period directly following the peace process, or during the post- Oslo honeymoon, as 
it is often called. Thus these data represent a particular historical moment in Pales-
tinian society characterized by optimism and the hope for peace. No such data are 
available on the general beliefs and attitudes of the Palestinian Israeli population 
since the beginning of the al- Aqsa intifada. Nevertheless it is safe to assume that 
political and cultural engagement as a result of the intifada would greatly affect data 
collected in the present day.




13. Rouhana, Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State.
14. For many, the term Israeli Arab refers to origins in and attachments to the “out-
side” Arab world. Such a play in meanings serves to deny the uninterrupted link these 
people have with their homes in Israel and at the same time refashions their native 
origins in Israel as rooted in the “outside” Arab world. In state discourse this is a deft 
way of turning an indigenous native population into a “foreign outside other.”
15. Smooha, “The Advances and Limits of the Israelization of Israel’s Palestinian 
Citizens,” 20.
16. Channels of Rage, produced and directed by Anat Halachmi, 96 min., 2004, 
dvd; Slingshot Hip- Hop, produced and directed by Jacqueline Salloum, 2005, dvd; 
Checkpoint Rock: Songs from Palestine, produced and directed by Javier Corcuera 
and Fermin Muguruza, 2009, dvd.
17. Walid Batrawi, “Arab Israeli Band Performs to Tell a People’s Story,” Inter Press 
Service, May 25, 2004.
18. In different online news articles written about dam, there are conflicting ac-
counts as to the meaning of the group’s name. In some instances dam means only 
blood, or only immortality, or only “Da Arabic mcs.” There are also articles that state 
that there is no meaning to the word at all. This particular account, which includes 
the juxtaposition of all three meanings, was given to me by Suheil Nafar in an inter-
view in summer 2005.
19. Blag Magazine, “Creative Environments” (joint interview of Dave Watts by 
Tamer Nafar, 2004). This quotation was originally written by Tamer Nafar in a thick 
urban dialect. For ease of reading I have changed many of his spellings.
20. Naji al- Ali is the famed political cartoonist noted for his criticism of Israel in 
his works. He drew well over four hundred thousand cartoons, many of which were 
harshly critical of Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab political leaders.
21. Marius Schattner, “Violence with Israel Further Isolates Arab Minority,” 
Agence France Presse (Paris), October 2, 2000.
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22. Ibid.
23. Ha’aretz (Jerusalem), November 12, 2000; bbc (London), October 11, 2000; 
Guardian (London), October 6, 2000.
24. On September 15, 2005, the police investigations department concluded its in-
quiry into the deaths of the twelve Israeli and one Palestinian victims of Black Octo-
ber. Its conclusion was that the killings were not a crime and that no charges would 
be brought against police responsible for the deaths. Throughout the investigation 
the commission was highly criticized for its handling of the situation. See, for ex-
ample, Yoav Stern, “Arab Victim Families: Review of Oct. Probe ‘Stinking Maneu-
ver,’” Ha’aretz (Jerusalem), September 29, 2005.
25. Deborah Camiel, “tn Don’t Stand for Tennessee No Mo’: It Stands for Tamer 
Nafar,” Reuters, November 20, 2000.
26. Ibid.
27. This translation was the result of collaboration between the author and dam. 
I have made every effort to provide a clear translation that maintains and preserves 
the artists’ preferences for certain words and phrases. In this example I would not 
have translated khā iʾn as renegade. I felt that their intent was more “traitor.” However 
dam were clear in their wish that this word be translated as renegade. They felt that 
renegade had more of an urban hip- hop connotation and better matched their origi-
nal inspiration.
28. Here it is worth noting the phenomenal documentary by Anat Halachmi, 
Channels of Rage (2004). This powerful movie chronicles the lives and careers of 
both Subliminal and Tamer Nafar, beginning with their early friendship as fellow 
rap artists and their eventual split as each grew more and more politicized.
29. Tamer Nafar stated this to me in one of our first interviews. Aviv Gefen stated 
in an interview with the Jerusalem Report, dated May 5, 2003, that twelve thousand 
people had downloaded the song from his ynet website.
30. Avidan, “Peaceful Rage,” Jerusalem Report (Jerusalem), May 5, 2003, 43.
31. These comments were a part of a nationally televised interview on the Israeli 
program Entertainment Tonight shortly after the video for “Innocent Criminals” was 
broadcast.
32. Avidan, “Peaceful Rage,” Jerusalem Report (Jerusalem), May 5, 2003, 43.
33. Ibid.
34. A copy of this interview was given to me by the artists and was also included 
in Anat Halachmi’s Channels of Rage (2004).
35. A fascinating example of how the discourse of terrorism has been played out 
in Israeli society is how in September 2005 an off- duty Israeli soldier murdered four 
Palestinians on a bus in Shfaram. Although Prime Minister Ariel Sharon described 
the murders as “a despicable act by a blood thirsty terrorist,” the victims’ families 
were denied state assistance because the state ministry recognizes terrorism only 
as committed by “organizations hostile to Israel.” See, for example, Chris McGeal, 
“Jewish Gunman Was No Terrorist, Israel Rules,” Guardian Unlimited (London), 
September 1, 2005.
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Chapter 9
1. Notice the use of “us” for Palestinians under occupation, as opposed to the 
“them” for Palestinians living as Israeli citizens. One group has rights within the 
nation- state; the other is under occupation from a foreign government. Many in 
Ramallah were quick to label Palestinians of ’48 as non- Palestinian based on their 
enfranchisement in Israeli society, a position that many Palestinians Israelis would 
disagree with.
2. This slogan is found in varying forms throughout the Palestinian world. Usually 
the last word of the phrase, the “thing” for which people will sacrifice themselves, is 
variable. The use of Arafat as the subject of their loyalty is common but not as wide-
spread as the more general “Palestine.”
3. Given that there is no “p” sound in Arabic, words with the letter p such as pizza 
and Pepsi become bīzza and Babsī. Here rap music becomes rāb in dialect.
4. McDonald, “Poetics and the Performance of Violence in Israel/Palestine,” 
72–78.
5. In certain public situations a Palestinian in Israel is almost guaranteed to be 
asked to present his or her identity card. Boarding buses; entering bus stations, res-
taurants, and shopping malls; and walking through public squares and plazas are all 
instances where Palestinians are requested to stand aside and be searched or ques-
tioned. In one particularly telling moment a Palestinian friend was commanded to 
sit on the curb and show his identity card because we were speaking Arabic in a Jew-
ish neighborhood. After a very tense twenty minutes of waiting and arguing with the 
Israeli soldier we were allowed to continue on. As we walked away from the scene, 
my friend turned to me and said that if I wanted to continue working with him I 
should learn to speak better Hebrew.
6. Knauft, Genealogies for the Present in Cultural Anthropology, 166.




11. Mahmoud Darwish, “Identity Card” (1964), unpublished poem.
12. Stein and Swedenburg, “Popular Culture, Relational History, and the Question 
of Power in Palestine and Israel”; Taraki, Living Palestine: Family Survival, Resis-
tance, and Mobility under Occupation.
13. Greenberg, “The King of the Streets: Hip- Hop and the Reclaiming of Mascu-
linity in Jerusalem’s Shuʿafat Refugee Camp.”
14. Collard, “dam of Lod,” Rolling Stone, January 2012.
Epilogue
1. See Laclau and Zac, “Minding the Gap.”
2. I gratefully borrow this concept and its imagery from Judith Butler, Bodies That 
Matter.
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